xmemcli 1.3.1__tar.gz → 1.4.0__tar.gz

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: xmemcli
-Version: 1.3.1
+Version: 1.4.0
 Summary: Command-line client for the xmemory HTTP API: PKCE auth, instances, read/write, schema and XMD tools.
 Keywords: api,cli,llm,memory,xmemory
 Requires-Python: <4,>=3.12
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ xmemcli binding add <instance_id> [--tier autoload|available|off] [--scope proje
 xmemcli binding remove <instance_id> [--scope project|user]
 xmemcli context [--text] [--max-tokens N] [--no-live-state]
 xmemcli trace ls [--instance ID]… [--trace-type T]… [--hours-back N] [--user-id U] [--api-key-id K] [--limit N] [--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID] [--counts-only]
-xmemcli trace ls --search [--text …] [--request …] [--response …] [--object NAME]… [--field NAME]… [--status S]… [--trace-id ID]… [--session-id S] [--instance ID] [--trace-type T]… [--hours-back N]
+xmemcli trace ls --search [--text …] [--request …] [--response …] [--object NAME]… [--field NAME]… [--status S]… [--trace-id ID]… [--session-id S] [--instance ID] [--trace-type T|delete]… [--hours-back N] [--limit N] [--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID]
 xmemcli trace get <trace_id> [--trace-type write|read|create|update|evolution]
 ```
 
@@ -82,7 +82,17 @@ NEXT=$(echo "$PAGE" | jq -r '"\(.next_before_ts_ms):\(.next_before_trace_id)"')
 xmemcli trace ls --instance "$ID" --limit 100 --cursor "$NEXT"
 ```
 
-`--search` has no cursor — the Console's Inspect endpoint doesn't page; it returns the newest matches up to a ceiling and the CLI warns when a response sits at it. A key sees the operations of the instances it can list — never more than its owner sees in the Console; a super admin's key sees what a super admin sees. Full reference: [](#trace--the-consoles-operation-traces).
+`--search` pages too, with the Inspect endpoint's three cursor fields — follow `has_more`, since a page can come back short:
+
+```bash
+PAGE=$(xmemcli trace ls --search --text "Ada")
+# `select(.has_more)` so the last page yields an empty string rather than the literal `null:null:null`,
+# which `--cursor` refuses.
+NEXT=$(echo "$PAGE" | jq -r 'select(.has_more) | "\(.next_before_sort_at_ms):\(.next_before_trace_id):\(.next_before_instance_id)"')
+[ -n "$NEXT" ] && xmemcli trace ls --search --text "Ada" --cursor "$NEXT"
+```
+
+A search with no filter shaping it is the Console's recent-activity view, which reaches back 180 days; when older operations exist, its last page says `truncated` and the CLI warns. A key sees the operations of the instances it can list — never more than its owner sees in the Console; a super admin's key sees what a super admin sees. Full reference: [](#trace--the-consoles-operation-traces).
 
 ## Output personality — JSON vs pretty
 
@@ -128,7 +138,7 @@ xmemcli version
 xmemcli auth login
 ```
 
-Version: **1.3.1**.
+Version: **1.4.0**.
 
 
 ---
@@ -196,7 +206,7 @@ Those three keys are required and must be strings. Anything else in the file is
 
 Since 1.1.0 the file may also carry **`mcp_url`** — the MCP resource the API reported for itself when the key was issued, written only when the server names one. It is what lets `xmemcli mcp` reach an on-premise MCP host: that host is in no table the client was built with, and the rc is the one anchor a cloned `.mcp.json` does not control. A blank or non-string value is read as absent. It outranks the single-origin sibling inference below — a deployment naming itself beats a shape we derived — and both beat the built-in default. The mount path is part of the destination: `https://host/mcp` authorises that mount, not the sibling services beside it — and the instance id is canonicalised as a UUID before it is appended, so nothing following the mount can walk back out of it. Every lookup that reads `mcp_url` refuses redirects rather than merely dropping the credential across them, because what it learns is a host the key is later sent to. Every mutation of the file — write, in-place update, and logout's delete — is serialised under an exclusive lock on its containing directory, and an update is additionally bound to the identity *and* origin it was decided from. What protects an in-place update is that comparison, which is portable; the lock narrows what remains — the moment between comparing and replacing — where the platform offers one. A failed record is a warning, a failed de-authorisation fails the command. The enrichment write after login is conditional on the same comparison, so logging out or signing in again while it is in flight is not undone by it.
 
-Resolution order: `--api-key` → `$XMEM_API_KEY` → `.xmemrc.json`. Origin: `--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc `api_url` → default — **except** when the key is explicit (`--api-key` / `$XMEM_API_KEY`): the rc's `api_url` is skipped and the origin falls back to the built-in default unless you also set `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL`. The localhost-key-at-prod guard applies when the key comes from the rc and an explicit `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL` mismatches that rc origin. A base URL's path is preserved, never stripped — on a single-origin deployment the API lives at `https://host/xmem`, and that mount is part of every request the CLI builds; query, fragment, and userinfo on a base URL refuse normalisation rather than being stripped, so sibling inference cannot run on a shape the caller did not supply. Console resolution for login: `--console-url` → Console pinned by a positional (or mistaken `--api-url`) single-origin URL → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` when `--api-url` was *not* given → sibling inference from the call's `--api-url` when it applies → sibling inference from `$XMEM_API_URL` → default. An explicit `--api-url` suppresses `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` for that invocation (a five-host `--api-url` without `--console-url` is a usage error, not a fall-through to the env Console). A named API origin from `$XMEM_API_URL` is held to the same infer-or-refuse rule, so an env-only non-default API without a Console cannot mint at the hosted Console and record that key against the foreign API; an inferred sibling that is remote HTTP is refused under the same HTTPS-or-loopback rule as a positional login URL. The same resolved Console is passed to the post-login `/whoami` that records `mcp_url`, so a leftover `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` cannot steer that lookup either. When `--api-url` is present, `$XMEM_API_URL` is not consulted for Console inference. Because a mounted base cannot also serve the `/api`-prefixed spelling of a route, the compatibility candidate in `whoami_urls` / `token_redeem_urls` (`{base}/api/whoami`, `{base}/api/cli/token` — a root-served deployment's second form) is offered only for a path-less base. The MCP bridge resolves its endpoint as `--mcp-url` → `$XMEM_MCP_URL` → the `/mcp` sibling of the effective API base (`--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc → default) → default, and its foreign-origin guard accepts the `/xmem` ↔ `/mcp` sibling pair as one deployment.
+Resolution order: `--api-key` → `$XMEM_API_KEY` → `.xmemrc.json`. Origin: `--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc `api_url` → default — **except** when the key is explicit (`--api-key` / `$XMEM_API_KEY`): the rc's `api_url` is skipped and the origin falls back to the built-in default unless you also set `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL`. The localhost-key-at-prod guard applies when the key comes from the rc and an explicit `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL` mismatches that rc origin. A base URL's path is preserved, never stripped — on a single-origin deployment the API lives at `https://host/xmem`, and that mount is part of every request the CLI builds; query, fragment, and userinfo on a base URL refuse normalisation rather than being stripped, so sibling inference cannot run on a shape the caller did not supply. Console resolution for login: `--console-url` → Console pinned by a positional (or mistaken `--api-url`) single-origin URL → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` when `--api-url` was *not* given → sibling inference from the call's `--api-url` when it applies → sibling inference from `$XMEM_API_URL` → default. An explicit `--api-url` suppresses `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` for that invocation (a five-host `--api-url` without `--console-url` is a usage error, not a fall-through to the env Console). A named API origin from `$XMEM_API_URL` is held to the same infer-or-refuse rule, so an env-only non-default API without a Console cannot mint at the hosted Console and record that key against the foreign API; an inferred sibling that is remote HTTP is refused under the same HTTPS-or-loopback rule as a positional login URL. An explicitly named Console (flag, env, or pinned) is also cross-checked against the API origin on this path — the browser redeem would fail safe on a wrong Console, but the interactive paste fallback presents the pasted key to it as a bearer — and a provably mismatched pair (mixed loopback-ness, or a production half paired with a non-production one) is refused before either worker starts, in the same words as the email sign-in. The same resolved Console is passed to the post-login `/whoami` that records `mcp_url`, so a leftover `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` cannot steer that lookup either. When `--api-url` is present, `$XMEM_API_URL` is not consulted for Console inference. Because a mounted base cannot also serve the `/api`-prefixed spelling of a route, the compatibility candidate in `whoami_urls` / `token_redeem_urls` (`{base}/api/whoami`, `{base}/api/cli/token` — a root-served deployment's second form) is offered only for a path-less base. The MCP bridge resolves its endpoint as `--mcp-url` → `$XMEM_MCP_URL` → the `/mcp` sibling of the effective API base (`--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc → default) → default, and its foreign-origin guard accepts the `/xmem` ↔ `/mcp` sibling pair as one deployment.
 
 ## Identity — `/whoami`
 
@@ -228,7 +238,7 @@ Each login binds its own port and names it in the login URL, so concurrent login
 
 # `xmemcli` — capabilities reference
 
-**Version:** `1.3.1` (see `xmemcli version`)
+**Version:** `1.4.0` (see `xmemcli version`)
 
 `xmemcli` is the command-line client for the **xmemory HTTP API**. It is **human-approved for key acquisition**: an AI-assisted IDE may run reads, writes, and inventory, and may initiate `auth login`, but a key is only issued after one explicit human approval — a click in the Console UI (PKCE handoff) or an approval of a sign-in email (`--email`). Quota limits change only in the **Console UI**. The full acquisition contract is in the auth-flow reference bundled with this package.
 
@@ -246,7 +256,7 @@ Every command below has dedicated help — see [Help](#help).
 
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
-| **`write`** `<text>` | Sync write (`POST …/write`). `--extraction fast\|deep` (default `fast`). `--no-wait` queues async write, returns `write_id`. `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable) anchors the write to existing objects: only they may be modified/deleted, new objects and links to them are allowed, anything else fails; fast extraction only. |
+| **`write`** `<text>` | Sync write (`POST …/write`). `--extraction fast\|deep` (default `fast`). `--no-wait` queues async write, returns `write_id`. `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable) anchors the write to existing objects: only they may be modified/deleted, new objects and links to them are allowed, anything else fails; works with either extraction mode. |
 | **`write-status`** `<write_id>` … | Poll async writes until terminal or `--timeout` (default 60s). Accepts multiple ids. |
 | **`read`** `<query>` | Read from active instance. `--read-mode single\|raw\|xresponse`, `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable), `--scope-relations`, `--related-types` (also return `related_types`: per object type the read touched, the fields it did not return and the object types a declared relation links it to; needs `instance.get_own` on the key), `--related-types-depth N` (1, 2 or 3, refused as a usage error otherwise; follow the relations N levels out, each catalog entry saying its distance; implies `--related-types`). |
 
@@ -261,7 +271,7 @@ Permission-filtered view of what this API key can see.
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
 | **`org list clusters`** | Clusters visible to this credential |
-| **`org list instances`** | Instances visible to this credential. A key minted with `data.read` but not `instance.get_own` (the supported shape for `trace …`) gets the ids only, with a warning saying so — the same set `trace ls` is scoped to. |
+| **`org list instances`** | Instances visible to this credential, as a bare array of records. A key minted with `data.read` but not `instance.get_own` (the supported shape for `trace …`) gets the ids only — the same set `trace ls` is scoped to — as a **degraded document** rather than an array: `{"items": [{"id": …}, …], "degraded": true, "missing_permission": "instance.get_own"}`, with the warning on stderr and in the document's `warnings`. The shape changes so a script cannot read an ids-only listing as a complete one; an array is never wrapped just to carry a warning. |
 | **`org list keys`** | API keys visible to this credential (metadata only; plaintext never returned) |
 
 ---
@@ -460,27 +470,30 @@ learn; the CLI composes the Console's search clauses itself.
 
 | Command | Console view | Description |
 |---------|--------------|-------------|
-| **`trace ls`** | Operations tab / Home | Operations, newest first, across every instance this credential can see (nothing given — the Home view), or the `--instance ID` given (repeatable, or a comma list; default `--instance-id` / `$XMEM_INSTANCE_ID`). Returns `operations[]`, `counts`, `instance_counts`, `series`, and the paging cursor `next_before_ts_ms` + `next_before_trace_id` (with `has_more_operations`). Flags: `--trace-type T` (repeatable / comma; `write`, `read`, `create`, `update`, `evolution`), `--hours-back N` (server default 24, `0` = unbounded) or `--start-ts` / `--end-ts` (epoch seconds), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--include-console-reads`, `--bucket-ms`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID` (the previous page's two halves, joined with a colon), `--counts-only` (`ops_limit=0`: what Home fetches — counters and series, no rows; refused together with `--limit` / `--cursor`, which would have nothing to page). |
-| **`trace ls --search`** | Inspect | The Inspect search, for the filters only it can answer: `--text` (free text), `--request` / `--response` (text on either side of the operation), `--object NAME` / `--field NAME` (repeatable; all must match), `--status S` (repeatable / comma; any may match: `ok`, `error`, `stale`, `timed_out`, `internal_error`, `quota_exceeded`, `in_progress`, `schema-gap`), `--trace-id ID` (repeatable / comma), `--session-id`; plus `--instance` (at most one — the Inspect scope), `--trace-type`, `--hours-back` (a floor applied to the hits *after* the search — Inspect's own recency windows decide the candidate pool, so this narrows a result, unlike the query window it is on `trace ls`), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`. Returns the Inspect document: `merged[]` hits with `kind`, `href` (`/write/{trace}`, `/read/{trace}`, `/create/…`, `/update/…`, `/evolution/…`), `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id` / `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix`, `status`, `time_taken_ms`, `match_items`. |
-| **`trace get`** `<trace_id>` | Detail pane | One operation's full document. `--trace-type` (`operation_type` on a `trace ls` row; the first path segment of a `--search` hit's `href`) makes it one request; without it the five detail endpoints are probed in order `write, read, create, update, evolution` and the first that knows the trace answers. A miss — the Console's `{"found": false}`, or its 404 for a trace outside your scope — is `stage: "not_found"`, exit **3**. |
+| **`trace ls`** | Operations tab / Home | Operations, newest first, across every instance this credential can see (nothing given — the Home view), or the `--instance ID` given (repeatable, or a comma list; default `--instance-id` / `$XMEM_INSTANCE_ID`). Returns `operations[]`, `counts`, `instance_counts`, `series`, and the paging cursor `next_before_ts_ms` + `next_before_trace_id` (with `has_more_operations`). Flags: `--trace-type T` (repeatable / comma; `write`, `read`, `create`, `update`, `evolution` — `delete` is `--search` only), `--hours-back N` (server default 24, `0` = unbounded) or `--start-ts` / `--end-ts` (epoch seconds), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--include-console-reads`, `--bucket-ms`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID` (the previous page's two halves, joined with a colon), `--counts-only` (`ops_limit=0`: what Home fetches — counters and series, no rows; refused together with `--limit` / `--cursor`, which would have nothing to page). |
+| **`trace ls --search`** | Inspect | The Inspect search, for the filters only it can answer: `--text` (free text), `--request` / `--response` (text on either side of the operation), `--object NAME` / `--field NAME` (repeatable; all must match), `--status S` (repeatable / comma; any may match: `ok`, `error`, `stale`, `timed_out`, `internal_error`, `quota_exceeded`, `in_progress`, `schema-gap`), `--trace-id ID` (repeatable / comma), `--session-id`; plus `--instance` (at most one — the Inspect scope), `--trace-type` (also `delete`), `--hours-back` (a floor applied to the hits *after* the search — Inspect's own recency windows decide the candidate pool, so this narrows a result, unlike the query window it is on `trace ls`), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID` (the previous page's three cursor fields, joined with colons). Returns the Inspect document: `merged[]` hits with `kind`, `href` (`/write/{trace}`, `/read/{trace}`, `/create/…`, `/update/…`, `/evolution/…`, or `#` for an instance deletion, which has no detail page), `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id` / `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix`, `status`, `time_taken_ms`, `match_items`; and the paging fields `has_more`, `next_before_sort_at_ms`, `next_before_trace_id`, `next_before_instance_id`, `truncated`. |
+| **`trace get`** `<trace_id>` | Detail pane | One operation's full document. `--trace-type` (`operation_type` on a `trace ls` row; the first path segment of a `--search` hit's `href`) makes it one request; without it the five detail endpoints are probed in order `write, read, create, update, evolution` and the first that knows the trace answers. A deletion's `DL0000_aaa` id is answered without a request: it has no detail page. A miss — the Console's `{"found": false}`, or its 404 for a trace outside your scope — is `stage: "not_found"`, exit **3**. |
+
+**`--search` is opt-in, on purpose.** The Inspect search runs text predicates across the trace store with a candidate pool of thousands and a merge — markedly more expensive than the indexed, cursor-paged `trace ls`. Passing a search-only flag (`--text`, `--request`, `--response`, `--object`, `--field`, `--status`, `--trace-id`, `--session-id`) without `--search` is a usage error (exit **2**) whose message says exactly that, so an agent reasons about whether it needs the search or whether `trace ls` narrowed by `--instance` / `--trace-type` / `--hours-back` plus `trace get` will do. Conversely `--counts-only`, `--start-ts` / `--end-ts`, `--bucket-ms` are refused with `--search` because the Inspect endpoint cannot honour them, and `--include-console-reads` because Inspect's only spelling of that toggle is a bare phrase inside `q` itself — which is also why a free-text value containing the words "include console reads" is refused rather than sent (the Console would flip the toggle and strip the phrase from the query).
 
-**`--search` is opt-in, on purpose.** The Inspect search runs text predicates across the trace store with a candidate pool of thousands and a merge — markedly more expensive than the indexed, cursor-paged `trace ls`. Passing a search-only flag (`--text`, `--request`, `--response`, `--object`, `--field`, `--status`, `--trace-id`, `--session-id`) without `--search` is a usage error (exit **2**) whose message says exactly that, so an agent reasons about whether it needs the search or whether `trace ls` narrowed by `--instance` / `--trace-type` / `--hours-back` plus `trace get` will do. Conversely `--limit`, `--cursor`, `--counts-only`, `--start-ts` / `--end-ts`, `--bucket-ms` are refused with `--search` because the Inspect endpoint cannot honour them, and `--include-console-reads` because Inspect's only spelling of that toggle is a bare phrase inside `q` itself — which is also why a free-text value containing the words "include console reads" is refused rather than sent (the Console would flip the toggle and strip the phrase from the query).
+**Breaking change in 1.4.0:** `trace ls --search` now asks the Console for one *page* (100 rows by default) instead of the whole capped result, under the Console's paging version 2 (`paging=2`), in which every search mode pages. A single call is no longer the complete answer: loop on `has_more`, and do not read a row count, or an absent `warnings` array, as completeness. Against a Console that predates paging the CLI says so in a warning, because that Console still answers whole and capped. What it tests is the absence of `has_more`, not the rows: a Console that pages sends the paging fields even when it found nothing, and an empty answer from one that does not is exactly where a row count misleads.
 
-**The pagination gap — read this before scripting `--search`.** `trace ls` pages properly (the Console's Operations tab does). `trace ls --search` does **not**: the Console's Inspect endpoint has no cursor — it returns the newest 50 matches when no filter narrows it (latest-activity mode) and up to 5 000 matches per source once filtered, and stops; the Console's own Inspect view has the same cliff. So `--search` takes no `--cursor` / `--limit`, and when a response sits at one of those ceilings the CLI emits a **warning** (stderr, and folded into the JSON document's `warnings` array) saying the result was cut and how to narrow it. The warning is **best-effort** — the warning is one-sided by construction: it fires on the count the client can see, and the Console narrows *after* its per-source row caps (type/status resolution, console-read exclusion, the caller's instance allowlist), so a capped response can shrink below the ceiling — even to near-empty for a scoped key searching without an instance filter — with no client-visible signal. A missing warning is not proof of completeness — and a warning is not proof of a cut: the 5 000 figure is *per source*, while the count the warning tests is the cross-source merge (truncated only in latest-activity mode), so several uncapped sources together can trip it on a complete result. Until the Console endpoint pages (and reports truncation itself), treat **every** `--search` result as "the newest matches", not "all matches".
+**Paging a search — read this before scripting `--search`.** `trace ls --search` pages like `trace ls`, with the Inspect endpoint's own keyset cursor: pass the previous page's `next_before_sort_at_ms`, `next_before_trace_id` and `next_before_instance_id` back as `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID` until `has_more` is `false`. Follow `has_more`, never the row count: the Console narrows each page after its row limits (type and status resolution, console-read exclusion), so a page can hold fewer rows than `--limit` — even none — and still have more. Paging reaches every match, with one exception the Console reports itself: a search with no filter that shapes the query (only scope such as `--instance`, `--session-id`, `--user-id`, `--api-key-id` or `--hours-back`) is the Console's recent-activity view, which reaches back 180 days. When this credential has older operations than that, the last page carries `truncated: true` and the CLI emits a **warning** (stderr, and folded into the JSON document's `warnings` array) naming the way past it — a filter such as `--trace-type` or `--text`. That flag comes from the endpoint, which knows what it could not reach; the CLI no longer guesses at a cut from how many rows came back. Asking for a page changes two things worth knowing before you script it: a free-text search answers from one candidate window per page rather than the exhaustive second pass the whole-result path ran, so a rare needle can give a short — even empty — first page with `has_more: true` where one call used to find the match; and a paged request is all-or-nothing, so a Console-side source failure is a `502` rather than a partial answer at exit 0. While a Console deploy is rolling out, a `--cursor` request can reach a node that does not page yet; it ignores the cursor, and the CLI exits **3** saying so rather than hand back its newest rows as the next page — retry the same `--cursor`.
 
 **Two document shapes.** `trace ls` returns the Operations-tab document; `trace ls --search` returns the Inspect document (above). They differ because the Console's two backends differ and this CLI does not reshape what the Console serves. Both carry the same identifiers per row (`trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id`, `status`), which is what `trace get` needs next.
 
 **Every operation row carries its internal ids.** `operations[]` rows have `operation_type`, `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `timestamp`, `status`, `is_success`, `error_code`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `user_email`, `api_key_id`, `api_key_name`, `api_key_prefix`, `time_taken_ms`, `text_snippet`, `object_names`, `field_names`.
 
-> **Three of those never resolve for an API key**, super admin or not, and this is by design rather than a gap. `user_email` is always absent: the accounts `/users` lookup is closed to keys (an agent may learn who *it* is, never enumerate the organisation's users), so rows keep `user_id` and you resolve names yourself if you need them — and a `User:<email>` search clause matches nothing; filter by `user_id`. `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` resolve only for the caller's **own** keys, because `GET /api-keys` scopes a key caller to its owner's keys. So a super admin's key does *not* see literally everything its owner's browser sees: it sees the same rows and the same fields, with those three enrichments empty. Everything scope-bearing — which instances, which detail fields, `llm_calls`, xuid substitution — is identical. Detail documents add what the Console's pane shows: `source_id`, `write_mode` / `read_mode`, `scope`, `extracted_objects`, `diff_plan` (sanitised unless super admin), `written_objects`, `migration_id`, `proposal_version`, `schema_version`, `stage`, `triggered_evolution {migration_id, evolution_trace_id, update_trace_id}`, `sql_queries`, and — **unrestricted callers only** (a super admin, or a browser session on a `KINGDOM_LOCAL` Console) — `llm_calls[]` (`llm_call_id`, `gateway_request_id`, `model_type`, `provider`, …), `full_error_message`, raw token counts, unsanitised xuids, `ddl_queries`, and `schema_generation`.
+> **Three of those never resolve for an API key**, super admin or not, and this is by design rather than a gap. `user_email` is always absent: the accounts `/users` lookup is closed to keys (an agent may learn who *it* is, never enumerate the organisation's users), so rows keep `user_id` and you resolve names yourself if you need them — and a `User:<email>` search clause matches nothing; filter by `user_id`. For that reason `--user-id` refuses a value containing `@` as a usage error (exit **2**) on both `trace ls` and `trace ls --search`, rather than sending a filter that can only ever return an empty result at exit 0. `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` resolve only for the caller's **own** keys, because `GET /api-keys` scopes a key caller to its owner's keys. So a super admin's key does *not* see literally everything its owner's browser sees: it sees the same rows and the same fields, with those three enrichments empty. Everything scope-bearing — which instances, which detail fields, `llm_calls`, xuid substitution — is identical. Detail documents add what the Console's pane shows: `source_id`, `write_mode` / `read_mode`, `scope`, `extracted_objects`, `diff_plan` (sanitised unless super admin), `written_objects`, `migration_id`, `proposal_version`, `schema_version`, `stage`, `triggered_evolution {migration_id, evolution_trace_id, update_trace_id}`, `sql_queries` (the rows owned by the read's instance, for every caller who may open the read), and two tiers of gated fields. **Super admin only** — the accounts `is_super_admin` flag decides, for a key exactly as for its owner's browser session: `llm_calls[]` (`llm_call_id`, `gateway_request_id`, `model_type`, `provider`, …), `full_error_message`, raw token counts, and unsanitised xuids. **Callers with no instance restriction at all** — a super admin, or a browser session on a `KINGDOM_LOCAL` Console; never a scoped key: `ddl_queries`, `schema_generation`, and the ownerless rows of `sql_queries`.
 
-**A scoped key gets `[]` for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation`, not the rows.** Those two come from `instance_create_ddl_queries` and `schema_generate_*`, which carry no instance ownership column — `schema_generate_*`'s trace id is client-supplied — so they cannot be scoped in SQL and are served only to callers with no instance restriction at all. This is a deliberate fail-closed choice, not a bug to work around: an empty array means "not available to this credential", never "this operation ran none". `llm_calls[]` behaves the same way and always has. `sql_queries` is not among them: `read_sql_queries` records the owning instance, so every caller who may open a read gets its SQL, attributed to that read even when another instance reused the trace id. **Xuids are hidden for every non-super-admin**, including on writes that carry no identity map — the substitution is done by the Console, server-side, so a caller with no browser sees `#hidden` rather than a raw id.
+**A scoped key gets `[]` for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation`, not the rows.** Those two come from `instance_create_ddl_queries` and `schema_generate_*`, which carry no instance ownership column — `schema_generate_*`'s trace id is client-supplied — so they cannot be scoped in SQL and are served only to callers with no instance restriction at all. This is a deliberate fail-closed choice, not a bug to work around: an empty array means "not available to this credential", never "this operation ran none". `llm_calls[]` behaves the same way (gated on super admin) and always has. `sql_queries` is split: statements recorded with their owning instance reach every caller who may open the read, even when another instance reused the trace id, while statements recorded before ownership was tracked carry no owner and reach unrestricted callers only. A scoped key therefore sees `[]` for reads that old. To let a script tell the two apart, the Console sets a sibling boolean next to each — `sql_queries_withheld`, `ddl_queries_withheld`, `schema_generation_withheld` — that is `true` exactly when a row that exists was withheld from this caller: for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation` that is every scoped caller, for `sql_queries` a scoped caller on a read that has ownerless rows. So `[]` with `…_withheld: false` is "none recorded", `[]` with `…_withheld: true` is "not yours to see". **Xuids are hidden for every non-super-admin**, including on writes that carry no identity map — the substitution is done by the Console, server-side, so a caller with no browser sees `#hidden` rather than a raw id.
 
 **Who sees what — the Console decides; `auth status` tells you which view to expect.**
 
 - A regular key sees the operations of the instances the accounts API lists for it — the same set `org list instances` prints. That is at most what its owner sees in the Console, never more.
 - Access requires the key's role to carry **`data.read`** — the same permission the data-read endpoint requires. A role deliberately scoped away from data (`auth status` shows the codes under `permissions`) is refused with **403 → exit 3, stage `permission`**, whoever owns the key — a permission denial, not a bad credential: rotating or re-issuing the key cannot fix a role that was scoped this way on purpose. An unknown or missing key is the separate 401 → exit 4 (`auth`).
 - A key whose owner is a **super admin** sees the super-admin Console: every organisation's instances, no instance filter, and the super-admin-only detail fields above. The accounts `is_super_admin` flag decides — the key sees the same rows and the same scope-bearing fields its owner's browser session sees, minus the three enrichments no key resolves (`user_email`, and `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` for other people's keys; see the note above). `auth status` reports it as `super_admin`.
+- When the Console **cannot** work out that scope — its accounts API is unreachable, answers non-2xx, is undecodable, or is not configured — it answers **503** with `{"error": "instance_scope_unresolved", "reason": "accounts_…"}` (or `accounts_unavailable` when the key's own lookup failed the same way) instead of an empty document. The CLI reports that as **exit 3, stage `unavailable`**, with a message that says the scope could not be resolved and that this is *not* "no operations": a zero-row answer from a Console that could not decide would have read as a quiet instance.
 - No new permission is involved: the Console answers a key exactly as it would answer its owner's browser session, narrowed to the key's instances. It never mints a session for a key. Filters that need to look other users up (`User:`-style email filters) are not offered: an API key can identify only itself, never list or look up users — filter by `--user-id`.
 
 **The Console origin.** `trace …` talk to the Console, a second origin. It is `--console-url` → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` → inferred: `https://console.xmemory.ai` for the default API, `:8002` for a local `:8000`. A key bound to any other API origin gets a usage error (exit **2**) rather than a guess — the credential-binding rule holds across origins.
@@ -493,7 +506,7 @@ learn; the CLI composes the Console's search clauses itself.
 
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
-| **`auth login`** | PKCE via Console `/xmemcli/<challenge>` → `.xmemrc.json`. `--no-browser`, `--timeout`, `--console-url`, `--callback-port` (pins the loopback callback port for `ssh -L`; `0` or omitted means any free port, otherwise 1024–65535; also `$XMEM_CALLBACK_PORT`, which is read globally). With `--email ADDR` (+ optional `--org-name`, used only when a new account is created; requires `--email`): headless email sign-in — one emailed approval, then the CLI mints its own org-wide key named `CLI email login (<hostname>, <timestamp>)`; details in the auth-flow reference. New-organisation creation additionally requires the deployment to allow public registration. Payload shapes: a fresh email mint carries `method: email`, `key_name`, `api_role`, and `org_created`; the browser path carries `method: pkce` (no role/org fields); a matching `--api-key` or rc credential short-circuits to `status: already_authorized` with `source`: flag / rc (`persisted: false` on the flag arm, which saves nothing); a matching `$XMEM_API_KEY` is copied into the rc and reports `status: authorized`, `source: environment`. Exit codes follow the standard HTTP contract (401 → 4 with stage `auth`, 403 → 3 with stage `permission`, other HTTP/network/server-state failures → 3). |
+| **`auth login`** | PKCE via Console `/xmemcli/<challenge>` → `.xmemrc.json`. `--no-browser`, `--timeout`, `--console-url`, `--callback-port` (pins the loopback callback port for `ssh -L`; `0` or omitted means any free port, otherwise 1024–65535; also `$XMEM_CALLBACK_PORT`, which is read globally). An explicitly named Console (`--console-url`, `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL`, or the one pinned by a single-origin URL) is cross-checked against the API origin before the browser opens or a pasted key is sent anywhere — a provably mismatched pair (mixed loopback-ness, or a production half paired with a non-production one) is a usage error (exit **2**), on the interactive paste path as much as on the browser path. With `--email ADDR` (+ optional `--org-name`, used only when a new account is created; requires `--email`): headless email sign-in — one emailed approval, then the CLI mints its own org-wide key named `CLI email login (<hostname>, <timestamp>)`; details in the auth-flow reference. New-organisation creation additionally requires the deployment to allow public registration. Payload shapes: a fresh email mint carries `method: email`, `key_name`, `api_role`, and `org_created`; the browser path carries `method: pkce` (no role/org fields); a matching `--api-key` or rc credential short-circuits to `status: already_authorized` with `source`: flag / rc (`persisted: false` on the flag arm, which saves nothing); a matching `$XMEM_API_KEY` is copied into the rc and reports `status: authorized`, `source: environment`. Exit codes follow the standard HTTP contract (401 → 4 with stage `auth`, 403 → 3 with stage `permission`, other HTTP/network/server-state failures → 3). |
 | **`auth logout`** | Remove active `.xmemrc.json` |
 | **`auth status`** | Call `/whoami`. No key → exit 0; bad key → auth error; good key → email + prefix + `super_admin` (whether the key's owner is a super admin — what decides which Console view `trace …` return) + `permissions` (the key's own capability codes; `trace …` requires `data.read` among them). |
 | **`mcp <instance-id>`** | Serve one instance to an MCP client over stdio, using this CLI's credential. Not for humans — see below. |
@@ -619,6 +632,7 @@ condition, and the hook author is the one reading stderr.
 | **Other 4xx/5xx** | **3** | `request` | Request failed for another reason (404, 422, 5xx, …) |
 | **402** (quota exhausted) | **6** | `quota` | Quota window exhausted — human must extend quota in Console |
 | **any status** with `errors[0].code == WRITE_STILL_PROCESSING` | **8** | `processing` | Write is still running — the write did not fail. Matched on the **code**, whatever the status: a keepalive-flattened **200** and an unflattened **500** both exit 8, so this row overrides the 4xx/5xx row above. Poll `write-status <write_id>`; a retry starts a second write |
+| **503** with body `{"error": "instance_scope_unresolved" \| "accounts_unavailable", "reason": …}` | **3** | `unavailable` | The Console could not resolve what the key may see (its accounts API is unreachable, non-2xx, undecodable, or not configured). **Not** "no operations" and **not** a bad credential — nothing was listed or checked; retry once accounts recovers. Recognised on the body, so it is named the same on every command that meets it. |
 
 #### How to interpret failures
 

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/README.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ xmemcli binding add <instance_id> [--tier autoload|available|off] [--scope proje
 xmemcli binding remove <instance_id> [--scope project|user]
 xmemcli context [--text] [--max-tokens N] [--no-live-state]
 xmemcli trace ls [--instance ID]… [--trace-type T]… [--hours-back N] [--user-id U] [--api-key-id K] [--limit N] [--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID] [--counts-only]
-xmemcli trace ls --search [--text …] [--request …] [--response …] [--object NAME]… [--field NAME]… [--status S]… [--trace-id ID]… [--session-id S] [--instance ID] [--trace-type T]… [--hours-back N]
+xmemcli trace ls --search [--text …] [--request …] [--response …] [--object NAME]… [--field NAME]… [--status S]… [--trace-id ID]… [--session-id S] [--instance ID] [--trace-type T|delete]… [--hours-back N] [--limit N] [--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID]
 xmemcli trace get <trace_id> [--trace-type write|read|create|update|evolution]
 ```
 
@@ -74,7 +74,17 @@ NEXT=$(echo "$PAGE" | jq -r '"\(.next_before_ts_ms):\(.next_before_trace_id)"')
 xmemcli trace ls --instance "$ID" --limit 100 --cursor "$NEXT"
 ```
 
-`--search` has no cursor — the Console's Inspect endpoint doesn't page; it returns the newest matches up to a ceiling and the CLI warns when a response sits at it. A key sees the operations of the instances it can list — never more than its owner sees in the Console; a super admin's key sees what a super admin sees. Full reference: [](#trace--the-consoles-operation-traces).
+`--search` pages too, with the Inspect endpoint's three cursor fields — follow `has_more`, since a page can come back short:
+
+```bash
+PAGE=$(xmemcli trace ls --search --text "Ada")
+# `select(.has_more)` so the last page yields an empty string rather than the literal `null:null:null`,
+# which `--cursor` refuses.
+NEXT=$(echo "$PAGE" | jq -r 'select(.has_more) | "\(.next_before_sort_at_ms):\(.next_before_trace_id):\(.next_before_instance_id)"')
+[ -n "$NEXT" ] && xmemcli trace ls --search --text "Ada" --cursor "$NEXT"
+```
+
+A search with no filter shaping it is the Console's recent-activity view, which reaches back 180 days; when older operations exist, its last page says `truncated` and the CLI warns. A key sees the operations of the instances it can list — never more than its owner sees in the Console; a super admin's key sees what a super admin sees. Full reference: [](#trace--the-consoles-operation-traces).
 
 ## Output personality — JSON vs pretty
 
@@ -120,7 +130,7 @@ xmemcli version
 xmemcli auth login
 ```
 
-Version: **1.3.1**.
+Version: **1.4.0**.
 
 
 ---
@@ -188,7 +198,7 @@ Those three keys are required and must be strings. Anything else in the file is
 
 Since 1.1.0 the file may also carry **`mcp_url`** — the MCP resource the API reported for itself when the key was issued, written only when the server names one. It is what lets `xmemcli mcp` reach an on-premise MCP host: that host is in no table the client was built with, and the rc is the one anchor a cloned `.mcp.json` does not control. A blank or non-string value is read as absent. It outranks the single-origin sibling inference below — a deployment naming itself beats a shape we derived — and both beat the built-in default. The mount path is part of the destination: `https://host/mcp` authorises that mount, not the sibling services beside it — and the instance id is canonicalised as a UUID before it is appended, so nothing following the mount can walk back out of it. Every lookup that reads `mcp_url` refuses redirects rather than merely dropping the credential across them, because what it learns is a host the key is later sent to. Every mutation of the file — write, in-place update, and logout's delete — is serialised under an exclusive lock on its containing directory, and an update is additionally bound to the identity *and* origin it was decided from. What protects an in-place update is that comparison, which is portable; the lock narrows what remains — the moment between comparing and replacing — where the platform offers one. A failed record is a warning, a failed de-authorisation fails the command. The enrichment write after login is conditional on the same comparison, so logging out or signing in again while it is in flight is not undone by it.
 
-Resolution order: `--api-key` → `$XMEM_API_KEY` → `.xmemrc.json`. Origin: `--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc `api_url` → default — **except** when the key is explicit (`--api-key` / `$XMEM_API_KEY`): the rc's `api_url` is skipped and the origin falls back to the built-in default unless you also set `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL`. The localhost-key-at-prod guard applies when the key comes from the rc and an explicit `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL` mismatches that rc origin. A base URL's path is preserved, never stripped — on a single-origin deployment the API lives at `https://host/xmem`, and that mount is part of every request the CLI builds; query, fragment, and userinfo on a base URL refuse normalisation rather than being stripped, so sibling inference cannot run on a shape the caller did not supply. Console resolution for login: `--console-url` → Console pinned by a positional (or mistaken `--api-url`) single-origin URL → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` when `--api-url` was *not* given → sibling inference from the call's `--api-url` when it applies → sibling inference from `$XMEM_API_URL` → default. An explicit `--api-url` suppresses `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` for that invocation (a five-host `--api-url` without `--console-url` is a usage error, not a fall-through to the env Console). A named API origin from `$XMEM_API_URL` is held to the same infer-or-refuse rule, so an env-only non-default API without a Console cannot mint at the hosted Console and record that key against the foreign API; an inferred sibling that is remote HTTP is refused under the same HTTPS-or-loopback rule as a positional login URL. The same resolved Console is passed to the post-login `/whoami` that records `mcp_url`, so a leftover `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` cannot steer that lookup either. When `--api-url` is present, `$XMEM_API_URL` is not consulted for Console inference. Because a mounted base cannot also serve the `/api`-prefixed spelling of a route, the compatibility candidate in `whoami_urls` / `token_redeem_urls` (`{base}/api/whoami`, `{base}/api/cli/token` — a root-served deployment's second form) is offered only for a path-less base. The MCP bridge resolves its endpoint as `--mcp-url` → `$XMEM_MCP_URL` → the `/mcp` sibling of the effective API base (`--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc → default) → default, and its foreign-origin guard accepts the `/xmem` ↔ `/mcp` sibling pair as one deployment.
+Resolution order: `--api-key` → `$XMEM_API_KEY` → `.xmemrc.json`. Origin: `--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc `api_url` → default — **except** when the key is explicit (`--api-key` / `$XMEM_API_KEY`): the rc's `api_url` is skipped and the origin falls back to the built-in default unless you also set `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL`. The localhost-key-at-prod guard applies when the key comes from the rc and an explicit `--api-url` / `$XMEM_API_URL` mismatches that rc origin. A base URL's path is preserved, never stripped — on a single-origin deployment the API lives at `https://host/xmem`, and that mount is part of every request the CLI builds; query, fragment, and userinfo on a base URL refuse normalisation rather than being stripped, so sibling inference cannot run on a shape the caller did not supply. Console resolution for login: `--console-url` → Console pinned by a positional (or mistaken `--api-url`) single-origin URL → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` when `--api-url` was *not* given → sibling inference from the call's `--api-url` when it applies → sibling inference from `$XMEM_API_URL` → default. An explicit `--api-url` suppresses `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` for that invocation (a five-host `--api-url` without `--console-url` is a usage error, not a fall-through to the env Console). A named API origin from `$XMEM_API_URL` is held to the same infer-or-refuse rule, so an env-only non-default API without a Console cannot mint at the hosted Console and record that key against the foreign API; an inferred sibling that is remote HTTP is refused under the same HTTPS-or-loopback rule as a positional login URL. An explicitly named Console (flag, env, or pinned) is also cross-checked against the API origin on this path — the browser redeem would fail safe on a wrong Console, but the interactive paste fallback presents the pasted key to it as a bearer — and a provably mismatched pair (mixed loopback-ness, or a production half paired with a non-production one) is refused before either worker starts, in the same words as the email sign-in. The same resolved Console is passed to the post-login `/whoami` that records `mcp_url`, so a leftover `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` cannot steer that lookup either. When `--api-url` is present, `$XMEM_API_URL` is not consulted for Console inference. Because a mounted base cannot also serve the `/api`-prefixed spelling of a route, the compatibility candidate in `whoami_urls` / `token_redeem_urls` (`{base}/api/whoami`, `{base}/api/cli/token` — a root-served deployment's second form) is offered only for a path-less base. The MCP bridge resolves its endpoint as `--mcp-url` → `$XMEM_MCP_URL` → the `/mcp` sibling of the effective API base (`--api-url` → `$XMEM_API_URL` → rc → default) → default, and its foreign-origin guard accepts the `/xmem` ↔ `/mcp` sibling pair as one deployment.
 
 ## Identity — `/whoami`
 
@@ -220,7 +230,7 @@ Each login binds its own port and names it in the login URL, so concurrent login
 
 # `xmemcli` — capabilities reference
 
-**Version:** `1.3.1` (see `xmemcli version`)
+**Version:** `1.4.0` (see `xmemcli version`)
 
 `xmemcli` is the command-line client for the **xmemory HTTP API**. It is **human-approved for key acquisition**: an AI-assisted IDE may run reads, writes, and inventory, and may initiate `auth login`, but a key is only issued after one explicit human approval — a click in the Console UI (PKCE handoff) or an approval of a sign-in email (`--email`). Quota limits change only in the **Console UI**. The full acquisition contract is in the auth-flow reference bundled with this package.
 
@@ -238,7 +248,7 @@ Every command below has dedicated help — see [Help](#help).
 
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
-| **`write`** `<text>` | Sync write (`POST …/write`). `--extraction fast\|deep` (default `fast`). `--no-wait` queues async write, returns `write_id`. `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable) anchors the write to existing objects: only they may be modified/deleted, new objects and links to them are allowed, anything else fails; fast extraction only. |
+| **`write`** `<text>` | Sync write (`POST …/write`). `--extraction fast\|deep` (default `fast`). `--no-wait` queues async write, returns `write_id`. `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable) anchors the write to existing objects: only they may be modified/deleted, new objects and links to them are allowed, anything else fails; works with either extraction mode. |
 | **`write-status`** `<write_id>` … | Poll async writes until terminal or `--timeout` (default 60s). Accepts multiple ids. |
 | **`read`** `<query>` | Read from active instance. `--read-mode single\|raw\|xresponse`, `--scope TYPE:ID` (repeatable), `--scope-relations`, `--related-types` (also return `related_types`: per object type the read touched, the fields it did not return and the object types a declared relation links it to; needs `instance.get_own` on the key), `--related-types-depth N` (1, 2 or 3, refused as a usage error otherwise; follow the relations N levels out, each catalog entry saying its distance; implies `--related-types`). |
 
@@ -253,7 +263,7 @@ Permission-filtered view of what this API key can see.
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
 | **`org list clusters`** | Clusters visible to this credential |
-| **`org list instances`** | Instances visible to this credential. A key minted with `data.read` but not `instance.get_own` (the supported shape for `trace …`) gets the ids only, with a warning saying so — the same set `trace ls` is scoped to. |
+| **`org list instances`** | Instances visible to this credential, as a bare array of records. A key minted with `data.read` but not `instance.get_own` (the supported shape for `trace …`) gets the ids only — the same set `trace ls` is scoped to — as a **degraded document** rather than an array: `{"items": [{"id": …}, …], "degraded": true, "missing_permission": "instance.get_own"}`, with the warning on stderr and in the document's `warnings`. The shape changes so a script cannot read an ids-only listing as a complete one; an array is never wrapped just to carry a warning. |
 | **`org list keys`** | API keys visible to this credential (metadata only; plaintext never returned) |
 
 ---
@@ -452,27 +462,30 @@ learn; the CLI composes the Console's search clauses itself.
 
 | Command | Console view | Description |
 |---------|--------------|-------------|
-| **`trace ls`** | Operations tab / Home | Operations, newest first, across every instance this credential can see (nothing given — the Home view), or the `--instance ID` given (repeatable, or a comma list; default `--instance-id` / `$XMEM_INSTANCE_ID`). Returns `operations[]`, `counts`, `instance_counts`, `series`, and the paging cursor `next_before_ts_ms` + `next_before_trace_id` (with `has_more_operations`). Flags: `--trace-type T` (repeatable / comma; `write`, `read`, `create`, `update`, `evolution`), `--hours-back N` (server default 24, `0` = unbounded) or `--start-ts` / `--end-ts` (epoch seconds), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--include-console-reads`, `--bucket-ms`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID` (the previous page's two halves, joined with a colon), `--counts-only` (`ops_limit=0`: what Home fetches — counters and series, no rows; refused together with `--limit` / `--cursor`, which would have nothing to page). |
-| **`trace ls --search`** | Inspect | The Inspect search, for the filters only it can answer: `--text` (free text), `--request` / `--response` (text on either side of the operation), `--object NAME` / `--field NAME` (repeatable; all must match), `--status S` (repeatable / comma; any may match: `ok`, `error`, `stale`, `timed_out`, `internal_error`, `quota_exceeded`, `in_progress`, `schema-gap`), `--trace-id ID` (repeatable / comma), `--session-id`; plus `--instance` (at most one — the Inspect scope), `--trace-type`, `--hours-back` (a floor applied to the hits *after* the search — Inspect's own recency windows decide the candidate pool, so this narrows a result, unlike the query window it is on `trace ls`), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`. Returns the Inspect document: `merged[]` hits with `kind`, `href` (`/write/{trace}`, `/read/{trace}`, `/create/…`, `/update/…`, `/evolution/…`), `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id` / `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix`, `status`, `time_taken_ms`, `match_items`. |
-| **`trace get`** `<trace_id>` | Detail pane | One operation's full document. `--trace-type` (`operation_type` on a `trace ls` row; the first path segment of a `--search` hit's `href`) makes it one request; without it the five detail endpoints are probed in order `write, read, create, update, evolution` and the first that knows the trace answers. A miss — the Console's `{"found": false}`, or its 404 for a trace outside your scope — is `stage: "not_found"`, exit **3**. |
+| **`trace ls`** | Operations tab / Home | Operations, newest first, across every instance this credential can see (nothing given — the Home view), or the `--instance ID` given (repeatable, or a comma list; default `--instance-id` / `$XMEM_INSTANCE_ID`). Returns `operations[]`, `counts`, `instance_counts`, `series`, and the paging cursor `next_before_ts_ms` + `next_before_trace_id` (with `has_more_operations`). Flags: `--trace-type T` (repeatable / comma; `write`, `read`, `create`, `update`, `evolution` — `delete` is `--search` only), `--hours-back N` (server default 24, `0` = unbounded) or `--start-ts` / `--end-ts` (epoch seconds), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--include-console-reads`, `--bucket-ms`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID` (the previous page's two halves, joined with a colon), `--counts-only` (`ops_limit=0`: what Home fetches — counters and series, no rows; refused together with `--limit` / `--cursor`, which would have nothing to page). |
+| **`trace ls --search`** | Inspect | The Inspect search, for the filters only it can answer: `--text` (free text), `--request` / `--response` (text on either side of the operation), `--object NAME` / `--field NAME` (repeatable; all must match), `--status S` (repeatable / comma; any may match: `ok`, `error`, `stale`, `timed_out`, `internal_error`, `quota_exceeded`, `in_progress`, `schema-gap`), `--trace-id ID` (repeatable / comma), `--session-id`; plus `--instance` (at most one — the Inspect scope), `--trace-type` (also `delete`), `--hours-back` (a floor applied to the hits *after* the search — Inspect's own recency windows decide the candidate pool, so this narrows a result, unlike the query window it is on `trace ls`), `--user-id`, `--api-key-id`, `--limit N` (default 100, Console cap 500), `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID` (the previous page's three cursor fields, joined with colons). Returns the Inspect document: `merged[]` hits with `kind`, `href` (`/write/{trace}`, `/read/{trace}`, `/create/…`, `/update/…`, `/evolution/…`, or `#` for an instance deletion, which has no detail page), `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id` / `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix`, `status`, `time_taken_ms`, `match_items`; and the paging fields `has_more`, `next_before_sort_at_ms`, `next_before_trace_id`, `next_before_instance_id`, `truncated`. |
+| **`trace get`** `<trace_id>` | Detail pane | One operation's full document. `--trace-type` (`operation_type` on a `trace ls` row; the first path segment of a `--search` hit's `href`) makes it one request; without it the five detail endpoints are probed in order `write, read, create, update, evolution` and the first that knows the trace answers. A deletion's `DL0000_aaa` id is answered without a request: it has no detail page. A miss — the Console's `{"found": false}`, or its 404 for a trace outside your scope — is `stage: "not_found"`, exit **3**. |
+
+**`--search` is opt-in, on purpose.** The Inspect search runs text predicates across the trace store with a candidate pool of thousands and a merge — markedly more expensive than the indexed, cursor-paged `trace ls`. Passing a search-only flag (`--text`, `--request`, `--response`, `--object`, `--field`, `--status`, `--trace-id`, `--session-id`) without `--search` is a usage error (exit **2**) whose message says exactly that, so an agent reasons about whether it needs the search or whether `trace ls` narrowed by `--instance` / `--trace-type` / `--hours-back` plus `trace get` will do. Conversely `--counts-only`, `--start-ts` / `--end-ts`, `--bucket-ms` are refused with `--search` because the Inspect endpoint cannot honour them, and `--include-console-reads` because Inspect's only spelling of that toggle is a bare phrase inside `q` itself — which is also why a free-text value containing the words "include console reads" is refused rather than sent (the Console would flip the toggle and strip the phrase from the query).
 
-**`--search` is opt-in, on purpose.** The Inspect search runs text predicates across the trace store with a candidate pool of thousands and a merge — markedly more expensive than the indexed, cursor-paged `trace ls`. Passing a search-only flag (`--text`, `--request`, `--response`, `--object`, `--field`, `--status`, `--trace-id`, `--session-id`) without `--search` is a usage error (exit **2**) whose message says exactly that, so an agent reasons about whether it needs the search or whether `trace ls` narrowed by `--instance` / `--trace-type` / `--hours-back` plus `trace get` will do. Conversely `--limit`, `--cursor`, `--counts-only`, `--start-ts` / `--end-ts`, `--bucket-ms` are refused with `--search` because the Inspect endpoint cannot honour them, and `--include-console-reads` because Inspect's only spelling of that toggle is a bare phrase inside `q` itself — which is also why a free-text value containing the words "include console reads" is refused rather than sent (the Console would flip the toggle and strip the phrase from the query).
+**Breaking change in 1.4.0:** `trace ls --search` now asks the Console for one *page* (100 rows by default) instead of the whole capped result, under the Console's paging version 2 (`paging=2`), in which every search mode pages. A single call is no longer the complete answer: loop on `has_more`, and do not read a row count, or an absent `warnings` array, as completeness. Against a Console that predates paging the CLI says so in a warning, because that Console still answers whole and capped. What it tests is the absence of `has_more`, not the rows: a Console that pages sends the paging fields even when it found nothing, and an empty answer from one that does not is exactly where a row count misleads.
 
-**The pagination gap — read this before scripting `--search`.** `trace ls` pages properly (the Console's Operations tab does). `trace ls --search` does **not**: the Console's Inspect endpoint has no cursor — it returns the newest 50 matches when no filter narrows it (latest-activity mode) and up to 5 000 matches per source once filtered, and stops; the Console's own Inspect view has the same cliff. So `--search` takes no `--cursor` / `--limit`, and when a response sits at one of those ceilings the CLI emits a **warning** (stderr, and folded into the JSON document's `warnings` array) saying the result was cut and how to narrow it. The warning is **best-effort** — the warning is one-sided by construction: it fires on the count the client can see, and the Console narrows *after* its per-source row caps (type/status resolution, console-read exclusion, the caller's instance allowlist), so a capped response can shrink below the ceiling — even to near-empty for a scoped key searching without an instance filter — with no client-visible signal. A missing warning is not proof of completeness — and a warning is not proof of a cut: the 5 000 figure is *per source*, while the count the warning tests is the cross-source merge (truncated only in latest-activity mode), so several uncapped sources together can trip it on a complete result. Until the Console endpoint pages (and reports truncation itself), treat **every** `--search` result as "the newest matches", not "all matches".
+**Paging a search — read this before scripting `--search`.** `trace ls --search` pages like `trace ls`, with the Inspect endpoint's own keyset cursor: pass the previous page's `next_before_sort_at_ms`, `next_before_trace_id` and `next_before_instance_id` back as `--cursor TS_MS:TRACE_ID:INSTANCE_ID` until `has_more` is `false`. Follow `has_more`, never the row count: the Console narrows each page after its row limits (type and status resolution, console-read exclusion), so a page can hold fewer rows than `--limit` — even none — and still have more. Paging reaches every match, with one exception the Console reports itself: a search with no filter that shapes the query (only scope such as `--instance`, `--session-id`, `--user-id`, `--api-key-id` or `--hours-back`) is the Console's recent-activity view, which reaches back 180 days. When this credential has older operations than that, the last page carries `truncated: true` and the CLI emits a **warning** (stderr, and folded into the JSON document's `warnings` array) naming the way past it — a filter such as `--trace-type` or `--text`. That flag comes from the endpoint, which knows what it could not reach; the CLI no longer guesses at a cut from how many rows came back. Asking for a page changes two things worth knowing before you script it: a free-text search answers from one candidate window per page rather than the exhaustive second pass the whole-result path ran, so a rare needle can give a short — even empty — first page with `has_more: true` where one call used to find the match; and a paged request is all-or-nothing, so a Console-side source failure is a `502` rather than a partial answer at exit 0. While a Console deploy is rolling out, a `--cursor` request can reach a node that does not page yet; it ignores the cursor, and the CLI exits **3** saying so rather than hand back its newest rows as the next page — retry the same `--cursor`.
 
 **Two document shapes.** `trace ls` returns the Operations-tab document; `trace ls --search` returns the Inspect document (above). They differ because the Console's two backends differ and this CLI does not reshape what the Console serves. Both carry the same identifiers per row (`trace_id`, `instance_id`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `api_key_id`, `status`), which is what `trace get` needs next.
 
 **Every operation row carries its internal ids.** `operations[]` rows have `operation_type`, `trace_id`, `instance_id`, `timestamp`, `status`, `is_success`, `error_code`, `session_id`, `user_id`, `user_email`, `api_key_id`, `api_key_name`, `api_key_prefix`, `time_taken_ms`, `text_snippet`, `object_names`, `field_names`.
 
-> **Three of those never resolve for an API key**, super admin or not, and this is by design rather than a gap. `user_email` is always absent: the accounts `/users` lookup is closed to keys (an agent may learn who *it* is, never enumerate the organisation's users), so rows keep `user_id` and you resolve names yourself if you need them — and a `User:<email>` search clause matches nothing; filter by `user_id`. `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` resolve only for the caller's **own** keys, because `GET /api-keys` scopes a key caller to its owner's keys. So a super admin's key does *not* see literally everything its owner's browser sees: it sees the same rows and the same fields, with those three enrichments empty. Everything scope-bearing — which instances, which detail fields, `llm_calls`, xuid substitution — is identical. Detail documents add what the Console's pane shows: `source_id`, `write_mode` / `read_mode`, `scope`, `extracted_objects`, `diff_plan` (sanitised unless super admin), `written_objects`, `migration_id`, `proposal_version`, `schema_version`, `stage`, `triggered_evolution {migration_id, evolution_trace_id, update_trace_id}`, `sql_queries`, and — **unrestricted callers only** (a super admin, or a browser session on a `KINGDOM_LOCAL` Console) — `llm_calls[]` (`llm_call_id`, `gateway_request_id`, `model_type`, `provider`, …), `full_error_message`, raw token counts, unsanitised xuids, `ddl_queries`, and `schema_generation`.
+> **Three of those never resolve for an API key**, super admin or not, and this is by design rather than a gap. `user_email` is always absent: the accounts `/users` lookup is closed to keys (an agent may learn who *it* is, never enumerate the organisation's users), so rows keep `user_id` and you resolve names yourself if you need them — and a `User:<email>` search clause matches nothing; filter by `user_id`. For that reason `--user-id` refuses a value containing `@` as a usage error (exit **2**) on both `trace ls` and `trace ls --search`, rather than sending a filter that can only ever return an empty result at exit 0. `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` resolve only for the caller's **own** keys, because `GET /api-keys` scopes a key caller to its owner's keys. So a super admin's key does *not* see literally everything its owner's browser sees: it sees the same rows and the same fields, with those three enrichments empty. Everything scope-bearing — which instances, which detail fields, `llm_calls`, xuid substitution — is identical. Detail documents add what the Console's pane shows: `source_id`, `write_mode` / `read_mode`, `scope`, `extracted_objects`, `diff_plan` (sanitised unless super admin), `written_objects`, `migration_id`, `proposal_version`, `schema_version`, `stage`, `triggered_evolution {migration_id, evolution_trace_id, update_trace_id}`, `sql_queries` (the rows owned by the read's instance, for every caller who may open the read), and two tiers of gated fields. **Super admin only** — the accounts `is_super_admin` flag decides, for a key exactly as for its owner's browser session: `llm_calls[]` (`llm_call_id`, `gateway_request_id`, `model_type`, `provider`, …), `full_error_message`, raw token counts, and unsanitised xuids. **Callers with no instance restriction at all** — a super admin, or a browser session on a `KINGDOM_LOCAL` Console; never a scoped key: `ddl_queries`, `schema_generation`, and the ownerless rows of `sql_queries`.
 
-**A scoped key gets `[]` for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation`, not the rows.** Those two come from `instance_create_ddl_queries` and `schema_generate_*`, which carry no instance ownership column — `schema_generate_*`'s trace id is client-supplied — so they cannot be scoped in SQL and are served only to callers with no instance restriction at all. This is a deliberate fail-closed choice, not a bug to work around: an empty array means "not available to this credential", never "this operation ran none". `llm_calls[]` behaves the same way and always has. `sql_queries` is not among them: `read_sql_queries` records the owning instance, so every caller who may open a read gets its SQL, attributed to that read even when another instance reused the trace id. **Xuids are hidden for every non-super-admin**, including on writes that carry no identity map — the substitution is done by the Console, server-side, so a caller with no browser sees `#hidden` rather than a raw id.
+**A scoped key gets `[]` for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation`, not the rows.** Those two come from `instance_create_ddl_queries` and `schema_generate_*`, which carry no instance ownership column — `schema_generate_*`'s trace id is client-supplied — so they cannot be scoped in SQL and are served only to callers with no instance restriction at all. This is a deliberate fail-closed choice, not a bug to work around: an empty array means "not available to this credential", never "this operation ran none". `llm_calls[]` behaves the same way (gated on super admin) and always has. `sql_queries` is split: statements recorded with their owning instance reach every caller who may open the read, even when another instance reused the trace id, while statements recorded before ownership was tracked carry no owner and reach unrestricted callers only. A scoped key therefore sees `[]` for reads that old. To let a script tell the two apart, the Console sets a sibling boolean next to each — `sql_queries_withheld`, `ddl_queries_withheld`, `schema_generation_withheld` — that is `true` exactly when a row that exists was withheld from this caller: for `ddl_queries` / `schema_generation` that is every scoped caller, for `sql_queries` a scoped caller on a read that has ownerless rows. So `[]` with `…_withheld: false` is "none recorded", `[]` with `…_withheld: true` is "not yours to see". **Xuids are hidden for every non-super-admin**, including on writes that carry no identity map — the substitution is done by the Console, server-side, so a caller with no browser sees `#hidden` rather than a raw id.
 
 **Who sees what — the Console decides; `auth status` tells you which view to expect.**
 
 - A regular key sees the operations of the instances the accounts API lists for it — the same set `org list instances` prints. That is at most what its owner sees in the Console, never more.
 - Access requires the key's role to carry **`data.read`** — the same permission the data-read endpoint requires. A role deliberately scoped away from data (`auth status` shows the codes under `permissions`) is refused with **403 → exit 3, stage `permission`**, whoever owns the key — a permission denial, not a bad credential: rotating or re-issuing the key cannot fix a role that was scoped this way on purpose. An unknown or missing key is the separate 401 → exit 4 (`auth`).
 - A key whose owner is a **super admin** sees the super-admin Console: every organisation's instances, no instance filter, and the super-admin-only detail fields above. The accounts `is_super_admin` flag decides — the key sees the same rows and the same scope-bearing fields its owner's browser session sees, minus the three enrichments no key resolves (`user_email`, and `api_key_name` / `api_key_prefix` for other people's keys; see the note above). `auth status` reports it as `super_admin`.
+- When the Console **cannot** work out that scope — its accounts API is unreachable, answers non-2xx, is undecodable, or is not configured — it answers **503** with `{"error": "instance_scope_unresolved", "reason": "accounts_…"}` (or `accounts_unavailable` when the key's own lookup failed the same way) instead of an empty document. The CLI reports that as **exit 3, stage `unavailable`**, with a message that says the scope could not be resolved and that this is *not* "no operations": a zero-row answer from a Console that could not decide would have read as a quiet instance.
 - No new permission is involved: the Console answers a key exactly as it would answer its owner's browser session, narrowed to the key's instances. It never mints a session for a key. Filters that need to look other users up (`User:`-style email filters) are not offered: an API key can identify only itself, never list or look up users — filter by `--user-id`.
 
 **The Console origin.** `trace …` talk to the Console, a second origin. It is `--console-url` → `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL` → inferred: `https://console.xmemory.ai` for the default API, `:8002` for a local `:8000`. A key bound to any other API origin gets a usage error (exit **2**) rather than a guess — the credential-binding rule holds across origins.
@@ -485,7 +498,7 @@ learn; the CLI composes the Console's search clauses itself.
 
 | Command | Description |
 |---------|-------------|
-| **`auth login`** | PKCE via Console `/xmemcli/<challenge>` → `.xmemrc.json`. `--no-browser`, `--timeout`, `--console-url`, `--callback-port` (pins the loopback callback port for `ssh -L`; `0` or omitted means any free port, otherwise 1024–65535; also `$XMEM_CALLBACK_PORT`, which is read globally). With `--email ADDR` (+ optional `--org-name`, used only when a new account is created; requires `--email`): headless email sign-in — one emailed approval, then the CLI mints its own org-wide key named `CLI email login (<hostname>, <timestamp>)`; details in the auth-flow reference. New-organisation creation additionally requires the deployment to allow public registration. Payload shapes: a fresh email mint carries `method: email`, `key_name`, `api_role`, and `org_created`; the browser path carries `method: pkce` (no role/org fields); a matching `--api-key` or rc credential short-circuits to `status: already_authorized` with `source`: flag / rc (`persisted: false` on the flag arm, which saves nothing); a matching `$XMEM_API_KEY` is copied into the rc and reports `status: authorized`, `source: environment`. Exit codes follow the standard HTTP contract (401 → 4 with stage `auth`, 403 → 3 with stage `permission`, other HTTP/network/server-state failures → 3). |
+| **`auth login`** | PKCE via Console `/xmemcli/<challenge>` → `.xmemrc.json`. `--no-browser`, `--timeout`, `--console-url`, `--callback-port` (pins the loopback callback port for `ssh -L`; `0` or omitted means any free port, otherwise 1024–65535; also `$XMEM_CALLBACK_PORT`, which is read globally). An explicitly named Console (`--console-url`, `$XMEM_CONSOLE_URL`, or the one pinned by a single-origin URL) is cross-checked against the API origin before the browser opens or a pasted key is sent anywhere — a provably mismatched pair (mixed loopback-ness, or a production half paired with a non-production one) is a usage error (exit **2**), on the interactive paste path as much as on the browser path. With `--email ADDR` (+ optional `--org-name`, used only when a new account is created; requires `--email`): headless email sign-in — one emailed approval, then the CLI mints its own org-wide key named `CLI email login (<hostname>, <timestamp>)`; details in the auth-flow reference. New-organisation creation additionally requires the deployment to allow public registration. Payload shapes: a fresh email mint carries `method: email`, `key_name`, `api_role`, and `org_created`; the browser path carries `method: pkce` (no role/org fields); a matching `--api-key` or rc credential short-circuits to `status: already_authorized` with `source`: flag / rc (`persisted: false` on the flag arm, which saves nothing); a matching `$XMEM_API_KEY` is copied into the rc and reports `status: authorized`, `source: environment`. Exit codes follow the standard HTTP contract (401 → 4 with stage `auth`, 403 → 3 with stage `permission`, other HTTP/network/server-state failures → 3). |
 | **`auth logout`** | Remove active `.xmemrc.json` |
 | **`auth status`** | Call `/whoami`. No key → exit 0; bad key → auth error; good key → email + prefix + `super_admin` (whether the key's owner is a super admin — what decides which Console view `trace …` return) + `permissions` (the key's own capability codes; `trace …` requires `data.read` among them). |
 | **`mcp <instance-id>`** | Serve one instance to an MCP client over stdio, using this CLI's credential. Not for humans — see below. |
@@ -611,6 +624,7 @@ condition, and the hook author is the one reading stderr.
 | **Other 4xx/5xx** | **3** | `request` | Request failed for another reason (404, 422, 5xx, …) |
 | **402** (quota exhausted) | **6** | `quota` | Quota window exhausted — human must extend quota in Console |
 | **any status** with `errors[0].code == WRITE_STILL_PROCESSING` | **8** | `processing` | Write is still running — the write did not fail. Matched on the **code**, whatever the status: a keepalive-flattened **200** and an unflattened **500** both exit 8, so this row overrides the 4xx/5xx row above. Poll `write-status <write_id>`; a retry starts a second write |
+| **503** with body `{"error": "instance_scope_unresolved" \| "accounts_unavailable", "reason": …}` | **3** | `unavailable` | The Console could not resolve what the key may see (its accounts API is unreachable, non-2xx, undecodable, or not configured). **Not** "no operations" and **not** a bad credential — nothing was listed or checked; retry once accounts recovers. Recognised on the body, so it is named the same on every command that meets it. |
 
 #### How to interpret failures
 

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "xmemcli"
-version = "1.3.1"
+version = "1.4.0"
 description = "Command-line client for the xmemory HTTP API: PKCE auth, instances, read/write, schema and XMD tools."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.12,<4"

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/__init__.py

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """Standalone xmemcli package (``xmemcli`` console script)."""
 
-__version__ = "1.3.1"
+__version__ = "1.4.0"

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/_email_login.py

@@ -292,6 +292,26 @@ def _error_text(reply: _Reply, *, fallback: str) -> str:
     return f"{fallback} (HTTP {reply.status})"
 
 
+#: The Console's code for a reply it composed without forwarding the request at all. Forwarded upstream
+#: errors keep their own body, and the accounts API's codes are a closed all-uppercase enum
+#: (``common/dto/response.py`` ``ErrorCode``), so a lowercase code like this one cannot arrive from it.
+PROXY_NOT_CONFIGURED_CODE = "proxy_not_configured"
+
+
+def _console_did_not_forward(reply: _Reply) -> bool:
+    """True when the Console answered without ever sending the request upstream.
+
+    Lets a caller that has just sent a non-idempotent request tell "this cannot have taken effect"
+    from "this may have", which a status alone cannot: the Console answers 502 both when it has no
+    accounts API configured and when it had one it could not reach.
+    """
+    errors = reply.body.get("errors")
+    if not isinstance(errors, list) or not errors:
+        return False
+    first = errors[0]
+    return isinstance(first, dict) and first.get("code") == PROXY_NOT_CONFIGURED_CODE
+
+
 def _raise_for_reply(reply: _Reply, *, fallback: str) -> NoReturn:
     raise HttpLoginError(_error_text(reply, fallback=fallback), status=reply.status)
 
@@ -531,8 +551,8 @@ class EmailSignin:
             raise HttpLoginError(f"{what} failed: {err}", status=reply.status)
         items = reply.body.get("items")
         if not isinstance(items, list):
-            # A 200 without the envelope can still carry a plain {"error": …} (the Console's
-            # proxy-not-configured arm answers exactly that); surface it over a generic shape.
+            # A 2xx that carries no envelope may still carry prose worth showing — a plain
+            # {"error": …}, say — so surface that over this helper's own generic wording.
             _raise_for_reply(reply, fallback=f"{what} returned no items")
         return [item for item in items if isinstance(item, dict)]
 
@@ -591,11 +611,15 @@ class EmailSignin:
                 status=403,
             )
         if reply.status == 0 or reply.status >= 500:
+            reason = _error_text(reply, fallback="API key creation failed")
+            if _console_did_not_forward(reply):
+                # The Console answered this one itself without sending it on, so no key exists to find.
+                # Naming an orphan here would be a false statement about a credential.
+                raise HttpLoginError(reason, status=reply.status)
             # The POST may have landed even though the reply was lost; the plaintext is shown
             # exactly once, so an orphan here is real and must be findable by its name.
             raise HttpLoginError(
-                _error_text(reply, fallback="API key creation failed")
-                + f' — a key named "{name}" may still have been created; check the Console\'s API Keys page',
+                reason + f' — a key named "{name}" may still have been created; check the Console\'s API Keys page',
                 status=reply.status,
             )
         items = self._envelope_items(reply, what="API key creation")

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/_login.py

@@ -912,7 +912,13 @@ def handoff_from_pasted_key(
     console_url: str | None = None,
     timeout_s: float = 10.0,
 ) -> HandoffResult:
-    """Build a handoff result from a human-pasted plaintext key."""
+    """Build a handoff result from a human-pasted plaintext key.
+
+    The key is presented to ``console_url`` as a bearer (``/whoami`` through the Console proxy), so
+    the caller must already have cross-checked that Console against ``api_url`` — ``cmd_auth_login``
+    does, in ``_pkce_console_origin``, before ``run_pkce_login`` starts the paste worker. This module
+    cannot do it itself (the check lives in ``xmem.py``, which imports this one).
+    """
     key = api_key.strip()
     shape_problem = validate_api_key_shape(key)
     if shape_problem is not None:

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/_org_cluster.py

@@ -59,8 +59,20 @@ def _lacks_instance_get_own(args: argparse.Namespace, api_key: str, base: str) -
     return "instance.get_own" not in {str(p) for p in permissions}
 
 
+#: The permission the verbose instance listing needs; its absence is the one degradation this command reports.
+INSTANCE_GET_OWN = "instance.get_own"
+
+
 def cmd_org_list_instances(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[CliOutput, int]:
-    """``org list instances`` — instances visible to this credential (``GET /instances``)."""
+    """``org list instances`` — instances visible to this credential (``GET /instances``).
+
+    Two payload shapes. The ordinary answer is the bare list of curated instance records. A key that
+    lacks ``instance.get_own`` gets the **degraded document** instead — ``{"items": [{"id": …}, …],
+    "degraded": true, "missing_permission": "instance.get_own"}`` — because a warned list cannot carry
+    its own warning (``_with_cli_warnings`` never reshapes a list, see ``cli/xmem.py``), and an ids-only
+    list that looks like every other list reads as complete to a script. The dict makes the degradation
+    part of the document; the CLI's usual ``warnings`` fold then lands on it in JSON mode.
+    """
     m = xmem_module()
     api_key, _ = m._require(args, need_instance=False)
     base = m._api_url(args)
@@ -103,10 +115,15 @@ def cmd_org_list_instances(args: argparse.Namespace) -> tuple[CliOutput, int]:
         ids = [str(i) for i in (envelope.get("ids") or []) if i]
         m._note_cli_warning(
             args,
-            "this key lacks instance.get_own, so only instance ids are listed (names and details need "
-            "instance.get_own); the set is exactly what `trace ls` is scoped to",
+            f"this key lacks {INSTANCE_GET_OWN}, so only instance ids are listed (names and details need "
+            f"{INSTANCE_GET_OWN}); the set is exactly what `trace ls` is scoped to",
         )
-        return (CliOutput(OutputKind.INSTANCE_LIST, [{"id": instance_id} for instance_id in ids]), m.EXIT_OK)
+        degraded = {
+            "items": [{"id": instance_id} for instance_id in ids],
+            "degraded": True,
+            "missing_permission": INSTANCE_GET_OWN,
+        }
+        return (CliOutput(OutputKind.INSTANCE_LIST, degraded), m.EXIT_OK)
     err = batch_envelope_error(envelope)
     if err:
         return (make_error(f"/instances failed: {err}", stage="request"), m.EXIT_HTTP_ERROR)

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/_output.py

@@ -159,7 +159,10 @@ class OutputKind(StrEnum):
     #: empty binding.
     AGENT_CONTEXT = "agent_context"
 
-    #: Output of ``xmemcli org list instances`` (and ``instance list`` alias).
+    #: Output of ``xmemcli org list instances`` (and ``instance list`` alias). Curated payload:
+    #: a list of instance records — or, for a key without ``instance.get_own``, the degraded
+    #: document ``{items: [{id}…], degraded: true, missing_permission}`` (ids only; see
+    #: ``cli/_org_cluster.py``).
     INSTANCE_LIST = "instance_list"
 
     #: Output of ``xmemcli instance get``.

{xmemcli-1.3.1 → xmemcli-1.4.0}/xmemcli/_pretty.py

@@ -323,18 +323,32 @@ def _render_status(payload: Any, stream: IO[str]) -> None:
 
 
 def _render_instance_list(payload: Any, stream: IO[str]) -> None:
-    if not isinstance(payload, list):
+    """``org list instances`` — one ``id  name`` line per instance.
+
+    Two payload shapes: the bare list of curated records, or the degraded document
+    ``{"items": [{"id"}…], "degraded": true, "missing_permission": …}`` a key without
+    ``instance.get_own`` gets (ids only; see ``cli/_org_cluster.py``). The degraded rows
+    render the same way, followed by one line saying why the names are missing — the
+    warning is already on stderr, but the note belongs next to the rows it explains.
+    """
+    degraded = isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("degraded") is True
+    rows = payload.get("items") if degraded else payload
+    if not isinstance(rows, list):
         _default_handler(payload, stream)
         return
-    if not payload:
+    if not rows:
         stream.write("(no instances)\n")
         return
-    for row in payload:
+    for row in rows:
         if not isinstance(row, dict):
             continue
         iid = row.get("id", "?")
-        name = row.get("name", "(unnamed)")
-        stream.write(f"{iid}  {name}\n")
+        # Degraded rows carry no name by construction; "(unnamed)" would misreport that as a fact about the instance.
+        name = row.get("name", None if degraded else "(unnamed)")
+        stream.write(f"{iid}  {name}\n" if name is not None else f"{iid}\n")
+    if degraded:
+        missing = _safe(payload.get("missing_permission"), limit=64) or "a permission"
+        stream.write(f"(ids only: this key lacks {missing}, so names and details are not listed)\n")
 
 
 def _render_instance_get(payload: Any, stream: IO[str]) -> None: