ap2_mandate_verifier 1.1.0 → 1.3.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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data/README.ja.md CHANGED
@@ -1,13 +1,27 @@
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- # AP2 Mandate Verifier — Checkout委任のRuby SDK
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+ # AP2 Mandate Verifier — Checkout・PaymentのRuby SDK
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- ### 次期候補:Payment(未公開)
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+ ### 1.3.0候補:Checkoutの選択的開示
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- 1.1.0案ではDirect/条件付きPayment Mandateと成功/エラーPayment Receiptを追加します。**まだ公開されていません。公開済み1.0.0はCheckout対応です。** [新API・制約・信頼境界](docs/PAYMENT.md)、[Ruby単体サンプル](examples/payment.rb)、[公開準備](docs/RELEASE_110_CANDIDATE.md)を参照してください。検証成功は実行許可ではなく、永続的・原子的な単発利用管理と実決済は利用アプリの責任です。
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+ 次期候補では、販売者・商品の非選択候補を送らず、全明細の必要数量を検証できます。CheckoutとPaymentの両方を選択的に開示するRuby単体例も用意します。まだ公開していません。[仕様・制限](docs/SELECTIVE_CHECKOUT.md)、[公開前の確認項目](docs/RELEASE_130_CANDIDATE.md)。以下の公開版導入手順は1.2.0です。
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+ ### 公開済み1.2.0:Payment候補の選択的開示
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+
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+ 公開済み1.2.0の明示的な`SelectivePayment` profileで、支払先・決済手段の非選択候補を送らずに検証できます。必須条件・委任・原文参照は省略しません。[API・プライバシー・Python差分](docs/SELECTIVE_PAYMENT.md)、[保持/送信を比較するRuby単体例](examples/selective_payment.rb)、[公開照合記録](docs/POST_RELEASE_120.md)。既存`Payment`の既定profileは変更しません。
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+
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+
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+ ### Payment発行・検証(1.1.0から継続)
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+
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+ Direct/条件付きPayment Mandateと成功/エラーPayment Receiptを追加しました。[API・制約・信頼境界](docs/PAYMENT.md)、[Ruby単体サンプル](examples/payment.rb)、[公開照合記録](docs/POST_RELEASE_110.md)、[GitHub Release](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v1.1.0)。検証成功は実行許可ではなく、永続的・原子的な単発利用管理と実決済は利用アプリの責任です。
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.2.0").full_gem_path')/examples/payment.rb"
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+ ```
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+
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  [English](README.md)
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- **公開済み安定版は1.0.0です。**
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+ **公開済み安定版は1.2.0です。**
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  1.0.0では、既存のDirectと条件付きCheckoutの公開API・保守契約を確立しました。
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  0.8.0の引数・既定値・profile・結果の意味・保存形式と製品実装を維持します。
@@ -27,8 +41,8 @@ Agent処理へProvider秘密鍵を渡しません。[API・信頼境界](docs/CO
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  正式対応MRI 3.4.12/4.0.9で動くRuby単体の導入例です。source checkoutやRailsは不要です:
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  ```sh
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- gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.0.0
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- ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.0.0").full_gem_path')/examples/conditional_checkout.rb"
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.2.0").full_gem_path')/examples/conditional_checkout.rb"
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  ```
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  [Ruby単体の実行例](examples/conditional_checkout.rb)はインストール済み公開APIだけを使い、
@@ -58,7 +72,7 @@ Rubyで購入委任データを検証する、AP2の固定profile向けGemです
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  正式対応は **MRI 3.4.12とMRI 4.0.9** です。利用者が選ぶGem環境で導入します。
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  ```sh
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- gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.0.0
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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  ```
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  BundlerのGemfile:
data/README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,13 +1,27 @@
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- # AP2 Mandate Verifier — Ruby SDK for Checkout delegation
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+ # AP2 Mandate Verifier — Ruby SDK for Checkout and Payment
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- ### Unpublished next candidate: Payment
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+ ### 1.3.0 candidate: selective Checkout
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- The proposed 1.1.0 candidate adds Direct and conditional Payment Mandates plus signed Success/Error Payment Receipts. It is **not published**. Published 1.0.0 remains Checkout-only. See [Payment APIs, supported constraints and trust boundaries](docs/PAYMENT.md), the [plain Ruby lifecycle sample](examples/payment.rb), and [release preparation](docs/RELEASE_110_CANDIDATE.md). Verification does not grant execution permission; durable one-use state and actual payment remain application responsibilities.
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+ The next candidate adds merchant and product candidate selection with all required quantities retained, plus a combined selective Checkout/Payment Ruby lifecycle. It is not published yet. [Contract and limitations](docs/SELECTIVE_CHECKOUT.md), [release gates](docs/RELEASE_130_CANDIDATE.md). Published installation instructions below remain on 1.2.0.
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+ ### Published1.2.0: selective Payment
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+
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+ Published1.2.0 adds explicit `SelectivePayment` candidate-array disclosure: retain confidential full issuance, send selected payee/instrument disclosures only, and verify every mandatory condition and exact original-wire reference. [Profile/API/privacy/Python limits](docs/SELECTIVE_PAYMENT.md), [plain Ruby retained-vs-sent example](examples/selective_payment.rb), [verified publication](docs/POST_RELEASE_120.md). Existing `Payment` defaults remain unchanged.
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+
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+
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+ ### Payment lifecycle (since1.1.0)
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+
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+ 1.1.0 adds Direct and conditional Payment Mandates plus signed Success/Error Payment Receipts. [Payment APIs and constraints](docs/PAYMENT.md), [plain Ruby lifecycle sample](examples/payment.rb), [verified publication](docs/POST_RELEASE_110.md), [GitHub Release](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v1.1.0). Verification does not grant execution permission; durable atomic one-use state and actual payment remain application responsibilities.
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.2.0").full_gem_path')/examples/payment.rb"
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+ ```
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+
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  [日本語](README.ja.md)
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- **Published stable: 1.0.0.**
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+ **Published stable: 1.2.0.**
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  1.0.0 establishes the stable public contract for the existing
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  Direct and conditional Checkout APIs. It preserves 0.8.0 signatures, defaults,
@@ -31,8 +45,8 @@ multi-item profile. Provider private keys never enter Agent operations.
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  Ruby-only Quick Start on MRI 3.4.12 or 4.0.9; no source checkout or Rails required:
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  ```sh
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- gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.0.0
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- ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.0.0").full_gem_path')/examples/conditional_checkout.rb"
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.2.0").full_gem_path')/examples/conditional_checkout.rb"
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  ```
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  The [standalone Ruby example](examples/conditional_checkout.rb) uses only installed
@@ -66,7 +80,7 @@ The [Rails demo](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier-demo#readm
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  Formal support is **MRI 3.4.12 and MRI 4.0.9**. In your chosen Gem environment:
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  ```sh
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- gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.0.0
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.2.0
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  ```
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  Or add to your Gemfile:
data/docs/PAYMENT.md CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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- # Payment APIs — unpublished 1.1.0 candidate
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+ # Payment APIs — published 1.1.0
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- Published 1.0.0 remains the Checkout-only API contract. These additive APIs do not change its arguments, defaults, profiles, accepted inputs, results, storage or Checkout Receipt references. The Gem is framework independent; Rails is optional.
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+ Published 1.0.0 established the Checkout-only API contract; [1.1.0 is now published](POST_RELEASE_110.md). These additive APIs do not change its arguments, defaults, profiles, accepted inputs, results, storage or Checkout Receipt references. The Gem is framework independent; Rails is optional.
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  ## Supported profile and specification
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  SDK verification is not final execution approval or payment success. User authentication/consent, key storage/enrollment/revocation, current order/trust policy, actual payment, durable one-use identity and atomic reservation/consumption belong to the app. Recheck them immediately before execution. No SDK object prevents replay across calls/processes. Persist original Open/final strings and exact Checkout inputs in protected storage; use present, then reverify with current external inputs. Never deserialize a successful Verification as proof. An authentic Error is not automatic retry permission. Missing/unverifiable Receipt or uncertain processing stays pending and requires reconciliation.
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- After installing the candidate Gem offline, run:
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+ After installing published 1.1.0, run:
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  ```sh
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  ruby -e 's=Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.1.0"); require File.join(s.full_gem_path, "examples/payment.rb"); PaymentExample.run'
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+ # 1.1.0 publication and verification
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+
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+ Owner registered 1.1.0 on RubyGems at **2026-11-03 09:20:11.580 UTC**. Independent official metadata and distribution retrieval confirms publication. [Machine-readable receipt](evidence/1.1.0_publication.json).
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+
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+ | Identity | Verified value |
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+ | --- | --- |
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+ | Gem / version / platform | ap2_mandate_verifier / 1.1.0 / ruby |
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+ | Prerelease / yanked at comparison | false / false |
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+ | Bytes | 115,200 |
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+ | SHA256 | `4c64cf5b6c61ae4395577828093a6f4022c35cf18b6ad1bcfcb9f95fbb4f43c9` |
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+ | Release source | `89e779cadeac0ea7941e68f12951eed13f1b8081` |
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+ | Reviewed/tested source | `631537ec52c33c3472fd856da55faeff3fb62203` |
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+ | Same source tree | `4282e3349d2a2851940d3f153460a013f0ea6ceb` |
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+ | Payload comparison | All 38 archive/source/installed files identical on both MRI endpoints |
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+
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+ The downloaded public archive is byte-for-byte identical to the Owner-approved candidate. The registry metadata SHA and GitHub Release asset also agree. Association with source follows the retained reviewed candidate and every payload comparison, not a RubyGems source attestation. No Gem rebuild or version overwrite was performed. After successful registration, no additional push was attempted.
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+
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+ The Owner's terminal reported successful registration while the browser showed a WebAuthn verification/callback error. These are distinct observations: registry metadata and actual distributed bytes establish successful publication. A cached metadata URL initially retained its earlier HTTP 404; a fresh read returned the published version and matching SHA. The browser error's precise cause is not established. It does not justify another push or credential/security-setting changes.
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+
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+ ## Tag and Release
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+
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+ [Formal v1.1.0 Release](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v1.1.0), ID 432487583, is public, non-draft and non-prerelease, published 2026-11-03T09:23:10Z. Annotated tag object `dff5006234c35c24de416786fa7d088953f86105` peels to the release-source commit above. The attached `ap2_mandate_verifier-1.1.0.gem` was downloaded independently and matches the same SHA256 and byte count.
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+
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+ ## Verification and compatibility
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+
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+ The approved candidate's existing Checkout regression and 113 Payment assertions per source/installed runtime, strict latest-HEAD independent reviews and [CI](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/actions/runs/41605001799) are recorded in [Issue #235](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/issues/235). Official AP2 SHA `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793` SDK/Schema comparisons cover Ruby→Python and Python→Ruby Direct/conditional Payment and both Receipt outcomes, plus independent original-wire hashes. Tests are synthetic and scoped; they do not establish general AP2 conformance or real Issuer trust.
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+
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+ After publication, fresh containers separately install the **downloaded public archive**, compare all 38 files against the formal tag source and installed payload, and pass the existing installed package checks, 113 Payment assertions and Direct/conditional/Success/Error packaged examples on MRI **3.4.12 and 4.0.9**. Updated published-guide checks also pass both English/Japanese README Quick Starts and retained Checkout walkthroughs plus the installed Payment sample. Repeated transitive suites are not summed into a total. Subsequent documentation CI is separate from the pre-release source/package CI above.
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+ Dependencies remain json=2.19.9, jwt=3.3.0, base64=0.3.0, openssl=4.0.2 and digest=3.2.1. Existing 1.0.0 Checkout arguments/defaults/profiles/results/storage and Receipt references are preserved. [Payment API and bounds](PAYMENT.md) are additive. The Gem's immutable packaged README/API documents retain their preparation snapshot; current repository publication records supersede status wording without changing published bytes.
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+
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+ ## Usage and application duties
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+
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+ ```sh
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+ gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 1.1.0
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+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.1.0").full_gem_path')/examples/payment.rb"
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+ ```
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+
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+ Framework-independent SDK use needs no Rails. The separate Rails demo upgrade uses the same public artifact and verifies it independently; it performs no deployment. SDK verification is not final execution permission. Receipt authentication and reported outcome are separate. Applications retain consent/trust/key lifecycle, current-order checks, durable atomic one-use state, actual payment and reconciliation of missing/invalid Receipts or uncertain processing. Unsupported recurrence/budget, PISP/execution_date/risk_data and arbitrary disclosure/delegation forms reject under the documented profile. No real payment or production deployment was performed.
data/docs/PUBLIC_API.md CHANGED
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- # Ruby SDK public API — 1.0.0
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+ # Ruby SDK public API — 1.x
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- **Status: published 1.0.0.**
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+ **Status: published 1.2.0; the original 1.0.0 Checkout contract below is preserved.**
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  This document defines the 1.x contract for the existing Checkout APIs.
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  The 1.0.0 release preserves the 0.8.0 runtime behavior, API names and accepted
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  formats. Exact distribution identity and validation are in
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  This does not remove the published partial-verification entries above, their
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  observable error behavior, or the documented profile identities and bounds.
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- ## Additive unpublished 1.1.0 candidate
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+ ## Additive published 1.1.0 Payment APIs
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- The preceding 1.0.0 Checkout contract remains unchanged. New `Payment` and `PaymentReceipt` APIs have a separate [candidate contract](PAYMENT.md); they are not available in published 1.0.0.
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+ The preceding 1.0.0 Checkout contract remains unchanged. New `Payment` and `PaymentReceipt` APIs have a separate [Payment contract](PAYMENT.md); they are available in 1.1.0 and later, not in 1.0.0.
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+ ## Published1.2.0 selective Payment
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+ New explicit `SelectivePayment` APIs are described in the [selective Payment contract](SELECTIVE_PAYMENT.md). They do not alter the published1.1.0 `Payment` default profile or Receipt reference format. They are available in1.2.0 and later, not in1.1.0.
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+ ## 1.3.0 candidate: selective Checkout
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+ The additive `SelectiveCheckout` profile is included in the 1.3.0 candidate. See the [candidate contract](SELECTIVE_CHECKOUT.md) for mandatory disclosure, independent candidate semantics, original-wire references and application responsibilities. It is not available in the published 1.2.0 package. Existing complete profile defaults are preserved.
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+ For the explicit selective Checkout profile, Evidence `original_root_graph_closure` records that every signed commitment and supplied disclosure was inspected and accounted for, allowing unresolved candidate leaves only at registered positions. It does not certify hidden preimages, their schema or uniqueness, or consent provenance. The checked scope covers the visible candidate subset and all mandatory conditions.
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+ > Historical preparation snapshot. The exact approved candidate is now published; see [publication evidence](POST_RELEASE_110.md). The original approval boundaries below describe that earlier checkpoint.
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+
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  # 1.1.0 candidate — publication requires Owner approval
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  Status: unpublished candidate. Published 1.0.0 remains available and unchanged. The source version 1.1.0 is a proposal for additive Payment APIs under the existing 1.x Checkout contract. Do not tag, publish GitHub Release, push/yank RubyGems, announce or deploy on the basis of this document.
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+ > Historical preparation snapshot. The exact approved candidate is now published; see [publication evidence](POST_RELEASE_120.md). Earlier approval boundaries below describe that checkpoint.
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+ # 1.2.0 candidate — unpublished, Owner decision required
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+ Published1.1.0 remains the released SDK. This is preparation for an additive opt-in Payment candidate-disclosure profile. No RubyGems push/yank, formal tag, GitHub Release, announcement or deployment is authorized by this document. The Owner decides final version and publication after reviewing exact source/artifact/verification identity in Issue#238.
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+ ## Proposed Release body
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+ Adds `SelectivePayment` for conditional Payment with individually disclosed payee and payment-instrument candidates. Retain the full issuance confidentially, select candidates, and send only the reduced Open plus Agent Closed. Mandatory amount/currency/time/delegation/fixed fields/Checkout reference remain visible and verified; partial disclosure never makes a required condition optional. Existing1.1.0 Checkout, Payment and Receipt APIs/defaults/formats are unchanged.
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+ ```ruby
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+ # Read approved_combinations from the protected consent record; do not derive
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+ # broader consent by expanding a correlated subset into a Cartesian product.
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+ full = AP2MandateVerifier::SelectivePayment.issue_open(
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+ **approved_open_inputs, approved_combinations: protected_approved_pairs,
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+ selective: :both)
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+ sent = AP2MandateVerifier::SelectivePayment.select(
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+ open_sd_jwt: full, payee_index: 0, instrument_index: 0)
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+ # Agent signs the exact reduced `sent` bytes, then receiver uses independently
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+ # trusted Checkout/payment/key/challenge inputs. See examples/selective_payment.rb.
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+ ```
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+
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+ Supported: single immediate conditional Payment, one Agent hop, candidate-array elements only, independent Cartesian allowlists with explicit approval guard. Correlated subsets require separate singleton/approved-rectangle Open Mandates; unsupported correlation, mandatory-field hiding, unknown structures and arbitrary SD reject. This does not add a generic selective-disclosure API or change Checkout disclosure support.
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+ [Full profile, reference and Python interoperability contract](SELECTIVE_PAYMENT.md). Receipt authenticity, reported outcome and final execution permission remain separate. Application-owned consent/trust/key lifecycle, durable atomic one-use state and payment execution are required. Unknown/missing Receipt remains pending and never automatic retry permission.
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+
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+ ## Exact-artifact publication checklist (not execution authority)
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+
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+ 1. Confirm the recorded reviewed and merged source/tree, latest-HEAD independent review with zero substantive unresolved findings, relevant CI, both MRI endpoint regressions, candidate ordinary installation/all-file identity, installed sample/privacy comparison and honest official SDK/profile-adapter interoperability scope. Missing required verification means HOLD.
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+ 2. Verify exact candidate filename/bytes/SHA256 and unchanged five runtime dependencies in the final manifest and Issue#238. Earlier development builds are not publication candidates. Owner chooses version and approves that exact artifact plus any formal tag/Release/announcement separately.
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+ 3. Only after that separate approval, inspect current registry/version/tag/Release state. Never overwrite a version or rebuild during publication. Publish the approved archive using existing Owner-controlled authentication; stop at any human authentication handoff and never request credentials/OTP in chat. On uncertain outcome inspect registry before retry.
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+ 4. Fetch actual public metadata/distribution, compare full bytes/SHA256 and every payload against approved source, install into fresh isolated environments and rerun published lifecycle/privacy/Receipt guides. Only then create the approved tag on the approved source and publish Release. Preserve source vs repository-only postpublication documentation identities.
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+
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+ No new publication/deployment workflow is introduced. Current product CI builds test candidates only. Existing unrelated research/Rust/production HOLDs remain untouched. Tested MRI endpoints remain3.4.12 and4.0.9; runtime dependencies remain json2.19.9,jwt3.3.0,base640.3.0,openssl4.0.2,digest3.2.1. Installation range>=3.4.12,<4.1 is not formal support for every intermediate release.
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+ # 1.3.0 release candidate preparation
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+
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+ Status: release candidate prepared; final evidence and GO/HOLD judgment are tracked in [Issue #241](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/issues/241). **Publication remains HOLD pending the Owner’s final decision.** RubyGems publication, formal v1.3.0 tag, GitHub Release and announcements require the Owner’s final approval. No production deployment or real payment is included.
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+
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+ ## Proposed release notes
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+
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+ Ruby applications can retain the approved full Checkout Mandate while disclosing only the merchant and products needed for the purchase. Every required line group and quantity remains enforced, including overlapping product choices and multiple purchased lines. The same Ruby lifecycle can combine selective Checkout with selective Payment and authenticate their respective Receipts.
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+ Existing complete Checkout and Payment profiles retain their APIs and defaults. The new Checkout profile requires explicit Host trust registration and explicit Payment issuance profile selection. It describes independent merchant/product candidate sets; correlated policies need separate Opens. Counts, ordering and issuer-JWT linkage remain visible. No general AP2 or official high-level Python facade conformance is claimed.
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+
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+ ## Completion gates
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+
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+ - Exact source SHA and independent latest-HEAD review, with no unresolved substantive findings.
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+ - Signed positive/negative/privacy/quantity coverage and all prior regressions on supported MRI versions.
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+ - Official pinned Python low-level interoperability with independently checked expectations and explicit high-level limitations.
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+ - CI on the reviewed HEAD; merged source tree equals reviewed tree.
17
+ - Build one candidate, inspect metadata/allowlist, install the same bytes offline under both supported MRI versions and compare every packaged file with source.
18
+ - Run standalone installed Checkout and combined Payment samples and optional demo.
19
+ - Record exact artifact size, SHA256, source and evidence before Owner GO/HOLD judgment.
20
+
21
+ ## Observed local verification
22
+
23
+ The implementation has passed the full source regression suite under MRI 3.4.12 and 4.0.9, including 95 new selective Checkout assertions. An initial candidate passed ordinary offline installation on both versions with all 49 files matching source/archive/installed bytes, plus installed standalone and combined examples. Official pinned Python low-level interoperability passed two scenarios in each direction, eight Receipt checks and 28 negative controls, both from source and an ordinary installed Gem under Ruby 3.4.12 / Python 3.11.2.
24
+
25
+ The fixed candidate builder uses MRI 3.4.12, RubyGems 3.6.9 and `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=1793750400`. Two builds under that builder matched byte for byte. MRI 4.0.9’s RubyGems 4.0.20 changes the `rubygems_version` metadata; its payload was identical, but that independently built archive is not the approved candidate. Both supported MRIs must test the same fixed-builder archive. After any packaged source change, rebuild and repeat its package equality checks. Exact final artifact hash, merged source, latest review and CI links belong in the tracking issue/external manifest to avoid a self-referential package checksum.
26
+
27
+ ## Publication procedure (not authorized yet)
28
+
29
+ After explicit approval of an exact candidate, recheck registry version absence and the approved artifact bytes/source/reviews/CI. The Owner can perform the single interactive RubyGems push using existing credentials and Docker. Never print credentials or retry an ambiguous push. Read registry metadata and download the published Gem, compare its complete bytes and payload to the approved candidate, then create the matching formal tag and GitHub Release only under the approved publication scope. Update published-state documentation after verification. Stop on any mismatch or uncertain mutation.
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
1
+ # Selective Checkout Mandates (1.3.0 candidate)
2
+
3
+ This explicit profile lets an application retain a confidential complete Open Checkout Mandate and send only the merchant and product candidates needed for a purchase. Every requirement and quantity remains visible and enforced. The existing complete Checkout profiles and their defaults remain available.
4
+
5
+ ## Approval and disclosure boundary
6
+
7
+ The application authenticates the user, obtains informed approval and stores the complete issuance securely before selecting a presentation. Merchant and per-requirement product lists describe independent allowed sets. They cannot encode “merchant A only sells approved product X, merchant B only approved product Y”, or correlated choices between requirements. Issue separate Opens for correlated policies. Never expand a restricted approval into independent lists.
8
+
9
+ Only the elements of `checkout.allowed_merchants.allowed` and each `checkout.line_items.items[*].acceptable_items` may be omitted. The signed content disclosure, both constraints, every requirement ID and quantity, delegation key and validity interval are mandatory. At least one candidate per requirement must be disclosed. Unresolved commitments in any other location, unknown conditions and unsupported formats fail closed.
10
+
11
+ Keep the complete issuance and its unselected leaf disclosures out of network requests, logs, exception reporting and analytics. Selection is data minimization, not anonymity: the issuer JWT, candidate counts, ordering, mandatory requirements and resulting transaction remain observable. Presentations sharing an issuer JWT can be linked.
12
+
13
+ ## Ruby API
14
+
15
+ ```ruby
16
+ m = AP2MandateVerifier
17
+ full = m::SelectiveCheckout.issue_open(
18
+ allowed_merchants: approved_merchants, requirements: approved_requirements,
19
+ candidate_policy: :independent,
20
+ agent_public_key_pem: agent_public_pem,
21
+ issued_at: now, expires_at: now + 600,
22
+ signer: provider_signer, public_key_pem: provider_public_pem)
23
+
24
+ # Keep full confidential; original candidate indices are zero based.
25
+ selected = m::SelectiveCheckout.select(
26
+ open_sd_jwt: full.root_presentation,
27
+ merchant_index: 0, item_indices: [[1], [0, 2]])
28
+ # Alternatively, select all approved candidates matching the actual cart IDs,
29
+ # and prove exact quantity coverage before returning the reduced Open:
30
+ selected = m::SelectiveCheckout.select_for_checkout(
31
+ open_sd_jwt: full.root_presentation, checkout: checkout_hash)
32
+ ```
33
+
34
+ `candidate_policy: :independent` is an explicit contract, not proof of consent. Supply only independently approved candidate sets from protected application state. `item_indices` contains one nonempty index array for every requirement, in original requirement order. The selection API preserves original signed commitment slots. Its immutable `Open` exposes `root_presentation` and alias `open_sd_jwt`; selecting is structural preparation, not issuer authentication.
35
+
36
+ Use `SelectiveCheckout.issue_closed` with the reduced `root_presentation`, original Merchant `checkout_jwt`, independently selected issuer/Agent/Merchant public keys, expected Merchant ID, audience, nonce, time and Agent signer. Its immutable Closed exposes the existing `root_presentation`, `terminal_jws`, `checkout_jwt` and `closed_sd_jwt` fields. `present` restores those transport fields without claiming verification.
37
+
38
+ Configure `InputBuilder.trust(..., profile_ref: SelectiveCheckout::PROFILE_REF)` using the application’s authenticated registry, then use the existing `InputBuilder.prepare`, `restore`, `inputs` and `verify` lifecycle with the reduced Open. The new profile is `ap2.checkout.selective_candidates.1`; the presentation cannot select trusted policy for the Host. Checkout signing and Receipt APIs accept this explicit `profile_ref`.
39
+
40
+ For Payment, pass `checkout_profile_ref: SelectiveCheckout::PROFILE_REF` explicitly to `Payment.issue_open` or `SelectivePayment.issue_open`, and supply the reduced Checkout Open as `open_checkout_sd_jwt`. The default is unchanged. `SelectivePayment.verify` still takes the seven original Checkout verification inputs and rechecks the full Host-bound chain.
41
+
42
+ Run the installed candidate’s [standalone Checkout example](../examples/selective_checkout.rb) and [combined Checkout/Payment example](../examples/selective_checkout_payment.rb). They generate synthetic keys in memory, compare retained/sent disclosures and authenticate both Success/Error Receipt alternatives without executing a purchase.
43
+
44
+ ## Verification and quantities
45
+
46
+ A new registered Host profile must be selected independently from the presentation. Verification follows the existing Host trust, issuer signature, complete commitment graph inspection, Agent key/signature/delegation, audience/nonce/time, Merchant signature and original Checkout binding, constraints and Host order/challenge verification path. A signature or a structurally restored presentation alone is insufficient.
47
+
48
+ For this profile, the existing Evidence field `original_root_graph_closure` means every signed commitment and every supplied disclosure was accounted for, with unresolved leaves allowed only at the registered candidate positions. It does not mean hidden candidate values were reconstructed or validated. A verifier cannot establish the schema, identity or uniqueness of an undisclosed preimage. The issuance API checks the complete approved candidate universe; presentation verification certifies the disclosed subset and every mandatory condition. These facts do not prove the application’s consent provenance.
49
+
50
+ All mandatory quantities participate in integer max-flow matching. Total required quantity must equal total purchased quantity and the maximum assignable flow. Matching uses product IDs; product titles are descriptive, as in the existing multi-item profile. Duplicate line IDs and requirement IDs are rejected. Multiple lines for the same product and overlapping candidate sets are supported. Hidden candidates do not add edges to the quantity graph.
51
+
52
+ The Agent signs the exact reduced Open bytes, including disclosure order and terminal `~`. The Host challenge and Payment reference must bind those same bytes. A confidential complete Open cannot be substituted after selection. Checkout Receipt references remain tied to the exact final Closed wire.
53
+
54
+ ## Supported bounds
55
+
56
+ The explicit profile supports at most eight merchant candidates, eight mandatory requirements, eight product candidates per requirement and eight purchased lines. A reduced presentation contains exactly one merchant disclosure and a nonempty subset for every requirement. A complete issuance can contain up to 73 disclosures including its content disclosure. Each encoded disclosure is limited to 8,192 bytes, the compact issuer token to 16,384 bytes and the complete original Open wire to 131,072 bytes. JSON parsing retains the existing bounded depth policy. These are joint limits: long identifiers/values can exhaust a byte budget before a count limit is reached. Issuance checks the final representation before calling a signer.
57
+
58
+ ## Compatibility and responsibility
59
+
60
+ Opt in explicitly when issuing a selective Checkout and configuring its Host trust profile. Existing complete profiles retain their missing-disclosure rejection. Existing saved records are not silently migrated. Payment issuance must explicitly identify the new Checkout profile when using its reduced Open; Payment verification still re-verifies the complete Checkout chain with independent Host inputs.
61
+
62
+ Verification establishes scoped checked facts; it does not authorize a purchase, execute payment or establish issuer provenance. The application owns consent, key enrollment/custody, revocation, current order state, atomic nonce consumption, replay prevention and uncertain outcome recovery. Receipt authenticity is distinct from independent settlement confirmation.
63
+
64
+ ## Official source and interoperability
65
+
66
+ The adopted AP2 source remains pinned to `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`. [Its Open Checkout Schema](https://github.com/google-agentic-commerce/AP2/blob/b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793/code/sdk/schemas/ap2/open_checkout_mandate.json) marks merchant and acceptable-item array values as selectively disclosable while retaining mandatory line requirement structure. The explicit registered profile, strict limits and subset acceptance policy are this SDK’s supported contract, not a claim of general AP2 conformance.
67
+
68
+ The pinned Python SDK high-level presentation helper does not expose this candidate selection/profile flow. Interoperability must distinguish official low-level signatures/chain/typed Schema checks from the strict subset adapter. In particular, its max-flow helper may accept an empty candidate list as a wildcard or accept underfilled demand; this SDK requires nonempty disclosed candidates and exact quantity coverage. Official SDK acceptance alone is not a strict quantity oracle.
69
+
70
+ Source interoperability observed two Checkout scenarios in each direction, eight Success/Error Receipt checks and 28 negative controls under Ruby 3.4.12 / Python 3.11.2. The Python terminal adapter uses the official JWT primitive plus an exact reduced-wire `sd_hash`, because the SDK’s generic key-binding creator discloses its final payload while this supported Checkout grammar requires an inline final Closed payload. Source and installed-candidate evidence, final review and CI are recorded separately in the release preparation report; these limited synthetic observations do not establish production trust.
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
1
+ # Payment candidate disclosure — published1.2.0 profile
2
+
3
+ [1.2.0 is published](POST_RELEASE_120.md). The1.1.0 complete-content Payment profile remains unchanged. New `AP2MandateVerifier::SelectivePayment` is an explicit opt-in conditional-only profile: `ap2.payment.selective_candidates.1`. Existing `Payment` remains strict and does not accept this new Open format. Existing Checkout/Payment/Receipt keyword/default/result/storage/reference contracts are unchanged. Payment verification/issuance additionally detaches mutable Agent-key inputs consistently and rechecks copied Checkout time; this tightens snapshot safety without changing supported formats or defaults. This is a framework-independent Ruby API; Rails is optional.
4
+
5
+ ## Normative source and policy boundary
6
+
7
+ Adopted official AP2 source/SDK/Schema SHA: `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`. Current upstream `e1ea56db72a6385bce3e5c1112b3a56ce60acb43` has identical relevant specification/Schema/SDK. The `open_payment_mandate.json` allowed_payees and allowed_payment_instruments definitions explicitly mark their allowed arrays as selectively disclosable. This profile permits disclosure only at those ARRAY ELEMENT positions; each disclosure is `[salt, complete_candidate_object]` committed through `{"...":digest}` using SHA256/base64url without padding. Salts use16random bytes. Root header remains ES256/example+sd-jwt; Agent terminal is ES256/kb+sd-jwt.
8
+
9
+ An Open has exactly the existing four constraints: amount_range, allowed_payees, allowed_payment_instruments and payment.reference. The entire Open content and all constraint types/fields are mandatory, as are cnf/iat/exp and any fixed payee/payment_amount/payment_instrument. They cannot be hidden. The new root's signed `ap2_profile` marker and the independently selected API fix this exact grammar. Unresolved commitments are allowed only at known candidate positions; no hidden whole condition, unknown location, nested SD, decoy, duplicate digest/disclosure, extra disclosure or unsupported field is accepted. Strictness is a scoped profile, not proof about arbitrary SD-JWT or a source of trust in the signer.
10
+
11
+ **Independent allowlists mean Cartesian product.** `[A,B]` and `[X,Y]` authorize all four combinations, not only `(A,X),(B,Y)`. Issuance requires `approved_combinations` from the application's protected approval record: integer index pairs must exactly cover the Cartesian product, with no duplicate/missing/extra pair. Correlated subsets reject BEFORE signer invocation. Do not auto-generate a broader approval matrix from a paired policy. For a correlated policy, issue separate singleton-pair or explicitly approved rectangular-subset Open Mandates, retaining the required amount/reference/time limits in each. This release does not claim general pairing-constraint support. The SDK does not authenticate user consent or the provenance of the supplied approval record.
12
+
13
+ ## Public lifecycle
14
+
15
+ ```ruby
16
+ full = AP2MandateVerifier::SelectivePayment.issue_open(
17
+ **independently_approved_open_inputs,
18
+ approved_combinations: protected_approved_pairs, selective: :both)
19
+ sent = AP2MandateVerifier::SelectivePayment.select(
20
+ open_sd_jwt: full, payee_index: 0, instrument_index: 0)
21
+ ```
22
+
23
+ `full` is confidential issuance material containing all disclosures. Retain it in protected application storage; do not send/log it. `sent` contains only the Open content disclosure plus selected candidate disclosures for selective axes. Nonselective axes are inline and therefore fully visible. `selective: :payees`, `:instruments` and `:both` explicitly determine the privacy boundary at issuance. Pass nil for each nonselective-axis index; providing an index for that axis rejects. Selection indices refer to the ORIGINAL signed candidate positions; reconstruction/removal of hidden array items does not renumber their meaning.
24
+
25
+ | API | Contract |
26
+ | --- | --- |
27
+ | `issue_open` | open_checkout_sd_jwt, constraints, fixed, approved_combinations, selective, agent_public_key_pem, issued_at, expires_at, signer, public_key_pem → confidential original issuance String. Constraints supplies exactly the three existing amount/payee/instrument conditions; reference is calculated from exact Open Checkout. |
28
+ | `select` | open_sd_jwt, payee_index, instrument_index → detached reduced Open String. Structural selection, not authenticity/consent. Each selective axis reveals exactly one candidate; nonselective axis remains visible. |
29
+ | `issue_closed` | open_presentation, payment, trusted_provider_public_key_pem, agent_public_key_pem, audience, nonce, verified_at, signer → Payment::Presentation with reduced Open and final Closed only. No Provider signer is passed to Agent. |
30
+ | `present` | open_presentation, closed_sd_jwt → Payment::Presentation preserving exact received reduced Open and final Closed; structural restoration only. |
31
+ | `verify` | open_presentation, closed_sd_jwt, checkout_inputs, expected_payment, trusted_provider_public_key_pem, expected_agent_public_key_pem, expected_audience, expected_nonce, verified_at → Payment::Verification. Reruns complete existing conditional Checkout verification, then root/delegation/conditions/reference/expected payment. |
32
+
33
+ The seven `checkout_inputs` are the original public `verify_checkout` keywords, prepared if useful with `InputBuilder.inputs`, at the same explicit verified_at. Expected Checkout/payment/keys/audience/challenge/time must come from independently trusted application state, not received unverified Payment. `Payment.details` can assemble expected payment from an independent Merchant JWT/key/current order and selected instrument. Full issuance/selection/restoration does not grant execution permission.
34
+
35
+ Result is the unchanged immutable `Payment::Verification`: verified?, code, selected payment claims, reference and expiry only; no full issuance/candidate universe. Existing `PaymentReceipt.sign/verify` works on the unchanged final Closed format. Errors use a fixed redacted new-profile Invalid exception without underlying cause; verify fails closed with no selected claims. No raw candidate, wire, parser cause or hidden value belongs in diagnostics/logs. Process/signing failure is not permission and may require reconciliation; preflight bounds run before signing callbacks.
36
+
37
+ ## Original bytes, restoration and privacy
38
+
39
+ | Value | Exact SHA256 target |
40
+ | --- | --- |
41
+ | Issuer signature | Original compact root JWT; unchanged when its disclosure subset/order changes |
42
+ | Agent sd_hash | ACTUAL reduced Open presentation, all selected disclosure strings in transmitted order, including terminal `~` |
43
+ | transaction_id | Original Merchant Checkout JWT, unchanged by Payment disclosure choice |
44
+ | payment.reference | Exact Open Checkout presentation from the independently verified Checkout chain |
45
+ | Payment Receipt reference | Final Closed Payment SD-JWT alone including its terminal `~`; excludes Open and chain `~~` separator |
46
+
47
+ Subset/order changes preserve the issuer JWT but change the presented Open hash. Agent must sign the intended exact presentation; later insertion/removal/reordering must fail, never repair the wire from retained issuance. Changing selected candidate usually changes final Closed payment and Receipt reference; with the same Closed claims, a newly signed Agent terminal can still differ and references always follow exact actual bytes. No JSON rebuilding substitutes for original-wire references. Persist exact sent Open and final Closed; `present` restores without reconstructing hidden data, then `verify` must run again with current independent inputs.
48
+
49
+ The receiver does not receive unselected candidate objects, their random salts or leaf disclosure strings. It DOES see commitment count/order, fixed mandatory fields and selected values. Stable issuer JWT/digests permit linkage between presentations of the same issuance; count hiding, padding/decoys, traffic-analysis resistance, unlinkability and secrecy from the issuer/holder are not promised. Nonselective inline axes are deliberately visible. Issuance and protected approval state necessarily contain candidate values; keep them separate from transmitted data and operational logs.
50
+
51
+ ## SDK differences and honest interoperability scope
52
+
53
+ Pinned Python `MandateClient.present` selects root2-element vct disclosures and3-element named claims, but drops candidate2-element array leaf disclosures. Its high-level selector cannot directly generate this profile. Use the tested explicit profile adapter and official lower-level issuance/chain primitives, and retain the exact received disclosure strings; do not claim the unsupported selector succeeds.
54
+
55
+ Official generic crypto verification and Schema validation are not this profile's semantic oracle. For example, the one-time Python payment constraint checker can accept a visible Open missing amount_range, and official Schema does not require all four constraints. This profile explicitly requires them and rejects signed missing/hidden mandatory conditions. Independent profile expectations check this safety boundary alongside official signature/chain/typed condition/Schema validation. Tests must report which layer passed and which stricter profile checks rejected; no signature-only or repaired-input result is called full Payment verification.
56
+
57
+ ## Limits, example and application responsibilities
58
+
59
+ At most8payees/8instruments, one Agent hop, one immediate payment, supported1.1.0 integer minor units/currencies and600-second lifetime. Only known candidate-array disclosures are supported; no generic arbitrary SD or Checkout selective-disclosure extension. Open wire is limited to65,536bytes, root compactJWT to16,384bytes, each decoded disclosure to24,576bytes, and total disclosures to2–17. Each candidate array has1–8entries; selected presentation requires one revealed candidate per selective axis. Existing JSON depth24, finalClosed32,769-byte wire and per-field bounds are reused. All structural/signing bounds are checked before signer effects. Recurrence/budget/PISP/execution_date/risk_data, arbitrary delegation, unsupported algorithms and unknown constraints reject.
60
+
61
+ After installing published1.2.0 with its pinned dependencies:
62
+
63
+ ```sh
64
+ ruby "$(ruby -e 'puts Gem::Specification.find_by_name("ap2_mandate_verifier", "1.2.0").full_gem_path')/examples/selective_payment.rb"
65
+ ```
66
+
67
+ The runnable example prints retained/transmitted disclosure counts and byte counts, confirms unchanged issuer JWT and changed presentation bytes, verifies chosen Payment and both Receipt outcomes without printing unselected values/disclosures. Its approved matrix is explicitly synthetic; real code reads protected consent. The application owns user authentication/consent, key enrollment/custody/revocation, current order/trust, final authorization, payment, durable one-use identity and atomic state transitions. Missing/invalid Receipt or uncertain processing remains pending, never automatic retry permission. Exact published artifact verification is in [publication evidence](POST_RELEASE_120.md); [release preparation](RELEASE_120_CANDIDATE.md) retains the historical candidate checkpoint.
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
1
+ {
2
+ "verified_at_utc": "2026-11-03T09:28:07.972453+00:00",
3
+ "name": "ap2_mandate_verifier",
4
+ "version": "1.1.0",
5
+ "platform": "ruby",
6
+ "registered_at": "2026-11-03T09:20:11.580Z",
7
+ "prerelease": false,
8
+ "yanked": false,
9
+ "ruby_requirement": ">= 3.4.12, < 4.1",
10
+ "runtime_dependencies": [
11
+ {
12
+ "name": "base64",
13
+ "requirements": "= 0.3.0"
14
+ },
15
+ {
16
+ "name": "digest",
17
+ "requirements": "= 3.2.1"
18
+ },
19
+ {
20
+ "name": "json",
21
+ "requirements": "= 2.19.9"
22
+ },
23
+ {
24
+ "name": "jwt",
25
+ "requirements": "= 3.3.0"
26
+ },
27
+ {
28
+ "name": "openssl",
29
+ "requirements": "= 4.0.2"
30
+ }
31
+ ],
32
+ "bytes": 115200,
33
+ "sha256": "4c64cf5b6c61ae4395577828093a6f4022c35cf18b6ad1bcfcb9f95fbb4f43c9",
34
+ "registry_metadata_sha_matches": true,
35
+ "candidate_public_archive_byte_identical": true,
36
+ "github_asset_byte_identical": true,
37
+ "payloads": 38,
38
+ "all_payloads_match_release_source_and_installed": true,
39
+ "release_source_sha": "89e779cadeac0ea7941e68f12951eed13f1b8081",
40
+ "reviewed_tested_sha": "631537ec52c33c3472fd856da55faeff3fb62203",
41
+ "release_tree": "4282e3349d2a2851940d3f153460a013f0ea6ceb",
42
+ "files_sha256": {
43
+ "LICENSE": "1442143c4265d88eedfc14f25d04298449358c837b0bb58dfa825f84b36391c8",
44
+ "README.ja.md": "8a9a9ad129dbd0be6a98d3097608f0e66705f832ee4e63b2026bcfd46095192e",
45
+ "README.md": "bc72e6df953d53ea8ac23d106c8d7a5e02aa28cd75328479b04f3fd68f4e8dfe",
46
+ "SECURITY.md": "3308faded0eaad624c5caf7477d59d6f172804588e910975873ef6a657010a06",
47
+ "docs/BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md": "96c67be9340a152d8bb4d10ea69b812eedce995a7d7b6a54bc0de3e6efca6ed5",
48
+ "docs/CONDITIONAL_CHECKOUT.md": "6ce7b14e3171525a7cbd4283862f724f98650f3f3e669bfab84345273ef3a2a7",
49
+ "docs/DIAGNOSTICS.ja.md": "302c87b40cb44bda43af021448ebe83409db96bbb2b0fb9c44e6a3dc78f3d433",
50
+ "docs/DIAGNOSTICS.md": "881cb7416ac1b18c26042ffa7f3bdbb33ccf5dbc95a2f7394f753271807df056",
51
+ "docs/INPUT_BUILDER.md": "428dbe89887fa13868dd750d19b524aa614eb8a80268bae6e4fd0c837a69841c",
52
+ "docs/MERCHANT_SIGNING.md": "31af8ead7fd507d72af4c400f2134e753d6d2297b1d6b85c831b3bd53185eeb4",
53
+ "docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md": "3db7caa63b33e7204c8d512ed22403fcceb2b90e198d9e963f13b2610c40b228",
54
+ "docs/PAYMENT.md": "7fea7f2d3433ad5d8fc922a0109d1a6ec34a60f4a1977eee42b43b02e688ccbc",
55
+ "docs/POST_RELEASE_MAINTENANCE.md": "d6662cd35a86d4b8f24a2d350cfef80f3e0b7a1c21bde079757da1b1ae6b5ea0",
56
+ "docs/PUBLIC_API.md": "1be306928a23dd49fe5d08da7714f7f524aed446a04926a6599d5355eef76a42",
57
+ "docs/RELEASE_100_CANDIDATE.md": "4c67c42b9d9987272bb9ef826c48651f7179888549dfe89e973589c8820555df",
58
+ "docs/RELEASE_110_CANDIDATE.md": "4bb9597c2ef0a7e8aa6ecd796f1886acad8dd0bd601ff84cf915260d24833c8b",
59
+ "docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md": "fe48c918918d644bd580e9bdd3d6f80b1a0341a0360b36065149d2cd4e8cb0b3",
60
+ "examples/conditional_checkout.rb": "dd672cc54c4a6650bfff654eb777eddd379c892481b67e58781e297a02c4c5af",
61
+ "examples/payment.rb": "48706d40d97d21c616d4b34f6c8d78c58fa57a7266dfaa81739a971b48cfa019",
62
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier.rb": "0a3608df80855b4986e105667aded9d63ada32b93b0d84f8e7a933636825df1b",
63
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/buyer.rb": "1a9c129b6eb33ac508472aa634eee7afc4add5a537a5c3cb7d49d12557269588",
64
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_jwt.rb": "d96a1e8ea9d69787ce94c35253b866c0d5fb867b8864cd7a9f93a526adbb8781",
65
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_receipt.rb": "ba37ef2519eb49d46313c2c85cba894e0e644626e33247d227e0b4c26149c303",
66
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/conditional_checkout.rb": "685a57939b8a1774dfeb40f2ba2fcb96686f613e4bbe02cb315a82b598e0391e",
67
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/diagnostic.rb": "0d2e961d80d5f29d42b49898e2df993f60962766437958adba568cbf9b5d7f1e",
68
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/host_binding.rb": "1373efe503ccc5eda817ffd790799fc622d6cb106f8b7da85ef2b3f4693c662e",
69
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/input_builder.rb": "a35a5ce9160f0a8816c6dde6eeeeac09724b655d465c5caf7f14acdbe17e3290",
70
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/input_validator.rb": "395f8e6f2012ab400d7b17f1fdcf4ee63a3c1c9622da4f2b32d35b522542bf00",
71
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/merchant_signature.rb": "f41aafd533dc3f988956c4503325ebbd82dc43a8bc1511e8c26572b4c32e7e70",
72
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/payment.rb": "93a44f115fd869fcc497e30e434253292b47aed6ec26502657c70b1477a1b285",
73
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/payment_receipt.rb": "31ad00de7c733810c6b243dcaf9880576cc3e552892eeeadaf16d212f2179335",
74
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/purchase_binding.rb": "6f3f966eed59511eed54cc7f28bb8fe83123d43b5b213502a9ea5cc328c53690",
75
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/research_result.rb": "6b0bc022e57a2a837e296f2b1bfe9a154d69b4c98fea46e269e2d3f28a1c948b",
76
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/result.rb": "ba4fc058784e34a870507446224121a6ba09387137ef2a8c044e02256fc6c64f",
77
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/root_disclosures.rb": "7e9d2f51a24c344b54fd4e63e6619108b794b88d0adc003b6cdee821b39a8d65",
78
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/root_signature.rb": "d9b68d989700a0c103f80004e14fb2d3aa992f823434e07bf2971f63052519dd",
79
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/scoped_constraints.rb": "5d50858ba365e2716b635a2888f08f38afda7937be879347dd536d11f7b5d44b",
80
+ "lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/trust_context.rb": "897936b2fec31e63a673ca15e89485c5254f13a427aafae9504e3c2525601f97"
81
+ },
82
+ "tag": "v1.1.0",
83
+ "tag_object": "dff5006234c35c24de416786fa7d088953f86105",
84
+ "github_release": {
85
+ "id": 432487583,
86
+ "published_at": "2026-11-03T09:23:10Z",
87
+ "draft": false,
88
+ "prerelease": false,
89
+ "url": "https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v1.1.0"
90
+ },
91
+ "postpublication_validation": {
92
+ "mri": [
93
+ "3.4.12",
94
+ "4.0.9"
95
+ ],
96
+ "ordinary_install_source_archive_installed_equality": "PASS both endpoints; release-tag source, no rebuild",
97
+ "payment_assertions_each_installed": 113,
98
+ "published_guides": "PASS both endpoints; EN/JA README, retained Checkout examples, installed Payment sample"
99
+ },
100
+ "authentication_observation": "Owner terminal reported successful registration; browser reported verification callback error. Registry metadata and distribution independently confirm publication. No retry push performed; browser error root cause not established."
101
+ }