certificate_authority 0.1.2 → 1.0.0

checksums.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+SHA256:
+  metadata.gz: e413d44d788e07a95a90b5849298f41796dbd57dce8fe08a0713191ae812798c
+  data.tar.gz: '059b6bee928fdcc1cebd04c6dff6890f7179d66094d6af17c549db7ef1811e56'
+SHA512:
+  metadata.gz: 718978b7b52352cee16da1e555a0b0e71d0c68543bc627ef94869b45ff43dd259ce49a19b194105f96700848535a5397e039e86fd8733de899e5b61865eac2a8
+  data.tar.gz: b5998a5cfe29679198f4d57995e3f3e03f0694cc238e5fbc6f75a3a65b2ab80bfe3f86caac09616cb27f64832c0b83cddd87f3aaaa8e642e817429e3ecad0b7d

data/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+pkg
+development
+.bundle
+.rvmrc
+coverage
+doc

data/.rspec

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+--require spec_helper
+--color
+--format documentation

data/.travis.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+---
+sudo: false
+language: ruby
+cache: bundler
+rvm:
+  - 2.5
+  - 2.6
+  - 2.7
+before_install: gem install bundler
+script:
+  - bundle exec rake

data/Gemfile

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-source 'http://rubygems.org'
+source 'https://rubygems.org'
 
-gem 'activemodel', "~> 3.0.6"
-
-group :development do
-	gem 'rspec'
-  gem "jeweler", "~> 1.5.2"
-  gem "rcov", ">= 0"
-end
+gemspec

data/Gemfile.lock

@@ -1,35 +1,79 @@
+PATH
+  remote: .
+  specs:
+    certificate_authority (1.0.0)
+
 GEM
-  remote: http://rubygems.org/
+  remote: https://rubygems.org/
   specs:
-    activemodel (3.0.6)
-      activesupport (= 3.0.6)
-      builder (~> 2.1.2)
-      i18n (~> 0.5.0)
-    activesupport (3.0.6)
-    builder (2.1.2)
-    diff-lcs (1.1.2)
-    git (1.2.5)
-    i18n (0.5.0)
-    jeweler (1.5.2)
-      bundler (~> 1.0.0)
-      git (>= 1.2.5)
-      rake
-    rake (0.8.7)
-    rcov (0.9.9)
-    rspec (2.5.0)
-      rspec-core (~> 2.5.0)
-      rspec-expectations (~> 2.5.0)
-      rspec-mocks (~> 2.5.0)
-    rspec-core (2.5.1)
-    rspec-expectations (2.5.0)
-      diff-lcs (~> 1.1.2)
-    rspec-mocks (2.5.0)
+    ast (2.4.0)
+    coderay (1.1.2)
+    coveralls (0.8.23)
+      json (>= 1.8, < 3)
+      simplecov (~> 0.16.1)
+      term-ansicolor (~> 1.3)
+      thor (>= 0.19.4, < 2.0)
+      tins (~> 1.6)
+    diff-lcs (1.3)
+    docile (1.3.2)
+    json (2.3.0)
+    method_source (1.0.0)
+    parallel (1.19.1)
+    parser (2.7.1.3)
+      ast (~> 2.4.0)
+    pry (0.13.1)
+      coderay (~> 1.1)
+      method_source (~> 1.0)
+    rainbow (3.0.0)
+    rake (13.0.1)
+    rexml (3.2.4)
+    rspec (3.9.0)
+      rspec-core (~> 3.9.0)
+      rspec-expectations (~> 3.9.0)
+      rspec-mocks (~> 3.9.0)
+    rspec-core (3.9.2)
+      rspec-support (~> 3.9.3)
+    rspec-expectations (3.9.2)
+      diff-lcs (>= 1.2.0, < 2.0)
+      rspec-support (~> 3.9.0)
+    rspec-mocks (3.9.1)
+      diff-lcs (>= 1.2.0, < 2.0)
+      rspec-support (~> 3.9.0)
+    rspec-support (3.9.3)
+    rubocop (0.84.0)
+      parallel (~> 1.10)
+      parser (>= 2.7.0.1)
+      rainbow (>= 2.2.2, < 4.0)
+      rexml
+      rubocop-ast (>= 0.0.3)
+      ruby-progressbar (~> 1.7)
+      unicode-display_width (>= 1.4.0, < 2.0)
+    rubocop-ast (0.0.3)
+      parser (>= 2.7.0.1)
+    ruby-progressbar (1.10.1)
+    simplecov (0.16.1)
+      docile (~> 1.1)
+      json (>= 1.8, < 3)
+      simplecov-html (~> 0.10.0)
+    simplecov-html (0.10.2)
+    sync (0.5.0)
+    term-ansicolor (1.7.1)
+      tins (~> 1.0)
+    thor (1.0.1)
+    tins (1.25.0)
+      sync
+    unicode-display_width (1.7.0)
 
 PLATFORMS
   ruby
 
 DEPENDENCIES
-  activemodel (~> 3.0.6)
-  jeweler (~> 1.5.2)
-  rcov
+  certificate_authority!
+  coveralls
+  pry
+  rake
   rspec
+  rubocop
+
+BUNDLED WITH
+   2.1.4

data/README.rdoc

@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 = CertificateAuthority - Because it shouldn't be this damned complicated
 
+{<img src="https://travis-ci.org/cchandler/certificate_authority.png?branch=master" alt="Build Status" />}[https://travis-ci.org/cchandler/certificate_authority]
+{<img src="https://codeclimate.com/github/cchandler/certificate_authority.png" alt="Code Climate" />}[https://codeclimate.com/github/cchandler/certificate_authority]
+{<img src="https://coveralls.io/repos/cchandler/certificate_authority/badge.png?branch=master" alt="Code Coverage" />}[https://coveralls.io/r/cchandler/certificate_authority]
+
 This is meant to provide a (more) programmer-friendly implementation of all the basic functionality contained in RFC-3280 to implement your own certificate authority.
 
 You can generate root certificates, intermediate certificates, and terminal certificates.  You can also generate/manage Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) messages.
@@ -24,14 +28,15 @@ Let's look at a complete example for generating a new root certificate. Assuming
 
 Generating a self-signed root certificate is fairly easy:
 
-	require 'certificate_authority'
-	root = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
-	root.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
-	root.serial_number.number=1
-	root.key_material.generate_key
-	root.signing_entity = true
-	root.sign!
-	
+  require 'certificate_authority'
+  root = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
+  root.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
+  root.serial_number.number=1
+  root.key_material.generate_key
+  root.signing_entity = true
+  signing_profile = {"extensions" => {"keyUsage" => {"usage" => ["critical", "keyCertSign"] }} }
+  root.sign!(signing_profile)
+
 The required elements for the gem at this time are a common name for the subject and a serial number for the certificate. Since this is our self-signed root we're going to give it the first serial available of 1. Because certificate_authority is not designed to manage the issuance lifecycle you'll be expected to store serial numbers yourself.
 
 Next, after taking care of required fields, we will require key material for the new certificate.  There's a convenience method made available on the key_material object for generating new keys.  The private key will be available in:
@@ -48,29 +53,30 @@ Lastly, we declare that the certificate we're about to sign is itself a signing
 
 == Creating a new intermediate
 
-Maybe you don't want to actually sign certificates with your super-secret root certificate. This is actually how a good number of most public certificate authorities do it. Rather than sign with the primary root, they generate an intermediate root that is then responsible for signing the final certificates.  If you wanted to create a root certificate you would do something like the following:
+Maybe you don't want to actually sign certificates with your super-secret root certificate. This is actually how a good number of most public certificate authorities do it. Rather than sign with the primary root, they generate an intermediate root that is then responsible for signing the final certificates.  If you wanted to create an intermediate root certificate you would do something like the following:
+
+  intermediate = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
+  intermediate.subject.common_name= "My snazzy intermediate!"
+  intermediate.serial_number.number=2
+  intermediate.key_material.generate_key
+  intermediate.signing_entity = true
+  intermediate.parent = root
+  signing_profile = {"extensions" => {"keyUsage" => {"usage" => ["critical", "keyCertSign"] }} }
+  intermediate.sign!(signing_profile)
 
-	intermediate = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
-	intermediate.subject.common_name= "My snazzy intermediate!"
-	intermediate.serial_number.number=2
-	intermediate.key_material.generate_key
-	intermediate.signing_entity = true
-	intermediate.parent = root
-	intermediate.sign!
-	
-All we have to do is create another certificate like we did with the root. In this example we gave it the next available serial number which for us, was 2.  We then generate (and save!) key material for this new entity.  Even the +signing_entity+ is set to true so this certificate can sign other certificates.  The difference here is that the +parent+ field is set to the root. Going forward, whatever entity you want to sign a certificate, you set that entity to be the parent. In this case, our root will be responsible for signing this intermediate when we call +sign!+.
+All we have to do is create another certificate like we did with the root. In this example we gave it the next available serial number, which for us, was 2.  We then generate (and save!) key material for this new entity.  Even the +signing_entity+ is set to true so this certificate can sign other certificates.  The difference here is that the +parent+ field is set to the root. Going forward, whatever entity you want to sign a certificate, you set that entity to be the parent. In this case, our root will be responsible for signing this intermediate when we call +sign!+.
 
 = Creating new certificates (in general)
 
 Now that we have a root certificate (and possibly an intermediate) we can sign end-user certificates.  It is, perhaps unsurprisingly, similar to all the others:
 
-	plain_cert = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
-	plain_cert.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
-	plain_cert.serial_number.number=4
-	plain_cert.key_material.generate_key
-	plain_cert.parent = root # or intermediate
-	plain_cert.sign!
-	
+  plain_cert = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
+  plain_cert.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
+  plain_cert.serial_number.number=4
+  plain_cert.key_material.generate_key
+  plain_cert.parent = root # or intermediate
+  plain_cert.sign!
+
 That's all there is to it!  In this example we generate the key material ourselves, but it's possible for the end-user to generate certificate signing request (CSR) that we can then parse and consume automatically (coming soon).  To get the PEM formatted certificate for the user you would need to call:
 
   plain_cert.to_pem
@@ -83,27 +89,27 @@ Creating basic certificates is all well and good, but maybe you want _more_ sign
 
 Here's an example of a full signing profile for most of the common V3 extensions:
 
-	 signing_profile = {
-	   "extensions" => {
-	     "basicConstraints" => {"ca" => false},
-	     "crlDistributionPoints" => {"uri" => "http://notme.com/other.crl" },
-	     "subjectKeyIdentifier" => {},
-	     "authorityKeyIdentifier" => {},
-	     "authorityInfoAccess" => {"ocsp" => ["http://youFillThisOut/ocsp/"] },
-	     "keyUsage" => {"usage" => ["digitalSignature","nonRepudiation"] },
-	     "extendedKeyUsage" => {"usage" => [ "serverAuth","clientAuth"]},
-	     "subjectAltName" => {"uris" => ["http://subdomains.youFillThisOut/"]},
-	     "certificatePolicies" => {
-	     "policy_identifier" => "1.3.5.8", "cps_uris" => ["http://my.host.name/", "http://my.your.name/"], 
-				 "user_notice" => {
-	        "explicit_text" => "Explicit Text Here", 
-				 "organization" => "Organization name",
-				 "notice_numbers" => "1,2,3,4"
-	       }
-	   	}
-	 	}
-	}
-	
+   signing_profile = {
+     "extensions" => {
+       "basicConstraints" => {"ca" => false},
+       "crlDistributionPoints" => {"uri" => "http://notme.com/other.crl" },
+       "subjectKeyIdentifier" => {},
+       "authorityKeyIdentifier" => {},
+       "authorityInfoAccess" => {"ocsp" => ["http://youFillThisOut/ocsp/"] },
+       "keyUsage" => {"usage" => ["digitalSignature","nonRepudiation"] },
+       "extendedKeyUsage" => {"usage" => [ "serverAuth","clientAuth"]},
+       "subjectAltName" => {"uris" => ["http://subdomains.youFillThisOut/"]},
+       "certificatePolicies" => {
+       "policy_identifier" => "1.3.5.8", "cps_uris" => ["http://my.host.name/", "http://my.your.name/"], 
+         "user_notice" => {
+          "explicit_text" => "Explicit Text Here", 
+         "organization" => "Organization name",
+         "notice_numbers" => "1,2,3,4"
+         }
+       }
+     }
+  }
+
 Using a signing profile is done this way:
 
   certificate.sign!(signing_profile)
@@ -128,33 +134,33 @@ This extension controls where a conformant client can go to obtain a list of cer
 
 This extension is required to be present, but doesn't offer any configurable parameters.  Directly from the RFC:
 
-	The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
-	certificates that contain a particular public key.
-
-	To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST
-	appear in all conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates
-	including the basic constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) where
-	the value of cA is TRUE.  The value of the subject key identifier
-	MUST be the value placed in the key identifier field of the Authority
-	Key Identifier extension (section 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by
-	the subject of this certificate.
-	
+  The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
+  certificates that contain a particular public key.
+
+  To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST
+  appear in all conforming CA certificates, that is, all certificates
+  including the basic constraints extension (section 4.2.1.10) where
+  the value of cA is TRUE.  The value of the subject key identifier
+  MUST be the value placed in the key identifier field of the Authority
+  Key Identifier extension (section 4.2.1.1) of certificates issued by
+  the subject of this certificate.
+
 == Authority Key Identifier
 
 Just like the subject key identifier, this is required under most circumstances and doesn't contain any meaningful configuration options.  From the RFC:
 
-	The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
-	be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
-	facilitate certification path construction.  There is one exception;
-	where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
-	certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted.  The
-	signature on a self-signed certificate is generated with the private
-	key associated with the certificate's subject public key.  (This
-	proves that the issuer possesses both the public and private keys.)
-	In this case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be
-	identical, but only the subject key identifier is needed for
-	certification path building.
-	
+  The keyIdentifier field of the authorityKeyIdentifier extension MUST
+  be included in all certificates generated by conforming CAs to
+  facilitate certification path construction.  There is one exception;
+  where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
+  certificate, the authority key identifier MAY be omitted.  The
+  signature on a self-signed certificate is generated with the private
+  key associated with the certificate's subject public key.  (This
+  proves that the issuer possesses both the public and private keys.)
+  In this case, the subject and authority key identifiers would be
+  identical, but only the subject key identifier is needed for
+  certification path building.
+
 == Authority Info Access
 
 The authority info access extension allows a CA to sign a certificate with information a client can use to get up-to-the-minute status information on a signed certificate.  This takes the form of an OCSP[link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online_Certificate_Status_Protocol] (Online Certificate Status Protocol) endpoints.
@@ -191,27 +197,99 @@ These CPSs define what vetting criteria and maintenance practices are required t
 
 [user_notice] This is a nested field containing explicit human readable text if you want to embed a notice in the certificate body related to certification practices. It contains nested attributes of +explicit_text+ for the notice, +organization+ and +notice_numbers+. Refer to the RFC for specific implications of how these are set, but whether or not browsers implement the correct specified behavior for their presence is another issue.
 
+= Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs)
+
+If you want certificate requestors to be able to request certificates without moving the private key you'll need to generate a CSR and submit it to the certificate authority.
+
+Here's an example of using +certificate_authority+ to generate a CSR.
+
+  csr = CertificateAuthority::SigningRequest.new
+  dn = CertificateAuthority::DistinguishedName.new
+  dn.common_name = "localhost"
+  csr.distinguished_name = dn
+  k = CertificateAuthority::MemoryKeyMaterial.new
+  k.generate_key(2048)
+  csr.key_material = k
+  csr.digest = "SHA256"
+  csr.to_x509_csr.to_pem
+
+Similarly, reading a CSR in is as simple as providing the PEM formatted version to +SigningRequest.from_x509_csr+.
+
+  csr = CertificateAuthority::SigningRequest.from_x509_csr(@pem_csr)
+
+Once you have the CSR in the form of a +SigningRequest+ you can transform it to a +Certificate+ with +to_cert+. At this point it works just like any other certificate. You'll have to provide a serial number to actually sign it.
+
+= Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
+
+Revocation lists let clients know when a certificate in the wild should no longer be trusted.
+
+Like end-user certificates, CRLs have to be signed by a signing authority to be valid. Additionally, you will need to furnish a +nextUpdate+ value that indicates to the client when it should look for updates to the CRL and how long it should consider a cached value valid.
+
+Ideally you would place the result CRL somewhere generally accessible on the Internet and reference the URI in the +crlDistributionPoints+ extension on issued certificates.
+
+  crl = CertificateAuthority::CertificateRevocationList.new
+  crl << certificate # Some CertificateAuthority::Certificate
+  crl << serial_number # Also works with plain CertificateAuthority::SerialNumber
+  crl.parent = root_certificate # A valid root
+  crl.next_update = (60 * 60 * 10) # 10 Hours
+  crl.sign!
+  crl.to_pem
+
+= OCSP Support
+
+OCSP is the Online Certificate Status Protocol. It provides a mechanism to query an authority to see if a certificate is still valid without downloading an entire CRL. To use this mechanism you provide a URI in the Authority Information Access extension.
+If a client wishes to check the validity of a certificate they can query this endpoint.
+This request will only contain serial numbers, so you'll need to uniquely identify your authority in the AIA path.
+
+If a client sends you a DER encoded OCSP request you can read it out via +OCSPRequestReader+
+
+  ocsp_request_reader = CertificateAuthority::OCSPRequestReader.from_der(@ocsp_request.to_der)
+  ocsp_request_reader.serial_numbers
+
+Then, you can construct a response like this
+
+  response_builder = CertificateAuthority::OCSPResponseBuilder.from_request_reader(ocsp_request_reader)
+  response_builder.parent = root
+  response = response_builder.build_response # Returns OpenSSL::OCSP::Response
+  response.to_der
+
+The response builder will copy a (possible) nonce from the request. By default, the +OCSPResponseBuilder+ will say that every certificate is GOOD.
+You should definitely override this if you plan on revoking certificates.
+If you want to override this you'll need to supply a proc/lambda that takes a serial number and returns an array of status and reason.
+
+  response_builder = CertificateAuthority::OCSPResponseBuilder.from_request_reader(ocsp_request_reader)
+  response_builder.verification_mechanism = lambda {|certid|
+    [CertificateAuthority::OCSPResponseBuilder::REVOKED,CertificateAuthority::OCSPResponseBuilder::UNSPECIFIED]
+  }
+  response_builder.parent = root
+  response = response_builder.build_response # Response will say everything is revoked for unspecified reasons
+
+Lastly, you can configure a nextUpdate time in the response. This is the length of time for which a client may consider this response valid.
+The default is 15 minutes.
+
+  response_builder.next_update = 30 * 60 # 30 minutes
+
 = PKCS#11 Support
 
 If you happen to have a PKCS#11 compliant hardware token you can use +certificate_authority+ to maintain private key materials in hardware security modules. At this point the scope of operating that hardware is out of scope of this README but it's there and it is supported.
 
 To configure a certificate to utilize PKCS#11 instead of in memory keys all you need to do is:
 
-	root = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
-	root.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
-	root.serial_number.number=1
-	root.signing_entity = true
-	
-	key_material_in_hardware = CertificateAuthority::Pkcs11KeyMaterial.new
-	key_material_in_hardware.token_id = "46"
-	key_material_in_hardware.pkcs11_lib = "/usr/lib/libeTPkcs11.so"
-	key_material_in_hardware.openssl_pkcs11_engine_lib = "/usr/lib/engines/engine_pkcs11.so"
-	key_material_in_hardware.pin = "11111111"
-	
-	root.key_material = key_material_in_hardware
-	root.sign!
-	
-You're current version of OpenSSL _must_ include dynamic engine support and you will need to have OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine support.  You will also require the actual PKCS#11 driver from the hardware manufacturer.  As of today the only tokens I've gotten to work are:
+  root = CertificateAuthority::Certificate.new
+  root.subject.common_name= "http://mydomain.com"
+  root.serial_number.number=1
+  root.signing_entity = true
+
+  key_material_in_hardware = CertificateAuthority::Pkcs11KeyMaterial.new
+  key_material_in_hardware.token_id = "46"
+  key_material_in_hardware.pkcs11_lib = "/usr/lib/libeTPkcs11.so"
+  key_material_in_hardware.openssl_pkcs11_engine_lib = "/usr/lib/engines/engine_pkcs11.so"
+  key_material_in_hardware.pin = "11111111"
+
+  root.key_material = key_material_in_hardware
+  root.sign!
+
+Your current version of OpenSSL _must_ include dynamic engine support and you will need to have OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine support.  You will also require the actual PKCS#11 driver from the hardware manufacturer.  As of today the only tokens I've gotten to work are:
 
 [eTokenPro] Released by Aladdin (now SafeNet Inc.). I have only had success with the version 4 and 5 (32 bit only) copy of the driver. The newer authentication client released by SafeNet appears to be completely broken for interacting with the tokens outside of SafeNet's own tools. If anyone has a different experience I'd like to hear from you.
 
@@ -221,17 +299,34 @@ You're current version of OpenSSL _must_ include dynamic engine support and you
 
 Also of note, I have gotten these to work with 32-bit copies of Ubuntu 10.10 and pre-Snow Leopard versions of OS X. If you are running Snow Leopard you're out of luck since none of the companies I've contacted make a 64 bit driver.
 
-= Coming Soon
+= Hopefully in the future
 
 * More PKCS#11 hardware (I need driver support from the manufacturers)
-* Configurable V3 extensions for all the extended functionality
+
+= Todone
+
+* Support for working with CSRs to request & issue certificates
+* OCSP support
+
+= Misc notes
+
+* Firefox will complain about root/intermediate certificates unless both digitalSignature and keyEncipherment are specified as keyUsage attributes. Thanks diogomonica
+
+= Special thanks and Contributions
+
+* Diogo Monica @diogo
+* Justin Cummins @sul3n3t
+* @databus23
+* Colin Jones @trptcolin
+* Eric Monti @emonti
+* TJ Vanderpoel @bougyman
 
 == Meta
 
-Written by Chris Chandler(http://chrischandler.name) of Flatterline(http://flatterline.com)
+Written by Chris Chandler(http://chrischandler.name)
 
 Released under the MIT License: http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php
 
-Main page: http://github.com/cchandler/certificateauthority
+Main page: http://github.com/cchandler/certificate_authority
 
-Issue tracking: https://github.com/cchandler/certificateauthority/issues
+Issue tracking: https://github.com/cchandler/certificate_authority/issues