dash 2.12.0 → 3.0.1

data/lib/kamal/configuration/validator/proxy.rb

@@ -3,9 +3,14 @@ class Kamal::Configuration::Validator::Proxy < Kamal::Configuration::Validator
     unless config.nil?
       super
 
-      # Skip SSL host validation when a loadbalancer is present
-      # since SSL is disabled when using a loadbalancer
-      if config["host"].blank? && config["hosts"].blank? && config["ssl"] && config["loadbalancer"].blank?
+      # Skip SSL host validation when a loadbalancer is present (SSL is
+      # disabled when using a loadbalancer) or when a ssl_domains source
+      # provides the hostnames at runtime.
+      # On-demand TLS joins loadbalancer and ssl_domains as a source of hostnames
+      # that only exist at handshake time - demanding a static host here would
+      # reject the one shape kamal-proxy requires for it.
+      if config["host"].blank? && config["hosts"].blank? && config["ssl"] && config["loadbalancer"].blank? &&
+         config.dig("ssl_domains", "source").blank? && ssl_config["on_demand_url"].blank?
         error "Must set a host to enable automatic SSL"
       end
 
@@ -13,19 +18,41 @@ class Kamal::Configuration::Validator::Proxy < Kamal::Configuration::Validator
         error "Specify one of 'host' or 'hosts', not both"
       end
 
+      if config.key?("loadbalancer")
+        validate_loadbalancer! config["loadbalancer"]
+      end
+
       if config["ssl"].is_a?(Hash)
-        if config["ssl"]["certificate_pem"].present? && config["ssl"]["private_key_pem"].blank?
-          error "Missing private_key_pem setting (required when certificate_pem is present)"
-        end
+        validate_ssl_hash! config["ssl"]
+      end
 
-        if config["ssl"]["private_key_pem"].present? && config["ssl"]["certificate_pem"].blank?
-          error "Missing certificate_pem setting (required when private_key_pem is present)"
-        end
+      # Truthiness, not present? — an empty hash must still fail the
+      # "Missing source" check rather than silently disable the feature.
+      if config["ssl_domains"]
+        validate_ssl_domains! config["ssl_domains"]
       end
 
+      if config["basic_auth"].is_a?(Hash)
+        validate_basic_auth! config["basic_auth"]
+      end
+
+      if config["cache"].is_a?(Hash)
+        validate_cache! config["cache"]
+      end
+
+      if config["compress"].is_a?(Hash)
+        validate_compress! config["compress"]
+      end
+
+      validate_access_control!
+      validate_traffic_shaping!
+      validate_canonical_host!
+      validate_lifecycle!
+      validate_tuning!
+
       if run_config = config["run"]
         if run_config["bind_ips"].present?
-          ensure_valid_bind_ips(config["bind_ips"])
+          ensure_valid_bind_ips(run_config["bind_ips"])
         end
 
         if run_config["publish"] == false
@@ -33,11 +60,597 @@ class Kamal::Configuration::Validator::Proxy < Kamal::Configuration::Validator
             error "Cannot set http_port, https_port or bind_ips when publish is false"
           end
         end
+
+        if run_config["acme"].is_a?(Hash)
+          validate_acme! run_config["acme"]
+        end
+
+        if run_config["cache"].is_a?(Hash)
+          validate_cache_store! run_config["cache"]
+        end
+
+        validate_run_server_options! run_config
       end
     end
   end
 
   private
+    # `true` picks the primary role's first host, `false` opts out of the
+    # auto-activation that kicks in for a multi-host primary role, and a string
+    # names the host to run the load balancer on — which may be a dedicated host
+    # outside `servers:`, so we only check its shape.
+    def validate_loadbalancer!(loadbalancer)
+      with_context("loadbalancer") do
+        return if loadbalancer == true || loadbalancer == false
+
+        unless loadbalancer.is_a?(String) && loadbalancer.present? && !loadbalancer.match?(/[\s,]/)
+          error "should be true, false, or a single host"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def validate_ssl_domains!(ssl_domains)
+      with_context("ssl_domains") do
+        source = ssl_domains["source"]
+
+        if source.blank?
+          error "Missing source setting (required when ssl_domains is set)"
+        elsif !valid_ssl_domains_source?(source)
+          error "source must be a path starting with '/' or an http(s) URL"
+        end
+
+        if (interval = ssl_domains["interval"]) && (!interval.is_a?(Integer) || interval < 1)
+          error "interval must be a positive integer"
+        end
+
+        if (batch_size = ssl_domains["batch_size"]) && (!batch_size.is_a?(Integer) || !batch_size.between?(1, 25))
+          error "batch_size must be an integer between 1 and 25"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # kamal-proxy only logs a warning for a DNS provider it does not recognise
+    # and then carries on with no provider at all, so the symptom is a
+    # certificate that never issues rather than a failed boot. Catch it here,
+    # before any host is contacted.
+    def validate_acme!(acme)
+      with_context("run") do
+        with_context("acme") do
+          if acme["email"].blank?
+            error "Missing email setting (required when acme is set)"
+          end
+
+          provider = acme["dns_provider"]
+
+          if provider.present? && !Kamal::Configuration::Proxy::Acme::SUPPORTED_DNS_PROVIDERS.include?(provider.to_s.downcase)
+            error "unsupported dns_provider '#{provider}'. " \
+              "Supported providers: #{Kamal::Configuration::Proxy::Acme::DNS_PROVIDERS.join(", ")}"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # The whole TLS surface lives in the one `ssl` hash: certificate material,
+    # on-demand issuance and the mTLS client CA. kamal-proxy rejects the
+    # on-demand combinations outright rather than picking a winner
+    # (ServiceOptions.Validate), so there is no precedence to document - only
+    # a deploy that would fail after the SSH round-trip. Fail here.
+    def validate_ssl_hash!(ssl)
+      with_context("ssl") do
+        if ssl["certificate_pem"].present? && ssl["private_key_pem"].blank?
+          error "Missing private_key_pem setting (required when certificate_pem is present)"
+        end
+
+        if ssl["private_key_pem"].present? && ssl["certificate_pem"].blank?
+          error "Missing certificate_pem setting (required when private_key_pem is present)"
+        end
+
+        if (on_demand_url = ssl["on_demand_url"]).present?
+          if config["host"].present? || config["hosts"].present?
+            error "cannot set on_demand_url together with host or hosts - " \
+              "on-demand TLS issues certificates for whatever hostnames the ask endpoint approves"
+          end
+
+          if ssl["certificate_pem"].present?
+            error "cannot set on_demand_url together with a custom ssl certificate"
+          end
+
+          if config.dig("ssl_domains", "source").present?
+            error "cannot set on_demand_url together with ssl_domains - " \
+              "both manage certificates for hostnames discovered at runtime, and only one can serve the handshake"
+          end
+
+          unless valid_ssl_domains_source?(on_demand_url)
+            error "on_demand_url must be a path starting with '/' or an http(s) URL"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # `ssl` may be a boolean or the hash form - the hash-only settings read
+    # through this so a bare `ssl: true` never trips a Hash dig.
+    def ssl_config
+      config["ssl"].is_a?(Hash) ? config["ssl"] : {}
+    end
+
+    REDIRECT_STATUSES = [ 301, 302, 303, 307, 308 ].freeze
+
+    # An RFC 9110 token, which is both a valid header field name and a valid
+    # cookie name. For a header, a space or a colon would also break the
+    # '<name>: <value>' encoding kamal-proxy cuts at the first colon.
+    TOKEN = /\A[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+\z/
+
+    POOL_KEYS = %w[ max_conns max_idle_conns idle_conn_timeout dial_timeout try_duration try_interval ].freeze
+
+    # A zero is meaningful for most of these, so only negatives are refused.
+    # kamal-proxy clamps them rather than failing when it reads saved state, and
+    # rejects them from a client — this is the client.
+    def validate_tuning!
+      target = config["target"] || {}
+
+      with_context("target") do
+        POOL_KEYS.each do |key|
+          error "#{key} cannot be negative" if target[key].to_f.negative?
+        end
+
+        # A retry interval paces attempts within a duration; without one there is
+        # only ever a single attempt for it to pace.
+        if target["try_interval"].present? && target["try_duration"].to_i.zero?
+          error "try_interval has no effect without try_duration"
+        end
+      end
+
+      if config["request_timeout"].to_f.negative?
+        with_context("request_timeout") { error "cannot be negative" }
+      end
+
+      # Sibling consistency: kamal-proxy clamps a negative --target-timeout as
+      # silently as a negative --request-timeout.
+      if config["response_timeout"].to_f.negative?
+        with_context("response_timeout") { error "cannot be negative" }
+      end
+
+      # Both maps reach kamal-proxy's one parsePathTimeouts, which refuses a
+      # negative duration.
+      %w[ path_response_timeouts path_request_timeouts ].each do |key|
+        with_context(key) do
+          (config[key] || {}).each do |prefix, duration|
+            error "'#{prefix}' cannot be negative" if duration.is_a?(Numeric) && duration.negative?
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # Session affinity and scale-to-zero. The one rule NOT here is that sleep
+    # needs proxy/run/docker_socket: a role can carry `sleep` while the root
+    # carries the socket, and this validator runs against the role's own proxy
+    # block before it is merged. Kamal::Configuration checks that pairing on the
+    # merged config instead.
+    def validate_lifecycle!
+      affinity = config["session_affinity"] || {}
+      sleep_config = config["sleep"] || {}
+
+      with_context("session_affinity") do
+        if affinity["cookie"].present?
+          if !affinity["enabled"]
+            error "cookie has no effect without enabled: true"
+          elsif !affinity["cookie"].to_s.match?(TOKEN)
+            # net/http drops a cookie with an invalid name when it writes the
+            # response, which looks exactly like affinity not working.
+            error "cookie '#{affinity["cookie"]}' is not a valid cookie name"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+
+      with_context("sleep") do
+        if sleep_config["after"].present?
+          error "after cannot be negative" if sleep_config["after"].to_i.negative?
+          error "wake_timeout cannot be negative" if sleep_config["wake_timeout"].to_i.negative?
+
+          if ssl_config["on_demand_url"].present?
+            error "after cannot be combined with ssl/on_demand_url - " \
+              "a sleeping target cannot answer the ask endpoint, and waking one would let any hostname start a container"
+          end
+        else
+          error "containers has no effect without after" if sleep_config["containers"].present?
+          error "wake_timeout has no effect without after" if sleep_config["wake_timeout"].present?
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # kamal-proxy rejects canonical_host + on-demand TLS after the SSH round
+    # trip (canonical redirection needs a fixed host, on-demand TLS has none),
+    # and a canonical host outside the host list redirects every request to a
+    # hostname this service does not serve.
+    def validate_canonical_host!
+      canonical_host = config["canonical_host"]
+      return if canonical_host.blank?
+
+      with_context("canonical_host") do
+        if ssl_config["on_demand_url"].present?
+          error "cannot be combined with ssl/on_demand_url - " \
+            "canonical redirection needs a fixed host, and on-demand TLS has none"
+        end
+
+        hosts = Array(config["hosts"].presence || config["host"]&.split(","))
+
+        if hosts.any? && !hosts.include?(canonical_host)
+          error "'#{canonical_host}' is not in hosts - " \
+            "every request would redirect to a hostname this service does not serve"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def validate_traffic_shaping!
+      validate_header_rules!
+      validate_path_rules! "redirects", redirect: true
+      validate_path_rules! "rewrites", redirect: false
+
+      with_context("intercept_errors") do
+        Array(config["intercept_errors"]).each do |status|
+          unless status.is_a?(Integer) && status.between?(400, 599)
+            error "#{status} must be a 4xx or 5xx status code"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def validate_header_shape!(headers)
+      validate_type! headers, Hash
+
+      with_context("headers") do
+        unknown_keys_error(headers.keys - %w[ request response ]) if (headers.keys - %w[ request response ]).any?
+
+        headers.each do |direction, rules|
+          with_context(direction) do
+            validate_type! rules, Hash
+            unknown_keys_error(rules.keys - %w[ set add remove ]) if (rules.keys - %w[ set add remove ]).any?
+
+            %w[ set add ].each { |verb| with_context(verb) { validate_hash_of! rules[verb], String } if rules.key?(verb) }
+            with_context("remove") { validate_array_of! rules["remove"], String } if rules.key?("remove")
+          end
+        end
+      end
+
+      true
+    end
+
+    def validate_header_rules!
+      headers = config["headers"] || {}
+
+      with_context("headers") do
+        %w[ request response ].each do |direction|
+          rules = headers[direction] || {}
+
+          with_context(direction) do
+            %w[ set add ].each do |verb|
+              with_context(verb) { (rules[verb] || {}).each { |name, value| validate_header_rule! direction, name, value } }
+            end
+
+            with_context("remove") { Array(rules["remove"]).each { |name| validate_header_rule! direction, name, nil } }
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def validate_header_rule!(direction, name, value)
+      unless name.to_s.match?(TOKEN)
+        return error "'#{name}' is not a valid header name"
+      end
+
+      # Go carries the request host in Request.Host rather than the header map,
+      # so kamal-proxy refuses the rule instead of silently doing nothing.
+      if direction == "request" && name.to_s.downcase == "host"
+        return error "cannot rewrite the Host header"
+      end
+
+      # Escaping would turn a newline into a literal backslash-n, so the operator
+      # would get a value they did not write, with no error. And CR/LF in a
+      # header is response splitting.
+      if value.to_s.match?(/[\r\n]/)
+        error "'#{name}' has a value containing a newline or carriage return"
+      end
+    end
+
+    # The pattern is deliberately not compiled: Go's RE2 and Ruby's Onigmo differ
+    # at the edges (Ruby rejects Go's `(?P<name>...)`), and refusing a pattern
+    # kamal-proxy would have accepted is worse than finding out at deploy time.
+    def validate_path_rules!(key, redirect:)
+      Array(config[key]).each_with_index do |rule, index|
+        with_context(key) do
+          with_context(index) do
+            rule = {} unless rule.is_a?(Hash)
+
+            if rule["from"].blank? || rule["to"].blank?
+              next error "needs both from and to"
+            end
+
+            # The wire format is '<from>=<to>' and kamal-proxy cuts at the
+            # FIRST '=', so an '=' inside the pattern silently builds a rule
+            # for a different path.
+            if rule["from"].to_s.include?("=")
+              next error "from cannot contain '=' - " \
+                "the <from>=<to> wire format cuts at the first '=' and would silently build a different rule"
+            end
+
+            unless rule["to"].to_s.start_with?("/") || (redirect && rule["to"].to_s.match?(%r{\Ahttps?://}))
+              next error "to must be an absolute path starting with '/'#{" or a full http(s) URL" if redirect}"
+            end
+
+            if rule["status"].present?
+              if !redirect
+                error "status is only meaningful for a redirect"
+              elsif !REDIRECT_STATUSES.include?(rule["status"])
+                error "status must be one of #{REDIRECT_STATUSES.join(", ")}"
+              end
+            end
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # kamal-proxy's --rate-limit is a Float64, so half a request per second is a
+    # legal rate. The docs example can only demonstrate one numeric type, and an
+    # Integer there would reject 0.5 — so the shape is checked by hand instead.
+    def validate_key_override!(key, value)
+      # Header names are the operator's to choose, so the docs example's names
+      # are illustrations rather than the permitted set — the example-driven
+      # unknown-key check would reject every real config. validate_header_rules!
+      # does the semantic checking.
+      return validate_header_shape!(value) if key.to_s == "headers"
+
+      # The whole point of proxy/run/flags is that the gem does not know the flag
+      # names, so the example's key is an illustration and the unknown-key check
+      # would reject every real use. Proxy::Run rejects one that collides with a
+      # named key; nothing else about the name is the gem's business.
+      if key.to_s == "flags"
+        validate_type! value, Hash
+        with_context("flags") { validate_hash_of! value, String }
+        return true
+      end
+
+      return false unless key.to_s == "rate_limit"
+
+      validate_type! value, Hash
+
+      with_context("rate_limit") do
+        unknown_keys_error(value.keys - %w[ requests burst exempt ]) if (value.keys - %w[ requests burst exempt ]).any?
+
+        with_context("requests") { validate_type! value["requests"], Numeric } if value.key?("requests")
+        with_context("burst") { validate_type! value["burst"], Integer } if value.key?("burst")
+        with_context("exempt") { validate_array_of! value["exempt"], String } if value.key?("exempt")
+      end
+
+      true
+    end
+
+    # Rate limiting and the IP allow list are only as correct as the address they
+    # key on, so kamal-proxy ties the three settings together with rules that
+    # otherwise surface only once the deploy has reached a host.
+    def validate_access_control!
+      allow_ips = Array(config["allow_ips"])
+      client_ip = config["client_ip"] || {}
+      rate_limit = config["rate_limit"] || {}
+      trusted_proxies = Array(client_ip["trusted_proxies"])
+      rate_limited = rate_limit["requests"].present?
+
+      with_context("allow_ips") { allow_ips.each { |entry| validate_ip_entry! entry } }
+      with_context("rate_limit") { with_context("exempt") { Array(rate_limit["exempt"]).each { |entry| validate_ip_entry! entry } } }
+
+      with_context("client_ip") do
+        with_context("trusted_proxies") do
+          trusted_proxies.each do |entry|
+            validate_ip_entry! entry
+
+            # Trusting everything means trusting every client to speak for
+            # someone else, which is the bypass this setting exists to prevent.
+            if default_route?(entry)
+              error "'#{entry}' is a default route - " \
+                "trusting every address means trusting every client to speak for someone else"
+            end
+          end
+        end
+
+        if trusted_proxies.any? && allow_ips.empty? && !rate_limited
+          error "trusted_proxies has no effect without allow_ips or rate_limit"
+        end
+
+        # Unconditional: even without allow_ips/rate_limit, kamal-proxy rewrites
+        # the client address (and X-Forwarded-For) from this header, so honoring
+        # it from untrusted peers is a client-spoofable identity.
+        if client_ip["header"].present? && trusted_proxies.empty?
+          error "header requires trusted_proxies, or the header would be ignored while appearing to be honored"
+        end
+      end
+
+      with_context("rate_limit") do
+        if rate_limited
+          error "requests cannot be negative" if rate_limit["requests"].to_f.negative?
+          error "burst cannot be negative" if rate_limit["burst"].to_i.negative?
+        else
+          error "burst has no effect without requests" if rate_limit["burst"].present?
+          error "exempt has no effect without requests" if rate_limit["exempt"].present?
+        end
+      end
+
+      # kamal-proxy serves the health check path without an address check and
+      # without a rate limit so deploys keep working, which makes '/' a hole
+      # straight through both features.
+      if (allow_ips.any? || rate_limited) && config.dig("healthcheck", "path") == "/"
+        with_context("healthcheck") do
+          error "path cannot be '/' when allow_ips or rate_limit is set, " \
+            "as that path is served without an address check or a rate limit"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # IPAddr is looser than the proxy's netip parsing in two ways that matter: it
+    # drops an IPv6 zone rather than rejecting it, and it accepts IPv4-mapped
+    # forms. Both would match nothing at runtime while looking configured.
+    def validate_ip_entry!(entry)
+      if entry.to_s.include?("%")
+        return error "'#{entry}' carries an IPv6 zone; write the address without it"
+      end
+
+      address = IPAddr.new(entry.to_s)
+
+      if address.ipv4_mapped?
+        error "'#{entry}' is IPv4-mapped; write it as plain IPv4"
+      end
+    rescue IPAddr::Error
+      error "'#{entry}' is not a valid address or CIDR range"
+    end
+
+    def default_route?(entry)
+      IPAddr.new(entry.to_s).prefix.zero?
+    rescue IPAddr::Error
+      false
+    end
+
+    # Mirrors CompressionOptions.Validate, which rejects each of these after the
+    # deploy has already reached the host.
+    def validate_compress!(compress)
+      with_context("compress") do
+        # An explicit false is a deliberate off switch - the tuned settings may
+        # stay for when it is flipped back on. (Distinct from an absent enabled
+        # with orphaned tuning, which is a block that never did anything.)
+        return if compress["enabled"] == false
+
+        encodings = Array(compress["encodings"])
+        enabled = compress["enabled"] || encodings.any?
+
+        unless enabled
+          if (orphaned = compress.keys - [ "enabled" ]).any?
+            error "#{orphaned.first} has no effect without compression - set enabled: true or name the encodings"
+          end
+
+          return
+        end
+
+        encodings.each do |encoding|
+          canonical = Kamal::Configuration::Proxy::COMPRESSION_ENCODING_ALIASES.fetch(encoding.to_s, encoding.to_s)
+
+          unless Kamal::Configuration::Proxy::SUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ENCODINGS.include?(canonical)
+            error "unsupported encoding '#{encoding}'. " \
+              "Supported encodings: #{Kamal::Configuration::Proxy::SUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ENCODINGS.join(", ")}"
+          end
+        end
+
+        if compress["min_length"].to_i.negative?
+          error "min_length cannot be negative"
+        end
+
+        Array(compress["content_types"]).each do |content_type|
+          # A main-type wildcard would match everything the proxy cannot see
+          # inside, so kamal-proxy allows a wildcard only in the subtype.
+          unless content_type.to_s.match?(%r{\A[^/*\s]+/[^/\s]+\z})
+            error "content_types entry '#{content_type}' must be a media type such as text/html or text/*"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    LOG_FORMATS = %w[ json text logfmt ].freeze
+    TRACE_CONTEXT_MODES = %w[ off propagate generate ].freeze
+    MIN_TLS_VERSIONS = %w[ 1.2 1.3 ].freeze
+    REFUSED_TLS_VERSIONS = %w[ 1.0 1.1 ].freeze
+    RUN_TIMEOUTS = %w[ read_header_timeout read_timeout write_timeout idle_timeout shutdown_timeout ].freeze
+
+    # kamal-proxy validates these three in preRun, so a typo does not fail the
+    # deploy - it stops the proxy container from booting at all.
+    def validate_run_server_options!(run_config)
+      with_context("run") do
+        if (format = run_config["log_format"]).present? && !LOG_FORMATS.include?(format.to_s.downcase.strip)
+          error "log_format '#{format}' is not a log format - use json or text"
+        end
+
+        if (mode = run_config["trace_context"]).present? && !TRACE_CONTEXT_MODES.include?(mode.to_s.downcase.strip)
+          error "trace_context '#{mode}' is not a trace context mode - use off, propagate or generate"
+        end
+
+        validate_min_tls! run_config["min_tls"]
+
+        RUN_TIMEOUTS.each do |key|
+          error "#{key} cannot be negative" if run_config[key].to_f.negative?
+        end
+
+        %w[ metrics_allow_ips proxy_protocol_allow_ips ].each do |key|
+          with_context(key) { Array(run_config[key]).each { |entry| validate_ip_entry! entry } }
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # Accepts the spellings kamal-proxy's normalizeTLSVersion reduces - a `tls`
+    # or `tlsv` prefix, and `_` for `.` - so a config written for upstream is not
+    # rejected here and accepted there.
+    def validate_min_tls!(value)
+      return if value.blank?
+
+      normalized = value.to_s.downcase.strip.sub(/\Atlsv?/, "").tr("_", ".")
+
+      if REFUSED_TLS_VERSIONS.include?(normalized)
+        # The flag narrows what the listener negotiates; it was never a way to
+        # widen it, and Go refuses these regardless.
+        error "min_tls #{normalized} cannot be enabled - the lowest accepted minimum is #{MIN_TLS_VERSIONS.first}"
+      elsif !MIN_TLS_VERSIONS.include?(normalized)
+        error "min_tls '#{value}' is not a TLS version - use #{MIN_TLS_VERSIONS.join(" or ")}"
+      end
+    end
+
+    # kamal-proxy reads the cache policy only when --cache is set and ignores it
+    # otherwise, so a tuned block with no `enabled` is a cache that silently
+    # never caches - this issue's own predicted first support question.
+    def validate_cache!(cache)
+      return if cache["enabled"]
+
+      with_context("cache") do
+        if (orphaned = cache.keys - [ "enabled" ]).any?
+          error "#{orphaned.first} has no effect without enabled: true - " \
+            "kamal-proxy ignores the cache policy entirely when --cache is absent"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    # An unsupported store is rejected in kamal-proxy's preRun, which means the
+    # proxy container exits at boot rather than a deploy failing. Catch it before
+    # the fleet loses its proxy.
+    def validate_cache_store!(cache)
+      store = cache["store"]
+      return if store.blank?
+
+      with_context("run") do
+        with_context("cache") do
+          unless store == "memory" || store.to_s.match?(%r{\Arediss?://\S+\z})
+            error "store must be 'memory' or a redis:// or rediss:// URL"
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def validate_basic_auth!(basic_auth)
+      with_context("basic_auth") do
+        if basic_auth["username"].blank?
+          error "Missing username setting (required when basic_auth is set)"
+        elsif basic_auth["username"].to_s.include?(":")
+          # kamal-proxy cuts <username>:<password> at the first colon, so a
+          # colon in the username would silently truncate it.
+          error "Invalid username: cannot contain a colon"
+        end
+
+        if basic_auth["password"].present? && basic_auth["password_secret"].present?
+          error "Specify one of 'password' or 'password_secret', not both"
+        end
+
+        if basic_auth["password"].blank? && basic_auth["password_secret"].blank?
+          error "Missing password or password_secret setting (required when basic_auth is set)"
+        end
+      end
+    end
+
+    def valid_ssl_domains_source?(source)
+      source.is_a?(String) && (source.start_with?("/") || source.match?(%r{\Ahttps?://\S+\z}i))
+    end
+
     def ensure_valid_bind_ips(bind_ips)
       bind_ips.present? && bind_ips.each do |ip|
         next if ip =~ Resolv::IPv4::Regex || ip =~ Resolv::IPv6::Regex