choria-mcorpc-support 2.21.1 → 2.23.1

data/lib/mcollective/security/choria.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,765 @@
+require "base64"
+require "openssl"
+require "yaml"
+
+require_relative "../util/choria"
+require_relative "../util/indifferent_hash"
+
+module MCollective
+  module Security
+    class Choria < Base
+      def initialize
+        super
+
+        # Stores lists of requests that came from legacy choria clients so they
+        # can be encoded appropriately for them on reply
+        #
+        # This has to be an expiring entity since not all requests make
+        # replies
+        #
+        # See issue 288 for background on this, this can be removed once we hit
+        # 1.0.0 along with the calls to the methods using this
+        Cache.setup(:choria_security, 3600)
+      end
+
+      def choria
+        @_choria ||= Util::Choria.new(false)
+      end
+
+      # Encodes a request on behalf of the MCollective Client code
+      #
+      # The request is turned into a `choria:request:1` message and then encoded in
+      # a `choria:secure:request:1` message prior to being serialized
+      #
+      # @param sender [String] the sender identity, typically @config.identity
+      # @param msg [Object] message to be sent, there really is no actual standard to these, any Ruby Object
+      # @param requestid [String] a UUID representing the message to be sent
+      # @param filter [Hash] the MCollective filter used for routing this request
+      # @param target_agent [String] the destination agent name
+      # @param target_collective [String] the sub collective to publish this message in
+      # @param ttl [Fixnum] how long this message is valid for
+      # @return [String] serialized message to be transmitted over the wire
+      def encoderequest(sender, msg, requestid, filter, target_agent, target_collective, ttl=60)
+        request = empty_request
+        request["message"] = serialize(msg, default_serializer)
+        request["envelope"]["requestid"] = requestid
+        request["envelope"]["filter"] = filter
+        request["envelope"]["agent"] = target_agent
+        request["envelope"]["collective"] = target_collective
+        request["envelope"]["ttl"] = ttl
+        request["envelope"]["callerid"] = callerid
+
+        serialized_request = serialize(request, default_serializer)
+
+        secure_request = {
+          "protocol" => "choria:secure:request:1",
+          "message" => serialized_request,
+          "signature" => "insecure",
+          "pubcert" => "insecure"
+        }
+
+        sign_secure_request!(secure_request)
+
+        serialize(secure_request)
+      end
+
+      # Signs a secure request
+      #
+      # @param secure_request the secure request to sign and embed certificates into
+      def sign_secure_request!(secure_request)
+        request_signer.sign_secure_request!(secure_request)
+      end
+
+      # The class the implements signing the requests
+      #
+      def request_signer
+        PluginManager.loadclass("MCollective::Signer::%s" % @config.pluginconf.fetch("choria.security.request_signer.plugin", "choria").capitalize)
+        PluginManager["choria_signer_plugin"]
+      end
+
+      # Encodes a reply to a earlier received message
+      #
+      # The reply is turned into a `choria:reply:1` and then encoded in
+      # a `choria:secure:reply:1` before being serialized
+      #
+      # @param sender_agent [String] the agent sending the message
+      # @param msg [Object] the message to send
+      # @param requestid [String] the requestid the message is a reply to
+      # @param requestcallerid [String] the callerid of the requestor
+      # @return [String] serialized message to be transmitted over the wire
+      def encodereply(sender_agent, msg, requestid, requestcallerid=nil)
+        reply = empty_reply
+        reply["envelope"]["requestid"] = requestid
+        reply["envelope"]["agent"] = sender_agent
+
+        if legacy_request?(requestid)
+          reply["message"] = msg
+          legacy_processed!(requestid)
+        else
+          reply["message"] = serialize(msg, default_serializer)
+        end
+
+        serialized_reply = serialize(reply, default_serializer)
+
+        serialize(
+          "protocol" => "choria:secure:reply:1",
+          "message" => serialized_reply,
+          "hash" => hash(serialized_reply)
+        )
+      end
+
+      # Decodes a message and validates it's security
+      #
+      # This will delegate the actual checking of messages to {#decode_request} and {#decode_reply}.
+      #
+      # @see MCollective::Security::Message#decode!
+      # @param message [Message] the message holding unverified/validated payload
+      # @raise [SecurityValidationFailed] when the message does not pass security checks
+      # @return [void]
+      def decodemsg(message)
+        secure_payload = deserialize(message.payload)
+
+        case secure_payload["protocol"]
+        when "choria:secure:request:1"
+          decode_request(message, secure_payload)
+
+        when "choria:secure:reply:1"
+          decode_reply(secure_payload)
+
+        else
+          Log.debug("Unknown protocol in message:\n%s" % secure_payload.pretty_inspect)
+          raise(SecurityValidationFailed, "Received an unknown protocol '%s' message, ignoring" % secure_payload["protocol"])
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Validates a received request is in the correct format and passes security checks
+      #
+      # During this the YAML encoded `message` held will be deserialized
+      #
+      # @param message [Message]
+      # @param secure_payload [Hash] A choria:secure:request:1 message
+      # @raise [SecurityValidationFailed] when the message does not pass security checks
+      # @return [Hash] a legacy MCollective request structure, see {#to_legacy_request}
+      def decode_request(message, secure_payload)
+        request = deserialize(secure_payload["message"], default_serializer)
+
+        unless valid_protocol?(request, "choria:request:1", empty_request) || valid_protocol?(request, "mcollective:request:3", empty_request)
+          raise(SecurityValidationFailed, "Unknown request body format received. Expected choria:request:1 or mcollective:request:3, cannot continue")
+        end
+
+        cache_client_pubcert(request["envelope"], secure_payload["pubcert"]) if @initiated_by == :node
+
+        validrequest?(secure_payload, request)
+
+        should_process_msg?(message, request["envelope"]["requestid"])
+
+        if request["message"].is_a?(String)
+          # non json based things like 'mco ping' that just sends 'ping' will fail on JSON serialize
+          # while yaml would not fail and just return the string
+          #
+          # So we ensure the message is left as it was should json deserialize fail, tbh this a train wreck
+          # but it's how the original mcollective was designed, definitely need a bit of a rethink there as
+          # at core its not compatible with this JSON stuff as is
+          begin
+            request["message"] = deserialize(request["message"], default_serializer)
+          rescue # rubocop:disable Lint/SuppressedException
+          end
+        else
+          record_legacy_request(request)
+        end
+
+        to_legacy_request(request)
+      end
+
+      # Records the fact that a request is from a legacy client
+      #
+      # @param request [Hash] decoded request
+      def record_legacy_request(request)
+        Cache.write(:choria_security, request["envelope"]["requestid"], true) if request["envelope"] && request["envelope"]["requestid"]
+      end
+
+      # Determines if a specific requestid was a previously seen legacy request
+      #
+      # @param requestid [String]
+      # @return [Boolean]
+      def legacy_request?(requestid)
+        !!Cache.read(:choria_security, requestid)
+      rescue
+        false
+      end
+
+      # Mark a request as processed and mark it for removal from the cache
+      #
+      # @param requestid [String]
+      def legacy_processed!(requestid)
+        Cache.invalidate!(:choria_security, requestid)
+      end
+
+      # Validates a received reply is in the correct format and passes security checks
+      #
+      # During this the YAML encoded `message` held will be deserialized
+      #
+      # @note right now no actual security checks are done on replies
+      # @param secure_payload [Hash] a choria:secure:reply:1 message
+      # @raise [SecurityValidationFailed] when the message does not pass security checks
+      # @return [Hash] a legacy MCollective reply structure, see {#to_legacy_reply}
+      def decode_reply(secure_payload)
+        reply = deserialize(secure_payload["message"], default_serializer)
+
+        if reply["message"].is_a?(String)
+          # non json based things like 'mco ping' that just sends 'ping' will fail on JSON serialize
+          # while yaml would not fail and just return the string
+          #
+          # So we ensure the message is left as it was should json deserialize fail, tbh this a train wreck
+          # but it's how the original mcollective was designed, definitely need a bit of a rethink there as
+          # at core its not compatible with this JSON stuff as is
+          begin
+            reply["message"] = deserialize(reply["message"], default_serializer)
+          rescue # rubocop:disable Lint/SuppressedException
+          end
+        end
+
+        unless valid_protocol?(reply, "choria:reply:1", empty_reply) || valid_protocol?(reply, "mcollective:reply:3", empty_reply)
+          raise(SecurityValidationFailed, "Unknown reply body format received. Expected choria:reply:1 or mcollective:reply:3, cannot continue")
+        end
+
+        to_legacy_reply(reply)
+      end
+
+      # Verifies the request by checking it's been signed with the cached certificate of the claimed callerid
+      #
+      # @param secure_payload [Hash] a choria:secure:request:1 message
+      # @param request [Hash] a choria:request:1 message
+      # @return [Boolean]
+      # @raise [SecurityValidationFailed] when the message cannot be decoded
+      def validrequest?(secure_payload, request)
+        return true if $choria_unsafe_disable_protocol_security # rubocop:disable Style/GlobalVars
+
+        callerid = request["envelope"]["callerid"]
+
+        if verify_signature(secure_payload["message"], secure_payload["signature"], callerid, true)
+          Log.info("Received valid request %s from %s" % [request["envelope"]["requestid"], callerid])
+          @stats.validated
+        else
+          @stats.unvalidated
+          raise(SecurityValidationFailed, "Received an invalid signature in message from %s" % callerid)
+        end
+
+        true
+      end
+
+      # Checks the structure of a message is well formed
+      #
+      # @todo this really should be json schema or even better protobufs
+      # @param body [Hash] a choria:request:1 or choria:reply:1
+      # @param protocol [String] the expected protocol
+      # @param template [Hash] a template message to check against {#empty_reply} or {#empty_request}
+      # @return [Boolean]
+      def valid_protocol?(body, protocol, template)
+        unless body.is_a?(Hash)
+          Log.warn("Body from the message should be a Hash")
+          return false
+        end
+
+        unless body["protocol"] == protocol
+          Log.warn("Unknown message protocol, should be %s" % protocol)
+          return false
+        end
+
+        unless body.include?("envelope")
+          Log.warn("No envelope found in the message")
+          return false
+        end
+
+        envelope = body["envelope"]
+
+        unless envelope.is_a?(Hash)
+          Log.warn("Envelope in message is not a hash")
+          return false
+        end
+
+        valid_envelope = template["envelope"].keys
+
+        unless (envelope.keys - valid_envelope).empty?
+          Log.warn("Envelope does not have the correct keys, only %s allowed" % valid_envelope.join(", "))
+          return false
+        end
+
+        unless body.include?("message")
+          Log.warn("Body has no message")
+          return false
+        end
+
+        true
+      end
+
+      # Parse a comma seperated list into a Regex spanning the list
+      #
+      # @param list [String] comma seperated list of strings and regex
+      # @param default [String,Regexp] what to do for empty lists
+      # @return [Regexp]
+      def comma_sep_list_to_regex(list, default)
+        matchlist = list.split(",").map do |item|
+          item.strip!
+
+          if item =~ /^\/(.+)\/$/
+            Regexp.new($1)
+          else
+            item
+          end
+        end.compact
+
+        matchlist << default if matchlist.empty?
+
+        Regexp.union(matchlist.compact.uniq)
+      end
+
+      # Calculate a Regex that will match the entire privileged user list
+      #
+      # Defaults to match /\.privileged.mcollective$/ othwerwise whatever is specified,
+      # in the comma seperated config item `choria.security.privileged_users`
+      #
+      # @example specific certs and the default
+      #
+      #     plugin.choria.security.privileged_users = bob, /\.privileged.mcollective$/
+      #
+      # @return [Regexp]
+      def privilegeduser_regex
+        users = @config.pluginconf.fetch("choria.security.privileged_users", "")
+
+        comma_sep_list_to_regex(users, /\.privileged\.mcollective$/)
+      end
+
+      # Search the cache directory for certificates matching the privileged user list
+      #
+      # @return [Array<String>] list of full paths to privileged certs
+      def privilegeduser_certs
+        match = privilegeduser_regex
+        dir = server_public_cert_dir
+
+        certs = Dir.entries(dir).grep(/pem$/).select do |cert|
+          File.basename(cert, ".pem").match(match)
+        end
+
+        certs.map {|cert| File.join(dir, cert) }
+      rescue Errno::ENOENT
+        []
+      end
+
+      # Calculate a Regex that will match the entire cert whitelist
+      #
+      # Defaults to match /\.mcollective$/ othwerwise whatever is specified,
+      # in the comma seperated config item `choria.security.cert_whitelist`
+      #
+      # @example specific certs and the default
+      #
+      #     plugin.choria.security.certname_whitelist = bob,/\.mcollective$/
+      #
+      # @return [Regexp]
+      def certname_whitelist_regex
+        whitelist = @config.pluginconf.fetch("choria.security.certname_whitelist", "")
+
+        comma_sep_list_to_regex(whitelist, /\.mcollective$/)
+      end
+
+      # Determines if a certificate should be cached
+      #
+      # This checks the cert is valid against our CA, it's name etc
+      #
+      # @todo support white/black lists
+      # @param pubcert [String] PEM encoded X509 cert text
+      # @param callerid [String] callerid who sent this cert
+      # @return [Boolean]
+      def should_cache_certname?(pubcert, callerid)
+        callerid_certname = certname_from_callerid(callerid)
+        certname = choria.valid_certificate?(pubcert, callerid_certname)
+        valid_regex = certname_whitelist_regex
+
+        unless certname
+          Log.warn("Received a certificate for '%s' that is not signed by a known CA, discarding" % callerid_certname)
+          return false
+        end
+
+        # this cert is allowed to set callerids != certname, so check it here and log callerid
+        if certname =~ privilegeduser_regex
+          Log.warn("Allowing cache of privileged user certname %s from callerid %s" % [certname, callerid])
+          return true
+        end
+
+        unless certname == callerid_certname
+          Log.warn("Received a certificate called '%s' that does not match the received callerid of '%s'" % [certname, callerid_certname])
+          return false
+        end
+
+        unless certname =~ valid_regex
+          Log.warn("Received certificate name '%s' does not match %s" % [certname, valid_regex])
+          return false
+        end
+
+        true
+      end
+
+      # Metadata about a pubcert based on the envelope
+      #
+      # @param envelope [Hash] the envelope from a choria:request:1
+      # @param pubcert [String] PEM encoded X509 public certificate
+      # @return [Hash]
+      def client_pubcert_metadata(envelope, pubcert)
+        cert = choria.parse_pubcert(pubcert).first
+
+        {
+          "create_time" => current_timestamp,
+          "senderid" => envelope["senderid"],
+          "requestid" => envelope["requestid"],
+          "certinfo" => {
+            "issuer" => cert.issuer.to_s,
+            "not_after" => Integer(cert.not_after),
+            "not_before" => Integer(cert.not_before),
+            "serial" => cert.serial.to_s,
+            "subject" => cert.subject.to_s,
+            "version" => cert.version,
+            "signature_algorithm" => cert.signature_algorithm
+          }
+        }
+      end
+
+      # Mutex used for locking write access to the pubcert cache
+      #
+      # @return [Mutex]
+      def client_cache_mutex
+        @_client_cache_mutex ||= Mutex.new
+      end
+
+      # Caches the public certificate of a sender
+      #
+      # If there is not yet a cached certificate for the callerid a new one
+      # is saved after first checking it against our CA
+      #
+      # @param envelope [Hash] the envelope from a choria:request:1
+      # @param pubcert [String] a X509 public certificate in PEM format
+      # @return [Boolean] true when the cert was cached, false when already cached
+      # @raise [StandardError] when an invalid cert was received
+      def cache_client_pubcert(envelope, pubcert)
+        return false if $choria_unsafe_disable_protocol_security # rubocop:disable Style/GlobalVars
+
+        client_cache_mutex.synchronize do
+          callerid = envelope["callerid"]
+          certfile = public_certfile(callerid)
+          certmetadata = public_cert_metadatafile(callerid)
+
+          if File.exist?(certfile)
+            Log.debug("Already have a cert from %s in %s" % [callerid, certfile])
+
+            false
+          else
+            raise("Received an invalid certificate for %s" % callerid) unless should_cache_certname?(pubcert, callerid)
+
+            Log.info("Saving verified pubcert for %s in %s" % [callerid, certfile])
+
+            File.open(certfile, "w") do |f|
+              f.print(pubcert)
+            end
+
+            File.open(certmetadata, "w") do |f|
+              f.print(client_pubcert_metadata(envelope, pubcert).to_json)
+            end
+
+            true
+          end
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Determines the path to a cached certificate for a caller
+      #
+      # @param callerid [String] the callerid to find a cert for
+      # @return [String] path to the pem file
+      def public_certfile(callerid)
+        "%s/%s.pem" % [server_public_cert_dir, certname_from_callerid(callerid)]
+      end
+
+      def public_cert_metadatafile(callerid)
+        public_certfile(callerid).gsub(/\.pem$/, ".json")
+      end
+
+      # Parses our callerids and return the certname
+      #
+      # @param id [String] the callerid to parse
+      # @return [String] the certificate name
+      # @raise [StandardError] when a unexpected format id is received
+      def certname_from_callerid(id)
+        if id =~ /^choria=([\w.\-]+)/
+          $1
+        else
+          raise("Received a callerid in an unexpected format: %s" % id)
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Serialize a object
+      #
+      # @param obj [Object] the item to serialize
+      # @param format [:json, :yaml] the serializer to use
+      # @return [String]
+      def serialize(obj, format=:json)
+        if format == :yaml
+          YAML.dump(obj)
+        else
+          JSON.dump(obj)
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Deserialize a string
+      #
+      # @param string [String] the serialized text
+      # @param format [:json, :yaml] the serializer to use
+      # @return [Class]
+      def deserialize(string, format=:json)
+        if format == :yaml
+          YAML.load(string)
+        else
+          JSON.parse(string, :object_class => Util::IndifferentHash)
+        end
+      end
+
+      # Determines the default serializer
+      #
+      # As of MCollective 2.11.0 it will translate "package" into :package to
+      # faciliate JSON requests and other programming languages.  This is a super
+      # experimental feature but will allow us to ditch YAML for now.
+      #
+      # By setting `choria.security.serializer` to JSON this new behaviour can be
+      # tested
+      #
+      # @return [Symbol]
+      def default_serializer
+        @config.pluginconf.fetch("choria.security.serializer", "json").downcase.intern
+      end
+
+      # The path where a server caches client certificates
+      #
+      # @note when the path does not exist it will attempt to make it
+      # @return [String]
+      # @raise [StandardError] when creating the directory fails
+      def server_public_cert_dir
+        dir = File.join(ssl_dir, "choria_security", "public_certs")
+
+        FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir) unless File.directory?(dir)
+
+        dir
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#ssl_dir)
+      def ssl_dir
+        choria.ssl_dir
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#certname)
+      def certname
+        choria.certname
+      end
+
+      def env_fetch(key, default=nil)
+        choria.env_fetch(key, default)
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#client_public_cert)
+      def client_public_cert
+        choria.client_public_cert
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#has_client_public_cert?)
+      def has_client_public_cert?
+        choria.has_client_public_cert?
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#client_private_key)
+      def client_private_key
+        choria.client_private_key
+      end
+
+      # (see Util::Choria#has_client_private_key?)
+      def has_client_private_key?
+        choria.has_client_private_key?
+      end
+
+      # The callerid based on the certificate name
+      #
+      # Caller ids are in the form `choria=certname`
+      #
+      # @return [String] callerid
+      # @raise [Exception] for invalid callerid or JWT token
+      def callerid
+        return request_signer.callerid if choria.anon_tls?
+
+        "choria=%s" % certname
+      end
+
+      # Signs a string using the private key
+      #
+      # @param string [String] the string to sign
+      # @param id [String] a callerid to sign as
+      # @return [String] Base64 encoded signature
+      # @raise [Exception] in case OpenSSL fails for some reason or keys cannot be found
+      def sign(string, id=nil)
+        key = client_private_key
+
+        @_keys ||= {}
+        if @_keys[key].nil?
+          if has_client_private_key?
+            Log.debug("Signing request using client private key %s" % key)
+          else
+            raise("Cannot find private key %s, cannot sign message" % key)
+          end
+
+          @_keys[key] ||= OpenSSL::PKey::RSA.new(File.read(key))
+        end
+
+        signed = @_keys[key].sign(OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256"), string)
+
+        Base64.encode64(signed).chomp
+      end
+
+      # Verifies a signature of a string using a certificate
+      #
+      # Optionally should the signature validation fail - or the specified cert does not exist -
+      # the list of privileged user certs will be tried to validate the message and any of those can
+      # validate it
+      #
+      # @param string [String] the signed string
+      # @param signature [String] Base64 encoded signature to verify
+      # @param callerid [String] Callerid to verify the signature for
+      # @param allow_privileged [Boolean] when true will check the privileged user certs should the main cert fails
+      def verify_signature(string, signature, callerid, allow_privileged=false)
+        candidate_keys = [public_certfile(callerid)]
+
+        candidate_keys.concat(privilegeduser_certs) if allow_privileged
+
+        candidate_keys.each do |certname|
+          next unless File.exist?(certname)
+
+          key = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new(File.read(certname)).public_key
+          result = key.verify(OpenSSL::Digest.new("SHA256"), Base64.decode64(signature), string)
+
+          if result
+            Log.debug("Message validated using certificate in %s (allow_privileged=%s)" % [certname, allow_privileged])
+            return true
+          end
+        end
+
+        false
+      end
+
+      # Produce a Base64 encoded SHA256 digest of a string
+      #
+      # @param string [String] the string to hash
+      # @return [String]
+      def hash(string)
+        OpenSSL::Digest.new("sha256", string).base64digest
+      end
+
+      # Retrieves the current time in UTC
+      #
+      # @return [Fixnum] seconds since epoch
+      def current_timestamp
+        Integer(Time.now.utc)
+      end
+
+      # Creates a empty choria:request:1
+      #
+      # Some envelope fields like time are set to sane defautls
+      #
+      # @return [Hash]
+      def empty_request
+        {
+          "protocol" => "choria:request:1",
+          "message" => nil,
+          "envelope" => {
+            "requestid" => nil,
+            "senderid" => @config.identity,
+            "callerid" => nil,
+            "filter" => {},
+            "collective" => @config.main_collective,
+            "agent" => nil,
+            "ttl" => @config.ttl,
+            "time" => current_timestamp
+          }
+        }
+      end
+
+      # Creates a empty choria:reply:1
+      #
+      # Some envelope fields like time are set to sane defautls
+      #
+      # @return [Hash]
+      def empty_reply
+        {
+          "protocol" => "choria:reply:1",
+          "message" => nil,
+          "envelope" => {
+            "senderid" => @config.identity,
+            "requestid" => nil,
+            "agent" => nil,
+            "time" => current_timestamp
+          }
+        }
+      end
+
+      # Converts a choria filter into a legacy format
+      #
+      # Choria filters have strings for fact filter keys, mcollective expect symbols
+      #
+      # @param filter [Hash] the input filter
+      # @return [Hash] a new filter converted to legacy format
+      def to_legacy_filter(filter)
+        return filter unless filter.include?("fact")
+
+        new = {}
+
+        filter.each do |key, value|
+          new[key] = value
+
+          next unless key == "fact"
+
+          new["fact"] = value.map do |ff|
+            {
+              :fact => ff.fetch(:fact, ff["fact"]),
+              :operator => ff.fetch(:operator, ff["operator"]),
+              :value => ff.fetch(:value, ff["value"])
+            }
+          end
+        end
+
+        new
+      end
+
+      # Converts a choria:request:1 to a legacy format
+      #
+      # @return [Hash]
+      def to_legacy_request(body)
+        {
+          :body => body["message"],
+          :senderid => body["envelope"]["senderid"],
+          :requestid => body["envelope"]["requestid"],
+          :filter => to_legacy_filter(body["envelope"]["filter"]),
+          :collective => body["envelope"]["collective"],
+          :agent => body["envelope"]["agent"],
+          :callerid => body["envelope"]["callerid"],
+          :ttl => body["envelope"]["ttl"],
+          :msgtime => body["envelope"]["time"]
+        }
+      end
+
+      # Converts a choria:reply:1 to a legacy format
+      #
+      # @return [Hash]
+      def to_legacy_reply(body)
+        {
+          :senderid => body["envelope"]["senderid"],
+          :requestid => body["envelope"]["requestid"],
+          :senderagent => body["envelope"]["agent"],
+          :msgtime => body["envelope"]["time"],
+          :body => body["message"]
+        }
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end