ap2_mandate_verifier 0.7.0 → 1.0.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
1
+ # Conditional Checkout delegation — published 0.8.0
2
+
3
+ Published 2026-11-01 06:01:31.103 UTC. The official 79,872-byte Gem and all29
4
+ payloads match source `5a7394c1b98f000b321423e2c2f80d50b5157808`.
5
+ [Publication verification and installed examples](POST_RELEASE_080.md).
6
+
7
+ Adopted AP2 v0.2.0 source remains `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`.
8
+ This is an additive Ruby issuance API for the existing explicit
9
+ `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` v1 profile. It does not relax old
10
+ profiles, add a general Schema engine, or establish real Issuer trust.
11
+
12
+ ## Security proposition and responsibilities
13
+
14
+ An authenticated approval service issues an Open for one registered Agent key,
15
+ one merchant and 1–8 requirements, each with 1–8 candidate products and an exact
16
+ integer quantity. The Agent can close it only against an authentic merchant
17
+ Checkout that completely satisfies those requirements. All signed original
18
+ bytes are retained. The existing full verifier independently checks the result
19
+ against registered trust, the current order and Host challenge.
20
+
21
+ The application authenticates the person, obtains informed consent and purchasing
22
+ authority, protects the approved conditions and controls the Provider signer.
23
+ No boolean approval establishes consent. Provider key material is never passed
24
+ to the Agent. Agent and Merchant keys are independently registered, not trusted
25
+ because they appear in received tokens. Host owns challenge issuance, trusted
26
+ clock, current order, revocation, durable atomic consumption and execution.
27
+ SDK verification is evidence, never Host ALLOW or payment completion.
28
+
29
+ ## Public API design
30
+
31
+ `ConditionalCheckout.issue_open(merchant:, requirements:, agent_public_key_pem:,
32
+ issued_at:, expires_at:, signer:, public_key_pem:)` returns immutable
33
+ `Open#root_presentation`. Merchant is `{id, name}`; requirements contain
34
+ `{id, quantity, acceptable_items: [{id, title}]}` with string keys. Input is a
35
+ protected application approval record, not untrusted Agent parameters.
36
+
37
+ `ConditionalCheckout.issue_closed(root_presentation:, checkout_jwt:,
38
+ trusted_issuer_public_key_pem:, agent_public_key_pem:,
39
+ trusted_merchant_public_key_pem:, expected_merchant_id:, audience:, nonce:,
40
+ verified_at:, signer:)` returns immutable `Closed` with original
41
+ `root_presentation`, `terminal_jws`, `closed_sd_jwt` and `checkout_jwt`.
42
+ It verifies Open signature, complete disclosure graph, schema subset, Agent
43
+ cnf, validity, Merchant signature and all quantity constraints before signing.
44
+ The signer receives frozen ASCII ES256 signing input and returns 64 JOSE bytes;
45
+ the supplied public key verifies the exact returned signature before success.
46
+ Signer network access, timeout and access control belong to the application.
47
+
48
+ `ConditionalCheckout.present(root_presentation:, terminal_jws:, checkout_jwt:)`
49
+ restores detached immutable original strings for transport/storage. It checks
50
+ bounded supported syntax and original-byte bindings, not authentication;
51
+ Merchant must use `InputBuilder.verify` / `verify_checkout` with independent
52
+ trust and Host inputs. The issuance object can be persisted as these three
53
+ strings; no claims or disclosures are reserialized during presentation.
54
+ Issuance/restoration failures raise a fixed redacted `ConditionalCheckout::Invalid`
55
+ without a cause. No partial claims, keys, nonce or raw tokens appear in errors.
56
+
57
+ ## Wire contract, limits and completeness
58
+
59
+ Open uses ES256 root `example+sd-jwt`, one SD array commitment to Open content,
60
+ one to the merchant, and one per candidate. All candidates and constraints are
61
+ always disclosed; subset selection is not supported. Salts are random 128-bit
62
+ values. No omitted, extra, duplicate, unknown or decoy commitments are accepted.
63
+ The profile's original-byte, depth, graph, 8-line/requirement/candidate and amount
64
+ limits apply jointly. Quantity matching uses exact integral max flow by product
65
+ ID, including same-product separate rows. Unknown constraints fail closed.
66
+
67
+ Open carries `cnf.jwk`, `iat`, `exp`, two ordered constraints and
68
+ `vct: mandate.checkout.open.1`. Lifetime is positive and at most 7200 seconds;
69
+ all checks use explicit integer epochs and `iat <= now < exp`. Agent Closed
70
+ inherits Open `iat/exp` exactly, as required by this existing profile. Terminal
71
+ KB-SD-JWT has `typ: kb+sd-jwt`, `aud`, `nonce`, fresh `iat`, `sd_hash` of the
72
+ entire original Open SD-JWT including disclosures and trailing `~`, and one
73
+ inline Closed containing the exact merchant JWT and its SHA256 base64url hash.
74
+ There are no selective disclosures in this final Closed; its SD-JWT is exactly
75
+ `terminal_jws + "~"`. Audience and nonce come from the Host challenge and must
76
+ also be independently checked by the Merchant. Proof age is at most 300 seconds.
77
+ Agent signing uses the existing terminal limits (24,576 decoded claim bytes and
78
+ 32,768 compact bytes), accommodating the embedded original Merchant JWT.
79
+ Merchant/Direct signing retain 12,000 decoded claim bytes and 16,384 wire bytes;
80
+ Checkout text/count limits and all joint effective bounds still apply.
81
+
82
+ Receipt `reference` is base64url without padding of SHA256 of **only the final
83
+ Closed SD-JWT**, including its trailing `~`. It excludes the preceding Open
84
+ chain, includes any disclosure bytes in profiles that have them, and never hashes
85
+ compact JWT alone or reconstructed JSON. This profile has zero final disclosures;
86
+ reordering Open disclosures changes the Agent's root binding but not that rule.
87
+ Existing `CheckoutReceipt.sign/verify` use the explicit multi-item profile.
88
+
89
+ ## Application outcomes and compatibility
90
+
91
+ After evidence verification, the application reserves/consumes the approval,
92
+ challenge and order transactionally and signs its explicit Success/Error outcome.
93
+ Authentic Success confirms the merchant's recorded result; authentic Error is
94
+ not automatic permission to replay. Retry requires current order/approval/nonce
95
+ policy. Missing Receipt, transport errors or uncertain commits remain pending;
96
+ reconcile saved operation IDs rather than repeat a purchase blindly.
97
+
98
+ Direct, old single-product defaults, InputBuilder saved formats, diagnostics,
99
+ Result/Evidence and Receipt contracts remain unchanged. No migration is required.
100
+ This new API explicitly selects the existing multi-item profile; no token can
101
+ select policy. Payment Mandates, budgets, repeated/split/multi-merchant purchases,
102
+ User Credentials, Rails and tax/shipping/discount calculation are out of scope.
103
+
104
+ ## Acceptance and independent evidence
105
+
106
+ Required checks: public-only installed example from conditions through both
107
+ Receipt outcomes; 1/8 rows, candidates, varying quantities, repeated product rows;
108
+ shortage/excess, wrong merchant/Agent/Open/Checkout, authentic invalid orders;
109
+ signature/hash/disclosure tampering, unknown/missing/duplicate fields, bounds,
110
+ expiry/future/proof-age boundaries, audience/nonce mismatch, exact receipt hash
111
+ scope and wrong key/issuer/time/reference; existing complete regression.
112
+ Official Python SDK primitives and unmodified pinned Schemas must independently
113
+ verify Ruby output and produce Ruby-accepted signed input. Normative specification,
114
+ SDK behavior and stricter local rules are recorded separately; SDK shortage and
115
+ empty-candidate differences remain in MULTI_ITEM_INTEROP.md. Latest-HEAD Codex
116
+ review and the same candidate Gem installed on both supported Rubies are required.
117
+
118
+ Status: published after separate Owner authorization; final review/CI/source and
119
+ distribution evidence are linked in POST_RELEASE_080.md. The preparation snapshot
120
+ remains in RELEASE_080_CANDIDATE.md. No production or actual payment is performed.
121
+
122
+ ## Official-source comparison and independent results
123
+
124
+ On 2026-11-01 official main is `e1ea56db72a6385bce3e5c1112b3a56ce60acb43`.
125
+ GitHub compare from the adopted commit changes only CHANGELOG, CONTRIBUTING,
126
+ README and uv.lock; normative docs, Schemas and SDK code are unchanged. Current
127
+ [Checkout](https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/checkout_mandate/) and
128
+ [Agent Authorization](https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/agent_authorization/) pages
129
+ were also read. Adoption stays pinned, with no dependency/source upgrade.
130
+
131
+ `test/conditional_interop.py` uses the pinned official `sd_jwt.create/verify`,
132
+ `kb_sd_jwt.verify`, JWT sign/verify helpers, unmodified Open/Closed/Checkout/Receipt
133
+ Schemas, independent commitment traversal and SHA256. Ruby Open/Closed is
134
+ verified by Python. Official Python Open issuance plus official JWT helper inline
135
+ Closed signing is accepted by Ruby; both Receipt outcomes work in both directions.
136
+ Keys remain in memory and no runtime network or remote Schema fallback is used.
137
+
138
+ The official high-level `kb_sd_jwt.create` always discloses `delegate_payload`
139
+ through a commitment and emits `_sd_alg`, even with empty metadata. Its output is
140
+ tested unchanged as an unsupported-form rejection. We do not strip signed claims
141
+ or weaken the existing inline-terminal profile to accept it. The supported inline
142
+ form uses official JWT signing and the same normative claim/hash rules, validated
143
+ independently. Choosing a new selective-disclosure terminal profile is future work.
144
+ This is bounded interoperability, not all SDK helpers or general AP2 compatibility.
145
+
146
+ The initial Codex P2 on restoration completeness was fixed by sharing the exact
147
+ Root closure walker for structural restoration. Restoration still authenticates
148
+ neither Root nor Agent signatures; full merchant verification remains mandatory.
149
+ Negative tests sign terminals bound to malformed/missing/duplicate Root disclosures
150
+ and require restoration rejection. Package/source results and final review status
151
+ are in [release preparation](RELEASE_080_CANDIDATE.md).
152
+
153
+ ## Handling non-success without replay
154
+
155
+ ```ruby
156
+ case result.status # from InputBuilder.verify / verify_checkout
157
+ when :verified_research
158
+ # Recheck current application authorization/order/trust; atomically reserve.
159
+ when :rejected
160
+ # Decline this presentation; do not execute or issue a Success Receipt.
161
+ when :unavailable
162
+ # Verification could not establish evidence; hold, diagnose and retry only
163
+ # verification under application policy, without executing the order.
164
+ end
165
+ # Missing/unverified Receipt after submission: retain operation_id => :pending,
166
+ # reconcile the merchant's saved result; do not resubmit a purchase blindly.
167
+ ```
168
+
169
+ Issuance `Invalid` similarly never means that an order was executed; a remote
170
+ signer error may have an uncertain signing outcome, so reconcile the application's
171
+ issuance record before reissuing. SDK operations here perform no payment side effect.
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
1
+ # Input assembly for explicit checkout profiles
2
+
3
+ ## Multi-item selection in published 0.6.0
4
+
5
+ Published stable 0.6.0 supports
6
+ `InputBuilder.trust(..., profile_ref: "ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item")`.
7
+ Omitting `profile_ref:` retains the unchanged single-SKU v1 profile. The new
8
+ selection is authenticated Host policy, not extracted from Mandate claims.
9
+ `prepare`, `restore`, `restore_trust`, `inputs` and `verify` retain their existing
10
+ arguments and follow that validated profile. Saved profile identifiers and
11
+ definition hashes must agree with current trust and binding; no repair occurs.
12
+ The old saved format remains valid for its original profile, and migration
13
+ requires a new selection and challenge before presentation.
14
+
15
+ Use the same explicit `profile_ref:` for `CheckoutJWT.sign` and
16
+ `CheckoutReceipt.reference/sign/verify`. The [multi-item guide](MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md)
17
+ describes supported identities, quantities, disclosures and limits; the
18
+ [complete synthetic example](../examples/multi_item_checkout.rb) covers signing,
19
+ prepare/save/restore/current verification and genuine Success/Error Receipts.
20
+ The normal business-order mapping below still supplies independent Host values;
21
+ received signed claims never become their own expected total or trust input.
22
+
23
+ Published 0.4.0 includes supplemental safe diagnostics; see [API and troubleshooting](DIAGNOSTICS.md). Existing verdict/Evidence contracts remain unchanged.
24
+
25
+ `AP2MandateVerifier::InputBuilder` converts explicit Host business information into
26
+ the existing seven verification inputs. It performs no network, database, Rails,
27
+ nonce issuance/consumption or payment operation. A built input is not verified
28
+ Evidence. `InputBuilder.verify` always invokes the complete `verify_checkout` core.
29
+ The original `verify_checkout`, `verify_research` and older APIs remain available.
30
+
31
+ ## Run the complete Ruby example
32
+
33
+ After ordinary installation of published 0.4.0 (`gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 0.4.0`), run these repository examples:
34
+
35
+ ```sh
36
+ ruby examples/input_builder.rb valid
37
+ ruby examples/input_builder.rb tampered
38
+ ruby examples/input_builder.rb expired
39
+ ruby examples/input_builder_before.rb
40
+ ```
41
+
42
+ The example contains independent synthetic order and public-registration data,
43
+ original signed Strings, issue-time preparation, temporary-file persistence,
44
+ restoration, fresh current-state reads, verification, and result handling. It does
45
+ not read `full.json` or infer trusted keys, prices, identities or nonce from tokens.
46
+ No private keys are distributed. See `examples/input_builder/NOTICE.md` for source.
47
+ The fixed synthetic clock is intentional: these historical signatures expire.
48
+
49
+ ## Host mapping
50
+
51
+ All structured input keys are Strings. Exact plain Hash/Array/String/Integer and
52
+ boolean values are accepted; do not pass model objects, Symbols, subclasses,
53
+ custom coercions or unbounded graphs. Unknown fields are rejected. Pure assembly
54
+ methods raise `InputBuilder::Invalid` for malformed business information; a caller
55
+ must treat missing results or exceptions as failure, never authorization.
56
+
57
+ `verify` converts malformed assembly arguments to the existing immutable Result
58
+ `:rejected / :invalid_host_context`; dependency or unexpected assembly failures
59
+ return `:unavailable / :research_verification_unavailable`. Both are non-success
60
+ with no Evidence. Codes produced after entering the complete verifier are retained.
61
+
62
+ | Business source | Builder argument | Host responsibility |
63
+ | --- | --- | --- |
64
+ | Authenticated registry snapshot and public PEM keys | `trust(snapshot:, tenant_id:, issuer:, agent:, merchant:, verified_at:)` | Provenance, enrollment, revocation, freshness and explicit selection |
65
+ | Current order/account/tenant, merchant, audience, version, currency, total minor units | `order:` | Independent authoritative state; no values inferred from signed claims |
66
+ | Original received Root and Checkout Strings | `root_presentation:`, `host_checkout_jws:` | Preserve exact bytes, including Root disclosure order and trailing `~` |
67
+ | Host-chosen ID, nonce, issuer and validity | `prepare(...)` | Actual issuance and durable authenticated persistence |
68
+ | Saved preparation String | `restore(saved_challenge:)` | Authenticate storage; retain state and references without repair |
69
+ | Current trust/order, terminal String and trusted clock | `inputs(...)` / `verify(...)` | Independent reads, currentness and clock provenance |
70
+ | Verified Evidence | returned Result | Final authorization; recheck trust/order, atomic nonce consumption and order CAS |
71
+
72
+ A snapshot has `id`, `policy_version`, `active`, `not_before`, `not_after`, and
73
+ `records`. Each record supplies `role`, `identity`, `tenant_id`, `purpose`,
74
+ `key_ref`, `public_key_pem`, `active`, `not_before`, `not_after`. Public PEM must
75
+ already be canonical P256 SPKI. The builder adds the fixed profile, algorithm and
76
+ fingerprint; it preserves and validates every record, including nonselected ones.
77
+ Role selectors each contain `identity`, `purpose`, `key_ref`.
78
+
79
+ An order contains `tenant_id`, `buyer_account_id`, `order_id`, `merchant_id`,
80
+ `audience`, `order_version`, `currency`, `expected_total` (integer minor units).
81
+ The builder adds selected Agent fingerprint, raw wire digests and fixed profile.
82
+ It does not compare current values by overwriting issued values.
83
+
84
+ ## Rails mapping example
85
+
86
+ Rails is optional. This explicit mapping belongs to the application; the Gem does
87
+ not interpret ActiveRecord models or acquire trust. Only use values whose source
88
+ and currentness your Host has authenticated:
89
+
90
+ ```ruby
91
+ order_information = {
92
+ "tenant_id" => order.tenant.external_id,
93
+ "buyer_account_id" => order.buyer.external_id,
94
+ "order_id" => order.external_id,
95
+ "merchant_id" => order.merchant.external_id,
96
+ "audience" => configured_checkout_audience,
97
+ "order_version" => order.lock_version.to_s,
98
+ "currency" => order.currency,
99
+ "expected_total" => order.total_minor
100
+ }
101
+ # registry_snapshot and role selectors use the same explicit plain-value mapping.
102
+ # Save prepare(...) bytes in a protected challenge record before handing out nonce.
103
+ # Later load that record unchanged and independently reread current order/trust.
104
+ inputs = AP2MandateVerifier::InputBuilder.inputs(
105
+ trust: current_trust, saved_challenge: challenge.preparation_bytes,
106
+ order: order_information, root_presentation: received_root,
107
+ terminal_jws: received_terminal, host_checkout_jws: original_checkout,
108
+ expected_challenge_issuer_id: configured_host_id,
109
+ clock_source_id: trusted_clock_id, verified_at: trusted_clock_unix_seconds)
110
+ result = AP2MandateVerifier.verify_checkout(**inputs)
111
+ # success? is checked evidence, not a purchase/payment permission.
112
+ ```
113
+
114
+ Do not call `prepare` again during verification. Changes in order, selected Agent,
115
+ raw signed bytes, trust snapshot/policy or saved references must remain observable.
116
+ Restoration validates the storage envelope and does not authenticate its contents.
117
+ Changing a stored digest to match current data defeats the Host trust boundary.
118
+ Persist state changes separately under authenticated atomic Host operations; do
119
+ not replace an already-used challenge with a new issued preparation.
120
+
121
+ ## Before/after measurement
122
+
123
+ The checked-in runnable examples are the measurement material, rather than a
124
+ one-line call that hides initial setup or persistence. Count nonblank,
125
+ noncomment Ruby lines with:
126
+
127
+ ```sh
128
+ awk 'NF && $0 !~ /^[[:space:]]*#/ {n++} END {print n}' examples/input_builder_before.rb
129
+ awk 'NF && $0 !~ /^[[:space:]]*#/ {n++} END {print n}' examples/input_builder.rb
130
+ ```
131
+
132
+ Current source counts are **64 before / 42 after**. Both include initial mapping,
133
+ issue preparation, save/read, current-state construction and result handling.
134
+ The after example additionally selects three scenarios; this is a small synthetic
135
+ example, not a general application-effort benchmark or performance claim.
136
+
137
+ | Burden | Before | Recommended path |
138
+ | --- | --- | --- |
139
+ | Initial business mapping | Required | Required, explicit and source-owned |
140
+ | Trust/profile envelopes and selection references | Handwritten nested shapes | Gem-generated |
141
+ | Public-key fingerprint, snapshot-body hash, Root/Checkout digest | 4 caller-side SHA256 call sites | 0 |
142
+ | Challenge B and trust-reference transcription | Caller constructs and copies | Gem-generated at preparation |
143
+ | Daily verification | Assemble current B, host JSON, seven arguments | Restore saved bytes, map current state, call builder |
144
+ | Storage, trust authenticity, nonce state, final business decision | Host-owned | Host-owned |
145
+
146
+ The improvement removes mechanical transformations and repeated profile/reference
147
+ knowledge. It does not remove the first-time work of identifying authoritative
148
+ business data, registration policy or atomic Host operations.
149
+
150
+ ## Versions and migration
151
+
152
+ Gem version (current published `0.6.0`), AP2 source
153
+ `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`, explicitly selected profile
154
+ (`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1 or `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` v1), and preparation format `1` are
155
+ separate identifiers. Unknown preparation/profile versions fail closed. There is
156
+ no generic future-profile fallback. New protocol requirements can require new
157
+ application data and an explicit migration or reissuance.
158
+
159
+ Keep existing seven-input integrations unchanged while adopting the builder for
160
+ new preparations. Existing raw Host JSON is not automatically upgraded into a
161
+ new issued challenge. Retain original signed bytes and authenticated saved
162
+ references. Reissue through the Host's normal authorization process when a stored
163
+ format cannot be supported; do not repair its digests or reinterpret its version.
164
+ See [SUPPORT_CONTRACT](SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md) and the [multi-item migration](MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md) for each profile's scope.
165
+
166
+ ### Restoring an existing trust snapshot
167
+
168
+ `trust(...)` creates a **new** snapshot body from business records. When your Host
169
+ persists an existing authenticated snapshot, keep `trust.trust_json` and
170
+ `trust.selection_json` as original Strings and reload them with:
171
+
172
+ ```ruby
173
+ current_trust = AP2MandateVerifier::InputBuilder.restore_trust(
174
+ trust_json: authenticated_registry.trust_bytes,
175
+ selection_json: authenticated_registry.selection_bytes,
176
+ verified_at: trusted_clock_unix_seconds)
177
+ ```
178
+
179
+ This preserves exact snapshot/profile body Strings and their existing digests.
180
+ Do not parse and regenerate a persisted trust body to suppress reference drift.
181
+ A restored snapshot must still be independently authenticated and current; loading
182
+ an older snapshot does not establish freshness or prevent rollback.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ puts signed.checkout_hash.length # 43
62
62
  `signed.jwt` is the frozen original compact JWT to transmit and retain. Supply
63
63
  that exact String as `host_checkout_jws` to InputBuilder and Verifier; supply
64
64
  `signed.checkout_hash` when a test or external Agent binds a Closed Mandate.
65
- These 0.5/0.6 APIs do not issue a product Mandate. The unpublished 0.7.0
65
+ These 0.5/0.6 APIs do not issue a product Mandate. The published 0.7.0
66
66
  [Direct buyer module](BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md) adds a separate issuance flow.
67
67
  Re-encoding claims or signing again
68
68
  creates different original wire, even when the order is the same.
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
1
+ # 公開後の整備 / Post-release maintenance
2
+
3
+ 現在の配布版は[0.8.0](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.8.0)です。フレームワーク非依存のAP2 Ruby SDKとして、対応profileにおけるDirect/条件付き購入委任の発行・提示・検証・Checkout Receipt確認を提供します。現行API・対応範囲は[SUPPORT_CONTRACT](SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md)、公開物と導入確認は[0.8.0公開記録](POST_RELEASE_080.md)を参照してください。**1.0.0は未公開候補**であり、候補の状態と検証は[1.0.0準備記録](RELEASE_100_CANDIDATE.md)に分けて記録します。
4
+
5
+ The current distribution is 0.8.0, a framework-independent Ruby SDK for the documented AP2 Checkout profiles. It includes Direct and conditional issuance, presentation, verification and Receipt confirmation. Version 1.0.0 is an unpublished candidate. Historical prerelease/candidate/prepublication statements below describe their original stages, not current availability.
6
+
7
+ 実Issuer信頼・特定Host本番GO・Phase 2-BはHOLDを維持します。一般AP2互換性・Phase2-A全面PASS・E10全面GOは未成立です。EvidenceはHost ALLOW・nonce消費・決済許可ではありません。
8
+ Real Issuer trust, specific Host production GO and Phase 2-B remain HOLD. General AP2 compatibility, full Phase2-A PASS and full E10 GO are not established. Evidence is not Host ALLOW, nonce consumption or payment permission.
9
+
10
+ ## 公開物と証拠 / Artifacts and evidence
11
+
12
+ | 配布先 / Distribution | 版 / Version | bytes | SHA256 |
13
+ | --- | --- | ---: | --- |
14
+ | [RubyGems](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.8.0) | 0.8.0(現行配布版 / current release) | 79,872 | `6c07664e4291aa8bc025b152075869322411a0d99861e1267959f1794e99acec` |
15
+ | [RubyGems](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.1.0) | 0.1.0(歴史記録 / historical) | 34,304 | `37b2a235b6fab2d9d9765ae985dd9db27afd3b2c5407fe263a6b65314550db32` |
16
+ | [RubyGems](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.1.0.pre.3) | 0.1.0.pre.3 | 37,888 | `8ad627818dc69b450d0fba970dafaf368ec42dd64fb51eec631731027de3882c` |
17
+ | [GitHub Release](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v0.1.0.pre.2) | 0.1.0.pre.2 | 33,280 | `e910659bbebda7aa5f00d63fb579f3b56819d59b5ee7d8b1734a6331f01d8de4` |
18
+
19
+ 0.8.0の公式配布物は保持候補およびsource `5a7394c1b98f000b321423e2c2f80d50b5157808` の全29 payloadと照合済みです。公開日時・照合・対応MRIでの公式Gem導入確認は[0.8.0公開記録](POST_RELEASE_080.md)が根拠です。この表は現行版と以下の歴史記録の対象を示し、全リリース一覧ではありません。
20
+ The 0.8.0 publication record identifies the exact source, distributed artifact and installed-Gem checks. Its observations do not validate a newly built 1.0.0 artifact. The table preserves the historical artifacts discussed below; it is not a complete version inventory.
21
+
22
+ ### 歴史記録:0.1.0公開 / Historical 0.1.0 publication
23
+
24
+ 0.1.0はOwnerのexact-artifact S7承認後、2026-10-26 08:35:32 UTCに公開。08:37:27 UTCの照合で公式版一覧・所有者`cuichangquan`・実配布bytes・保持R2のSHA/sizeが一致し、13 payload/18 source manifest項目も照合済みです。[公開receiptと限界](../research/stable010_release_linux_package/README.md#rubygems-publication-verified)が根拠です。版別APIの初回404とMFA停止は当時の記録として保持し、公開後照合で再pushはしていません。GitHubのsource snapshotは配布Gemと同一bytesではありません。
25
+ Stable 0.1.0 publication was verified against official versions/owners metadata and the downloaded distribution. This exact-artifact S7 approval does not grant actual Host production GO or authorize a later release. Published artifacts and original validation evidence remain immutable.
26
+
27
+ ### 歴史記録:pre.3/pre.2 / Historical prereleases
28
+
29
+ pre3は2026-10-23に所有者 `cuichangquan` が公開し、Ownerが公式API・実配布物・MBA原本の一致を確認しました。
30
+ 今回のMac mini監査ではRubyGems閲覧取得不能/APIへのDNS解決失敗のため独立再確認できていません。
31
+ これは昨日の公開検証記録を否定するものでも、今回の再検証成功を示すものでもありません。
32
+ The Owner's 2026-10-23 publication check matched the official API, distributed
33
+ pre3 archive and MBA original under owner `cuichangquan`. The subsequent Mac mini
34
+ audit could not independently refetch RubyGems (page/API retrieval unavailable,
35
+ local API DNS resolution failed); it does not constitute another successful
36
+ publication validation.
37
+
38
+ [PR177](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/pull/177) records
39
+ `MBA409-PRE3PACKAGE02-20261023`: MBA Darwin arm64, MRI4.0.9,13 payload identities,
40
+ 10 loaded libraries and52 installed checks (42 saved independent expectations,
41
+ 7 legacy APIs,2 input rejections,1 constructor rejection). It did not rerun885
42
+ source regressions. **pre3 Linux subsequently passed [run40038620413 attempt1](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/actions/runs/40038620413).** The earlier NOT_RUN status was historical and is superseded by that pre3 observation. The successful pre2 Linux
43
+ [run39939021098 attempt1](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/actions/runs/39939021098)
44
+ is historical pre2 evidence, not a pre3 package or independent Linux Oracle run.
45
+ Unknown safety, runtime/native attestation and worst-case CPU/RSS/concurrency
46
+ remain unproved; historical communication-accounting gaps remain unresolved.
47
+
48
+ ## 文書と再公開の境界 / Documentation and publication
49
+
50
+ READMEとSUPPORT_CONTRACTはGem同梱対象です。公開Gem内の文書は包装時点のスナップショットとして保持し、
51
+ 「RubyGems未公開」等の古い記載はmainの文書で追補します。現在のmainは同梱文書と異なります。
52
+ 同じ版を再ビルドしても公開Gemと同一ではなく、公開SHA・包装検証を引き継ぎません。
53
+ 公開Gem・タグ・Releaseは上書きせず、文書訂正だけの再リリースは行いません。
54
+ Gemの次版が必要になったときに、同梱文書・候補metadataを別途見直します。
55
+ README and SUPPORT_CONTRACT are packaged files. Published copies remain immutable
56
+ packaging snapshots; main supplements their stale unpublished wording. Current
57
+ main differs from packaged documentation. A same-version rebuild is not the
58
+ published artifact and inherits neither its SHA nor package-validation evidence.
59
+ Do not overwrite published Gems, tags or Releases. Documentation corrections alone
60
+ do not require a new Gem release. Review packaged documents and candidate metadata
61
+ when a separately approved next version is needed.
62
+
63
+ ## 受付 / Reporting
64
+
65
+ - 通常の不具合・導入問題 / Ordinary bugs and installation issues:
66
+ [GitHub Issues](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/issues).
67
+ Include Gem version, artifact SHA if known, Ruby/OS/dependency versions,
68
+ sanitized minimal synthetic reproduction, expected/actual behavior and scope.
69
+ - 脆弱性 / Suspected vulnerabilities: follow [SECURITY.md](../SECURITY.md).
70
+ Do not publish exploit details in Issues or PRs. Never include credentials,
71
+ private keys, real Mandates/nonces or personal data in either reporting route.
72
+ - Owner `cuichangquan` is the initial maintainer contact through these GitHub
73
+ routes. Triage distinguishes reproducible defects, unsupported profiles,
74
+ environment failures and security concerns. No response/fix deadline or
75
+ production support commitment is promised.
76
+
77
+ ## 1.xの保守・互換性方針案 / Proposed 1.x maintenance and compatibility
78
+
79
+ 以下は1.0.0公開に向けた保守方針案です。1.0.0の公開済み表示や、旧版への保守保証ではありません。公開面の対象は[PUBLIC_API](PUBLIC_API.md)、対応profile・信頼前提・環境は[SUPPORT_CONTRACT](SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md)に定義します。
80
+
81
+ - **保守対象:** 1.x公開後は、最新の1.xマイナー系列の最新patchを対象とします。新しい1.xマイナーが公開された後、以前のマイナー系列・0.x・preへのbackportは約束しません。固定保守年数、受付・修正・開示期限、SLA、24時間対応も約束しません。重大未対処問題や保守不能が判明した場合はHOLDとし、対象版・理由・利用者が取れる対応を明記します。
82
+ - **patch:** 文書化された公開契約を保つ不具合修正です。以前誤って受理した不正・未対応入力を拒否して既存契約を回復するセキュリティ修正は含み得ます。その場合も影響版・受理範囲の変化・理由・必要な移行を開示します。
83
+ - **minor:** 既存の公開契約を保つAPI追加、明示選択するprofileの追加、非推奨化の告知です。既定profileや保存済み原文の扱いを黙って変更しません。非推奨化するAPIは移行先を示してminorで告知し、削除は次のmajor以降とします。固定の暦日猶予は設けません。
84
+ - **major:** 公開API、結果・エラーの契約、既定動作、既存profileの受理条件、保存形式、対応環境に対する非互換変更です。セキュリティ対策という理由だけで、文書化された契約変更を互換patchとして扱いません。必要な修正を互換性のために放置せず、影響と移行を明示して適切な版で対応します。
85
+
86
+ Once 1.x is released, the proposal maintains only the latest patch of its latest minor series. No backports to older minors, 0.x or prereleases, fixed support term, response/fix/disclosure deadlines or SLA are promised. Patch releases preserve the documented public contract; minor releases add compatible capabilities or announce deprecations with migration guidance; incompatible public-contract changes require a major release. Deprecations are announced in a minor release, with removal no earlier than the next major and no fixed calendar notice period.
87
+
88
+ Security fixes may reject inputs previously accepted in violation of the documented contract, including in a patch release, with affected versions, reasons and migration disclosed. An actual documented-contract change is not automatically patch-compatible because it is security-related. Unsupported profiles, real Issuer trust and Host/payment duties are not brought into scope by the 1.0.0 version number. Dependency updates require an explicit compatibility assessment; they are not automatically compatible.
89
+
90
+ ## 依存と回帰 / Dependencies and regression
91
+
92
+ 担当はOwner/保守者です。Owner採用済みの手動見直し頻度は月1回、および関連advisory判明時・次版判断前です。
93
+ 1.xの保守対象案は前節のとおりです。現行0.8.0の報告窓口は維持しますが、旧版backport・固定保守年数・SLAは約束しません。
94
+ これは定期監視・自動実行・対応期限が稼働中だという宣言でも、実行の包括承認でもありません。
95
+ 2026-10-24 JSTの設定確認ではPrivate vulnerability reportingを有効化し、Dependabot alerts/security updatesは無効、version更新用設定ファイルはなしと記録しました。
96
+ これは当時の設定記録であり、今回の文書整備では現在の設定の再確認やDependabot・CI・認証設定の変更はしていません。
97
+ The Owner-adopted manual cadence is monthly, on relevant advisory discovery
98
+ and before a next release. The proposed 1.x maintenance scope is above; the current
99
+ 0.8.0 reporting routes remain available without a backport or SLA promise. This is
100
+ not an active scheduled monitor, automatic execution authority or response/fix
101
+ deadline. The 2026-10-24 JST setting record is historical: private reporting was
102
+ enabled, Dependabot alerts/security updates were disabled and no version-update
103
+ configuration was present. This documentation update neither rechecks nor changes
104
+ those settings.
105
+
106
+ 1.0.0準備で正式対応環境は広げません。MRI **3.4.12 / 4.0.9**、JSON **2.19.9**、JWT **3.3.0**、base64 **0.3.0**、OpenSSL gem **4.0.2**、Digest **3.2.1**の固定を維持します。RubyGemsの`>= 3.4.12, < 4.1`は依存解決範囲であり、その範囲の全Ruby版・他engine・OS/providerを検証済みとするものではありません。実測環境は各版の検証記録で区別します。
107
+ Formal runtime support remains exactly MRI 3.4.12 and 4.0.9 with the five dependency pins above. The Gem's Ruby resolution interval does not certify all versions or engines within it, or unmeasured OS/native-provider configurations.
108
+
109
+ Before proposing an update, assess official Ruby/JSON/JWT/base64/OpenSSL/Digest
110
+ advisories and the actual native providers, affected scope and reproducibility.
111
+ Keep exact dependency pins until a scoped change is approved; do not silently
112
+ accept a later provider or relabel historical manifests/results.
113
+
114
+ 文書のみの変更はリンク・日英整合・版/SHA・証拠範囲・CI triggerを静的確認します。
115
+ 依存/コード/包装を変更する場合は、差分に応じて現行のVerifier・InputBuilder・署名/Receipt・Direct・条件付き委任の回帰と、必要な独立正常・因果負例/Schema比較を計画します。
116
+ 新しい配布候補では、対応MRIごとの通常インストール、候補metadata、全payloadのsource/archive/installed一致、公開APIだけを使う例を確認します。実施範囲・件数・未実施はその版の記録に保存し、旧版の固定件数を現在の合格基準や新しいPASSとして流用しません。
117
+ 新しい結果は版・source SHA・runtime/provider・入力/期待値・環境・runを区別して保存します。
118
+ Linuxの保存期待値再生を独立Oracle再実行とは呼びません。失敗・未知・不一致はSTOP/HOLDです。
119
+ For documentation-only changes, statically check links, bilingual consistency,
120
+ version/SHA identities, evidence scope and CI triggers. Dependency/code/package
121
+ changes need a diff-based validation plan covering the affected current modules
122
+ and relevant independent positive/causal-negative or Schema comparisons. New
123
+ candidates require ordinary installation on both supported MRI versions, metadata
124
+ and complete source/archive/installed payload comparisons, and public-API examples.
125
+ Record the actual scope, counts and NOT_RUN work per release rather than copying
126
+ old counts or PASS results. Preserve new evidence separately by version, source SHA,
127
+ runtime/provider, inputs/expectations, environment and run. Saved-expectation
128
+ replays are not independent Oracle reruns. Failure, uncertainty or mismatch means
129
+ STOP/HOLD. Builds, installs, dynamic tests, Actions, dependency changes and releases
130
+ need their own explicit scope/approval; this document grants none.
131
+
132
+ The [0.8.0 publication record](POST_RELEASE_080.md) remains evidence for that distribution. The [1.0.0 candidate record](RELEASE_100_CANDIDATE.md) reports its own completed and pending validation; this maintenance plan does not assert that those checks have run.
133
+
134
+
135
+ ## 歴史記録:未公開0.1.0候補と採用済み保守条件(2026-10-26 UTC)
136
+
137
+ 公開物の表はpre3/pre2のままです。**0.1.0は未公開候補**であり、[候補source・Mac/Ubuntu結果](../research/stable010_candidate/README.md)を別記録に保存します。候補43,008B / SHA256 `0553645fa6c067dd8d7a7a1a7cdf13799370393e76dc3bc4ba161ab2ca5981b0`、両環境13 payload/10 loaded/52 installedが確認済み。候補内の未実施記述は包装時点snapshotで、後続Ubuntu成功は外部追補を参照してください。再包装や公開済みGem/tag/Releaseの上書きはしません。
138
+
139
+ 前節の月次/勧告時/次版前の手動見直しをOwnerが具体条件として採用しました。担当はOwner/保守者、通常不具合はIssues、脆弱性はSECURITYの非公開窓口です。初回安定系列の最新修正版のみを対象とし、pre/旧系列backport・一定年数・受付/修正期限・24時間対応は約束しません。更新/廃止/保守終了は対象版・理由・移行先と状態を告知し、固定猶予期間は設けません。自動監視は稼働中と扱わず、担当不在/保守不能/重大未対処問題はHOLDです。
140
+
141
+ 上記の一般的な回帰計画は全件再実行の義務ではありません。今回の版/文書/包装期待値の差分では、製品10件・固定依存と既存証拠を照合して885を再利用し、新候補の包装/導入を両環境各1回確認しました。147は885の内数、旧runtime独立比較や保存期待値再生は新独立Oracleではありません。追加検証は具体的不足に応じ別承認とし、今回追加試験/取得/build/Actions/公開はなしです。
142
+
143
+ Provider/component確認と全面安全性は別です。D1/D2停止とD3限定成功、JSON公式修正ソース根拠とGHSA metadata不整合、OS dyld/全binding・通信全量・物理容量peak等の未証明を保持します。最後にexact archive・配布先・保証範囲・残余を示すS7公開GOが必要で、特定Host本番GOは別/HOLDです。
144
+
145
+ The public-artifact table still lists pre3/pre2 only. Candidate0.1.0 has separate Mac/Ubuntu evidence; its packaging snapshots are supplemented externally without rebuilding. Adopted maintenance covers the latest patch in the initial stable series, with manual monthly/advisory/pre-release review, existing reporting routes and explicit update/deprecation notices; no backport/fixed-term/SLA/24-hour promises or automatic monitoring. Diff-based historical evidence reuse is not a fresh885 run. Publication and specific Host production GO remain separate and unapproved.
146
+
147
+
148
+
149
+ ## Historical R2 preparation / 歴史記録:公開向け文書のR2
150
+
151
+ The0.1.0 consumer documentation now describes the fixed verification contract and installation only after official listing, without declaring publication. Earlier candidate/R1/pre3 descriptions above are historical. A newly built R2 archive has separate [source and validation evidence](../research/stable010_release_linux_package/README.md); R1's43,008B archive and observations are not reused as new-byte validation. Existing maintenance scope/reporting routes/exclusions remain unchanged. RubyGems publication and specific Host production GO still require separate authorization.
152
+
153
+ 0.1.0の公開向け文書を整理しましたが、公開済みとは表示しません。旧candidate/R1/pre3は履歴として保持し、新R2は別archive・別証拠です。採用済み保守条件・窓口・保証除外は不変で、Gem公開GO・特定Host本番GOは別途必要です。
154
+
155
+
156
+ ## Historical prepublication supplement / 歴史記録:公開前R2検証追補
157
+
158
+ The new34,304B R2 archive (SHA256 `37b2a235b6fab2d9d9765ae985dd9db27afd3b2c5407fe263a6b65314550db32`) passed Mac and [Ubuntu run40288305150 attempt1](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/actions/runs/40288305150) payload13/loaded10/installed52 checks with matching payload/dependency identities. See [exact results and limitations](../research/stable010_release_linux_package/README.md). This is distinct from R1/pre3, not a new885 or independent Oracle run. Source/packaged bytes remain frozen. No Gem, tag or Release publication occurred; S7 and specific Host production GO remain HOLD. Existing maintenance policy and reporting routes are unchanged.
159
+
160
+ 新R2はMac/Ubuntuで限定包装検証済みですが未公開です。provider確認を全面安全性へ昇格せず、JSON勧告metadata不整合、OS dyld/全binding、総通信/physical peak等の未証明を保持します。原結果のhash/読戻し後に今回分だけを清掃し、旧停止履歴・証拠・archiveは保持。追加build/試験/Actions/取得はこの追補作業では行いません。