agentadmit 1.3.0 → 1.4.0

checksums.yaml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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data/README.md

@@ -96,6 +96,27 @@ head :forbidden unless verdict["granted"]
 
 Consent is orthogonal to revocation: a denied verdict means your app returns its own 403; the connection and token stay valid so the user can flip consent back on without re-connecting. Write switches through `PUT /api/v1/consent/settings` from your backend; export the audit trail with `GET /api/v1/consent/export` (every plan).
 
+### Presence verification
+
+AgentAdmit can attest that the human who authorized a connection completed a WebAuthn presence ceremony on the consent page. The verify result carries the fact:
+
+```ruby
+result = AgentAdmit::IntrospectionClient.new.verify(token)
+result.presence_verified?  # true only when the ceremony completed
+```
+
+For sensitive actions, enforce it in your controllers the same way you enforce scopes:
+
+```ruby
+class TransfersController < ApplicationController
+  include AgentAdmit::ScopeEnforcement
+
+  before_action -> { require_presence! }, only: [:create]
+end
+```
+
+`require_presence!` fails closed: agents whose connection was minted without a completed ceremony get a 403 `presence_required`, and so do connections from servers that predate the feature. `presence_verified?` returns true only on an explicit boolean `verified: true`; absent or malformed presence data reads as not verified.
+
 ## Rate Limiting
 
 The AgentAdmit introspection endpoint enforces rate limits. The Ruby SDK handles HTTP 429 responses **automatically** with exponential backoff and jitter -- no changes needed in your middleware code.

data/lib/agentadmit/introspection_client.rb

@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ module AgentAdmit
     MAX_RETRY_BUDGET_MS = 120_000
 
     IntrospectionResult = Struct.new(:user_id, :connection_id, :scopes, :agent_label,
-                                     :sub, :role, :app_id, :jti, :exp, :consent, keyword_init: true) do
+                                     :sub, :role, :app_id, :jti, :exp, :consent,
+                                     :presence, keyword_init: true) do
       def has_scope?(scope)
         scopes.include?(scope)
       end
@@ -34,6 +35,16 @@ module AgentAdmit
         return true if consent.nil?
         consent["granted"] == true
       end
+
+      # Human-presence fact from the WebAuthn step-up (additive; may be nil).
+      # True ONLY when the connection was authorized by a human who completed
+      # a presence ceremony on the consent page: verified must be the boolean
+      # true. Unlike consent, absence fails closed -- older servers never send
+      # the block, and connections minted without a ceremony carry
+      # verified: false, so nil/false/malformed all read as not verified.
+      def presence_verified?
+        presence.is_a?(Hash) && presence["verified"] == true
+      end
     end
 
     def initialize(config = nil)
@@ -157,6 +168,13 @@ module AgentAdmit
         consent = data["consent"]
         consent = nil unless consent.is_a?(Hash)
 
+        # Presence rides along when the platform returns it. Same strictness
+        # as active: verified must be the boolean true or false, never coerced.
+        # Unlike consent, a malformed block is dropped -- presence_verified?
+        # fails closed on nil, so dropping cannot fail open.
+        presence = data["presence"]
+        presence = nil unless presence.is_a?(Hash) && [true, false].include?(presence["verified"])
+
         return IntrospectionResult.new(
           user_id:      data["user_id"],
           connection_id: data["connection_id"],
@@ -167,7 +185,8 @@ module AgentAdmit
           app_id:       data["app_id"],
           jti:          data["jti"],
           exp:          data["exp"],
-          consent:      consent
+          consent:      consent,
+          presence:     presence
         )
       end
 

data/lib/agentadmit/middleware.rb

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ module AgentAdmit
   #   env['agentadmit.scopes']        -- granted scopes array
   #   env['agentadmit.connection_id'] -- connection identifier
   #   env['agentadmit.agent_label']   -- agent display name
+  #   env['agentadmit.presence']      -- human-presence block (Hash) or nil
   #
   class Middleware
     # RFC 7235: the auth-scheme token is case-insensitive.
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ module AgentAdmit
           env["agentadmit.scopes"] = result.scopes
           env["agentadmit.connection_id"] = result.connection_id
           env["agentadmit.agent_label"] = result.agent_label
+          env["agentadmit.presence"] = result.presence
         rescue InvalidTokenError => e
           return [401, { "Content-Type" => "application/json" },
             [{ error: "invalid_token", error_description: e.message }.to_json]]

data/lib/agentadmit/scope_enforcement.rb

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ module AgentAdmit
   #
   #     before_action -> { require_scope!("read:orders") }, only: [:index, :show]
   #     before_action -> { require_scope_if_agent!("create:orders") }, only: [:create]
+  #     before_action -> { require_presence! }, only: [:destroy]
   #   end
   #
   module ScopeEnforcement
@@ -54,6 +55,27 @@ module AgentAdmit
       end
     end
 
+    ##
+    # Enforce human-presence verification -- agent's connection MUST have been
+    # authorized with a completed WebAuthn presence ceremony or gets 403.
+    # Fail closed: connections from servers that predate the presence feature
+    # (no presence block) are treated as not verified.
+    #
+    def require_presence!
+      unless request.env["agentadmit.auth_type"] == "agent"
+        render json: { error: "invalid_token", error_description: "AgentAdmit token required" }, status: :unauthorized
+        return
+      end
+
+      presence = request.env["agentadmit.presence"]
+      unless presence.is_a?(Hash) && presence["verified"] == true
+        render json: {
+          error: "presence_required",
+          error_description: "This action requires a connection authorized with human presence verification."
+        }, status: :forbidden
+      end
+    end
+
     ##
     # Get the current agent/user context.
     #
@@ -64,6 +86,7 @@ module AgentAdmit
         scopes: request.env["agentadmit.scopes"],
         connection_id: request.env["agentadmit.connection_id"],
         agent_label: request.env["agentadmit.agent_label"],
+        presence: request.env["agentadmit.presence"],
       }
     end
   end

data/lib/agentadmit/version.rb

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # frozen_string_literal: true
 
 module AgentAdmit
-  VERSION = "1.3.0"
+  VERSION = "1.4.0"
 end

metadata

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 --- !ruby/object:Gem::Specification
 name: agentadmit
 version: !ruby/object:Gem::Version
-  version: 1.3.0
+  version: 1.4.0
 platform: ruby
 authors:
 - Christopher Emerson
 autorequire:
 bindir: bin
 cert_chain: []
-date: 2026-07-04 00:00:00.000000000 Z
+date: 2026-07-05 00:00:00.000000000 Z
 dependencies:
 - !ruby/object:Gem::Dependency
   name: json