apple-data 1.0.606 → 1.0.608
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- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/lib/apple_data/version.rb +1 -1
- data/share/img4.yaml +463 -386
- data/share/pki.yaml +288 -162
- data/share/terms.yaml +173 -169
- metadata +2 -2
data/share/img4.yaml
CHANGED
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@@ -4,39 +4,51 @@ metadata:
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4
4
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credits:
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|
5
5
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types:
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6
6
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digest-object:
|
|
7
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-
description: Digest Objects are Firmare or Other Hashable Datastreams.
|
|
8
|
-
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|
9
|
-
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|
10
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-
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11
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-
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|
7
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+
description: Digest Objects are Firmare or Other Hashable Datastreams. They will
|
|
8
|
+
exist in NOR, Disk, or be received over USB. These objects will contain a `DGST`
|
|
9
|
+
value that is the cryptographic hash of the contents. They can contain additional
|
|
10
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+
properties per object, some of which are standard and others that are object
|
|
11
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+
specific.
|
|
12
12
|
common_properties:
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|
13
|
-
ESEC: Effective Security Mode - The security mode after evaluating the chip
|
|
14
|
-
|
|
15
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-
|
|
13
|
+
ESEC: Effective Security Mode - The security mode after evaluating the chip
|
|
14
|
+
and any demotion request
|
|
15
|
+
EPRO: Effective Production Mode - The peoduction mode after evaluating the chip
|
|
16
|
+
production and demotation request
|
|
17
|
+
EKEY: Effective Key Access - The effective access to teh SEP, used to protect
|
|
18
|
+
data during demotion
|
|
16
19
|
subtypes:
|
|
17
20
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local-boot-object:
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|
18
21
|
trust-measurement:
|
|
19
|
-
description: A trust measurement is requested from the processor to ensure
|
|
20
|
-
the boot flow has not changed since a prior time that measurement was
|
|
21
|
-
To date the trust measurement is commonly found on SEP firmware images.
|
|
22
|
+
description: A trust measurement is requested from the processor to ensure
|
|
23
|
+
that the boot flow has not changed since a prior time that measurement was
|
|
24
|
+
taken. To date the trust measurement is commonly found on SEP firmware images.
|
|
22
25
|
ssv-root-hash:
|
|
23
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-
description: Root Hash values are used to validate the Signature of an APFS
|
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24
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-
volume or snapshot. They will be paired to a coresponding disk image. Some
|
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25
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-
are paired with `ssv-merkle-tree` which includes the metadata for the
|
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26
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+
description: Root Hash values are used to validate the Signature of an APFS
|
|
27
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+
Signed volume or snapshot. They will be paired to a coresponding disk image. Some
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|
28
|
+
also are paired with `ssv-merkle-tree` which includes the metadata for the
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29
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+
volume.
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26
30
|
trust-cache:
|
|
27
31
|
img4-disk-image:
|
|
28
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-
description: Disk images are often signed IMG4 payloads used for USB boot
|
|
29
|
-
arm64BaseSystem.dmg. IMG4 is used for smaller disk images that
|
|
30
|
-
validated "single shot" unlike larger disks which use SSV
|
|
32
|
+
description: Disk images are often signed IMG4 payloads used for USB boot
|
|
33
|
+
or as the arm64BaseSystem.dmg. IMG4 is used for smaller disk images that
|
|
34
|
+
can be entirely validated "single shot" unlike larger disks which use SSV
|
|
35
|
+
and validate on read.
|
|
31
36
|
img4_tags:
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|
37
|
+
acdc:
|
|
38
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+
description:
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32
39
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acfw:
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|
33
40
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description:
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34
41
|
ache:
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35
42
|
description:
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36
43
|
acib:
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37
44
|
description:
|
|
45
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+
AcID:
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|
46
|
+
description: Apple Account DSID
|
|
47
|
+
type: integer
|
|
48
|
+
acid:
|
|
38
49
|
aciw:
|
|
39
50
|
description:
|
|
51
|
+
ADCL:
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|
40
52
|
ader:
|
|
41
53
|
description:
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|
42
54
|
agfi:
|
|
@@ -44,9 +56,9 @@ img4_tags:
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44
56
|
almo:
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45
57
|
description: Some internal iBootable image. Unknown purpose
|
|
46
58
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AMNM:
|
|
47
|
-
description: allow mix-n-match
|
|
48
|
-
|
|
49
|
-
|
|
59
|
+
description: allow mix-n-match When set to true, img4s can be any valid signed
|
|
60
|
+
version, allowing for unusual AP tickets where some components may be from a
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|
61
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+
prior verson
|
|
50
62
|
type: boolean
|
|
51
63
|
anef:
|
|
52
64
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description: Apple Neural Engine Firmware
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|
@@ -55,6 +67,7 @@ img4_tags:
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|
55
67
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- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
56
68
|
anrd:
|
|
57
69
|
description:
|
|
70
|
+
ansf:
|
|
58
71
|
aofi:
|
|
59
72
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description:
|
|
60
73
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aopf:
|
|
@@ -71,64 +84,79 @@ img4_tags:
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|
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71
84
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auac:
|
|
72
85
|
description:
|
|
73
86
|
aubt:
|
|
74
|
-
description:
|
|
87
|
+
description: Audio Boot Chime
|
|
75
88
|
augs:
|
|
76
|
-
description:
|
|
77
|
-
|
|
78
|
-
|
|
89
|
+
description: Auxiliary System Image Included in APTicket CA extensions, as well
|
|
90
|
+
as factory manifests. All cryptex manifests, and APTickets other then the root
|
|
91
|
+
APTicket (the one that is used directly from NOR) have this set to 1, indidcating
|
|
92
|
+
that it is an an addition or replacement to APTicket, but only if authroized. It
|
|
93
|
+
also seems to travel with `aubt` and `aupr`
|
|
79
94
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roots:
|
|
80
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-
|
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81
|
-
|
|
95
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+
- ExtraContent
|
|
96
|
+
- ManifestKey
|
|
82
97
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aupr:
|
|
83
|
-
description:
|
|
98
|
+
description: Audio Power Attach Chime
|
|
99
|
+
auxh:
|
|
100
|
+
description: User Authorized Kext List Hash
|
|
101
|
+
context:
|
|
84
102
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auxi:
|
|
85
|
-
title: Auxiliary
|
|
86
|
-
description:
|
|
87
|
-
|
|
88
|
-
|
|
89
|
-
|
|
90
|
-
into the LocalPolicy to avoid the potential for mixing and matching previously
|
|
91
|
-
system at boot time. If iBoot finds the auxi field
|
|
92
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-
|
|
93
|
-
|
|
94
|
-
|
|
95
|
-
|
|
96
|
-
|
|
97
|
-
|
|
98
|
-
|
|
103
|
+
title: Auxiliary Image4 Manifest Hash (`auxi`)
|
|
104
|
+
description: 'After the system verifies that the UAKL hash matches what’s found
|
|
105
|
+
in the `auxp` field of the LocalPolicy, it requests that the AuxKC be signed
|
|
106
|
+
by the Secure Enclave processor application that’s responsible for LocalPolicy
|
|
107
|
+
signing. Next, an SHA384 hash of the AuxKC Image4 manifest signature is placed
|
|
108
|
+
into the LocalPolicy to avoid the potential for mixing and matching previously
|
|
109
|
+
signed AuxKCs to an operating system at boot time. If iBoot finds the auxi field
|
|
110
|
+
in the LocalPolicy, it attempts to load the AuxKC from storage and validate
|
|
111
|
+
its signature. It also verifies that the hash of the Image4 manifest attached
|
|
112
|
+
to the AuxKC matches the value found in the auxi field. If the AuxKC fails to
|
|
113
|
+
load for any reason, the system continues to boot without this boot object and
|
|
114
|
+
(so) without any third-party kexts loaded. The auxp field is a prerequisite
|
|
115
|
+
for setting the auxi field in the LocalPolicy. Users change the auxi value implicitly
|
|
116
|
+
when they change the UAKL by approving a kext from the Security & Privacy pane
|
|
117
|
+
in System Preferences.
|
|
118
|
+
|
|
119
|
+
'
|
|
120
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
121
|
+
subtype: manifest
|
|
99
122
|
access:
|
|
100
123
|
write:
|
|
101
|
-
|
|
124
|
+
- macOS
|
|
102
125
|
auxk:
|
|
103
126
|
description: Auxiliary Kernel Cache
|
|
104
127
|
auxp:
|
|
105
|
-
title: Auxiliary
|
|
106
|
-
description:
|
|
107
|
-
|
|
108
|
-
|
|
109
|
-
|
|
110
|
-
|
|
128
|
+
title: Auxiliary Policy Hash (auxp)
|
|
129
|
+
description: 'The `auxp` is an SHA384 hash of the user-authorized kext list (UAKL)
|
|
130
|
+
policy. This is used at AuxKC generation time to help ensure that only user-authorized
|
|
131
|
+
kexts are included in the AuxKC. `smb2` is a prerequisite for setting this field.
|
|
132
|
+
Users change the `auxp` value implicitly when they change the UAKL by approving
|
|
133
|
+
a kext from the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
|
|
134
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+
|
|
135
|
+
'
|
|
111
136
|
type: binary
|
|
112
137
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subtype: sha2-384
|
|
113
138
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access:
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|
114
139
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write:
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|
115
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-
|
|
140
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+
- macOS
|
|
116
141
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auxr:
|
|
117
142
|
title: Auxiliary Kernel Collection (AuxKC) Receipt Hash (auxr)
|
|
118
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-
description:
|
|
119
|
-
|
|
120
|
-
|
|
121
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-
|
|
122
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-
some kexts that can be used to break the user-kernel boundary may lead to decreased
|
|
123
|
-
such as an inability to use Apple Pay or play 4K and HDR content.
|
|
124
|
-
opt in to a more restrictive AuxKC inclusion.
|
|
125
|
-
field
|
|
126
|
-
the
|
|
143
|
+
description: 'The `auxr` is an SHA384 hash of the AuxKC receipt, which indicates
|
|
144
|
+
the exact set of kexts that were included into the AuxKC. The AuxKC receipt
|
|
145
|
+
can be a subset of the UAKL, because kexts can be excluded from the AuxKC even
|
|
146
|
+
if they’re user authorized if they’re known to be used for attacks. In addition,
|
|
147
|
+
some kexts that can be used to break the user-kernel boundary may lead to decreased
|
|
148
|
+
functionality, such as an inability to use Apple Pay or play 4K and HDR content.
|
|
149
|
+
Users who want these capabilities opt in to a more restrictive AuxKC inclusion.
|
|
150
|
+
The auxp field is a prerequisite for setting the auxr field in the LocalPolicy.
|
|
151
|
+
Users change the auxr value implicitly when they build a new AuxKC from the
|
|
152
|
+
Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
|
|
153
|
+
|
|
154
|
+
'
|
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127
155
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type: digest-object
|
|
128
156
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subtype: sha2-384
|
|
129
157
|
access:
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|
130
158
|
write:
|
|
131
|
-
|
|
159
|
+
- macOS
|
|
132
160
|
avef:
|
|
133
161
|
description: AV Encryption (DRM) Firmware
|
|
134
162
|
type: digest-object
|
|
@@ -140,18 +168,19 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
140
168
|
description: battery image 1
|
|
141
169
|
batf:
|
|
142
170
|
description: battery full image
|
|
171
|
+
batF:
|
|
143
172
|
BLDS:
|
|
144
173
|
description:
|
|
145
|
-
prid:
|
|
146
|
-
description: Encrypted Private Key / Private Key Info
|
|
147
174
|
bles:
|
|
148
175
|
description:
|
|
149
|
-
|
|
150
|
-
description:
|
|
151
|
-
|
|
152
|
-
recovery: true
|
|
176
|
+
BMac:
|
|
177
|
+
description: Bluetooth MAC Address
|
|
178
|
+
manifest: true
|
|
153
179
|
BNCH:
|
|
154
|
-
|
|
180
|
+
title: Boot Nonce Hash
|
|
181
|
+
description: Based on the values of com.apple.System.boot-nonces
|
|
182
|
+
type: nonce
|
|
183
|
+
subtype:
|
|
155
184
|
BORD:
|
|
156
185
|
description: |-
|
|
157
186
|
The board the chip is attached to. With iPhones/iPads this is the variation between device sizes (occasionally
|
|
@@ -161,15 +190,31 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
161
190
|
With the T2 this value is unique to all MacBooks with the T2.
|
|
162
191
|
type: integer
|
|
163
192
|
alias:
|
|
164
|
-
|
|
193
|
+
- board-id
|
|
165
194
|
bstc:
|
|
166
|
-
|
|
195
|
+
title: Base Sysetm Trust Cache
|
|
196
|
+
description: 'The Base System Trust Cache is the static trust cache (a file containing
|
|
197
|
+
a list of CDHashes that is to be trusted and executed at platform trust.) that
|
|
198
|
+
coresponds to the Base System (typically arm64BaseSystem.dmg).
|
|
199
|
+
|
|
200
|
+
'
|
|
167
201
|
type: digest-object
|
|
168
202
|
subtype: trust-cache
|
|
169
203
|
bsys:
|
|
170
|
-
|
|
204
|
+
title: Base System Root Hash
|
|
205
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
206
|
+
subtype: ssv-root-hash
|
|
207
|
+
caos:
|
|
208
|
+
description:
|
|
209
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
210
|
+
root:
|
|
211
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
212
|
+
casy:
|
|
213
|
+
description: App Cryptex SSV Root Hash
|
|
171
214
|
type: digest-object
|
|
172
215
|
subtype: ssv-root-hash
|
|
216
|
+
roots:
|
|
217
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
173
218
|
CEPO:
|
|
174
219
|
description: |-
|
|
175
220
|
Certificate/Chip Epoch. This is a unit of roll-forward time (monotonic) that allows for any security issues
|
|
@@ -177,17 +222,13 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
177
222
|
nullable: true
|
|
178
223
|
type: boolean
|
|
179
224
|
alias:
|
|
180
|
-
|
|
225
|
+
- chip-epoch
|
|
181
226
|
cfel:
|
|
182
227
|
description:
|
|
183
228
|
chg0:
|
|
184
229
|
description: Charging Image 0
|
|
185
230
|
type: digest-object
|
|
186
231
|
subtype: graphic
|
|
187
|
-
faic:
|
|
188
|
-
description:
|
|
189
|
-
type: integer
|
|
190
|
-
default: 0
|
|
191
232
|
chg1:
|
|
192
233
|
description: Charging Image 1
|
|
193
234
|
type: digest-object
|
|
@@ -197,34 +238,44 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
197
238
|
sharing the same GID key
|
|
198
239
|
type: integer
|
|
199
240
|
width: 2
|
|
200
|
-
nsph:
|
|
201
|
-
description: preboot splat manifest hash
|
|
202
241
|
CHMH:
|
|
203
|
-
|
|
242
|
+
title: Chained Manifest Hash
|
|
243
|
+
description: Appears in manfiest / APTickets where the ticket is chained from
|
|
244
|
+
another via `nish` or `nsph`.
|
|
245
|
+
ciof:
|
|
204
246
|
cker:
|
|
205
247
|
description:
|
|
206
248
|
ckih:
|
|
207
249
|
description:
|
|
250
|
+
clas:
|
|
251
|
+
description: Class for Key / Object - Found in FDR objects
|
|
252
|
+
examples:
|
|
253
|
+
roots:
|
|
254
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
255
|
+
CLHS:
|
|
256
|
+
clid:
|
|
208
257
|
cmsv:
|
|
209
258
|
description:
|
|
210
|
-
|
|
211
|
-
|
|
212
|
-
|
|
259
|
+
cnch:
|
|
260
|
+
roots:
|
|
261
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
213
262
|
coih:
|
|
214
263
|
title: CustomOS Image4 Manifest Hash (coih)
|
|
215
|
-
description:
|
|
216
|
-
|
|
217
|
-
|
|
218
|
-
|
|
264
|
+
description: 'The `coih` is an SHA384 hash of CustomOS Image4 manifest. The payload
|
|
265
|
+
for that manifest is used by iBoot (instead of the XNU kernel) to transfer control.
|
|
266
|
+
Users change the `coih` value implicitly when they use the `kmutil` configure-boot
|
|
267
|
+
command-line tool in 1TR.
|
|
268
|
+
|
|
269
|
+
'
|
|
219
270
|
type: digest-object
|
|
220
271
|
subtype: IM4M
|
|
221
272
|
access:
|
|
222
273
|
write:
|
|
223
|
-
|
|
274
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
224
275
|
CPRO:
|
|
225
276
|
description: Chip promotion fuse value (what is burned in)
|
|
226
277
|
alias:
|
|
227
|
-
|
|
278
|
+
- certificate-production-status
|
|
228
279
|
nullable: true
|
|
229
280
|
type: boolean
|
|
230
281
|
CSEC:
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|
@@ -232,19 +283,10 @@ img4_tags:
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232
283
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type: boolean
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233
284
|
nullable: true
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234
285
|
alias:
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235
|
-
|
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236
|
-
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237
|
-
description: Install / Restore SSV Root Hash
|
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238
|
-
type: digest-object
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239
|
-
subtype: ssv-root-hash
|
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240
|
-
dali:
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241
|
-
description:
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242
|
-
data:
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286
|
+
- certificate-security-mode
|
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287
|
+
csos:
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243
288
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description:
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244
|
-
casy:
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245
|
-
description: App Cryptex SSV Root Hash
|
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246
289
|
type: digest-object
|
|
247
|
-
subtype: ssv-root-hash
|
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248
290
|
roots:
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|
249
291
|
- ExtraContent
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250
292
|
cssy:
|
|
@@ -253,34 +295,28 @@ img4_tags:
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253
295
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subtype: ssv-root-hash
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254
296
|
roots:
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255
297
|
- ExtraContent
|
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298
|
+
csys:
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299
|
+
description: Install / Restore SSV Root Hash
|
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300
|
+
type: digest-object
|
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301
|
+
subtype: ssv-root-hash
|
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302
|
+
dali:
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303
|
+
description:
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304
|
+
data:
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305
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+
description:
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306
|
+
dcp2:
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256
307
|
DGST:
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257
308
|
description: payload digest
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258
309
|
diag:
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259
310
|
description:
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260
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-
trca:
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261
|
-
description:
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262
|
-
type: digest-object
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263
|
-
roots:
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264
|
-
- ExtraContent
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265
|
-
csos:
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266
|
-
description:
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267
|
-
type: digest-object
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268
|
-
roots:
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269
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
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270
|
-
trcs:
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271
|
-
description:
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272
|
-
type: digest-object
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273
|
-
roots:
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274
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
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275
311
|
disk:
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276
312
|
description:
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277
313
|
DPRO:
|
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278
|
-
description: Demote from Production Request
|
|
279
|
-
|
|
314
|
+
description: Demote from Production Request Value is used by TSS sever to issue
|
|
315
|
+
EPRO values, or effective AP prodctuion state.
|
|
280
316
|
DSEC:
|
|
281
|
-
description: Demote from Secure Request
|
|
282
|
-
|
|
283
|
-
|
|
317
|
+
description: Demote from Secure Request Value is used by TSS server to issue ESEC
|
|
318
|
+
values, or effective AP Security Mode should the requester be authorized. These
|
|
319
|
+
requests are not available to consumers, only to Apple Internal.
|
|
284
320
|
dtre:
|
|
285
321
|
description: device tree
|
|
286
322
|
type: digest-object
|
|
@@ -290,6 +326,7 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
290
326
|
type: digest-object
|
|
291
327
|
subtype: device-tree
|
|
292
328
|
recovery: true
|
|
329
|
+
dven:
|
|
293
330
|
ECID:
|
|
294
331
|
description: Exclusive chip identifier. This is burned into an eFuse at time
|
|
295
332
|
of manufacture and unique across all devices sharing the same CHIP
|
|
@@ -313,119 +350,57 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
313
350
|
nullable: false
|
|
314
351
|
type: boolean
|
|
315
352
|
EPRO:
|
|
316
|
-
description: Effective chip promotion / demotion state (if CPFM 03 this must be
|
|
353
|
+
description: Effective chip promotion / demotion state (if CPFM 03 this must be
|
|
354
|
+
0 to set ESEC)
|
|
317
355
|
alias:
|
|
318
|
-
|
|
356
|
+
- effective-production-status-ap
|
|
319
357
|
nullable: false
|
|
320
358
|
type: boolean
|
|
321
|
-
secb:
|
|
322
|
-
description: Sets a security value such as `trst` or the FDR signing trust object. "security blob?"
|
|
323
359
|
esca:
|
|
324
360
|
description:
|
|
325
|
-
hrlp:
|
|
326
|
-
title: Has Secure Enclave Signed recoveryOS Local Policy (hrlp)
|
|
327
|
-
description: >
|
|
328
|
-
The `hrlp` indicates whether or not the `prot` value is the measurement of a Secure Enclave–signed
|
|
329
|
-
recoveryOS LocalPolicy. If not, then the recoveryOS LocalPolicy is signed by the Apple online signing server,
|
|
330
|
-
which signs things such as macOS Image4 files.
|
|
331
|
-
type: boolean
|
|
332
|
-
access:
|
|
333
|
-
write:
|
|
334
|
-
- 1TR
|
|
335
|
-
- recoveryOS
|
|
336
|
-
- macOS
|
|
337
361
|
esdm:
|
|
338
362
|
description: Extended Security Domain fuses
|
|
339
363
|
type: integer
|
|
340
364
|
alias:
|
|
341
|
-
|
|
342
|
-
styp:
|
|
343
|
-
description: Crytpex Subtype
|
|
344
|
-
type: u32
|
|
345
|
-
alias:
|
|
346
|
-
- cryptex subtype
|
|
347
|
-
roots:
|
|
348
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
|
349
|
-
acid:
|
|
350
|
-
stID:
|
|
351
|
-
description: Station IDentifier
|
|
352
|
-
AcID:
|
|
353
|
-
description: Apple Account DSID
|
|
354
|
-
type: integer
|
|
355
|
-
WSKU:
|
|
356
|
-
description: Wireless SKU
|
|
357
|
-
WMac:
|
|
358
|
-
description: Wireless MAC Address
|
|
359
|
-
TMac:
|
|
360
|
-
description: Thunderbolt MAC Address
|
|
361
|
-
manifest: true
|
|
362
|
-
BMac:
|
|
363
|
-
description: Bluetooth MAC Address
|
|
364
|
-
manifest: true
|
|
365
|
-
SrNm:
|
|
366
|
-
description: Unit Serial Number
|
|
367
|
-
manifest: true
|
|
368
|
-
ptrp:
|
|
369
|
-
snuf:
|
|
370
|
-
description: Staged next update firmware?
|
|
371
|
-
Regn:
|
|
372
|
-
description: Region Code
|
|
373
|
-
example: LL/A
|
|
374
|
-
type: string
|
|
375
|
-
manifest: true
|
|
376
|
-
Mod#:
|
|
377
|
-
CLHS:
|
|
378
|
-
HmCA:
|
|
379
|
-
FSCl:
|
|
380
|
-
ADCL:
|
|
381
|
-
clid:
|
|
382
|
-
hop0:
|
|
383
|
-
oppd:
|
|
384
|
-
description: Unknown, used by `stg1`/`sepi` - sha384 hash sized
|
|
365
|
+
- esdm-fuses
|
|
385
366
|
ESEC:
|
|
386
367
|
description: Effective security mode
|
|
387
368
|
alias:
|
|
388
|
-
|
|
369
|
+
- effective-security-mode-ap
|
|
389
370
|
euou:
|
|
390
371
|
description: engineering use-only unit
|
|
391
|
-
|
|
392
|
-
description:
|
|
393
|
-
|
|
394
|
-
|
|
395
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
|
396
|
-
psmh:
|
|
397
|
-
description: previous stage manifest hash
|
|
398
|
-
|
|
372
|
+
faic:
|
|
373
|
+
description:
|
|
374
|
+
type: integer
|
|
375
|
+
default: 0
|
|
399
376
|
fchp:
|
|
400
377
|
description: Cryptex1,ChipID - Mask
|
|
401
378
|
roots:
|
|
402
379
|
- ExtraContent
|
|
403
380
|
fdrs:
|
|
404
381
|
description:
|
|
405
|
-
rvok:
|
|
406
|
-
description: Trust object revocation list
|
|
407
|
-
trpk:
|
|
408
|
-
description: Trust public keys
|
|
409
|
-
rssl:
|
|
410
|
-
description: The valid CA used for secure communications with the FDR server to obtain the FDR objects. This
|
|
411
|
-
differs from the `trst` object as `rssl` is in transit and `trst` is at rest.
|
|
412
382
|
fdrt:
|
|
413
383
|
description:
|
|
384
|
+
fgpt:
|
|
385
|
+
description: factory glob al pre-release trust
|
|
414
386
|
file:
|
|
415
387
|
description:
|
|
416
388
|
fpgt:
|
|
417
389
|
description:
|
|
390
|
+
FSCl:
|
|
418
391
|
ftab:
|
|
419
|
-
description:
|
|
420
|
-
|
|
421
|
-
|
|
422
|
-
|
|
423
|
-
|
|
424
|
-
|
|
425
|
-
|
|
392
|
+
description: 'Factory Trust - Auto Boot FTAB images (used for devices such as
|
|
393
|
+
AirPods, etc) are "hacktivated" or pre-APTicket''ed devices as they lack either
|
|
394
|
+
a restore connection, or persistet memory. Common early usage of this was the
|
|
395
|
+
Heywire dongles used for video conversion on the Mac. It was simplest for the
|
|
396
|
+
device to lack NAND and simply receive the firmware from a host on powerup. FTAB
|
|
397
|
+
files are fully ready to run blobs often including RTKit OS based memory images.
|
|
398
|
+
|
|
399
|
+
'
|
|
426
400
|
ftap:
|
|
427
|
-
description:
|
|
428
|
-
|
|
401
|
+
description: 'Factory Trust - Application Processor
|
|
402
|
+
|
|
403
|
+
'
|
|
429
404
|
type: hash
|
|
430
405
|
ftot:
|
|
431
406
|
description: Factory Trust - Other
|
|
@@ -440,6 +415,7 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
440
415
|
description:
|
|
441
416
|
glyc:
|
|
442
417
|
description: Gyroscope Calibration
|
|
418
|
+
glyP:
|
|
443
419
|
glyp:
|
|
444
420
|
description:
|
|
445
421
|
hash:
|
|
@@ -448,46 +424,41 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
448
424
|
description:
|
|
449
425
|
hime:
|
|
450
426
|
description:
|
|
427
|
+
HmCA:
|
|
451
428
|
hmmr:
|
|
452
429
|
description:
|
|
453
430
|
homr:
|
|
454
431
|
description:
|
|
455
|
-
|
|
456
|
-
|
|
457
|
-
|
|
458
|
-
|
|
459
|
-
|
|
460
|
-
|
|
461
|
-
|
|
462
|
-
|
|
463
|
-
|
|
464
|
-
|
|
465
|
-
|
|
432
|
+
hop0:
|
|
433
|
+
hrlp:
|
|
434
|
+
title: Has Secure Enclave Signed recoveryOS Local Policy (hrlp)
|
|
435
|
+
description: 'The `hrlp` indicates whether or not the `prot` value is the measurement
|
|
436
|
+
of a Secure Enclave–signed recoveryOS LocalPolicy. If not, then the recoveryOS
|
|
437
|
+
LocalPolicy is signed by the Apple online signing server, which signs things
|
|
438
|
+
such as macOS Image4 files.
|
|
439
|
+
|
|
440
|
+
'
|
|
441
|
+
type: boolean
|
|
442
|
+
access:
|
|
443
|
+
write:
|
|
444
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
445
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
446
|
+
- macOS
|
|
466
447
|
hypr:
|
|
467
448
|
description: Hypervisor
|
|
449
|
+
ibd1:
|
|
450
|
+
description: iBoot Data Stage 1
|
|
451
|
+
ibdt:
|
|
452
|
+
description: iBoot Data
|
|
468
453
|
iBEC:
|
|
469
454
|
description: iBoot Epoch Change
|
|
470
455
|
ibot:
|
|
471
456
|
description: iBoot
|
|
472
|
-
ibdt:
|
|
473
|
-
description: iBoot Data
|
|
474
|
-
ibd1:
|
|
475
|
-
description: iBoot Data Stage 1
|
|
476
|
-
glyP:
|
|
477
457
|
ibss:
|
|
478
|
-
dven:
|
|
479
|
-
dcp2:
|
|
480
|
-
ciof:
|
|
481
|
-
batF:
|
|
482
|
-
ansf:
|
|
483
|
-
rfcg:
|
|
484
|
-
type: boolean
|
|
485
458
|
iBSS:
|
|
486
459
|
description: iBoot Second Stage
|
|
487
460
|
ienv:
|
|
488
461
|
description:
|
|
489
|
-
LLB:
|
|
490
|
-
description: Low Level iBoot
|
|
491
462
|
IM4M:
|
|
492
463
|
description:
|
|
493
464
|
IM4P:
|
|
@@ -496,6 +467,8 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
496
467
|
description:
|
|
497
468
|
IMG4:
|
|
498
469
|
description:
|
|
470
|
+
inst:
|
|
471
|
+
descryption: The key or file to install
|
|
499
472
|
ipdf:
|
|
500
473
|
description:
|
|
501
474
|
isor:
|
|
@@ -516,84 +489,78 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
516
489
|
description:
|
|
517
490
|
krnl:
|
|
518
491
|
description: Kernel
|
|
519
|
-
acdc:
|
|
520
|
-
description:
|
|
521
492
|
kuid:
|
|
522
493
|
title: Key encryption key (KEK) Group UUID (kuid)
|
|
523
|
-
description:
|
|
524
|
-
|
|
525
|
-
|
|
526
|
-
|
|
494
|
+
description: 'The kuid indicates the volume that was booted. The key encryption
|
|
495
|
+
key has typically been used for Data Protection. For each LocalPolicy, it’s
|
|
496
|
+
used to protect the LocalPolicy signing key. The kuid is set by the user implicitly
|
|
497
|
+
when creating a new operating system install.
|
|
498
|
+
|
|
499
|
+
'
|
|
527
500
|
type: binary
|
|
528
501
|
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
529
502
|
access:
|
|
530
503
|
write:
|
|
531
|
-
|
|
532
|
-
|
|
533
|
-
|
|
504
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
505
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
506
|
+
- macOS
|
|
534
507
|
lamo:
|
|
535
508
|
description:
|
|
536
509
|
lckr:
|
|
537
510
|
description:
|
|
511
|
+
LLB:
|
|
512
|
+
description: Low Level iBoot
|
|
538
513
|
LNCH:
|
|
539
514
|
description:
|
|
540
515
|
lobo:
|
|
541
|
-
description: Local Boot Object. Indicates that the object is to be used as the
|
|
542
|
-
and not provided by the server for remote / DFU
|
|
516
|
+
description: Local Boot Object. Indicates that the object is to be used as the
|
|
517
|
+
target of a local boot only and not provided by the server for remote / DFU
|
|
518
|
+
boots.
|
|
543
519
|
logo:
|
|
544
520
|
description: Apple logo image
|
|
545
521
|
love:
|
|
546
|
-
title:
|
|
547
|
-
description:
|
|
548
|
-
|
|
549
|
-
|
|
522
|
+
title: Long Operating System Version (love)
|
|
523
|
+
description: 'The love indicates the OS version that the LocalPolicy is created
|
|
524
|
+
for. The version is obtained from the next state manifest during LocalPolicy
|
|
525
|
+
creation and is used to enforce recoveryOS pairing restrictions.
|
|
526
|
+
|
|
527
|
+
'
|
|
550
528
|
type: string
|
|
551
|
-
example:
|
|
529
|
+
example: 21.3.66.0.0,0
|
|
552
530
|
access:
|
|
553
531
|
write:
|
|
554
|
-
|
|
555
|
-
|
|
556
|
-
|
|
557
|
-
roots:
|
|
558
|
-
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
559
|
-
prtp:
|
|
560
|
-
description: Product ID String
|
|
561
|
-
type: string
|
|
562
|
-
example: iPhone16,2
|
|
563
|
-
roots:
|
|
564
|
-
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
565
|
-
sdkp:
|
|
566
|
-
description: SDK for Product
|
|
567
|
-
type: string
|
|
532
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
533
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
534
|
+
- macOS
|
|
568
535
|
roots:
|
|
569
536
|
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
570
|
-
values:
|
|
571
|
-
- iphoneos
|
|
572
|
-
- macos
|
|
573
537
|
lphp:
|
|
574
538
|
description:
|
|
575
|
-
mspr:
|
|
576
539
|
lpnh:
|
|
577
540
|
title: LocalPolicy Nonce Hash (lpnh)
|
|
578
|
-
description:
|
|
579
|
-
|
|
580
|
-
|
|
581
|
-
|
|
582
|
-
|
|
583
|
-
would need to place a value into the Secure Storage Component, which
|
|
584
|
-
found in the LocalPolicy they want to replay.
|
|
585
|
-
|
|
586
|
-
|
|
587
|
-
|
|
588
|
-
|
|
589
|
-
|
|
541
|
+
description: 'The lpnh is used for anti-replay of the LocalPolicy. This is an
|
|
542
|
+
SHA384 hash of the LocalPolicy Nonce (LPN), which is stored in the Secure Storage
|
|
543
|
+
Component and accessible using the Secure Enclave Boot ROM or Secure Enclave.
|
|
544
|
+
The raw nonce is never visible to the Application Processor, only to the sepOS.
|
|
545
|
+
An attacker wanting to convince LLB that a previous LocalPolicy they had captured
|
|
546
|
+
was valid would need to place a value into the Secure Storage Component, which
|
|
547
|
+
hashes to the same lpnh value found in the LocalPolicy they want to replay.
|
|
548
|
+
Normally there is a single LPN valid on the system—except during software updates,
|
|
549
|
+
when two are simultaneously valid—to allow for the possibility of falling back
|
|
550
|
+
to booting the old software in the event of an update error. When any LocalPolicy
|
|
551
|
+
for any operating system is changed, all policies are re-signed with the new
|
|
552
|
+
lpnh value corresponding to the new LPN found in the Secure Storage Component.
|
|
553
|
+
This change happens when the user changes security settings or creates new operating
|
|
554
|
+
systems with a new LocalPolicy for each.
|
|
555
|
+
|
|
556
|
+
'
|
|
590
557
|
type: binary
|
|
591
558
|
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
592
559
|
access:
|
|
593
560
|
write:
|
|
594
|
-
|
|
595
|
-
|
|
596
|
-
|
|
561
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
562
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
563
|
+
- macOS
|
|
597
564
|
lpol:
|
|
598
565
|
description: Local Policy
|
|
599
566
|
ltrs:
|
|
@@ -616,29 +583,70 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
616
583
|
description:
|
|
617
584
|
mmsv:
|
|
618
585
|
description:
|
|
586
|
+
Mod#:
|
|
619
587
|
mpro:
|
|
620
588
|
description:
|
|
621
589
|
msec:
|
|
622
590
|
description:
|
|
591
|
+
mspr:
|
|
623
592
|
msys:
|
|
624
|
-
description:
|
|
593
|
+
description: 'System Volume Cannonical Metadata Contains a Merkle Tree of the
|
|
594
|
+
System Volume. The Merkle-Tree is used to verify Signed System Volume, in a
|
|
595
|
+
similar way to a Git repository, where every file is included in the tree of
|
|
596
|
+
the folder and so on up to the root node. The root node is validated against
|
|
597
|
+
the coresponding `root_hash`. The inclusion of the merkle tree allows for discovery
|
|
598
|
+
of where the system volume''s data is broken, as the root_hash can only tell
|
|
599
|
+
you if it is broken.
|
|
600
|
+
|
|
601
|
+
'
|
|
625
602
|
mtfw:
|
|
626
603
|
description:
|
|
604
|
+
mtpf:
|
|
627
605
|
name:
|
|
628
606
|
description:
|
|
607
|
+
ndom:
|
|
608
|
+
roots:
|
|
609
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
610
|
+
nish:
|
|
611
|
+
title: Next Stage Image4 Manifest Hash (nsih)
|
|
612
|
+
description: 'The nsih field represents an SHA384 hash of the Image4 manifest
|
|
613
|
+
data structure that describes the booted macOS. The macOS Image4 manifest contains
|
|
614
|
+
measurements for all the boot objects—such as iBoot, the static trust cache,
|
|
615
|
+
device tree, Boot Kernel Collection, and signed system volume (SSV) volume root
|
|
616
|
+
hash. When LLB is directed to boot a given macOS, it’s designed to ensure that
|
|
617
|
+
the hash of the macOS Image4 manifest attached to iBoot matches what’s captured
|
|
618
|
+
in the nsih field of the LocalPolicy. In this way, the nsih captures the user
|
|
619
|
+
intention of what operating system the user has created a LocalPolicy for. Users
|
|
620
|
+
change the nsih value implicitly when they perform a software update.
|
|
621
|
+
|
|
622
|
+
'
|
|
623
|
+
type: binary
|
|
624
|
+
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
625
|
+
context:
|
|
626
|
+
lpol:
|
|
627
|
+
access:
|
|
628
|
+
write:
|
|
629
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
630
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
631
|
+
- macOS
|
|
629
632
|
nrde:
|
|
630
633
|
description:
|
|
631
634
|
nsih:
|
|
632
635
|
description: Next Stage Image Hash
|
|
636
|
+
nsph:
|
|
637
|
+
description: Next Stage preboot splat manifest hash
|
|
633
638
|
nsrv:
|
|
634
639
|
description:
|
|
635
640
|
OBJP:
|
|
636
|
-
description: Object Properties - Values that may be assigned per "object" (firmawres)
|
|
641
|
+
description: Object Properties - Values that may be assigned per "object" (firmawres)
|
|
642
|
+
that contain a `DGST`
|
|
637
643
|
type: sequence
|
|
638
644
|
omer:
|
|
639
645
|
description:
|
|
640
646
|
ooth:
|
|
641
647
|
description:
|
|
648
|
+
oppd:
|
|
649
|
+
description: Unknown, used by `stg1`/`sepi` - sha384 hash sized
|
|
642
650
|
osev:
|
|
643
651
|
description:
|
|
644
652
|
osrd:
|
|
@@ -647,6 +655,14 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
647
655
|
description:
|
|
648
656
|
owns:
|
|
649
657
|
description:
|
|
658
|
+
pave:
|
|
659
|
+
description: 'Pre-authorization Version (XNU) The version of a pre-authorized
|
|
660
|
+
Cryptex.
|
|
661
|
+
|
|
662
|
+
'
|
|
663
|
+
type: string
|
|
664
|
+
roots:
|
|
665
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
650
666
|
PAYP:
|
|
651
667
|
description:
|
|
652
668
|
pcrp:
|
|
@@ -667,24 +683,48 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
667
683
|
subtype:
|
|
668
684
|
pndp:
|
|
669
685
|
description:
|
|
686
|
+
prid:
|
|
687
|
+
description: Encrypted Private Key / Private Key Info
|
|
670
688
|
prot:
|
|
671
689
|
title: Paired recoveryOS Trusted Boot Policy Measurement (prot)
|
|
672
|
-
description:
|
|
673
|
-
|
|
674
|
-
|
|
675
|
-
|
|
676
|
-
macOS LocalPolicy, provides a pairing to indicate the recoveryOS LocalPolicy
|
|
677
|
-
macOS LocalPolicy.
|
|
690
|
+
description: 'A paired recoveryOS Trusted Boot Policy Measurement (TBPM) is a
|
|
691
|
+
special iterative SHA384 hash calculation over the Image4 manifest of a LocalPolicy,
|
|
692
|
+
excluding nonces, in order to give a consistent measurement over time (because
|
|
693
|
+
nonces like lpnh are frequently updated). The prot field, which is found only
|
|
694
|
+
in each macOS LocalPolicy, provides a pairing to indicate the recoveryOS LocalPolicy
|
|
695
|
+
that corresponds to the macOS LocalPolicy.
|
|
696
|
+
|
|
697
|
+
'
|
|
678
698
|
type: digest-object
|
|
679
699
|
subtype: trust-measurement
|
|
680
700
|
access:
|
|
681
701
|
write:
|
|
682
|
-
|
|
683
|
-
|
|
684
|
-
|
|
702
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
703
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
704
|
+
- macOS
|
|
705
|
+
prtp:
|
|
706
|
+
description: Product Type String
|
|
707
|
+
type: string
|
|
708
|
+
example: iPhone16,2
|
|
709
|
+
roots:
|
|
710
|
+
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
711
|
+
psmh:
|
|
712
|
+
description: previous stage manifest hash
|
|
713
|
+
ptrp:
|
|
714
|
+
rans:
|
|
715
|
+
description: Restore Apple NAND Storage Firmware
|
|
716
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
685
717
|
rbmt:
|
|
686
718
|
description:
|
|
687
|
-
|
|
719
|
+
rcfg:
|
|
720
|
+
description: 'Appears in certificates issues by factory such as `T6031-SDOM1-TssLive-ManifestKey-RevA-Factory`.
|
|
721
|
+
Potentially indicates that the policy is for a recovery boot only.
|
|
722
|
+
|
|
723
|
+
'
|
|
724
|
+
type: boolean
|
|
725
|
+
rcio:
|
|
726
|
+
description: Restore CIO
|
|
727
|
+
rdcp:
|
|
688
728
|
rddg:
|
|
689
729
|
description:
|
|
690
730
|
rdsk:
|
|
@@ -693,16 +733,17 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
693
733
|
description:
|
|
694
734
|
recm:
|
|
695
735
|
description:
|
|
696
|
-
|
|
697
|
-
description:
|
|
698
|
-
|
|
699
|
-
|
|
736
|
+
Regn:
|
|
737
|
+
description: Region Code
|
|
738
|
+
example: LL/A
|
|
739
|
+
type: string
|
|
740
|
+
manifest: true
|
|
741
|
+
rfcg:
|
|
700
742
|
type: boolean
|
|
701
743
|
rfta:
|
|
702
744
|
description:
|
|
703
745
|
rfts:
|
|
704
746
|
description:
|
|
705
|
-
rdcp:
|
|
706
747
|
rkrn:
|
|
707
748
|
description: restore kernel
|
|
708
749
|
rlgo:
|
|
@@ -714,78 +755,45 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
714
755
|
type: boolean
|
|
715
756
|
ronh:
|
|
716
757
|
title: recoveryOS Nonce Hash (ronh)
|
|
717
|
-
description:
|
|
718
|
-
|
|
719
|
-
|
|
720
|
-
|
|
721
|
-
|
|
722
|
-
Secure Storage Component), while still leaving the system recoveryOS bootable.
|
|
723
|
-
operating systems can be reenabled when the system owner proves
|
|
724
|
-
putting in their iCloud password used for the
|
|
725
|
-
|
|
758
|
+
description: 'The ronh behaves the same way as the lpnh, but is found exclusively
|
|
759
|
+
in the LocalPolicy for system recoveryOS. It’s updated when the system recoveryOS
|
|
760
|
+
is updated, such as on software updates. A separate nonce from the lpnh and
|
|
761
|
+
rpnh is used so that when a device is put into a disabled state by Find My,
|
|
762
|
+
existing operating systems can be disabled (by removing their LPN and RPN from
|
|
763
|
+
the Secure Storage Component), while still leaving the system recoveryOS bootable.
|
|
764
|
+
In this way, the operating systems can be reenabled when the system owner proves
|
|
765
|
+
their control over the system by putting in their iCloud password used for the
|
|
766
|
+
Find My account. This change happens when a user updates the system recoveryOS
|
|
767
|
+
or creates new operating systems.
|
|
768
|
+
|
|
769
|
+
'
|
|
726
770
|
type: binary
|
|
727
771
|
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
728
772
|
access:
|
|
729
773
|
write:
|
|
730
|
-
|
|
731
|
-
|
|
732
|
-
|
|
774
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
775
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
776
|
+
- macOS
|
|
733
777
|
rosi:
|
|
734
778
|
description:
|
|
735
|
-
nish:
|
|
736
|
-
title: Next Stage Image4 Manifest Hash (nsih)
|
|
737
|
-
description: >
|
|
738
|
-
The nsih field represents an SHA384 hash of the Image4 manifest data structure that describes the booted
|
|
739
|
-
macOS. The macOS Image4 manifest contains measurements for all the boot objects—such as iBoot, the static
|
|
740
|
-
trust cache, device tree, Boot Kernel Collection, and signed system volume (SSV) volume root hash. When
|
|
741
|
-
LLB is directed to boot a given macOS, it’s designed to ensure that the hash of the macOS Image4 manifest
|
|
742
|
-
attached to iBoot matches what’s captured in the nsih field of the LocalPolicy. In this way, the nsih
|
|
743
|
-
captures the user intention of what operating system the user has created a LocalPolicy for. Users
|
|
744
|
-
change the nsih value implicitly when they perform a software update.
|
|
745
|
-
type: binary
|
|
746
|
-
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
747
|
-
context:
|
|
748
|
-
lpol:
|
|
749
|
-
access:
|
|
750
|
-
write:
|
|
751
|
-
- 1TR
|
|
752
|
-
- recoveryOS
|
|
753
|
-
- macOS
|
|
754
|
-
spih:
|
|
755
|
-
description: Cryptex1 Image4 Hash
|
|
756
|
-
stng:
|
|
757
|
-
description: Cryptex1 Generation / Cryptex type?
|
|
758
|
-
auxh:
|
|
759
|
-
description: User Authorized Kext List Hash
|
|
760
|
-
context:
|
|
761
779
|
rpnh:
|
|
762
780
|
title: Remote Policy Nonce Hash (rpnh)
|
|
763
|
-
description:
|
|
764
|
-
|
|
765
|
-
|
|
766
|
-
|
|
781
|
+
description: 'The rpnh behaves the same way as the lpnh but is updated only when
|
|
782
|
+
the remote policy is updated, such as when changing the state of Find My enrollment.
|
|
783
|
+
This change happens when the user changes the state of Find My on their Mac.
|
|
784
|
+
|
|
785
|
+
'
|
|
767
786
|
type: binary
|
|
768
787
|
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
769
788
|
access:
|
|
770
789
|
write:
|
|
771
|
-
|
|
772
|
-
|
|
773
|
-
|
|
774
|
-
RSCH:
|
|
775
|
-
description: Research mode
|
|
776
|
-
rcio:
|
|
777
|
-
description: Restore CIO
|
|
778
|
-
fgpt:
|
|
779
|
-
description: factory glob al pre-release trust
|
|
780
|
-
UDID:
|
|
781
|
-
description: universal device identifier
|
|
790
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
791
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
792
|
+
- macOS
|
|
782
793
|
rsch:
|
|
783
794
|
description: research mode
|
|
784
|
-
|
|
785
|
-
description:
|
|
786
|
-
type: string
|
|
787
|
-
roots:
|
|
788
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
|
795
|
+
RSCH:
|
|
796
|
+
description: Research mode
|
|
789
797
|
rsep:
|
|
790
798
|
description: Restore SEP Image, paired with oppd/tbms
|
|
791
799
|
type: string
|
|
@@ -798,12 +806,31 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
798
806
|
description:
|
|
799
807
|
rso3:
|
|
800
808
|
description:
|
|
809
|
+
rssl:
|
|
810
|
+
description: The valid CA used for secure communications with the FDR server to
|
|
811
|
+
obtain the FDR objects. This differs from the `trst` object as `rssl` is in
|
|
812
|
+
transit and `trst` is at rest.
|
|
813
|
+
rtmu:
|
|
814
|
+
description: Restore TMU for AP
|
|
815
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
816
|
+
firmware: true
|
|
817
|
+
recovery: true
|
|
801
818
|
rtpf:
|
|
802
819
|
description:
|
|
803
820
|
rtsc:
|
|
804
821
|
description:
|
|
822
|
+
rvok:
|
|
823
|
+
description: Trust object revocation list
|
|
805
824
|
scef:
|
|
806
825
|
description:
|
|
826
|
+
sdkp:
|
|
827
|
+
description: SDK Platform
|
|
828
|
+
type: string
|
|
829
|
+
roots:
|
|
830
|
+
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
831
|
+
values:
|
|
832
|
+
- iphoneos
|
|
833
|
+
- macos
|
|
807
834
|
SDOM:
|
|
808
835
|
description: |-
|
|
809
836
|
Security domain, or which set of certificates govern device security.
|
|
@@ -812,15 +839,18 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
812
839
|
0x01 - Main Production certificates
|
|
813
840
|
width: 2
|
|
814
841
|
alias:
|
|
815
|
-
|
|
842
|
+
- security-domain
|
|
843
|
+
secb:
|
|
844
|
+
description: Sets a security value such as `trst` or the FDR signing trust object. "security
|
|
845
|
+
blob?". Known to include `trst` (yes a `trst` partition with a `secb` object with a `trst` object),
|
|
846
|
+
`rssl` (Factory SSL root CA), `rvok` (Revocation list) and `trpk` (trusted public keys?)
|
|
816
847
|
SECM:
|
|
817
848
|
description:
|
|
818
849
|
seid:
|
|
819
850
|
description: Secure Enclave ID
|
|
820
|
-
|
|
821
|
-
description:
|
|
822
|
-
|
|
823
|
-
encoding: sha2-384
|
|
851
|
+
sei3:
|
|
852
|
+
description: Secure Enclave ID (alternate)?
|
|
853
|
+
Appears to have a value identical to `seid`.
|
|
824
854
|
sepi:
|
|
825
855
|
description: SEP Image, contains oppd and tbms in seal
|
|
826
856
|
type: string
|
|
@@ -832,15 +862,18 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
832
862
|
sip0:
|
|
833
863
|
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 0 Status - Overall
|
|
834
864
|
sip1:
|
|
835
|
-
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 1 Status - Signed System Volume
|
|
865
|
+
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 1 Status - Signed System Volume
|
|
866
|
+
Status
|
|
836
867
|
sip2:
|
|
837
868
|
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 2 Status - Kernel CTRR Status
|
|
838
869
|
sip3:
|
|
839
|
-
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 3 Status - Boot Args Filtering
|
|
870
|
+
description: System Integrity Protection (SIP) 3 Status - Boot Args Filtering
|
|
871
|
+
Status
|
|
840
872
|
slvn:
|
|
841
873
|
description:
|
|
842
874
|
smb0:
|
|
843
|
-
description: Secure Multi-Boot 0 - Security Mode - Full Security, Reduced, Disabled
|
|
875
|
+
description: Secure Multi-Boot 0 - Security Mode - Full Security, Reduced, Disabled
|
|
876
|
+
- Setting to 1 sets to reduced
|
|
844
877
|
smb1:
|
|
845
878
|
description: Secure Multi-Boot 1 - Setting to 1 allows Permissive
|
|
846
879
|
smb2:
|
|
@@ -851,31 +884,74 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
851
884
|
description: Secure Multi-Boot 3 - DEP-allowed MDM Control
|
|
852
885
|
smb5:
|
|
853
886
|
description: Unknown - but known to exist in Factory signing
|
|
854
|
-
SNON:
|
|
855
|
-
description: SEP Nonce
|
|
856
887
|
snon:
|
|
857
888
|
description: SEP Nonce
|
|
889
|
+
SNON:
|
|
890
|
+
description: SEP Nonce
|
|
891
|
+
snuf:
|
|
892
|
+
description: Staged next update firmware?
|
|
893
|
+
spih:
|
|
894
|
+
description: Cryptex1 Image4 Hash
|
|
895
|
+
SPTM:
|
|
896
|
+
description: Secure Page Table Monitor
|
|
858
897
|
srnm:
|
|
859
898
|
description:
|
|
899
|
+
SrNm:
|
|
900
|
+
description: Unit Serial Number
|
|
901
|
+
manifest: true
|
|
902
|
+
ssca:
|
|
903
|
+
sski:
|
|
904
|
+
description: SHA2 os some kind
|
|
905
|
+
type: binary
|
|
860
906
|
ster:
|
|
861
907
|
description:
|
|
908
|
+
stg1:
|
|
909
|
+
description: stage 1 bootloader
|
|
910
|
+
type: string
|
|
911
|
+
encoding: sha2-384
|
|
912
|
+
stID:
|
|
913
|
+
description: Station IDentifier
|
|
914
|
+
stng:
|
|
915
|
+
description: Cryptex1 Generation / Cryptex type?
|
|
916
|
+
styp:
|
|
917
|
+
description: Crytpex Subtype
|
|
918
|
+
type: u32
|
|
919
|
+
alias:
|
|
920
|
+
- cryptex subtype
|
|
921
|
+
roots:
|
|
922
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
862
923
|
svrn:
|
|
863
924
|
description: Server nonce
|
|
925
|
+
tatp:
|
|
926
|
+
description: Target Type (board name)
|
|
927
|
+
roots:
|
|
928
|
+
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
864
929
|
tbmr:
|
|
865
930
|
description: Trusted Boot Measurement (Recovery/Root?)
|
|
866
931
|
tbms:
|
|
867
932
|
description: Trusted Boot Measurement (Signature?)
|
|
868
933
|
notes: Likely encrypted by the SEP and opaque to the AP
|
|
869
|
-
tatp:
|
|
870
|
-
description: Board Name (such as d84) - Target AP Test
|
|
871
|
-
roots:
|
|
872
|
-
- ManifestKey-DataCenter
|
|
873
934
|
tery:
|
|
874
935
|
description:
|
|
875
936
|
test:
|
|
876
937
|
description:
|
|
877
938
|
tics:
|
|
878
939
|
description:
|
|
940
|
+
TMac:
|
|
941
|
+
description: Thunderbolt MAC Address
|
|
942
|
+
manifest: true
|
|
943
|
+
trca:
|
|
944
|
+
description:
|
|
945
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
946
|
+
roots:
|
|
947
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
948
|
+
trcs:
|
|
949
|
+
description:
|
|
950
|
+
type: digest-object
|
|
951
|
+
roots:
|
|
952
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
953
|
+
trpk:
|
|
954
|
+
description: Trust public keys
|
|
879
955
|
trst:
|
|
880
956
|
description: Trust Object
|
|
881
957
|
tsys:
|
|
@@ -885,15 +961,12 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
885
961
|
type: integer
|
|
886
962
|
roots:
|
|
887
963
|
- ExtraContent
|
|
888
|
-
caos:
|
|
889
|
-
description:
|
|
890
|
-
type: digest-object
|
|
891
|
-
root:
|
|
892
|
-
- ExtraContent
|
|
893
964
|
ucer:
|
|
894
965
|
description: User Cert
|
|
895
966
|
ucon:
|
|
896
967
|
description:
|
|
968
|
+
UDID:
|
|
969
|
+
description: universal device identifier
|
|
897
970
|
udid:
|
|
898
971
|
description: Unique Device ID
|
|
899
972
|
uidm:
|
|
@@ -905,34 +978,38 @@ img4_tags:
|
|
|
905
978
|
description:
|
|
906
979
|
vkdl:
|
|
907
980
|
description:
|
|
981
|
+
vnum:
|
|
982
|
+
description: Version Number - Update Maximum
|
|
983
|
+
type: string
|
|
984
|
+
roots:
|
|
985
|
+
- ExtraContent
|
|
908
986
|
vuid:
|
|
909
987
|
title: APFS volume group UUID (vuid)
|
|
910
|
-
description:
|
|
911
|
-
|
|
912
|
-
|
|
913
|
-
|
|
988
|
+
description: 'The vuid indicates the volume group the kernel should use as root.
|
|
989
|
+
This field is primarily informational and isn’t used for security constraints.
|
|
990
|
+
This vuid is set by the user implicitly when creating a new operating system
|
|
991
|
+
install.
|
|
992
|
+
|
|
993
|
+
'
|
|
914
994
|
type: binary
|
|
915
995
|
subtype: sha2-384
|
|
916
996
|
access:
|
|
917
|
-
|
|
918
|
-
|
|
919
|
-
|
|
997
|
+
- 1TR
|
|
998
|
+
- recoveryOS
|
|
999
|
+
- macOS
|
|
920
1000
|
ware:
|
|
921
1001
|
description:
|
|
922
|
-
|
|
923
|
-
description:
|
|
924
|
-
type: binary
|
|
925
|
-
inst:
|
|
926
|
-
descryption: The key or file to install
|
|
1002
|
+
WCHF:
|
|
1003
|
+
description: Wireless Charging Firmware
|
|
927
1004
|
wchf:
|
|
928
1005
|
description: Wireless Charging Framework
|
|
1006
|
+
WMac:
|
|
1007
|
+
description: Wireless MAC Address
|
|
1008
|
+
WSKU:
|
|
1009
|
+
description: Wireless SKU
|
|
929
1010
|
xbtc:
|
|
930
1011
|
description: x86 Boot Trust Cache
|
|
931
1012
|
xsys:
|
|
932
1013
|
description: x86 System Root Hash
|
|
933
1014
|
xugs:
|
|
934
1015
|
description:
|
|
935
|
-
SPTM:
|
|
936
|
-
description: Secure Page Table Monitor
|
|
937
|
-
WCHF:
|
|
938
|
-
description: Wireless Charging Firmware
|