contrast-agent 3.9.1 → 6.15.3

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/bot_blocker/bot_blocker_input_classification.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/input_type'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/score_level'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/details/bot_blocker_details'
+require 'contrast/utils/input_classification_base'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # This module will do the Input Classification stage of CMD Injection rule
+        # as a result input would be marked as WORTHWATCHING or IGNORE,
+        # to be analyzed at the sink level.
+        module BotBlockerInputClassification
+          USER_AGENT = 'USER_AGENT'
+          AGENT_LIB_HEADER_NAME = 'user-agent'
+          BOT_BLOCKER_MATCH = 'bot-blocker-input-tracing-v1'
+
+          class << self
+            include InputClassificationBase
+
+            # Input Classification stage is done to determine if an user input is
+            # DEFINITEATTACK or to be ignored.
+            #
+            # @param rule_id [String] Name of the protect rule.
+            # @param input_type [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType] The type of the user input.
+            # @param value [Hash<String>] the value of the input.
+            # @param input_analysis [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysis] Holds all the results from the
+            #                                                       agent analysis from the current
+            #                                                       Request.
+            # @return ia [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysis, nil] with updated results.
+            def classify rule_id, input_type, value, input_analysis
+              return unless (rule = Contrast::PROTECT.rule(rule_id))
+              return unless rule.applicable_user_inputs.include?(input_type)
+              return unless input_analysis.request
+
+              value.each_value do |val|
+                result = create_new_input_result(input_analysis.request, rule.rule_name, input_type, val)
+                append_result(input_analysis, result)
+              end
+
+              input_analysis
+            rescue StandardError => e
+              logger.debug("An Error was recorded in the input classification of the #{ rule_id }", error: e)
+            end
+
+            private
+
+            # This methods checks if input is tagged WORTHWATCHING or IGNORE matches value with it's
+            # key if needed and Creates new instance of InputAnalysisResult.
+            #
+            # @param request [Contrast::Agent::Request] the current request context.
+            # @param rule_id [String] The name of the Protect Rule.
+            # @param input_type [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType] The type of the user input.
+            # @param value [String, Array<String>] the value of the input.
+            #
+            # @return res [Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysisResult]
+            def create_new_input_result request, rule_id, input_type, value
+              return unless request.headers.key(value) == USER_AGENT
+              return unless Contrast::AGENT_LIB
+
+              # If there is no match this would return nil.
+              header_eval = Contrast::AGENT_LIB.eval_header(AGENT_LIB_HEADER_NAME,
+                                                            value,
+                                                            Contrast::AGENT_LIB.rule_set[rule_id],
+                                                            Contrast::AGENT_LIB.eval_option[:NONE])
+
+              ia_result = new_ia_result(rule_id, input_type, request.path, value)
+              score = header_eval&.score || 0
+              if score >= THRESHOLD
+                ia_result.score_level = DEFINITEATTACK
+                ia_result.ids << BOT_BLOCKER_MATCH
+                ia_result.details = Contrast::Agent::Reporting::BotBlockerDetails.new
+                # details:
+                add_details(ia_result, value)
+              else
+                ia_result.score_level = IGNORE
+              end
+              add_needed_key(request, ia_result, input_type, value)
+              ia_result
+            end
+
+            def add_details ia_result, value
+              ia_result.details.bot = value.downcase
+              if value.include?(Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::CARROT)
+                ia_result.details.bot.delete!(Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::CARROT)
+              end
+              ia_result.details.user_agent = value
+            end
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmd_injection.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base'
+require 'contrast/utils/stack_trace_utils'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/components/logger'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/input_type'
+require 'contrast/agent_lib/interface'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_chained_command'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_dangerous_path'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_backdoors'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection rule.
+        class CmdInjection < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
+          include Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection'
+          APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS = [
+            BODY, COOKIE_VALUE, HEADER, PARAMETER_NAME,
+            PARAMETER_VALUE, JSON_VALUE, MULTIPART_VALUE,
+            MULTIPART_FIELD_NAME, XML_VALUE, DWR_VALUE
+          ].cs__freeze
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          # Array of sub_rules:
+          #
+          # @return [Array]
+          def sub_rules
+            @_sub_rules ||= [
+              Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBackdoors.new,
+              Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiChainedCommand.new,
+              Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiDangerousPath.new
+            ].cs__freeze
+          end
+
+          def applicable_user_inputs
+            APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS
+          end
+
+          # CMDI infilter:
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request context
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode is set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
+          def infilter context, classname, method, command
+            return unless infilter?(context)
+
+            ia_results = gather_ia_results(context)
+            return if ia_results.empty?
+
+            if ::Contrast::APP_CONTEXT.in_new_process?
+              logger.trace('Running cmd-injection infilter within new process - creating new context')
+              context = Contrast::Agent::RequestContext.new(context.request.rack_request)
+              Contrast::Agent::REQUEST_TRACKER.update_current_context(context)
+            end
+
+            result = find_attacker_with_results(context, command, ia_results,
+                                                **{ classname: classname, method: method })
+            result ||= report_command_execution(context, command, **{ classname: classname, method: method })
+            return unless result
+
+            append_to_activity(context, result)
+            cef_logging(result, :successful_attack)
+
+            return unless blocked?
+
+            # Raise cmdi error
+            raise_error(classname, method)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_backdoors.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base'
+require 'contrast/agent/request/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmd_injection'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Command
+        # Backdoors sub-rule.
+        class CmdiBackdoors < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-command-backdoors'
+          MATCHES = %w[/bin/bash-c /bin/sh-c sh-c bash-c].cs__freeze
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          def sub_rules
+            Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY
+          end
+
+          # CMDI Backdoors infilter:
+          # This rule does not have input classification.
+          # If a value matches the CMDI applicable input types and it's length is > 2
+          # we can check if it's used as command backdoors.
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request contest
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode ise set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
+          def infilter context, classname, method, command
+            return if protect_excluded_by_url?(rule_name, context.request.path)
+            return unless backdoors_match?(command)
+            return unless (result = build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, command,
+                                                            **{ classname: classname, method: method }))
+
+            append_to_activity(context, result)
+            cef_logging(result, :successful_attack)
+            return unless blocked?
+
+            raise_error(classname, method)
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Command Backdoor rule triggered. ' \
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          # Check to see if value is backdoor match
+          #
+          # @param potential_attack_string [String]
+          def backdoors_match? potential_attack_string
+            return false unless potential_attack_string && potential_attack_string.length > 2
+            return false unless matches_shell_parameter?(potential_attack_string)
+
+            true
+          end
+
+          # Checks to see if input is used as parameter for a shell cmd.
+          #
+          # @param cmd [String]
+          # @return [Boolean]
+          def matches_shell_parameter? cmd
+            normalize_cmd = cmd.delete(Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::SPACE)
+            MATCHES.each do |match|
+              return true if normalize_cmd.include?(match)
+            end
+            false
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/details/cmd_injection_details'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/attack_result/user_input'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_input_classification'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/attack_result/response_type'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Dangerous Path sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiBaseRule < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::Base
+          include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
+          include Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputType
+
+          CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS = /[;&|<>]/.cs__freeze
+          APPLICABLE_USER_INPUTS = [
+            BODY, COOKIE_VALUE, HEADER, PARAMETER_NAME,
+            PARAMETER_VALUE, JSON_VALUE, MULTIPART_VALUE,
+            MULTIPART_FIELD_NAME, XML_VALUE, DWR_VALUE
+          ].cs__freeze
+
+          # CMDI input classification
+          #
+          # @return [module<Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiInputClassification>]
+          def classification
+            @_classification ||= Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiInputClassification.cs__freeze
+          end
+
+          # CMDI Semantic infilter:
+          # This rule does not have input classification.
+          # If a value matches the CMDI applicable input types and it's length is > 2
+          # we can check if it's used as command backdoors.
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext] current request contest
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException] if the rule mode ise set
+          # to BLOCK and valid cdmi is detected.
+          def infilter context, classname, method, command
+            return unless infilter?(command)
+            return if protect_excluded_by_url?(rule_name, context.request.path)
+            return unless (result = build_violation(context, command))
+
+            append_to_activity(context, result)
+            raise_error(classname, method) if blocked_violation?(result)
+          end
+
+          def build_attack_with_match(context,
+                                      input_analysis_result,
+                                      result,
+                                      candidate_string,
+                                      **kwargs)
+            return result if mode == :NO_ACTION || mode == :PERMIT
+
+            result ||= build_attack_result(context)
+            update_successful_attack_response(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string)
+            append_sample(context, input_analysis_result, result, candidate_string, **kwargs)
+            result
+          end
+
+          protected
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Rule triggered. ' \
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          # Allows for the InputAnalysis from service to be extracted early.
+          # Because results are not necessarily on the context across
+          # processes; extract early and pass into the method
+          #
+          # @param context [Contrast::Agent::RequestContext]
+          # @param potential_attack_string [String, nil]
+          # @param ia_results [Array<Contrast::Agent::Reporting::InputAnalysis>]
+          # @param **kwargs
+          # @return [Contrast::Agent::Reporting, nil]
+          def find_attacker_with_results context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
+            logger.trace('Checking vectors for attacks', rule: rule_name, input: potential_attack_string)
+            result = super(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs) if ia_results
+            if result.nil? && potential_attack_string
+              result = find_probable_attacker(context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs)
+            end
+            result
+          end
+
+          # Build a subclass of the RaspRuleSample using the query string and the
+          # evaluation
+          def build_sample context, input_analysis_result, candidate_string, **kwargs
+            sample = build_base_sample(context, input_analysis_result)
+            sample.details = Contrast::Agent::Reporting::Details::CmdInjectionDetails.new
+
+            # extract data from kwargs for the agent_lib check
+            agent_lib_result_struct = kwargs[:result_struct]
+            command = candidate_string || input_analysis_result.value
+            command = Contrast::Utils::StringUtils.protobuf_safe_string(command)
+            handle_with_agent_lib(sample, agent_lib_result_struct, command)
+
+            # This is a special case where the user input is UNKNOWN_USER_INPUT but
+            # we want to send the attack value. Usually we do this for semantic rules.
+            if input_analysis_result.nil?
+              ui = Contrast::Agent::Reporting::UserInput.new
+              ui.input_type = :UNKNOWN
+              ui.value = command
+              sample.user_input = ui
+            end
+
+            sample
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          def report_command_execution context, command, **kwargs
+            return unless report_any_command_execution?
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, nil, nil, command, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          def find_probable_attacker context, potential_attack_string, ia_results, **kwargs
+            return unless chained_command?(potential_attack_string)
+
+            likely_attacker = ia_results.find { |input_analysis_result| chained_command?(input_analysis_result.value) }
+            return unless likely_attacker
+
+            build_attack_with_match(context, likely_attacker, nil, potential_attack_string, **kwargs)
+          end
+
+          def chained_command? command
+            CHAINED_COMMAND_CHARS.match(command)
+          end
+
+          # Part of the Hardening for Command Injection detection is the
+          # ability to detect and prevent any command execution from within the
+          # application. This check determines if that hardening has been
+          # enabled.
+          # @return [Boolean] if the agent should report all command
+          #   executions.
+          def report_any_command_execution?
+            ::Contrast::PROTECT.report_any_command_execution?
+          end
+
+          # handle agent_lib data being attached
+          def handle_with_agent_lib sample, agent_lib_result_struct, command
+            sample.details.cmd = command
+            if agent_lib_result_struct&.cs__is_a?(Hash)
+              sample.details.start_idx = agent_lib_result_struct[:start_index]
+              sample.details.end_idx = if (agent_lib_result_struct[:end_index]).zero?
+                                         command.length
+                                       else
+                                         agent_lib_result_struct[:end_index]
+                                       end
+            else
+              sample.details.end_idx = command.length
+            end
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_chained_command.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base'
+require 'contrast/agent/request/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Chained Command sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiChainedCommand < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-semantic-chained-commands'
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          def sub_rules
+            Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY
+          end
+
+          # @param command [String] potential dangerous command executed.
+          def infilter? command
+            return unless enabled?
+            return unless chained_command?(command)
+
+            true
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Semantic Chained Commands rule triggered. ' \
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          # Check if potential chained attack is detected in user input.
+          #
+          # @param command [String] command to check.
+          # @return index[Boolean Returns the index of the command chaining if found.
+          # If the chaining index is >= 0, an injection is detected. Returns -1 when no
+          # command chaining is found.
+          def chained_command? command
+            return false unless (agent_lib = Contrast::AGENT_LIB) && command
+            return false if agent_lib.chained_cmdi_index(command).negative?
+
+            true
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_dangerous_path.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/base'
+require 'contrast/agent/request/request_context'
+require 'contrast/utils/object_share'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_base_rule'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # The Ruby implementation of the Protect Command Injection Semantic
+        # Dangerous Path sub-rule. This rule should report
+        class CmdiDangerousPath < Contrast::Agent::Protect::Rule::CmdiBaseRule
+          NAME = 'cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths'
+
+          def rule_name
+            NAME
+          end
+
+          def sub_rules
+            Contrast::Utils::ObjectShare::EMPTY_ARRAY
+          end
+
+          # @param path [String] potential dangerous path executed.
+          def infilter? path
+            return unless enabled?
+            return unless dangerous_path?(path)
+
+            true
+          end
+
+          private
+
+          # Used to customize the raised error message.
+          #
+          # @param classname [String] Name of the class
+          # @param method [String] name of the method triggering the rule
+          # @raise [Contrast::SecurityException]
+          def raise_error classname, method
+            raise(Contrast::SecurityException.new(self,
+                                                  'Command Injection Dangerous Path rule triggered. ' \
+                                                  "Call to #{ classname }.#{ method } blocked."))
+          end
+
+          # Checks if a given shell command is trying to access a dangerous path.
+          # This is used for the cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths rule.
+          #
+          # @param path [String] path to check.
+          # @return index[Boolean] Returns true if a dangerous path is found.
+          # Returns false if no dangerous paths are found.
+          def dangerous_path? path
+            return false unless (agent_lib = Contrast::AGENT_LIB) && path
+
+            agent_lib.dangerous_path?(path)
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end

data/lib/contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmdi_input_classification.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2023 Contrast Security, Inc. See https://www.contrastsecurity.com/enduser-terms-0317a for more details.
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/rule/cmdi/cmd_injection'
+require 'contrast/agent/reporting/input_analysis/score_level'
+require 'contrast/agent/protect/input_analyzer/input_analyzer'
+require 'contrast/utils/input_classification_base'
+require 'contrast/components/logger'
+
+module Contrast
+  module Agent
+    module Protect
+      module Rule
+        # This module will do the Input Classification stage of CMD Injection rule
+        # as a result input would be marked as WORTHWATCHING or IGNORE,
+        # to be analyzed at the sink level.
+        module CmdiInputClassification
+          WORTHWATCHING_MATCH = 'cmdi-worth-watching-v2'.cs__freeze
+          class << self
+            include InputClassificationBase
+            include Contrast::Components::Logger::InstanceMethods
+          end
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end