ap2_mandate_verifier 0.6.0 → 0.8.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/README.ja.md +182 -0
- data/README.md +47 -10
- data/docs/BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md +180 -0
- data/docs/CONDITIONAL_CHECKOUT.md +168 -0
- data/docs/MERCHANT_SIGNING.md +8 -5
- data/docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md +6 -5
- data/docs/RELEASE_080_CANDIDATE.md +109 -0
- data/docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md +46 -5
- data/examples/conditional_checkout.rb +84 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/buyer.rb +153 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_jwt.rb +27 -1
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_receipt.rb +5 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/conditional_checkout.rb +150 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/merchant_signature.rb +9 -4
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/root_disclosures.rb +24 -1
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/scoped_constraints.rb +12 -7
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier.rb +2 -0
- metadata +8 -1
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# Conditional Checkout delegation — 0.8.0 candidate
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Adopted AP2 v0.2.0 source remains `b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`.
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This is an additive Ruby issuance API for the existing explicit
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`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` v1 profile. It does not relax old
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profiles, add a general Schema engine, or establish real Issuer trust.
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## Security proposition and responsibilities
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An authenticated approval service issues an Open for one registered Agent key,
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one merchant and 1–8 requirements, each with 1–8 candidate products and an exact
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integer quantity. The Agent can close it only against an authentic merchant
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Checkout that completely satisfies those requirements. All signed original
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bytes are retained. The existing full verifier independently checks the result
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against registered trust, the current order and Host challenge.
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The application authenticates the person, obtains informed consent and purchasing
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authority, protects the approved conditions and controls the Provider signer.
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No boolean approval establishes consent. Provider key material is never passed
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to the Agent. Agent and Merchant keys are independently registered, not trusted
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because they appear in received tokens. Host owns challenge issuance, trusted
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clock, current order, revocation, durable atomic consumption and execution.
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SDK verification is evidence, never Host ALLOW or payment completion.
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## Public API design
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`ConditionalCheckout.issue_open(merchant:, requirements:, agent_public_key_pem:,
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issued_at:, expires_at:, signer:, public_key_pem:)` returns immutable
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`Open#root_presentation`. Merchant is `{id, name}`; requirements contain
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`{id, quantity, acceptable_items: [{id, title}]}` with string keys. Input is a
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protected application approval record, not untrusted Agent parameters.
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`ConditionalCheckout.issue_closed(root_presentation:, checkout_jwt:,
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trusted_issuer_public_key_pem:, agent_public_key_pem:,
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trusted_merchant_public_key_pem:, expected_merchant_id:, audience:, nonce:,
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verified_at:, signer:)` returns immutable `Closed` with original
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`root_presentation`, `terminal_jws`, `closed_sd_jwt` and `checkout_jwt`.
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It verifies Open signature, complete disclosure graph, schema subset, Agent
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cnf, validity, Merchant signature and all quantity constraints before signing.
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The signer receives frozen ASCII ES256 signing input and returns 64 JOSE bytes;
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the supplied public key verifies the exact returned signature before success.
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Signer network access, timeout and access control belong to the application.
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`ConditionalCheckout.present(root_presentation:, terminal_jws:, checkout_jwt:)`
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restores detached immutable original strings for transport/storage. It checks
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bounded supported syntax and original-byte bindings, not authentication;
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Merchant must use `InputBuilder.verify` / `verify_checkout` with independent
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trust and Host inputs. The issuance object can be persisted as these three
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strings; no claims or disclosures are reserialized during presentation.
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Issuance/restoration failures raise a fixed redacted `ConditionalCheckout::Invalid`
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without a cause. No partial claims, keys, nonce or raw tokens appear in errors.
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## Wire contract, limits and completeness
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Open uses ES256 root `example+sd-jwt`, one SD array commitment to Open content,
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one to the merchant, and one per candidate. All candidates and constraints are
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always disclosed; subset selection is not supported. Salts are random 128-bit
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values. No omitted, extra, duplicate, unknown or decoy commitments are accepted.
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The profile's original-byte, depth, graph, 8-line/requirement/candidate and amount
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limits apply jointly. Quantity matching uses exact integral max flow by product
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ID, including same-product separate rows. Unknown constraints fail closed.
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Open carries `cnf.jwk`, `iat`, `exp`, two ordered constraints and
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`vct: mandate.checkout.open.1`. Lifetime is positive and at most 7200 seconds;
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all checks use explicit integer epochs and `iat <= now < exp`. Agent Closed
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inherits Open `iat/exp` exactly, as required by this existing profile. Terminal
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KB-SD-JWT has `typ: kb+sd-jwt`, `aud`, `nonce`, fresh `iat`, `sd_hash` of the
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entire original Open SD-JWT including disclosures and trailing `~`, and one
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inline Closed containing the exact merchant JWT and its SHA256 base64url hash.
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There are no selective disclosures in this final Closed; its SD-JWT is exactly
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`terminal_jws + "~"`. Audience and nonce come from the Host challenge and must
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also be independently checked by the Merchant. Proof age is at most 300 seconds.
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Agent signing uses the existing terminal limits (24,576 decoded claim bytes and
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32,768 compact bytes), accommodating the embedded original Merchant JWT.
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Merchant/Direct signing retain 12,000 decoded claim bytes and 16,384 wire bytes;
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Checkout text/count limits and all joint effective bounds still apply.
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Receipt `reference` is base64url without padding of SHA256 of **only the final
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Closed SD-JWT**, including its trailing `~`. It excludes the preceding Open
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chain, includes any disclosure bytes in profiles that have them, and never hashes
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compact JWT alone or reconstructed JSON. This profile has zero final disclosures;
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reordering Open disclosures changes the Agent's root binding but not that rule.
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Existing `CheckoutReceipt.sign/verify` use the explicit multi-item profile.
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## Application outcomes and compatibility
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After evidence verification, the application reserves/consumes the approval,
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challenge and order transactionally and signs its explicit Success/Error outcome.
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Authentic Success confirms the merchant's recorded result; authentic Error is
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not automatic permission to replay. Retry requires current order/approval/nonce
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policy. Missing Receipt, transport errors or uncertain commits remain pending;
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reconcile saved operation IDs rather than repeat a purchase blindly.
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Direct, old single-product defaults, InputBuilder saved formats, diagnostics,
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Result/Evidence and Receipt contracts remain unchanged. No migration is required.
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This new API explicitly selects the existing multi-item profile; no token can
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select policy. Payment Mandates, budgets, repeated/split/multi-merchant purchases,
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User Credentials, Rails and tax/shipping/discount calculation are out of scope.
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## Acceptance and independent evidence
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Required checks: public-only installed example from conditions through both
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Receipt outcomes; 1/8 rows, candidates, varying quantities, repeated product rows;
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shortage/excess, wrong merchant/Agent/Open/Checkout, authentic invalid orders;
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signature/hash/disclosure tampering, unknown/missing/duplicate fields, bounds,
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expiry/future/proof-age boundaries, audience/nonce mismatch, exact receipt hash
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scope and wrong key/issuer/time/reference; existing complete regression.
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Official Python SDK primitives and unmodified pinned Schemas must independently
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verify Ruby output and produce Ruby-accepted signed input. Normative specification,
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SDK behavior and stricter local rules are recorded separately; SDK shortage and
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empty-candidate differences remain in MULTI_ITEM_INTEROP.md. Latest-HEAD Codex
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review and the same candidate Gem installed on both supported Rubies are required.
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Status: implemented and locally tested; release gates and final package/review
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evidence are tracked in RELEASE_080_CANDIDATE.md and the external manifest.
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No RubyGems push, public tag/Release,
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production connection or actual payment is authorized by this task.
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## Official-source comparison and independent results
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On 2026-11-01 official main is `e1ea56db72a6385bce3e5c1112b3a56ce60acb43`.
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GitHub compare from the adopted commit changes only CHANGELOG, CONTRIBUTING,
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README and uv.lock; normative docs, Schemas and SDK code are unchanged. Current
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[Checkout](https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/checkout_mandate/) and
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[Agent Authorization](https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/agent_authorization/) pages
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were also read. Adoption stays pinned, with no dependency/source upgrade.
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`test/conditional_interop.py` uses the pinned official `sd_jwt.create/verify`,
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`kb_sd_jwt.verify`, JWT sign/verify helpers, unmodified Open/Closed/Checkout/Receipt
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Schemas, independent commitment traversal and SHA256. Ruby Open/Closed is
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verified by Python. Official Python Open issuance plus official JWT helper inline
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Closed signing is accepted by Ruby; both Receipt outcomes work in both directions.
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Keys remain in memory and no runtime network or remote Schema fallback is used.
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The official high-level `kb_sd_jwt.create` always discloses `delegate_payload`
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through a commitment and emits `_sd_alg`, even with empty metadata. Its output is
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tested unchanged as an unsupported-form rejection. We do not strip signed claims
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or weaken the existing inline-terminal profile to accept it. The supported inline
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form uses official JWT signing and the same normative claim/hash rules, validated
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independently. Choosing a new selective-disclosure terminal profile is future work.
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This is bounded interoperability, not all SDK helpers or general AP2 compatibility.
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The initial Codex P2 on restoration completeness was fixed by sharing the exact
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Root closure walker for structural restoration. Restoration still authenticates
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neither Root nor Agent signatures; full merchant verification remains mandatory.
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Negative tests sign terminals bound to malformed/missing/duplicate Root disclosures
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and require restoration rejection. Package/source results and final review status
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are in [release preparation](RELEASE_080_CANDIDATE.md).
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## Handling non-success without replay
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```ruby
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case result.status # from InputBuilder.verify / verify_checkout
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when :verified_research
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# Recheck current application authorization/order/trust; atomically reserve.
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when :rejected
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# Decline this presentation; do not execute or issue a Success Receipt.
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when :unavailable
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# Verification could not establish evidence; hold, diagnose and retry only
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# verification under application policy, without executing the order.
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end
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# Missing/unverified Receipt after submission: retain operation_id => :pending,
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# reconcile the merchant's saved result; do not resubmit a purchase blindly.
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```
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Issuance `Invalid` similarly never means that an order was executed; a remote
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signer error may have an uncertain signing outcome, so reconcile the application's
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issuance record before reissuing. SDK operations here perform no payment side effect.
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data/docs/MERCHANT_SIGNING.md
CHANGED
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# Merchant Checkout signing and Receipt
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## Explicit multi-item selection — 0.6.0
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## Explicit multi-item selection — published 0.6.0
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The APIs introduced in 0.5.0 retain their default single-SKU behavior. Published 0.6.0
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adds optional `profile_ref: "ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item"` to
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`CheckoutJWT.sign` and `CheckoutReceipt.reference/sign/verify`. Pass it consistently
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when working with a multi-item Checkout. The new profile validates every line,
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per-line hashes or a compact-only alternate. Profile selection validates the
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supported embedded Checkout shape; reference computation alone does not verify
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Mandate authorization. Result/Evidence and business-outcome separation remain
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unchanged. 0.6.0
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unchanged. The [0.6.0 publication record](PROJECT_STATUS.md#060-publication) identifies
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the reviewed source, distribution and validation separately.
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The original single-SKU signing/Receipt APIs were introduced in [0.5.0](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.5.0); the explicit multi-item selection above is available in 0.6.0. [Complete runnable single-SKU example](../examples/merchant_signing.rb). The example is repository content, not part of the installed Gem.
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## Scope and responsibility
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`signed.jwt` is the frozen original compact JWT to transmit and retain. Supply
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that exact String as `host_checkout_jws` to InputBuilder and Verifier; supply
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`signed.checkout_hash` when a test or external Agent binds a Closed Mandate.
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These 0.5/0.6 APIs do not issue a product Mandate. The published 0.7.0
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[Direct buyer module](BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md) adds a separate issuance flow.
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Re-encoding claims or signing again
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creates different original wire, even when the order is the same.
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`signer.call(signing_input)` receives the frozen ASCII `header.payload` and returns
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data/docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md
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# Multiple-item Checkout profile — 0.6.0
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# Multiple-item Checkout profile — published 0.6.0
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This is the contract for the additive, explicitly selected
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`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` version `1
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[project status](PROJECT_STATUS.md);
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`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` version `1`, available in published
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0.6.0. The `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1 default remains unchanged.
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Tests, review, distribution identity and publication are recorded separately in
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[project status](PROJECT_STATUS.md#060-publication); publication does not authorize
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a Host purchase or payment.
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## Selection and lifecycle
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# 0.8.0 candidate — conditional Checkout delegation, unpublished
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Compatible feature release preparation for approved conditional purchasing:
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`ConditionalCheckout.issue_open` → Agent `.issue_closed` → `.present` → existing
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full `InputBuilder.verify` → `CheckoutReceipt.sign/verify`. The installed
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[standalone example](../examples/conditional_checkout.rb) uses A/B×1 and C×2,
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three rows and repeated C products. [API/specification](CONDITIONAL_CHECKOUT.md).
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Published stable remains 0.7.0, verified from the official RubyGems versions API
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on 2026-11-01; 0.8.0 is absent, so no version-plan collision is currently observed.
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0.7.0 source/tag is `9b4b78a7ed9aa95e7d35e01a64efc1281ba95be3`; its published
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64,000-byte SHA256 is `baab8c68355b5e6c9351e7d86a836fab50652cdad662bbc99d1676c5e6134447`.
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Current base main is `50f9639a4fe316556189088ab6b737a642f5f6e2`, initially no open PRs.
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No verified prior artifact or previous task checkout was modified.
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## Validation and compatibility
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All 17 source-suite entry points pass offline on MRI 3.4.12 and 4.0.9. Existing
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regression includes Direct, both old profiles, signed missing/unknown/duplicate
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disclosures, original-wire binding, InputBuilder save/restore, Result/Evidence,
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diagnostics and Receipt outcomes. New tests add 8 cases (123 assertions on MRI
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3.4.12 / 126 on MRI 4.0.9, including installed-Gem execution) for
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issuance, sign-before-check prevention, bounds, 8×8 candidate/requirement cases,
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same-product separate rows, wrong keys/time/audience/nonce, restoration closure,
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and exact final Closed Receipt reference. A long-ID/title eight-row Checkout
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also completes through the larger existing Agent-terminal bounds while Merchant
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JWT and Direct signing bounds remain unchanged. Suite counts include shared legacy
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dependencies; no misleading aggregate of repeated assertion counters is claimed.
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Official pinned Python comparison passes for signatures in both directions,
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Open/Closed/Checkout/Receipt Schemas, complete Open commitments and normative
|
|
32
|
+
sd_hash including final `~`, both receipt outcomes and negative controls. SDK
|
|
33
|
+
high-level Closed helper emits an unsupported SD form; it is a rejection control,
|
|
34
|
+
not claimed accepted interoperability. Existing max-flow shortage/empty-candidate
|
|
35
|
+
differences and compact-only Receipt helper remain documented and fail closed.
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
Candidate Gem identity, corresponding final source SHA, payload hashes, byte size,
|
|
38
|
+
ordinary installation on both Rubies and exact example output are recorded in the
|
|
39
|
+
external candidate manifest beside the Gem. The Gem includes both READMEs, this
|
|
40
|
+
decision document, the API contract and the standalone example. Dependencies and
|
|
41
|
+
supported MRI versions are unchanged; old callers require no migration.
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
## Review and external-operation status
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
|
+
Initial independent Codex review found one substantive P2 (restoration Root
|
|
46
|
+
closure); fixed through shared structural parsing and signed negative regression.
|
|
47
|
+
GitHub review additionally found that the Merchant signing helper's 12,000-byte
|
|
48
|
+
claims / 16,384-byte JWS limits prevented valid larger Agent terminals. KB terminal
|
|
49
|
+
signing now uses its existing verifier's 24,576-byte payload / 32,768-byte wire
|
|
50
|
+
bounds only; JWT and Direct retain the old limits. Long-ID/title eight-row Ruby
|
|
51
|
+
and official Python signature/Schema/hash regressions exercise this fix.
|
|
52
|
+
Latest-HEAD independent review must be completed and identified in the external
|
|
53
|
+
verification report. Review no-findings alone is not a security proof.
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
Initial Draft PR branch push was denied by automatic approval review before
|
|
56
|
+
execution. Owner subsequently explicitly authorized the specified commit/branch
|
|
57
|
+
push, Draft PR, existing-budget CI, latest-HEAD Codex review/fixes and conditional
|
|
58
|
+
Squash Merge at 2026-11-01 14:41 JST. The branch was pushed and
|
|
59
|
+
[Draft PR #231](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/pull/231)
|
|
60
|
+
created. No alternate route bypassed the denial; authorization resolved it first.
|
|
61
|
+
No owner approval review is submitted. Current exact-HEAD review, CI and merge
|
|
62
|
+
results are recorded in that PR and the external final verification report.
|
|
63
|
+
Only existing `merchant-source-package.yml` is expected to trigger for this diff:
|
|
64
|
+
two MRI jobs in one workflow run, existing Ubuntu runner/15-minute job timeout,
|
|
65
|
+
public dependencies, no secrets, extra cost zero. No workflow edits. Issue #101's
|
|
66
|
+
maximum 3 runs/PR is a ceiling, no blind reruns; the PR records every consumed run.
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
## Build and final candidate evidence
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
Use the final committed tree, existing pinned Docker images and no network:
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
```sh
|
|
73
|
+
gem build ap2_mandate_verifier.gemspec --output /out/ap2_mandate_verifier-0.8.0.gem
|
|
74
|
+
sh scripts/check_candidate_package.sh /out/package /out/ap2_mandate_verifier-0.8.0.gem
|
|
75
|
+
```
|
|
76
|
+
|
|
77
|
+
Run source regression with `sh scripts/check_ruby_compatibility.sh /out/source`.
|
|
78
|
+
The packaging script installs the **same** built Gem with normal RubyGems
|
|
79
|
+
resolution (`gem install --local`), audits every source/archive/installed payload,
|
|
80
|
+
then executes detached old APIs and the example physically inside the installed
|
|
81
|
+
Gem. Reuse one artifact across both MRI runtimes. Do not substitute an earlier
|
|
82
|
+
working-tree package or rebuild a lookalike after approval. Exact source SHA and
|
|
83
|
+
Gem SHA cannot be embedded recursively in their own bytes; use external manifest.
|
|
84
|
+
|
|
85
|
+
## Publication decision and recovery plan
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
1. Review final source SHA, strict latest-HEAD review, all tests/independent
|
|
88
|
+
comparison, exact candidate manifest and remaining GitHub PR/CI gates.
|
|
89
|
+
2. Obtain separate Owner authorization for that exact Gem publication; **no push,
|
|
90
|
+
public tag or GitHub Release is authorized by this request**.
|
|
91
|
+
3. After explicit authorization only, RubyGems push the approved exact artifact,
|
|
92
|
+
fetch the official distribution and compare bytes/SHA/size and every payload.
|
|
93
|
+
4. Only under publication/tag/Release authorization, bind `v0.8.0` to its verified
|
|
94
|
+
source, publish release notes and update stable install guides/demo after the
|
|
95
|
+
registry version is actually available. A candidate README is not publication.
|
|
96
|
+
5. On mismatch, invalid dependency/content, signature or material regression,
|
|
97
|
+
stop rollout and retain evidence. Do not overwrite a published version; assess
|
|
98
|
+
scoped yank/patch publication with separate Owner decision. Keep 0.7.0 install
|
|
99
|
+
guidance until the successor is independently verified. Preserve original
|
|
100
|
+
saved mandates/challenges; do not reinterpret them under a changed profile.
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
Limits: one merchant/Checkout, all candidates disclosed, ES256/P-256, exact finite
|
|
103
|
+
profile, no real Issuer trust/production Host proof. Authentication/consent,
|
|
104
|
+
revocation/key lifecycle, persistence/CAS/nonce consumption, execution and payment
|
|
105
|
+
remain app responsibilities. Payment Mandates, budgets, repeating/split orders,
|
|
106
|
+
User Credentials and tax/shipping/discount engines remain out of scope.
|
|
107
|
+
Production/real wallet/payment/deployment, RubyGems push and public tag/Release
|
|
108
|
+
are NOT_RUN. Release readiness requires the final exact-HEAD PR/review/CI and
|
|
109
|
+
package gates; the external report records their actual completion state.
|
data/docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,8 +1,29 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
# Fixed-profile AP2 verification — 0.
|
|
1
|
+
# Fixed-profile AP2 verification — published 0.7.0 / history
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
## Unpublished 0.8.0 additive candidate
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
`ConditionalCheckout.issue_open/issue_closed/present` add conditional delegation
|
|
6
|
+
issuance and original-wire presentation under the unchanged explicit multi-item
|
|
7
|
+
profile v1. [Contract, errors, limits and application responsibilities](CONDITIONAL_CHECKOUT.md).
|
|
8
|
+
The packaged standalone example uses only public installed APIs. No old default,
|
|
9
|
+
profile definition/hash, Result/Evidence/diagnostic, saved record or Receipt
|
|
10
|
+
acceptance condition is changed. All candidates remain required; no new selective
|
|
11
|
+
disclosure profile is introduced. Published stable remains 0.7.0.
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
Published 0.7.0 adds the separate [Direct buyer module](BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md):
|
|
14
|
+
merchant Checkout verification before human approval, Provider-signed issuance,
|
|
15
|
+
Agent presentation, Direct merchant verification and whole-wire Receipt confirmation.
|
|
16
|
+
It supports one merchant, 1–8 lines and multiple products; existing Open→Closed
|
|
17
|
+
Result/Evidence/profile/save contracts are unchanged. Publication was verified at
|
|
18
|
+
2026-11-01 03:14:04 UTC: 64,000 bytes, SHA256
|
|
19
|
+
`baab8c68355b5e6c9351e7d86a836fab50652cdad662bbc99d1676c5e6134447`, all 24 payloads
|
|
20
|
+
match source `9b4b78a7ed9aa95e7d35e01a64efc1281ba95be3`.
|
|
21
|
+
[Publication record](PROJECT_STATUS.md#070-publication). Older version statements below
|
|
22
|
+
retain their historical scope; they do not exclude the new Direct APIs.
|
|
2
23
|
|
|
3
24
|
## Current source: explicit multi-item profile
|
|
4
25
|
|
|
5
|
-
|
|
26
|
+
Published **0.6.0** adds the explicitly
|
|
6
27
|
selected `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` v1 across input preparation,
|
|
7
28
|
restoration/current-state verification, Checkout signing and Checkout Receipts.
|
|
8
29
|
The [multi-item contract](MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md) defines the accepted shapes,
|
|
@@ -14,9 +35,20 @@ their original releases; they do not exclude this separately selected addition.
|
|
|
14
35
|
|
|
15
36
|
Formal MRI 3.4.12 and 4.0.9, all five dependency pins, Result/status/code,
|
|
16
37
|
diagnostic and Evidence meanings remain unchanged. Tests, independent review,
|
|
17
|
-
CI and
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
38
|
+
CI and archive identities are recorded separately in the
|
|
39
|
+
[0.6.0 publication record](PROJECT_STATUS.md#060-publication) and
|
|
40
|
+
[validation record](MULTI_ITEM_VALIDATION.md); pending work is not a PASS.
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
Registered 2026-10-31 **11:50:18.664 UTC**, official metadata/distribution
|
|
43
|
+
comparison completed **11:51:54 UTC**: 56,832 bytes, SHA256
|
|
44
|
+
`ff669a62717f91b2295b3cea1b68c6c4143c490d98df071fd322ad4b0007195d`,
|
|
45
|
+
source `baee59a603d08123adc0af50e57c8710ea62f4f9`. All 22 payloads match
|
|
46
|
+
the approved source and candidate, with unchanged five runtime pins and Ruby
|
|
47
|
+
requirement. Platform `ruby`, non-prerelease, not yanked at comparison.
|
|
48
|
+
Source association is established by candidate/distribution bytes, not RubyGems
|
|
49
|
+
source attestation. [Publication receipt](evidence/0.6.0_publication.json).
|
|
50
|
+
Packaged documents retain their preparation snapshot; these repository-only
|
|
51
|
+
updates do not rebuild, repush or replace the published Gem.
|
|
20
52
|
|
|
21
53
|
Published **0.5.0** adds separate [Merchant signing and Checkout Receipt APIs](MERCHANT_SIGNING.md). They do not broaden the existing Verifier profile or change Result/Evidence/status/code. Checkout Receipt uses the dedicated Schema and normative final SD-JWT reference; unsupported forms fail closed. No product Mandate issuance, payment, persistence or real key/trust management is included.
|
|
22
54
|
|
|
@@ -382,3 +414,12 @@ The summary must explicitly identify the completed observation; a missing,
|
|
|
382
414
|
failed or mismatched report is not success. No local path is a public evidence
|
|
383
415
|
URL. Raw local environment logs are not published by this package.
|
|
384
416
|
|
|
417
|
+
|
|
418
|
+
## Direct buyer module — published 0.7.0
|
|
419
|
+
|
|
420
|
+
Additive `CheckoutJWT.verify` and `Buyer.issue_closed/present_closed/verify`
|
|
421
|
+
implement Trusted Agent Provider / Human Present exact-order approval. Direct
|
|
422
|
+
Receipt requires explicit `Buyer::PROFILE_REF`; existing defaults and 2profile
|
|
423
|
+
contracts are unchanged. Supports the existing 1–8-line multi-item Checkout subset
|
|
424
|
+
end to end. [Full input, failure, trust and replay contract](BUYER_DIRECT_CHECKOUT.md).
|
|
425
|
+
No general AP2, production authorization, payment or real-Issuer claim is added.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# frozen_string_literal: true
|
|
2
|
+
# Ordinary installed Gem only. No test fixtures, source-path loading or network.
|
|
3
|
+
require "ap2_mandate_verifier"
|
|
4
|
+
require "openssl"
|
|
5
|
+
|
|
6
|
+
module ConditionalCheckoutExample
|
|
7
|
+
M = AP2MandateVerifier
|
|
8
|
+
PROFILE = M::ConditionalCheckout::PROFILE_REF
|
|
9
|
+
NOW = 1_800_000_000
|
|
10
|
+
def self.totals(n) = %w[subtotal total].map { |type| {"type" => type, "amount" => n} }
|
|
11
|
+
def self.run
|
|
12
|
+
provider, agent, merchant = Array.new(3) { OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate("prime256v1") }
|
|
13
|
+
seller = {"id" => "shop", "name" => "Office supplies"}
|
|
14
|
+
# This protected record is created AFTER application authentication, display
|
|
15
|
+
# of these conditions and authority/consent checks. No approved flag is proof.
|
|
16
|
+
requirements = [{"id" => "choice", "quantity" => 1,
|
|
17
|
+
"acceptable_items" => %w[A B].map { |id| {"id" => id, "title" => "Product #{id}"} }},
|
|
18
|
+
{"id" => "required", "quantity" => 2, "acceptable_items" => [{"id" => "C", "title" => "Product C"}]}]
|
|
19
|
+
opening = M::ConditionalCheckout.issue_open(merchant: seller, requirements: requirements,
|
|
20
|
+
agent_public_key_pem: agent.public_to_pem, issued_at: NOW, expires_at: NOW + 600,
|
|
21
|
+
signer: M::CheckoutJWT.es256_signer(private_key: provider), public_key_pem: provider.public_to_pem)
|
|
22
|
+
# Merchant Checkout has three rows, including C in two distinct rows.
|
|
23
|
+
lines = %w[B C C].each_with_index.map do |id, i|
|
|
24
|
+
{"id" => "row-#{i}", "item" => {"id" => id, "title" => "Product #{id}", "price" => 100},
|
|
25
|
+
"quantity" => 1, "totals" => totals(100)}
|
|
26
|
+
end
|
|
27
|
+
order = {"id" => "office-1", "merchant" => seller, "status" => "ready_for_complete",
|
|
28
|
+
"currency" => "USD", "line_items" => lines, "totals" => totals(300), "links" => []}
|
|
29
|
+
checkout = M::CheckoutJWT.sign(checkout: order, profile_ref: PROFILE,
|
|
30
|
+
signer: M::CheckoutJWT.es256_signer(private_key: merchant), public_key_pem: merchant.public_to_pem)
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
# Host enrollment and challenge are synthetic authenticated application data.
|
|
33
|
+
roles = %w[Issuer Agent Merchant]
|
|
34
|
+
records = roles.zip([provider, agent, merchant]).map do |role, key|
|
|
35
|
+
{"role" => role, "identity" => role == "Merchant" ? "shop" : role.downcase,
|
|
36
|
+
"tenant_id" => "tenant", "purpose" => "checkout", "key_ref" => role.downcase,
|
|
37
|
+
"public_key_pem" => key.public_to_pem, "active" => true, "not_before" => NOW - 1, "not_after" => NOW + 1000}
|
|
38
|
+
end
|
|
39
|
+
selectors = records.to_h { |record| [record["role"].downcase.to_sym, record.slice("identity", "purpose", "key_ref")] }
|
|
40
|
+
trust = M::InputBuilder.trust(snapshot: {"id" => "registry", "policy_version" => "1", "active" => true,
|
|
41
|
+
"not_before" => NOW - 1, "not_after" => NOW + 1000, "records" => records},
|
|
42
|
+
tenant_id: "tenant", verified_at: NOW, profile_ref: PROFILE, **selectors)
|
|
43
|
+
host_order = {"tenant_id" => "tenant", "buyer_account_id" => "buyer", "order_id" => "office-1",
|
|
44
|
+
"merchant_id" => "shop", "audience" => "merchant-host", "order_version" => "1", "currency" => "USD", "expected_total" => 300}
|
|
45
|
+
host_inputs = {trust: trust, order: host_order, root_presentation: opening.root_presentation, host_checkout_jws: checkout.jwt}
|
|
46
|
+
saved = M::InputBuilder.prepare(**host_inputs, challenge_id: "challenge-1", nonce: "synthetic-one-use-nonce",
|
|
47
|
+
issuer_id: "host", not_before: NOW, not_after: NOW + 60)
|
|
48
|
+
# Agent receives public trust, Open, Checkout, challenge and its own signer.
|
|
49
|
+
# Provider signer/private key is not an input to this operation.
|
|
50
|
+
closed = M::ConditionalCheckout.issue_closed(root_presentation: opening.root_presentation, checkout_jwt: checkout.jwt,
|
|
51
|
+
trusted_issuer_public_key_pem: provider.public_to_pem, agent_public_key_pem: agent.public_to_pem,
|
|
52
|
+
trusted_merchant_public_key_pem: merchant.public_to_pem, expected_merchant_id: "shop",
|
|
53
|
+
audience: "merchant-host", nonce: "synthetic-one-use-nonce", verified_at: NOW,
|
|
54
|
+
signer: M::CheckoutJWT.es256_signer(private_key: agent))
|
|
55
|
+
wire = M::ConditionalCheckout.present(root_presentation: closed.root_presentation,
|
|
56
|
+
terminal_jws: closed.terminal_jws, checkout_jwt: closed.checkout_jwt)
|
|
57
|
+
checked = M::InputBuilder.verify(**host_inputs, terminal_jws: wire.terminal_jws,
|
|
58
|
+
saved_challenge: M::InputBuilder.restore(saved_challenge: saved), expected_challenge_issuer_id: "host",
|
|
59
|
+
clock_source_id: "synthetic-clock", verified_at: NOW)
|
|
60
|
+
raise "verification failed" unless checked.success?
|
|
61
|
+
puts "Open -> Agent Closed -> merchant evidence: verified=true; rows=3; requirements=2"
|
|
62
|
+
# These are ALTERNATIVE synthetic application outcomes, never two executions.
|
|
63
|
+
%w[Success Error].each do |outcome|
|
|
64
|
+
fields = outcome == "Success" ? {order_id: "office-1"} : {error: "policy_rejected", error_description: "Application declined"}
|
|
65
|
+
receipt = M::CheckoutReceipt.sign(closed_sd_jwt: wire.closed_sd_jwt, profile_ref: PROFILE,
|
|
66
|
+
issuer: "shop", outcome: outcome, issued_at: NOW, **fields,
|
|
67
|
+
signer: M::CheckoutJWT.es256_signer(private_key: merchant), public_key_pem: merchant.public_to_pem)
|
|
68
|
+
result = M::CheckoutReceipt.verify(jwt: receipt.jwt, closed_sd_jwt: wire.closed_sd_jwt,
|
|
69
|
+
profile_ref: PROFILE, trusted_public_key_pem: merchant.public_to_pem, expected_issuer: "shop",
|
|
70
|
+
not_before: NOW, not_after: NOW + 60, verified_at: NOW)
|
|
71
|
+
raise "receipt failed" unless result.verified? && result.outcome == outcome
|
|
72
|
+
puts "Receipt #{outcome}: authentic=true; purchase_succeeded=#{result.purchase_succeeded?}"
|
|
73
|
+
end
|
|
74
|
+
# Application state, not an SDK purchase permit: durable transaction/CAS in
|
|
75
|
+
# real code must consume approval/challenge/order once and save its receipt.
|
|
76
|
+
states = {"success" => :consumed, "error" => :requires_new_policy_decision, "missing_receipt" => :pending}
|
|
77
|
+
raise "unknown replay" unless states["missing_receipt"] == :pending
|
|
78
|
+
puts "Success=consumed; Error=policy decision; missing Receipt/uncertain commit=pending"
|
|
79
|
+
puts "Synthetic only; evidence and Receipt authenticity are not payment completion."
|
|
80
|
+
{opening: opening, closed: closed, result: checked, host_inputs: host_inputs, saved: saved,
|
|
81
|
+
keys: [provider, agent, merchant], requirements: requirements, checkout: order}
|
|
82
|
+
end
|
|
83
|
+
end
|
|
84
|
+
ConditionalCheckoutExample.run if $PROGRAM_NAME == __FILE__
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# frozen_string_literal: true
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
module AP2MandateVerifier
|
|
4
|
+
# Optional Direct/Human Present profile; never an Open -> Closed chain.
|
|
5
|
+
module Buyer
|
|
6
|
+
PROFILE_REF = "ap2.checkout.direct.single_merchant".freeze
|
|
7
|
+
CHECKOUT_PROFILE = ScopedConstraints::MULTI_PROFILE_REF
|
|
8
|
+
MAX_LIFETIME = 600
|
|
9
|
+
class Invalid < ArgumentError
|
|
10
|
+
def initialize = super("invalid direct checkout information")
|
|
11
|
+
end
|
|
12
|
+
class Issued
|
|
13
|
+
attr_reader :closed_sd_jwt
|
|
14
|
+
def initialize(wire)
|
|
15
|
+
@closed_sd_jwt = wire.freeze
|
|
16
|
+
freeze
|
|
17
|
+
end
|
|
18
|
+
private_class_method :new
|
|
19
|
+
end
|
|
20
|
+
class Verification
|
|
21
|
+
attr_reader :code, :checkout, :checkout_hash, :reference, :expires_at
|
|
22
|
+
def initialize(code, parsed = nil)
|
|
23
|
+
@code = code
|
|
24
|
+
if parsed
|
|
25
|
+
@checkout = parsed.fetch(:checkout)
|
|
26
|
+
@checkout_hash = parsed.fetch(:closed).fetch("checkout_hash").freeze
|
|
27
|
+
@expires_at = parsed.fetch(:closed).fetch("exp")
|
|
28
|
+
@reference = Buyer.send(:hash, parsed.fetch(:wire)).freeze
|
|
29
|
+
end
|
|
30
|
+
freeze
|
|
31
|
+
end
|
|
32
|
+
def verified? = code == :direct_checkout_verified
|
|
33
|
+
private_class_method :new
|
|
34
|
+
end
|
|
35
|
+
|
|
36
|
+
# Only the authenticated approval backend calls this method. The approved
|
|
37
|
+
# wire comes from its protected approval record, never an Agent boolean.
|
|
38
|
+
# This is an equality contract, not authentication of the approver.
|
|
39
|
+
def self.issue_closed(checkout_jwt:, approved_checkout_jwt:, trusted_merchant_public_key_pem:,
|
|
40
|
+
expected_merchant_id:, issued_at:, expires_at:, signer:, public_key_pem:)
|
|
41
|
+
wire = InputValidator.snapshot!(checkout_jwt, max_bytes: 16_384)
|
|
42
|
+
approved = InputValidator.snapshot!(approved_checkout_jwt, max_bytes: 16_384)
|
|
43
|
+
raise Invalid unless wire == approved
|
|
44
|
+
epoch!(issued_at); epoch!(expires_at)
|
|
45
|
+
raise Invalid unless expires_at > issued_at && expires_at - issued_at <= MAX_LIFETIME
|
|
46
|
+
checked = CheckoutJWT.verify(jwt: wire, trusted_public_key_pem: trusted_merchant_public_key_pem,
|
|
47
|
+
expected_merchant_id: expected_merchant_id, profile_ref: CHECKOUT_PROFILE)
|
|
48
|
+
require "securerandom"
|
|
49
|
+
disclosure = encode([encode(SecureRandom.random_bytes(16)), "checkout_jwt", checked.jwt])
|
|
50
|
+
closed = {"vct" => "mandate.checkout.1", "checkout_hash" => checked.checkout_hash,
|
|
51
|
+
"iat" => issued_at, "exp" => expires_at, "_sd" => [hash(disclosure)]}
|
|
52
|
+
content = encode([encode(SecureRandom.random_bytes(16)), closed])
|
|
53
|
+
payload = {"delegate_payload" => [{"..." => hash(content)}], "_sd_alg" => "sha-256"}
|
|
54
|
+
jwt = MerchantSignature.sign!(payload, signer, public_key_pem, typ: "example+sd-jwt")
|
|
55
|
+
result = "#{jwt}~#{content}~#{disclosure}~"
|
|
56
|
+
parse!(result)
|
|
57
|
+
Issued.send(:new, result)
|
|
58
|
+
rescue StandardError, LoadError
|
|
59
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil
|
|
60
|
+
end
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
# All two disclosures are required for this profile. No Agent signature,
|
|
63
|
+
# aud, nonce, or KB-JWT is added. Restoration preserves the exact bytes.
|
|
64
|
+
def self.present_closed(closed_sd_jwt:)
|
|
65
|
+
parse!(closed_sd_jwt).fetch(:wire)
|
|
66
|
+
rescue StandardError, LoadError
|
|
67
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil
|
|
68
|
+
end
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
# Merchant supplies independently registered Provider/Merchant keys and
|
|
71
|
+
# the exact current order from its own database. Success is not Host ALLOW.
|
|
72
|
+
def self.verify(closed_sd_jwt:, trusted_provider_public_key_pem:, trusted_merchant_public_key_pem:,
|
|
73
|
+
expected_checkout_jwt:, expected_merchant_id:, verified_at:)
|
|
74
|
+
epoch!(verified_at)
|
|
75
|
+
parsed = parse!(closed_sd_jwt)
|
|
76
|
+
RootSignature.verified_payload!(parsed.fetch(:jwt), trusted_provider_public_key_pem)
|
|
77
|
+
closed = parsed.fetch(:closed)
|
|
78
|
+
raise Invalid unless closed.fetch("iat") <= verified_at && verified_at < closed.fetch("exp")
|
|
79
|
+
expected = InputValidator.snapshot!(expected_checkout_jwt, max_bytes: 16_384)
|
|
80
|
+
raise Invalid unless closed.fetch("checkout_jwt") == expected
|
|
81
|
+
checked = CheckoutJWT.verify(jwt: expected, trusted_public_key_pem: trusted_merchant_public_key_pem,
|
|
82
|
+
expected_merchant_id: expected_merchant_id, profile_ref: CHECKOUT_PROFILE)
|
|
83
|
+
Verification.send(:new, :direct_checkout_verified, parsed.merge(checkout: checked.checkout))
|
|
84
|
+
rescue StandardError, LoadError
|
|
85
|
+
Verification.send(:new, :direct_checkout_verification_failed)
|
|
86
|
+
end
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
88
|
+
# Exact bounded grammar, not a general selective-disclosure resolver.
|
|
89
|
+
# Every commitment is consumed exactly once, without decoys/hidden fields.
|
|
90
|
+
def self.parse!(source)
|
|
91
|
+
RootSignature.send(:dependencies!)
|
|
92
|
+
wire = InputValidator.snapshot!(source, max_bytes: 32_768)
|
|
93
|
+
raise Invalid unless wire.ascii_only?
|
|
94
|
+
jwt, content, disclosure, tail, *extra = wire.split("~", -1)
|
|
95
|
+
raise Invalid unless tail == "" && extra.empty?
|
|
96
|
+
parts = jwt.split(".", -1)
|
|
97
|
+
raise Invalid unless parts.size == 3
|
|
98
|
+
header = InputValidator.parse!(RootSignature.send(:decode!, parts[0], 2_048))
|
|
99
|
+
CheckoutReceipt.send(:header!, header, "example+sd-jwt")
|
|
100
|
+
raise Invalid unless RootSignature.send(:decode!, parts[2], 64).bytesize == 64
|
|
101
|
+
payload = InputValidator.parse!(RootSignature.send(:decode!, parts[1], 2_048))
|
|
102
|
+
exact!(payload, %w[_sd_alg delegate_payload])
|
|
103
|
+
raise Invalid unless payload["_sd_alg"] == "sha-256"
|
|
104
|
+
pointer = ScopedConstraints.send(:one!, payload["delegate_payload"])
|
|
105
|
+
exact!(pointer, ["..."])
|
|
106
|
+
raise Invalid unless pointer["..."] == hash(content)
|
|
107
|
+
revealed = decode_disclosure!(content, 2)
|
|
108
|
+
closed = revealed[1]
|
|
109
|
+
exact!(closed, %w[_sd checkout_hash exp iat vct])
|
|
110
|
+
raise Invalid unless closed["vct"] == "mandate.checkout.1" && closed["_sd"] == [hash(disclosure)]
|
|
111
|
+
epoch!(closed["iat"]); epoch!(closed["exp"])
|
|
112
|
+
raise Invalid unless closed["exp"] > closed["iat"] && closed["exp"] - closed["iat"] <= MAX_LIFETIME
|
|
113
|
+
leaf = decode_disclosure!(disclosure, 3)
|
|
114
|
+
raise Invalid unless leaf[1] == "checkout_jwt"
|
|
115
|
+
checkout = InputValidator.snapshot!(leaf[2], max_bytes: 16_384)
|
|
116
|
+
raise Invalid unless closed["checkout_hash"] == hash(checkout)
|
|
117
|
+
# Parse supported merchant syntax too, without claiming its authenticity.
|
|
118
|
+
checkout_parts = checkout.split(".", -1)
|
|
119
|
+
raise Invalid unless checkout_parts.size == 3
|
|
120
|
+
checkout_header = InputValidator.parse!(RootSignature.send(:decode!, checkout_parts[0], 2_048))
|
|
121
|
+
CheckoutReceipt.send(:header!, checkout_header, "JWT")
|
|
122
|
+
raise Invalid unless RootSignature.send(:decode!, checkout_parts[2], 64).bytesize == 64
|
|
123
|
+
claims = InputValidator.parse!(RootSignature.send(:decode!, checkout_parts[1], 12_000))
|
|
124
|
+
CheckoutJWT.send(:validate!, claims, profile_ref: CHECKOUT_PROFILE)
|
|
125
|
+
{wire: wire, jwt: jwt, closed: closed.merge("checkout_jwt" => checkout)}
|
|
126
|
+
end
|
|
127
|
+
def self.decode_disclosure!(wire, size)
|
|
128
|
+
value = InputValidator.parse!(RootSignature.send(:decode!, wire, 24_576))
|
|
129
|
+
raise Invalid unless value.instance_of?(Array) && value.size == size &&
|
|
130
|
+
value[0].instance_of?(String) && value[0].match?(/\A[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22,128}\z/)
|
|
131
|
+
value
|
|
132
|
+
end
|
|
133
|
+
def self.epoch!(value) = CheckoutReceipt.send(:epoch!, value)
|
|
134
|
+
def self.exact!(value, fields) = PurchaseBinding.send(:exact!, value, fields)
|
|
135
|
+
def self.hash(wire) = Base64.urlsafe_encode64(Digest::SHA256.digest(wire), padding: false)
|
|
136
|
+
def self.encode(value)
|
|
137
|
+
require "json"
|
|
138
|
+
Base64.urlsafe_encode64(value.instance_of?(String) ? value : JSON.generate(value), padding: false)
|
|
139
|
+
end
|
|
140
|
+
%i[issue_closed present_closed verify].each do |name|
|
|
141
|
+
implementation = method(name)
|
|
142
|
+
fields = implementation.parameters.map(&:last).freeze
|
|
143
|
+
define_singleton_method(name) do |**arguments|
|
|
144
|
+
unless (fields - arguments.keys).empty? && (arguments.keys - fields).empty?
|
|
145
|
+
next Verification.send(:new, :direct_checkout_verification_failed) if name == :verify
|
|
146
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil
|
|
147
|
+
end
|
|
148
|
+
implementation.call(**arguments)
|
|
149
|
+
end
|
|
150
|
+
end
|
|
151
|
+
private_class_method :parse!, :decode_disclosure!, :epoch!, :exact!, :hash, :encode
|
|
152
|
+
end
|
|
153
|
+
end
|