ap2_mandate_verifier 0.4.0 → 0.6.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/README.md +46 -9
- data/docs/DIAGNOSTICS.ja.md +6 -7
- data/docs/DIAGNOSTICS.md +7 -9
- data/docs/MERCHANT_SIGNING.md +170 -0
- data/docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md +118 -0
- data/docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md +29 -4
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_jwt.rb +88 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/checkout_receipt.rb +145 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/host_binding.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/input_builder.rb +16 -11
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/merchant_signature.rb +22 -0
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/purchase_binding.rb +7 -2
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/root_disclosures.rb +33 -10
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/scoped_constraints.rb +143 -2
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier/trust_context.rb +21 -4
- data/lib/ap2_mandate_verifier.rb +5 -2
- metadata +7 -2
checksums.yaml
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
---
|
|
2
2
|
SHA256:
|
|
3
|
-
metadata.gz:
|
|
4
|
-
data.tar.gz:
|
|
3
|
+
metadata.gz: dbeaa8817a128ad64b2307ae68a86cb2c36f40e710dc459f28354e24b3b251f9
|
|
4
|
+
data.tar.gz: 70d40f6293a88043e0f29f10b00e337418ae6819f91cffcb55db8f6c68f21785
|
|
5
5
|
SHA512:
|
|
6
|
-
metadata.gz:
|
|
7
|
-
data.tar.gz:
|
|
6
|
+
metadata.gz: bd6ba8a1c4be5e8b81ff589624ab17d3e1d3861d49cb8aad457abf96708c2446b996381dc0c948f868538c6b80ae9d2ef45d1c693e2e1fa1cf6874df085faeb5
|
|
7
|
+
data.tar.gz: 7652d380a3ab2024016f0442672b384f6f8e8eecbec416318b1c9224cc8a954c3be1600e5eb1125f1f9eaa5b172609b41e6c0a3074564c0932bc897ae1f8d2ec
|
data/README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,33 +1,60 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
# AP2 Mandate Verifier — 0.
|
|
2
|
-
|
|
3
|
-
> **Unreleased 0.4.0 candidate:** adds `result.diagnostic` with stage, safe field, reason and English/Japanese guidance. See the [diagnostic guide](docs/DIAGNOSTICS.md). Ordinary installation below still selects published 0.3.0; use the guide’s local candidate path to try diagnostics.
|
|
1
|
+
# AP2 Mandate Verifier — 0.6.0 preparation
|
|
4
2
|
|
|
5
3
|
[日本語](README.ja.md)
|
|
6
4
|
|
|
5
|
+
Published stable is **0.5.0**. This checkout prepares additive multi-item support for **0.6.0**, which is not published. Review, CI, final package validation and Owner publication approval are separate gates; see [current status](docs/PROJECT_STATUS.md).
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
## Multiple items and quantities
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
Explicitly select `profile_ref: "ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item"` when creating trust with `InputBuilder.trust`, signing a checkout with `CheckoutJWT.sign`, and using `CheckoutReceipt.reference/sign/verify`. The complete verifier follows the authenticated trust selection. The default `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1 retains its exact definition, hash and one-line acceptance range.
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
The new v1 profile supports one merchant, one checkout, one currency and up to eight lines, with different quantities and repeated product IDs on distinct lines. It matches all disclosed product candidates using integer maximum flow: every requirement and every ordered unit must be consumed exactly once. Requirement IDs and checkout line IDs are distinct identifiers. See the [multi-item contract and migration](docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md) and [synthetic runnable lifecycle](examples/multi_item_checkout.rb).
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
7
13
|
Verify purchase-delegation data in Ruby using a deliberately fixed AP2 profile. The Gem checks signed data against independently supplied Host trust and order information, then returns immutable Evidence. **Verification success is not purchase or payment permission.**
|
|
8
14
|
|
|
9
15
|
`InputBuilder` converts business records into verification inputs: it creates the Gem-specific trust/selection/Host JSON, fingerprints and original-wire digests for you. You still choose whom to trust and supply the expected order, challenge state and clock. The Gem is Rails-independent and performs no network, database or payment operations.
|
|
10
16
|
|
|
11
17
|
## Try the local demo
|
|
12
18
|
|
|
13
|
-
The [Rails demo](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier-demo#readme) uses published 0.
|
|
19
|
+
The [Rails demo](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier-demo#readme) uses published 0.5.0 and InputBuilder by default. Its Docker instructions require no host Ruby installation. Compare synthetic normal, tampered and expired cases, including actual status/code, diagnostics and Evidence presence. Merchant signing and authentic Success/Error Receipts are also available. It is local-only; it does not issue real challenges, consume nonces or execute purchases.
|
|
14
20
|
|
|
15
21
|
## Install
|
|
16
22
|
|
|
17
23
|
Formal support is **MRI 3.4.12 and MRI 4.0.9**. In your chosen Gem environment:
|
|
18
24
|
|
|
19
25
|
```sh
|
|
20
|
-
gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 0.
|
|
26
|
+
gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 0.5.0
|
|
21
27
|
```
|
|
22
28
|
|
|
23
29
|
Or add to your Gemfile:
|
|
24
30
|
|
|
25
31
|
```ruby
|
|
26
|
-
gem "ap2_mandate_verifier", "= 0.
|
|
32
|
+
gem "ap2_mandate_verifier", "= 0.5.0"
|
|
27
33
|
```
|
|
28
34
|
|
|
29
35
|
Runtime dependencies are pinned to JSON 2.19.9, JWT 3.3.0, base64 0.3.0, OpenSSL gem 4.0.2 and Digest 3.2.1. Normal installation may download/build dependencies; do not relax the pins to work around a conflict. The Ruby resolution interval is not certification of every Ruby version, OS or native provider. See the [support contract](docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md).
|
|
30
36
|
|
|
37
|
+
## Merchant signing and Receipt
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
Create a signed checkout, then sign the application's explicit outcome. These additive APIs are included in published 0.5.0.
|
|
40
|
+
Here `checkout` is the application order Hash, `key` its P-256 signing key,
|
|
41
|
+
`received_closed_sd_jwt` the original final inline SD-JWT and `now` the application clock:
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
```ruby
|
|
44
|
+
signing = AP2MandateVerifier::CheckoutJWT
|
|
45
|
+
signed = signing.sign(checkout: checkout, signer: signing.es256_signer(private_key: key),
|
|
46
|
+
public_key_pem: key.public_to_pem)
|
|
47
|
+
# Retain signed.jwt unchanged; use it as InputBuilder's host_checkout_jws.
|
|
48
|
+
receipt = AP2MandateVerifier::CheckoutReceipt.sign(closed_sd_jwt: received_closed_sd_jwt,
|
|
49
|
+
issuer: "shop", outcome: "Error", error: "declined", error_description: "Application declined",
|
|
50
|
+
issued_at: now, signer: signing.es256_signer(private_key: key), public_key_pem: key.public_to_pem)
|
|
51
|
+
```
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
Receipt verification separately checks a trusted public key, expected issuer,
|
|
54
|
+
explicit time window and original closed-Mandate reference. An authentic Error
|
|
55
|
+
Receipt has `verified? == true` and `purchase_succeeded? == false`.
|
|
56
|
+
See the [complete runnable example](examples/merchant_signing.rb) and [API contract / SDK differences](docs/MERCHANT_SIGNING.md).
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
31
58
|
## A small InputBuilder example
|
|
32
59
|
|
|
33
60
|
After installation, use a checkout of this repository. Save the following as `quick_start.rb` in its root and run `ruby quick_start.rb`. The JSON files under [`examples/input_builder/`](examples/input_builder/) contain explicit synthetic order/registration records and original signed Strings; they are not part of the installed Gem. Their fixed clock is intentional because the saved signatures expire. These are test inputs, not real enrollment or current production data.
|
|
@@ -84,17 +111,27 @@ Do not call `prepare` again during verification or update saved hashes/reference
|
|
|
84
111
|
| `:rejected`, `rejected? == true` | No Evidence. Stop and inspect `result.code`. |
|
|
85
112
|
| `:unavailable`, `unavailable? == true` | No Evidence. Stop; a dependency or processing failure is not proof of invalid business data. |
|
|
86
113
|
|
|
114
|
+
On failure, inspect supplemental check candidates. Successful results have no failure diagnostic.
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
```ruby
|
|
117
|
+
if (diagnostic = result.diagnostic)
|
|
118
|
+
puts diagnostic.to_h(locale: :en) # :ja for Japanese
|
|
119
|
+
end
|
|
120
|
+
```
|
|
121
|
+
|
|
122
|
+
`stage / field / reason / hint` are guidance; they do not change status/code or the verdict. Unknown fields/causes are not asserted. See the [diagnostic guide](docs/DIAGNOSTICS.md).
|
|
123
|
+
|
|
87
124
|
Exceptions, process failure and missing results also never authorize an operation. Do not log raw inputs/nonces or treat serialized Evidence as an authenticated credential.
|
|
88
125
|
|
|
89
126
|
The Gem checks signatures, supported disclosure closure, delegation, purchase/Host bindings, constraints and validity. The Host supplies authenticated, independent and current trust/keys/revocation, order/challenge state and clock. Before acting, it rechecks current state and validity, atomically consumes the nonce with order CAS, handles uncertain outcomes, and makes the final authorization/payment decision. `prepare`/`restore` do not authenticate storage or prove an unused nonce.
|
|
90
127
|
|
|
91
|
-
|
|
128
|
+
Published 0.5.0 uses `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1: ES256/P256, one Merchant/SKU/cart line, USD/EUR/JPY and the documented disclosure shapes. This checkout adds the explicitly selected [multi-item profile](docs/MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md). Unknown/unsupported forms fail closed. General AP2/all-Schema support, real Issuer interoperability, product Mandate issuance/presentation, Rails adapters, DB/payment execution and numeric performance guarantees remain outside scope. Real Issuer/Host production GO and Phase 2-B remain separate HOLDs.
|
|
92
129
|
|
|
93
130
|
### Which API should I use?
|
|
94
131
|
|
|
95
132
|
| Entry | Role |
|
|
96
133
|
| --- | --- |
|
|
97
|
-
| `InputBuilder.verify(**business_information)` | Recommended business-data path in 0.
|
|
134
|
+
| `InputBuilder.verify(**business_information)` | Recommended business-data path in 0.5.0. Assembles inputs and runs complete verification; preparation and restoration are separate steps shown above. |
|
|
98
135
|
| `verify_checkout(**inputs)` | Direct complete verification with the existing seven inputs, including caller-supplied trust/selection/Host JSON. |
|
|
99
136
|
| `verify_research(**inputs)` | Retained name for the same seven-input verification pipeline; no deprecation warning. |
|
|
100
137
|
| `verify(presentation_json:)` | Legacy JSON syntax check only. Never returns successful Evidence. |
|
|
@@ -105,7 +142,7 @@ Malformed assembly arguments, including missing keywords, to `InputBuilder.verif
|
|
|
105
142
|
|
|
106
143
|
- [Business-data lifecycle and Rails mapping](docs/INPUT_BUILDER.md), [complete Ruby example](examples/input_builder.rb) and [before/after example](examples/input_builder_before.rb).
|
|
107
144
|
- [Supported inputs, limits and Result/Evidence contract](docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md); [Issuer/Host responsibilities](docs/ISSUER_HOST_MINIMUM_CONTRACT.md).
|
|
108
|
-
- [Published 0.
|
|
145
|
+
- [Published 0.5.0 release](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/releases/tag/v0.5.0), [publication/withdrawal records](docs/PROJECT_STATUS.md) and [changelog](CHANGELOG.md). Repository README changes do not rebuild or replace published Gem bytes.
|
|
109
146
|
- [Pinned historical seven-input / saved FULL example](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/blob/e0ab9fb21045e89fc58fb06145eeda4855b2dc54/README.md#try-the-saved-synthetic-example), [older artifact/provider evidence](research/stable010_release_linux_package/README.md) and [historical conceptual diagrams](https://github.com/cuichangquan/ap2-mandate-verifier/blob/e0ab9fb21045e89fc58fb06145eeda4855b2dc54/README.md#illustrated-concepts-japanese-diagrams). These records are preserved, not current integration instructions or broader support claims.
|
|
110
147
|
- [Security reporting](SECURITY.md), [maintenance policy](docs/POST_RELEASE_MAINTENANCE.md) and [product direction](docs/PRODUCT_VISION.md). Do not include secrets, real Mandates or personal data in reports.
|
|
111
148
|
|
data/docs/DIAGNOSTICS.ja.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
#
|
|
1
|
+
# 失敗時の診断(公開済み 0.4.0)
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
Gem内部を追わず、失敗した検査と次の確認候補を取得できます。診断は補助情報です。
|
|
4
4
|
既存呼び出し、status/code、固定profile、Fail Closed、非成功時のEvidenceなし契約は不変です。
|
|
@@ -53,14 +53,13 @@ trust選択、Host・challengeの確認候補を提供します。旧unverified
|
|
|
53
53
|
署名原文、鍵、nonce、個人情報、stack traceは保持・表示しません。診断はEvidenceではなく、
|
|
54
54
|
元入力の再構築もできません。
|
|
55
55
|
|
|
56
|
-
##
|
|
56
|
+
## 公開版をローカルで試す
|
|
57
57
|
|
|
58
|
-
|
|
59
|
-
|
|
58
|
+
対応MRI 3.4.12または4.0.9と固定依存を備えた環境で、公開済み0.4.0を通常導入し、
|
|
59
|
+
リポジトリのチェックアウトから例を実行してください。
|
|
60
60
|
|
|
61
61
|
```sh
|
|
62
|
-
gem
|
|
63
|
-
gem install --local --no-document ./ap2_mandate_verifier-0.4.0.gem
|
|
62
|
+
gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 0.4.0
|
|
64
63
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb valid
|
|
65
64
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb tampered
|
|
66
65
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb expired
|
|
@@ -74,4 +73,4 @@ ruby examples/input_builder.rb unsupported_saved_format
|
|
|
74
73
|
後半4例はrejected / invalid_host_contextのまま、理由が順にmissing_required_field、invalid_type、
|
|
75
74
|
unknown_field、unsupported_saved_formatになります。合成fixtureの固定時刻を使います。
|
|
76
75
|
業務データの対応・保存責務は[InputBuilderガイド](INPUT_BUILDER.ja.md)を参照してください。
|
|
77
|
-
|
|
76
|
+
Gemの公開は、実Issuer接続、本番購入許可、Phase 2-B移行を意味しません。
|
data/docs/DIAGNOSTICS.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
# Failure diagnostics (
|
|
1
|
+
# Failure diagnostics (published 0.4.0)
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
Diagnostics help you inspect a failed check without reading gem internals. They
|
|
4
4
|
are supplemental: existing calls, status/code, fixed profile, Fail Closed and
|
|
@@ -62,15 +62,13 @@ hints come from a closed catalog. No values, arbitrary field names, signed
|
|
|
62
62
|
wires, public/private keys, nonce, PII or stack traces are retained or emitted.
|
|
63
63
|
The diagnostic is not Evidence and cannot reconstruct original inputs.
|
|
64
64
|
|
|
65
|
-
## Try the
|
|
65
|
+
## Try the published release locally
|
|
66
66
|
|
|
67
|
-
|
|
68
|
-
|
|
69
|
-
MRI (3.4.12 or 4.0.9) and pinned dependencies:
|
|
67
|
+
Normally install published 0.4.0 in an environment with supported MRI
|
|
68
|
+
(3.4.12 or 4.0.9) and pinned dependencies. Run the examples from a repository checkout:
|
|
70
69
|
|
|
71
70
|
```sh
|
|
72
|
-
gem
|
|
73
|
-
gem install --local --no-document ./ap2_mandate_verifier-0.4.0.gem
|
|
71
|
+
gem install ap2_mandate_verifier --version 0.4.0
|
|
74
72
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb valid
|
|
75
73
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb tampered
|
|
76
74
|
ruby examples/input_builder.rb expired
|
|
@@ -86,5 +84,5 @@ assembly examples return `rejected / invalid_host_context` with diagnostic
|
|
|
86
84
|
reasons `missing_required_field`, `invalid_type`, `unknown_field` and
|
|
87
85
|
`unsupported_saved_format`. Synthetic fixture clocks are intentional. See
|
|
88
86
|
[InputBuilder](INPUT_BUILDER.md) for data mapping and storage responsibilities.
|
|
89
|
-
|
|
90
|
-
|
|
87
|
+
Gem availability does not imply real Issuer interoperability, production
|
|
88
|
+
authorization or Phase 2-B GO.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Merchant Checkout signing and Receipt
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
## Explicit multi-item selection — 0.6.0 preparation
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
Published 0.5.0 APIs below retain their default single-SKU behavior. This checkout
|
|
6
|
+
adds optional `profile_ref: "ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item"` to
|
|
7
|
+
`CheckoutJWT.sign` and `CheckoutReceipt.reference/sign/verify`. Pass it consistently
|
|
8
|
+
when working with a multi-item Checkout. The new profile validates every line,
|
|
9
|
+
integer product/sum limits and unique line IDs before signing. Its
|
|
10
|
+
[full contract](MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md) covers quantities, candidate matching,
|
|
11
|
+
limits and migration; the [synthetic example](../examples/multi_item_checkout.rb)
|
|
12
|
+
connects signing with InputBuilder verification and both Receipt outcomes.
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
Receipt still references the complete original `<terminal_jws>~`, without
|
|
15
|
+
per-line hashes or a compact-only alternate. Profile selection validates the
|
|
16
|
+
supported embedded Checkout shape; reference computation alone does not verify
|
|
17
|
+
Mandate authorization. Result/Evidence and business-outcome separation remain
|
|
18
|
+
unchanged. 0.6.0 is not yet published; its final validation is recorded separately.
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
Published [0.5.0](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.5.0) includes these APIs. [Complete runnable synthetic example](../examples/merchant_signing.rb). The example is repository content, not part of the installed Gem.
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
|
+
## Scope and responsibility
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
This additive API starts from the existing single Merchant / single SKU Checkout
|
|
25
|
+
profile, ES256 with a P-256 key. It leaves `Verifier`, `Result`, `Evidence`,
|
|
26
|
+
`InputBuilder` and diagnostics unchanged. A merchant signature attests to the
|
|
27
|
+
merchant-authored order bytes; it does not create user authorization, establish
|
|
28
|
+
merchant enrollment, persist an order, consume a nonce or make a payment.
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
The adopted AP2 source remains
|
|
31
|
+
[`b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`](https://github.com/google-agentic-commerce/AP2/tree/b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793).
|
|
32
|
+
Checkout-specific ordering is defined by the existing local fixed profile, not
|
|
33
|
+
all UCP shapes. Under the default profile, multiple items are rejected. The
|
|
34
|
+
explicit multi-item profile supports the documented bounded subset. Unsupported
|
|
35
|
+
fields, nonempty links and unsupported currencies are rejected in both profiles.
|
|
36
|
+
Amounts are integer minor units; totals must agree.
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
## Minimal executable example
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
Run from this repository with the documented runtime and dependencies:
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
```ruby
|
|
43
|
+
require "ap2_mandate_verifier"
|
|
44
|
+
require "openssl"
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
key = OpenSSL::PKey::EC.generate("prime256v1") # Test only; app owns real keys.
|
|
47
|
+
totals = [{"type" => "subtotal", "amount" => 100}, {"type" => "total", "amount" => 100}]
|
|
48
|
+
checkout = {
|
|
49
|
+
"id" => "order-1", "merchant" => {"id" => "shop", "name" => "Demo shop"},
|
|
50
|
+
"status" => "ready_for_complete", "currency" => "USD", "links" => [],
|
|
51
|
+
"line_items" => [{"id" => "line-1", "item" => {"id" => "sku", "title" => "Sample", "price" => 100},
|
|
52
|
+
"quantity" => 1, "totals" => totals}], "totals" => totals
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
signing = AP2MandateVerifier::CheckoutJWT
|
|
55
|
+
signed = signing.sign(checkout: checkout, signer: signing.es256_signer(private_key: key),
|
|
56
|
+
public_key_pem: key.public_to_pem)
|
|
57
|
+
puts signed.jwt.split(".").length # 3
|
|
58
|
+
puts signed.checkout_hash.length # 43
|
|
59
|
+
```
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
`signed.jwt` is the frozen original compact JWT to transmit and retain. Supply
|
|
62
|
+
that exact String as `host_checkout_jws` to InputBuilder and Verifier; supply
|
|
63
|
+
`signed.checkout_hash` when a test or external Agent binds a Closed Mandate.
|
|
64
|
+
The Gem does not issue a product Mandate API. Re-encoding claims or signing again
|
|
65
|
+
creates different original wire, even when the order is the same.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
`signer.call(signing_input)` receives the frozen ASCII `header.payload` and returns
|
|
68
|
+
64 binary bytes containing the JOSE ES256 `r || s` signature. An HSM/remote
|
|
69
|
+
adapter must implement this interface and handle its own authorization, timeouts
|
|
70
|
+
and availability. The Gem itself performs no network operation. The selected
|
|
71
|
+
independent canonical public SPKI PEM verifies the final signature before a
|
|
72
|
+
`Signed` object is returned. The token cannot choose its own verification key.
|
|
73
|
+
`es256_signer` is a convenience closure over an application-owned OpenSSL P-256
|
|
74
|
+
private key; it never serializes the private key.
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
Invalid orders, wrong keys, unsupported keys, failed signer calls and invalid
|
|
77
|
+
signer output raise `CheckoutJWT::Invalid` with a fixed message and no original
|
|
78
|
+
cause. They never return a signed result. All application key lifecycle and trust
|
|
79
|
+
registration remain outside the Gem.
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
81
|
+
## Checkout Receipt contract and specification discrepancy
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
Checkout-specific Schema uses `status: Success/Error`, `iss`, `iat`, `reference`;
|
|
84
|
+
Success requires `order_id`; Error requires `error` and `error_description`.
|
|
85
|
+
The generic authorization prose instead describes `result: success/error`.
|
|
86
|
+
Checkout schema and generated model do not strictly forbid fields from the other
|
|
87
|
+
branch; a stricter local profile must be documented as such.
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
Normative authorization/dispute text requires the final closed SD-JWT hash in
|
|
90
|
+
the same manner as `sd_hash`. Fixed SDK `sdjwt/common.py` includes the terminal
|
|
91
|
+
`~` even without disclosures. `MandateClient.get_closed_mandate_jwt` instead
|
|
92
|
+
extracts only compact JWT, discarding disclosures and `~`, and recommends hashing
|
|
93
|
+
that. These are distinct hashes even in the existing inline terminal profile.
|
|
94
|
+
The adopted contract prioritizes normative `sd_hash`: explicit original
|
|
95
|
+
closed SD-JWT input `<terminal_jws>~`, default SHA256/base64url without padding.
|
|
96
|
+
This is the existing inline terminal profile serialized as its final SD-JWT.
|
|
97
|
+
The caller must supply this exact representation; compact-only input is rejected.
|
|
98
|
+
The Gem never adds a missing `~`, extracts a leaf from a chain, or guesses a
|
|
99
|
+
reference from unparseable input. Disclosures, extra hops, `_sd_alg` extensions
|
|
100
|
+
and unsupported terminal claims are rejected. Bounded `kid` is accepted exactly
|
|
101
|
+
as in the existing verifier but never selects a trusted key. The entire input,
|
|
102
|
+
including `kid` bytes and terminal `~`, contributes to the hash.
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
The generic `result` spelling is not accepted. Success permits only `order_id`,
|
|
105
|
+
and Error permits only `error` and `error_description` alongside common fields.
|
|
106
|
+
This branch exclusivity, nonempty bounded strings and rejection of unknown
|
|
107
|
+
fields are explicit local-profile constraints, stronger than the base Schema.
|
|
108
|
+
`iat` is an integer epoch. `not_before <= iat <= verified_at <= not_after` is an
|
|
109
|
+
explicit application verification window, not an upstream freshness guarantee.
|
|
110
|
+
The application owns trusted key enrollment, expected issuer and time policy.
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
```ruby
|
|
113
|
+
receipt = AP2MandateVerifier::CheckoutReceipt
|
|
114
|
+
# closed_sd_jwt is the exact received final `<terminal_jws>~` String.
|
|
115
|
+
rejection = receipt.sign(closed_sd_jwt: closed_sd_jwt, issuer: "shop",
|
|
116
|
+
outcome: "Error", error: "declined", error_description: "Application declined",
|
|
117
|
+
issued_at: now, signer: signing.es256_signer(private_key: key),
|
|
118
|
+
public_key_pem: key.public_to_pem)
|
|
119
|
+
checked = receipt.verify(jwt: rejection.jwt, closed_sd_jwt: closed_sd_jwt,
|
|
120
|
+
trusted_public_key_pem: independently_registered_public_pem, expected_issuer: "shop",
|
|
121
|
+
not_before: now - 60, not_after: now + 60, verified_at: now)
|
|
122
|
+
p [checked.verified?, checked.purchase_succeeded?, checked.purchase_rejected?]
|
|
123
|
+
# => [true, false, true]
|
|
124
|
+
```
|
|
125
|
+
|
|
126
|
+
A Success call replaces Error fields with `outcome: "Success", order_id: "order-1"`.
|
|
127
|
+
`Signed#jwt` is the immutable transmitted receipt wire and `Signed#reference` its
|
|
128
|
+
Mandate reference. Invalid creation raises `CheckoutReceipt::Invalid` without
|
|
129
|
+
input values or original cause. Verification returns an immutable
|
|
130
|
+
`CheckoutReceipt::Verification`: `verified?`, `outcome` (`Success` or `Error`),
|
|
131
|
+
`purchase_succeeded?`, `purchase_rejected?`, `order_id`, `error`,
|
|
132
|
+
`error_description`, and a `code`. Failure exposes no untrusted claim values and
|
|
133
|
+
returns false for all three predicates. It never returns existing Verifier
|
|
134
|
+
`Result`/`Evidence` or modifies their status/code meanings.
|
|
135
|
+
|
|
136
|
+
Reference calculation validates supported syntax and preserves byte identity;
|
|
137
|
+
it does not verify the Mandate's authority. Receipt authenticity does not verify
|
|
138
|
+
Mandate authorization or evidence of payment/order execution. Obtain authorization
|
|
139
|
+
through the existing complete verifier plus Host responsibilities separately.
|
|
140
|
+
The application must explicitly provide its final business outcome; no Verifier
|
|
141
|
+
success is automatically converted into a Success Receipt.
|
|
142
|
+
|
|
143
|
+
## Current verification
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
Dedicated offline Docker checks exercise original-wire hashing, signer failures,
|
|
146
|
+
wrong keys, unsupported input and complete existing Verifier/InputBuilder
|
|
147
|
+
integration. `test/merchant_interop.py` uses the fixed official Python SDK's
|
|
148
|
+
`create_jwt` and `verify_jwt`, compares decoded checkout claims and independently
|
|
149
|
+
computes the original JWT SHA256; reverse-direction wrong-key verification must
|
|
150
|
+
reject. Synthetic private keys stay in process memory. The scripts do not imply
|
|
151
|
+
real issuer provenance or universal AP2 conformance.
|
|
152
|
+
|
|
153
|
+
The fixed SDK `ReceiptClient.verify_receipt` checks signature/model/callback but
|
|
154
|
+
not expected issuer or application time policy. Our interoperability test compares
|
|
155
|
+
these separately on the Ruby side and verifies every callback argument against
|
|
156
|
+
the independently computed expected reference; a JWT-only hash must fail.
|
|
157
|
+
The SDK annotation says cryptography public key, but `jwt_helper.verify_jwt` uses
|
|
158
|
+
jwcrypto; the test supplies a public `JWK` adapter without skipping verification.
|
|
159
|
+
Success creation uses SDK ReceiptClient with a deterministic test clock; Error
|
|
160
|
+
uses the generated CheckoutReceipt model and official signing helper. SDK model
|
|
161
|
+
validation is also checked against original JSON Schema. No unconditional
|
|
162
|
+
success callback or reference-validation bypass is used.
|
|
163
|
+
|
|
164
|
+
The pinned Receipt Schema references `types/receipt_status.json`, while the
|
|
165
|
+
referenced file declares `$id` `.../schemas/receipt-status.json`. The local
|
|
166
|
+
Schema registry explicitly registers the reference URI as an alias for the
|
|
167
|
+
unaltered pinned file, plus declared IDs; it performs no network fallback.
|
|
168
|
+
This reference-resolution adjustment is recorded by the test output and does
|
|
169
|
+
not rewrite Schema conditions or skip validation. Checkout and Closed Mandate
|
|
170
|
+
payloads are also validated with the unaltered original JSON Schemas.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Multiple-item Checkout profile — 0.6.0 preparation
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
This is the contract for the additive, explicitly selected
|
|
4
|
+
`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` version `1`. Published 0.5.0 remains
|
|
5
|
+
available with the unchanged `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1 default.
|
|
6
|
+
Candidate test/CI/review/package completion is recorded separately in
|
|
7
|
+
[project status](PROJECT_STATUS.md); this document does not authorize publication.
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
## Selection and lifecycle
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
Pass `profile_ref: "ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item"` to:
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
- `InputBuilder.trust(snapshot:, tenant_id:, issuer:, agent:, merchant:, verified_at:, profile_ref:)`;
|
|
14
|
+
- `CheckoutJWT.sign(checkout:, signer:, public_key_pem:, profile_ref:)`;
|
|
15
|
+
- `CheckoutReceipt.reference`, `.sign` and `.verify`, alongside their existing arguments.
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
The complete `InputBuilder.verify` / seven-input `verify_checkout` pipeline
|
|
18
|
+
selects the profile from authenticated Host trust, never a token's self-claim.
|
|
19
|
+
Other arguments, Result status/code, supplemental diagnostic meaning, immutable
|
|
20
|
+
Evidence v2 and responsibility boundaries retain their existing meanings.
|
|
21
|
+
Lower-level purchase/constraint APIs accept an explicit `profile_ref:`; omitted
|
|
22
|
+
selection retains their old default.
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
For a complete synthetic preparation → saved challenge → restore → current-state
|
|
25
|
+
verification → Success/Error Receipt example, see
|
|
26
|
+
[`examples/multi_item_checkout.rb`](../examples/multi_item_checkout.rb).
|
|
27
|
+
Its test-only issuer/Agent construction is not a product Mandate issuance API.
|
|
28
|
+
The expected successful verifier result remains
|
|
29
|
+
`verified_research/scoped_research_verified`; an authentic Error Receipt has
|
|
30
|
+
`verified? == true`, `purchase_succeeded? == false`.
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
Persist the original challenge String and all signed Strings. Restore trust and
|
|
33
|
+
challenge bytes without reserializing them. Migration creates a new authenticated
|
|
34
|
+
profile selection and a new challenge before presentation; it never relabels or
|
|
35
|
+
repairs an old challenge. An old saved envelope remains an old-profile envelope.
|
|
36
|
+
Current profile, order, trust and signed-byte differences must remain detectable.
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
## Product, requirement and line identity
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
There are three independent identities: requirement `id`, checkout line `id`,
|
|
41
|
+
and product `item.id` / candidate `id`. Requirement IDs must be unique within
|
|
42
|
+
requirements; line IDs must be unique within checkout lines. They need not match
|
|
43
|
+
each other. Candidate product IDs must be unique within each requirement.
|
|
44
|
+
Different requirements may contain overlapping candidate IDs.
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
Repeated product IDs on different checkout lines are supported. Quantity
|
|
47
|
+
allocation connects lines to requirements by product ID only for evaluation; it never deletes,
|
|
48
|
+
deduplicates, sorts or replaces signed lines. Titles remain bounded strings,
|
|
49
|
+
but product matching uses IDs. Price and totals are checked for every line.
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
An integer maximum-flow allocation must consume both all required quantities
|
|
52
|
+
and all ordered quantities. A unit cannot satisfy two requirements. For example,
|
|
53
|
+
requirements `{A or B: 1}` and `{A: 1}` accept `A: 1, B: 1`; a greedy allocation
|
|
54
|
+
which consumes A for the first requirement is insufficient. Missing units,
|
|
55
|
+
extra units and extra products reject. One requirement's quantity may be
|
|
56
|
+
distributed across its revealed candidate IDs.
|
|
57
|
+
|
|
58
|
+
Ordering does not change quantity satisfiability. A separately and correctly
|
|
59
|
+
signed checkout in another order has different original bytes and must be bound
|
|
60
|
+
by its own Mandate and Host challenge. Reordering an existing signed JWT or
|
|
61
|
+
reusing the previous reference is a signature/binding failure.
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
## Closed subset and limits
|
|
64
|
+
|
|
65
|
+
These are Gem profile restrictions, not general AP2 requirements.
|
|
66
|
+
|
|
67
|
+
| Input | New v1 limit / supported form |
|
|
68
|
+
| --- | --- |
|
|
69
|
+
| Merchant / Checkout / currency | One each; USD, EUR or JPY |
|
|
70
|
+
| Checkout lines | 1–8; distinct line IDs |
|
|
71
|
+
| Requirements | 1–8; distinct requirement IDs |
|
|
72
|
+
| Candidates per requirement | 1–8; distinct product IDs within the requirement |
|
|
73
|
+
| Quantity per line / requirement | Integer 1–1,000,000 |
|
|
74
|
+
| Unit price / multiplication / summed total | Integer minor units, 0–9,007,199,254,740,991 |
|
|
75
|
+
| Line and Checkout totals | Exactly subtotal and total, each equal to its checked amount |
|
|
76
|
+
| Constraints | Ordered `checkout.line_items`, then `checkout.allowed_merchants`; no unknown constraints |
|
|
77
|
+
| Links / taxes / shipping / discount | Empty links; no tax, shipping or discount engine or extra total types |
|
|
78
|
+
| Root disclosures | Every candidate, the Open payload and allowed merchant; at most 66 |
|
|
79
|
+
| Disclosure segment / Root input | 8,192 / 131,072 bytes |
|
|
80
|
+
| Commitment walk | At most 2,048 visits; container depth 24; array length 16 |
|
|
81
|
+
| Checkout JWT / terminal JWS | Existing 16,384 / 32,768 byte limits |
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
All candidate positions must be array commitments under
|
|
84
|
+
`delegate_payload[0].disclosed.constraints[0].items[i].acceptable_items[j]`.
|
|
85
|
+
The Open payload and sole allowed merchant retain their existing commitment
|
|
86
|
+
positions. Missing, reused or unused disclosures and unsupported positions fail
|
|
87
|
+
closed. Bounds apply together: an input below one count cap can still exceed
|
|
88
|
+
the segment, wire or traversal cap. Oversized values are rejected, never truncated.
|
|
89
|
+
No unmeasured worst-case CPU, memory, concurrency or numeric SLA is promised.
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
## Normative source and SDK differences
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
The AP2 source stays pinned to
|
|
94
|
+
`b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793`. The Line Items normative text defines
|
|
95
|
+
maximum flow and requires both sides to be fully satisfied. Schema descriptions
|
|
96
|
+
and Python helper behavior must be compared independently; see
|
|
97
|
+
[the interoperability record](MULTI_ITEM_INTEROP.md) for measured cases and scope.
|
|
98
|
+
No generic AP2/full-Schema or real-Issuer conformance claim follows from synthetic
|
|
99
|
+
tests. Unrelated latest-spec changes are not adopted by this profile.
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
Receipt still uses Checkout-specific `status: Success/Error`. Its reference is
|
|
102
|
+
the original final closed SD-JWT `<terminal_jws>~`; no per-line receipt or
|
|
103
|
+
compact-only alternate hash is introduced. The existing
|
|
104
|
+
[Receipt specification/SDK differences](MERCHANT_SIGNING.md) remain applicable.
|
|
105
|
+
|
|
106
|
+
## Host responsibilities
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
The Host independently supplies authenticated, current trust/keys/revocation,
|
|
109
|
+
clock, expected order/currency/total and saved challenge state. A total extracted
|
|
110
|
+
from the received checkout is not an independent expected order. It rechecks
|
|
111
|
+
state before acting, atomically consumes the nonce with order CAS, handles
|
|
112
|
+
uncertain outcomes and makes the final purchase/payment decision.
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
Verification success is checked Evidence, not Host ALLOW or payment success.
|
|
115
|
+
Receipt authenticity is separate from its explicit business outcome. Multiple
|
|
116
|
+
merchants, splitting one Open Mandate across Checkouts, Payment Mandates/Receipts,
|
|
117
|
+
product issuance/presentation, real payments and production operation are outside
|
|
118
|
+
this task. Formal MRI 3.4.12 / 4.0.9 and all five runtime dependency pins are unchanged.
|
data/docs/SUPPORT_CONTRACT.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,31 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
# Fixed-profile AP2 verification —
|
|
1
|
+
# Fixed-profile AP2 verification — 0.6.0 preparation / published history
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
## Current source: explicit multi-item profile
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
This checkout prepares **0.6.0**, not yet published. It adds the explicitly
|
|
6
|
+
selected `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_multi_item` v1 across input preparation,
|
|
7
|
+
restoration/current-state verification, Checkout signing and Checkout Receipts.
|
|
8
|
+
The [multi-item contract](MULTI_ITEM_CHECKOUT.md) defines the accepted shapes,
|
|
9
|
+
eight-line/eight-requirement/eight-candidate bounds, integer maximum-flow matching,
|
|
10
|
+
complete disclosures, exact original-byte binding and migration. Existing
|
|
11
|
+
`ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` v1 identifier/body/hash/acceptance range and all
|
|
12
|
+
default APIs remain unchanged. Historical single-profile statements below describe
|
|
13
|
+
their original releases; they do not exclude this separately selected addition.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
Formal MRI 3.4.12 and 4.0.9, all five dependency pins, Result/status/code,
|
|
16
|
+
diagnostic and Evidence meanings remain unchanged. Tests, independent review,
|
|
17
|
+
CI and final archive identities must be read from the task's final validation
|
|
18
|
+
record; pending work is not a PASS. Publication/tag/Release operations require
|
|
19
|
+
Owner judgment and have not been performed for 0.6.0.
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
Published **0.5.0** adds separate [Merchant signing and Checkout Receipt APIs](MERCHANT_SIGNING.md). They do not broaden the existing Verifier profile or change Result/Evidence/status/code. Checkout Receipt uses the dedicated Schema and normative final SD-JWT reference; unsupported forms fail closed. No product Mandate issuance, payment, persistence or real key/trust management is included.
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
[0.5.0 publication record](PROJECT_STATUS.md#050-publication): 50,688 bytes, SHA256 `00b0ce0981070864c67a056906c5af204bbc5aaa80d029cb4a64294634367dd8`, approved source `bf796a53600c189b0cfe66c9cfcd1de8a353c03d`. Current repository examples/docs do not replace the published preparation snapshot.
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
Historical published 0.4.0 adds supplemental safe diagnostics; see [API and troubleshooting](DIAGNOSTICS.md). Existing verdict/Evidence contracts remain unchanged.
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
[0.4.0 on RubyGems](https://rubygems.org/gems/ap2_mandate_verifier/versions/0.4.0) was registered 2026-10-31 04:25:06.427 UTC and compared at 04:26:15 UTC: owner `cuichangquan`, platform `ruby`, prerelease false, not yanked at comparison; 44,032 bytes, SHA256 `b212db01e7deb18dcef1199414f9d93ef43cb1f74b62baa55306de3955dfe177`. The download matches the saved reviewed artifact and all 17 payload files match source `fc42852f53c615f96d7c165a8de494b24b252519`. RubyGems does not independently attest the source SHA. Formal MRI support and all five runtime pins below are unchanged. [Publication record](PROJECT_STATUS.md#040-publication) and [validation scope](DIAGNOSTICS_VALIDATION.md). Packaged documentation retains its preparation snapshot; repository updates do not replace published bytes.
|
|
2
28
|
|
|
3
|
-
Unreleased 0.4.0 adds supplemental safe diagnostics; see [API and troubleshooting](DIAGNOSTICS.md). Published 0.3.0 and existing verdict/Evidence contracts remain unchanged.
|
|
4
29
|
|
|
5
30
|
## Published 0.3.0 input assistance
|
|
6
31
|
|
|
@@ -61,7 +86,7 @@ Gem-owned signature/original-wire/closure, delegation, binding, supplied-trust s
|
|
|
61
86
|
Host inputs must be authenticated, independent of the token and current: trust/keys/profile/revocation/rollback protection, clock and order/challenge state. Recheck before use; atomically consume nonce with order CAS, reconcile unknown results as PENDING, and decide final ALLOW/payment separately.
|
|
62
87
|
Evidence is immutable checked facts in the same trusted Ruby process, not ALLOW or a transport credential. JSON/Hash reconstruction does not authenticate it. Rejection, unavailability, exceptions and no result never authorize an operation. Trusted Ruby is a precondition, not a malicious-Ruby sandbox.
|
|
63
88
|
|
|
64
|
-
No worst-case CPU/RSS/concurrency or numeric SLA is promised. Host process/time/memory/concurrency limits supplement, not replace, Gem finite input bounds.
|
|
89
|
+
No worst-case CPU/RSS/concurrency or numeric SLA is promised. Host process/time/memory/concurrency limits supplement, not replace, Gem finite input bounds. Product Mandate issuance/presentation, Rails adapters, real payments and Host DB operations remain outside the Gem. Separate merchant signing/Checkout Receipt APIs are documented in [MERCHANT_SIGNING](MERCHANT_SIGNING.md).
|
|
65
90
|
Supported-input semantics and existing API/status/code/Evidence contracts must not change silently. Security-driven acceptance narrowing requires impact/reason/migration disclosure; breaking required-field/profile/API changes must be explicit. Dependency updates are not automatically compatible.
|
|
66
91
|
|
|
67
92
|
The published 0.2.0 and historical baseline below is MRI4.0.9 plus JSON2.19.9/JWT3.3.0/base640.3.0/OpenSSL gem4.0.2/Digest3.2.1, with the exact observed MBA arm64-darwin25 and Ubuntu24.04/x86_64 configurations. RubyGems version constraints do not enforce MRI/OS/provider identity. All OS versions, other engines/architectures and arbitrary provider updates are not supported by past observations.
|
|
@@ -76,7 +101,7 @@ The API/limit specification below preserves the existing contract. All pre2/pre3
|
|
|
76
101
|
|
|
77
102
|
## Supported proposition and environment
|
|
78
103
|
|
|
79
|
-
The sole registered profile is `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` version1,
|
|
104
|
+
The historical sole registered profile is `ap2.checkout.single_merchant_sku` version1,
|
|
80
105
|
with the exact `TrustContext::PROFILE_BODY`/hash. Official AP2 source is fixed at
|
|
81
106
|
b4587ac1d055888a73b4b21750973cffba961793; its subset-source reference027ed4734...
|
|
82
107
|
is historical profile provenance, not runtime code attestation. Root typ is
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# frozen_string_literal: true
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
module AP2MandateVerifier
|
|
4
|
+
# Merchant-authored checkout, not a Mandate or authorization decision.
|
|
5
|
+
module CheckoutJWT
|
|
6
|
+
class Invalid < ArgumentError
|
|
7
|
+
def initialize = super("invalid checkout signing information")
|
|
8
|
+
end
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
class Signed
|
|
11
|
+
attr_reader :jwt, :checkout_hash
|
|
12
|
+
def initialize(jwt)
|
|
13
|
+
@jwt = jwt.freeze
|
|
14
|
+
@checkout_hash = Base64.urlsafe_encode64(Digest::SHA256.digest(jwt), padding: false).freeze
|
|
15
|
+
freeze
|
|
16
|
+
end
|
|
17
|
+
private_class_method :new
|
|
18
|
+
end
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
# signer.call receives the exact ASCII JWS signing input and must return a
|
|
21
|
+
# 64-byte JOSE ES256 signature. The supplied independent public key verifies
|
|
22
|
+
# the result before any signed object is returned (including remote signers).
|
|
23
|
+
def self.sign(checkout:, signer:, public_key_pem:, profile_ref: TrustContext::PROFILE_REF)
|
|
24
|
+
RootSignature.send(:dependencies!)
|
|
25
|
+
value = InputBuilder.send(:copy!, checkout)
|
|
26
|
+
validate!(value, profile_ref: profile_ref)
|
|
27
|
+
jwt = MerchantSignature.sign!(value, signer, public_key_pem)
|
|
28
|
+
Signed.send(:new, jwt)
|
|
29
|
+
rescue StandardError, LoadError
|
|
30
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil
|
|
31
|
+
end
|
|
32
|
+
|
|
33
|
+
# No key serialization, storage, lookup or logging. The application owns the
|
|
34
|
+
# lifetime of this key/closure. Remote signers can implement the same call.
|
|
35
|
+
def self.es256_signer(private_key:)
|
|
36
|
+
RootSignature.send(:dependencies!)
|
|
37
|
+
raise Invalid unless private_key.instance_of?(OpenSSL::PKey::EC) &&
|
|
38
|
+
private_key.private? && private_key.group.curve_name == "prime256v1"
|
|
39
|
+
lambda do |input|
|
|
40
|
+
der = private_key.dsa_sign_asn1(Digest::SHA256.digest(input))
|
|
41
|
+
OpenSSL::ASN1.decode(der).value.map { |n| n.value.to_s(2).rjust(32, "\0") }.join
|
|
42
|
+
end
|
|
43
|
+
rescue StandardError, LoadError
|
|
44
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil
|
|
45
|
+
end
|
|
46
|
+
|
|
47
|
+
def self.validate!(checkout, profile_ref: TrustContext::PROFILE_REF)
|
|
48
|
+
profile_ref = InputValidator.snapshot!(profile_ref, max_bytes: 256)
|
|
49
|
+
if profile_ref == ScopedConstraints::MULTI_PROFILE_REF
|
|
50
|
+
ScopedConstraints.multi_checkout!(checkout)
|
|
51
|
+
return nil
|
|
52
|
+
end
|
|
53
|
+
raise Invalid unless profile_ref == TrustContext::PROFILE_REF
|
|
54
|
+
c = ScopedConstraints
|
|
55
|
+
c.send(:exact!, checkout, %w[currency id line_items links merchant status totals])
|
|
56
|
+
c.send(:text!, checkout["id"])
|
|
57
|
+
raise Invalid unless checkout["status"] == "ready_for_complete" &&
|
|
58
|
+
c::CURRENCIES.include?(checkout["currency"]) && checkout["links"] == []
|
|
59
|
+
c.send(:exact!, checkout["merchant"], %w[id name])
|
|
60
|
+
c.send(:text!, checkout["merchant"]["id"])
|
|
61
|
+
c.send(:text!, checkout["merchant"]["name"], 512)
|
|
62
|
+
line = c.send(:one!, checkout["line_items"])
|
|
63
|
+
c.send(:exact!, line, %w[id item quantity totals])
|
|
64
|
+
c.send(:text!, line["id"])
|
|
65
|
+
c.send(:quantity!, line["quantity"])
|
|
66
|
+
item = line["item"]
|
|
67
|
+
c.send(:exact!, item, %w[id price title])
|
|
68
|
+
c.send(:text!, item["id"])
|
|
69
|
+
c.send(:text!, item["title"], 512)
|
|
70
|
+
c.send(:amount!, item["price"])
|
|
71
|
+
total = item["price"] * line["quantity"]
|
|
72
|
+
c.send(:amount!, total)
|
|
73
|
+
c.send(:totals!, line["totals"], total)
|
|
74
|
+
c.send(:totals!, checkout["totals"], total)
|
|
75
|
+
nil
|
|
76
|
+
end
|
|
77
|
+
%i[sign es256_signer].each do |name|
|
|
78
|
+
implementation = method(name)
|
|
79
|
+
fields = implementation.parameters.filter_map { |kind, field| field if kind == :keyreq }.freeze
|
|
80
|
+
optional = implementation.parameters.filter_map { |kind, field| field if kind == :key }.freeze
|
|
81
|
+
define_singleton_method(name) do |**arguments|
|
|
82
|
+
raise Invalid.new, cause: nil unless (fields - arguments.keys).empty? && (arguments.keys - fields - optional).empty?
|
|
83
|
+
implementation.call(**arguments)
|
|
84
|
+
end
|
|
85
|
+
end
|
|
86
|
+
private_class_method :validate!
|
|
87
|
+
end
|
|
88
|
+
end
|