Impact

The dynamic file upload feature is subject to potential XSS attach in case the attacker manages to modify the file names of the records being uploaded to the server.

This appears in sections where the user controls the file upload dialogs themselves and has the technical knowledge to change the file names through the dynamic upload endpoint. Therefore I believe it would require the attacker to control the whole session of the particular user but in any case, this needs to be fixed.

Successful exploit of this vulneratibility would require the user to have successfully uploaded a file blob to the server with a malicious file name and then have the possibility to direct the other user to the edit page of the record where the attachment is attached.

The users are able to craft the direct upload requests themselves controlling the file name that gets stored to the database as shown here: https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/a967d355c6fee9ad9b8bd115d43bc8b0fc207e7e/activestorage/app/controllers/active_storage/direct_uploads_controller.rb#L14

The attacker is able to change the filename e.g. to <svg onload=alert('XSS')> if they know how to craft these requests themselves. And then enter the returned blob ID to the form inputs manually by modifying the edit page source.

Therefore, anywhere we display these strings, we should properly escape them.

Patches

PR #11612 fixes this problem both for 0.28.dev and 0.27.x.

Workarounds

Disable dynamic uploads for the instance, e.g. from proposals.

References

OWASP ASVS v4.0.3-5.1.3

Credits

This issue was discovered in City of Helsinki's security audit against Decidim 0.27 done during September 2023. The security audit was implemented by Deloitte Finland.

Impact

The invites feature allows users to accept the invitation for an unlimited amount of time through the password reset functionality.

When using the password reset functionality, the devise_invitable gem always accepts the pending invitation if the user has been invited as shown in this piece of code within the devise_invitable gem: https://github.com/scambra/devise_invitable/blob/41f58970ff76fb64382a9b9ea1bd530f7c3adab2/lib/devise_invitable/models.rb#L198

The only check done here is if the user has been invited but the code does not ensure that the pending invitation is still valid as defined by the invite_for expiry period as explained in the gem's documentation: https://github.com/scambra/devise_invitable#model-configuration-

invite_for: The period the generated invitation token is valid. After this period, the invited resource won’t be able to accept the invitation. When invite_for is 0 (the default), the invitation won’t expire.

Decidim sets this configuration to 2.weeks so this configuration should be respected: https://github.com/decidim/decidim/blob/d2d390578050772d1bdb6d731395f1afc39dcbfc/decidim-core/config/initializers/devise.rb#L134

The bug is in the devise_invitable gem and should be fixed there and the dependency should be upgraded in Decidim once the fix becomes available.

Patches

Update devise_invitable to version 2.0.9 or above by running the following command:

$ bundle update devise_invitable

Workarounds

The invitations can be cancelled directly from the database by running the following command from the Rails console:

> Decidim::User.invitation_not_accepted.update_all(invitation_token: nil)

References

OWASP ASVS V4.0.3-2.3.1

This bug has existed in the devise_invitable gem since this commit which was first included in the v0.4.rc3 release of this gem: https://github.com/scambra/devise_invitable/commit/94d859c7de0829bf63f679ae5dd3cab2b866a098

All versions since then are affected.

This gem was first introduced at its version ~> 1.7.0 to the decidim-admin gem in this commit which was first included in the v0.0.1.alpha3 release of Decidim: https://github.com/decidim/decidim/commit/073e60e2e4224dd81815a784002ebba30f2ebb34

It was first introduced at its version ~> 1.7.0 to the decidim-system gem in this commit which was also first included in the v0.0.1.alpha3 release of Decidim: https://github.com/decidim/decidim/commit/b12800717a689c295a9ea680a38ca9f823d2c454

Credits

This issue was discovered in City of Helsinki's security audit against Decidim 0.27 done during September 2023. The security audit was implemented by Deloitte Finland.