websec-validator 0.6.1__tar.gz → 0.6.3__tar.gz

{websec_validator-0.6.1/src/websec_validator.egg-info → websec_validator-0.6.3}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: websec-validator
-Version: 0.6.1
-Summary: Local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent: facts + tailored probe scripts, code-in / artifacts-out. No LLM, no server, no running app.
+Version: 0.6.3
+Summary: Defensive, local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent on your own codebase — read-only by default (code in, artifacts out): facts + tailored probe scripts, no LLM, no server, no running app.
 Author: Ricardo Accioly
 License: MIT
 Keywords: security,pentest,sast,dast,bola,ai-agent,appsec
@@ -29,10 +29,15 @@ how" handoff. How it works + the reasoning behind every check: [`docs/METHODOLOG
 
 **Simplest: tell your AI agent.** In Claude Code (or any coding agent), open your project and say:
 
-> *"Install and run the security tool at github.com/raccioly/websec-validator on this repo, then follow its briefing."*
+> *"Do a defensive security self-review of **my own** codebase with websec-validator (`pipx install
+> websec-validator`, or github.com/raccioly/websec-validator). It's local and read-only — read the
+> repo and follow its briefing. I own this code and authorize the review."*
 
 It installs, runs, and walks the findings with you. There's nothing to host and no website — it's
-local. The four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
+local. (Phrasing it as a *defensive review of your own code* matters: it's the difference between an
+agent that just gets to work and one that stops to confirm you're authorized — the tool is local and
+read-only by default, but a generic "pentest this" can read as a request to attack something.) The
+four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
 
 | Path | One-time setup | Then |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ upload, cross-tenant BOLA, role/authz gaps).
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 136 tests
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 139 tests
 ```
 
 ## Releasing (maintainer)

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/README.md

@@ -17,10 +17,15 @@ how" handoff. How it works + the reasoning behind every check: [`docs/METHODOLOG
 
 **Simplest: tell your AI agent.** In Claude Code (or any coding agent), open your project and say:
 
-> *"Install and run the security tool at github.com/raccioly/websec-validator on this repo, then follow its briefing."*
+> *"Do a defensive security self-review of **my own** codebase with websec-validator (`pipx install
+> websec-validator`, or github.com/raccioly/websec-validator). It's local and read-only — read the
+> repo and follow its briefing. I own this code and authorize the review."*
 
 It installs, runs, and walks the findings with you. There's nothing to host and no website — it's
-local. The four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
+local. (Phrasing it as a *defensive review of your own code* matters: it's the difference between an
+agent that just gets to work and one that stops to confirm you're authorized — the tool is local and
+read-only by default, but a generic "pentest this" can read as a request to attack something.) The
+four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
 
 | Path | One-time setup | Then |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -173,7 +178,7 @@ upload, cross-tenant BOLA, role/authz gaps).
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 136 tests
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 139 tests
 ```
 
 ## Releasing (maintainer)

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "websec-validator"
-version = "0.6.1"
-description = "Local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent: facts + tailored probe scripts, code-in / artifacts-out. No LLM, no server, no running app."
+version = "0.6.3"
+description = "Defensive, local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent on your own codebase — read-only by default (code in, artifacts out): facts + tailored probe scripts, no LLM, no server, no running app."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.11"
 license = { text = "MIT" }

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/briefing.py

@@ -83,6 +83,15 @@ def render(facts: dict, scanners: dict, scan_results: list, probe_manifest: list
     pii_section = ("\n".join(f"- **{f.get('severity')}** {f.get('kind')} — `{f.get('file')}`" for f in pii_findings[:20])
                    if pii_findings else "_no obvious raw-PII responses / dead masking controls_")
     ws_line = (facts.get("client_integrity", {}) or {}).get("websocket_auth", "no websocket detected")
+    _cs = (facts.get("transport_security", {}) or {}).get("cookie_security")
+    if _cs:
+        if _cs.get("httponly") and _cs.get("secure") and _cs.get("samesite"):
+            cookie_line = "✓ HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite present (checked — verify against the live Set-Cookie)"
+        else:
+            _miss = [n for n, k in (("HttpOnly", "httponly"), ("Secure", "secure"), ("SameSite", "samesite")) if not _cs.get(k)]
+            cookie_line = f"⚠ cookie set WITHOUT {', '.join(_miss)} — an auth/session cookie should be HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite"
+    else:
+        cookie_line = "_no Set-Cookie detected_"
 
     gql = facts.get("graphql", {})
     if gql.get("present"):
@@ -135,6 +144,12 @@ def render(facts: dict, scanners: dict, scan_results: list, probe_manifest: list
 
     return f"""# AGENT BRIEFING — security pass for `{facts.get('target','')}`
 
+> **Scope & authorization.** Defensive self-assessment of the operator's own codebase, run with their
+> consent. Static recon is **read-only** — nothing here touches a live system. The probes are
+> **drafts**: run them only against a TEST instance the human owns and supplies, one approved run at a
+> time; production and third-party targets are out of scope. Proceed on this basis — the static review
+> needs no further escalation.
+
 > Generated by **websec-validator v{facts.get('version','')}** — deterministic recon, no LLM.
 > **You are an AI coding agent.** The tool did the reliable half (mapping the surface + staging
 > the probes). You + the human do the reasoning, the running, and the fixing.
@@ -205,6 +220,8 @@ Production source maps exposed: {client.get("production_source_maps", False)}
 
 **WebSocket auth model (CSWSH determinant — is it an ambient cookie?):** {ws_line}
 
+**Cookie hardening (report-the-pass / gap):** {cookie_line}
+
 **File-upload security (#2b — sniff bytes, derive stored name, nosniff on serve):**
 {up_section}
 

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/cli.py

@@ -351,7 +351,9 @@ def _print_facts_summary(facts: dict) -> None:
 
 def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
     p = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="websec",
-        description="Local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent.")
+        description="Defensive, local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent — "
+                    "read-only by default: it reads your own repo and writes a briefing, and never "
+                    "touches a live app. Active probes are opt-in against a TEST instance you own.")
     p.add_argument("--version", action="version", version=f"websec-validator {__version__}")
     # metavar lists only the user-facing commands; recon/proof/calibrate still work but are
     # omitted (they get no `help=`, so argparse leaves them out of the listing entirely).

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/extractors/transport_security.py

@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ HTML_SURFACE = re.compile(r"\.(?:html|tsx|jsx|vue|svelte|astro)$|_document|app/l
 # applies even with no frontend framework. This is the gap that missed a Cloudflare Worker's CSP.
 HTML_CONTENT = re.compile(r"<!DOCTYPE\s+html|<html[\s>]|text/html|res\.send\(\s*[`'\"]\s*<|c\.html\(", re.I)
 FRONTEND_FW = {"react", "next", "nextjs", "vue", "nuxt", "svelte", "sveltekit", "angular", "astro", "remix", "solid"}
+# Cookie hardening — "report the PASS" (HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite ✓ builds trust + is a regression
+# assertion) and flag the gap. Flags are matched per cookie-setting file (lenient — a positive lead).
+SET_COOKIE = re.compile(r"set-?cookie|res\.cookie\(|cookies\.set\(|\.setCookie\(|c\.cookie\(", re.I)
+CK_HTTPONLY = re.compile(r"httponly", re.I)
+CK_SECURE = re.compile(r";\s*secure\b|\bsecure\s*[:=]\s*true|\bsecure\s*:\s*!", re.I)
+CK_SAMESITE = re.compile(r"samesite", re.I)
 
 
 class TransportSecurityExtractor(Extractor):
@@ -55,6 +61,7 @@ class TransportSecurityExtractor(Extractor):
         hsts_present = hsts_sub = hsts_preload = False
         html_surface = bool(frameworks & FRONTEND_FW)
         inline_handlers = []
+        sets_cookie = ck_httponly = ck_secure = ck_samesite = False
         hsts_files, hsts_api_only, hsts_html = [], True, False
 
         # config manifests carry headers too (next.config, vercel.json, netlify.toml, _headers)
@@ -87,6 +94,11 @@ class TransportSecurityExtractor(Extractor):
                     hsts_html = True
                 elif not API_SCOPED.search(rel):
                     hsts_api_only = False   # a non-API, non-HTML place (e.g. global edge middleware)
+            if SET_COOKIE.search(blob):
+                sets_cookie = True
+                ck_httponly = ck_httponly or bool(CK_HTTPONLY.search(blob))
+                ck_secure = ck_secure or bool(CK_SECURE.search(blob))
+                ck_samesite = ck_samesite or bool(CK_SAMESITE.search(blob))
 
         if CSP_ANY.search(manifests):
             csp_present = True
@@ -155,12 +167,28 @@ class TransportSecurityExtractor(Extractor):
                                      "detail": f"HSTS is present but missing {', '.join(gaps)} — add where the domain "
                                                "model allows (don't preload a domain whose subdomains aren't all HTTPS)."})
 
+        # 0.6.2: report the cookie-hardening PASS (✓ builds trust + is a regression assertion), or flag the gap.
+        passes, cookie_security = [], None
+        if sets_cookie:
+            cookie_security = {"httponly": ck_httponly, "secure": ck_secure, "samesite": ck_samesite}
+            if ck_httponly and ck_secure and ck_samesite:
+                passes.append("cookies set HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite (checked ✓)")
+            else:
+                miss = [n for n, ok in (("HttpOnly", ck_httponly), ("Secure", ck_secure),
+                                        ("SameSite", ck_samesite)) if not ok]
+                findings.append({"severity": "LOW", "kind": "cookie-flags", "attack_class": "insecure-cookie",
+                                 "detail": f"A cookie is set without {', '.join(miss)} — an auth/session cookie should be "
+                                           "HttpOnly (no JS read), Secure (HTTPS-only), and SameSite=Lax/Strict (CSRF). "
+                                           "Verify against the live Set-Cookie."})
+
         return {
             "web_surface": web_surface, "html_surface": html_surface,
             "csp_present": csp_present, "strict_csp": strict_csp, "csp_has_unsafe": csp_unsafe,
             "hsts_present": hsts_present, "hsts_includes_subdomains": hsts_sub, "hsts_preload": hsts_preload,
             "hsts_files": sorted(set(hsts_files))[:20],
             "inline_event_handlers": sorted(set(inline_handlers)),
+            "cookie_security": cookie_security,
+            "passes": passes,
             "findings": findings,
             "note": ("CSP/HSTS baseline audit — these are the enabling controls for the client trust boundary. "
                      "LOW/architectural: verify against the LIVE response headers (a static scan can't see the edge/CDN "

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/findings.py

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ STANDARDS = {
                                  "ASVS V11.1.4", ["API4:2023 Unrestricted Resource Consumption",
                                                   "API6:2023 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows"]),
     "redundant-secret-fetch": (["CWE-200 Information Exposure"], "ASVS V2.10", ["API8:2023 Misconfiguration"]),
+    "insecure-cookie": (["CWE-1004 Sensitive Cookie Without HttpOnly", "CWE-614 Sensitive Cookie Without Secure"],
+                        "ASVS V3.4.1", ["API8:2023 Misconfiguration"]),
 }
 REMEDIATION = {
     "missing-auth": "Add an auth guard to the handler (e.g. requireAuth()/getServerSession()), or a "
@@ -152,6 +154,8 @@ REMEDIATION = {
     "redundant-secret-fetch": "Fetch each secret-manager key ONCE per request and reuse it; use the project's existing "
                               "secret-provider abstraction instead of a bespoke loader (smaller exposure window + "
                               "consistency).",
+    "insecure-cookie": "Set auth/session cookies `HttpOnly` (blocks JS/XSS theft) + `Secure` (HTTPS-only) + "
+                       "`SameSite=Lax`/`Strict` (CSRF). Verify against the live Set-Cookie header.",
 }
 _DEFAULT_REM = "Review and remediate per the cited standard."
 

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/appsync-cswsh.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # appsync-cswsh.sh — Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking on the AppSync realtime endpoint (REF-PENTEST
 # #4). The graphql-ws handshake must validate Origin; if it doesn't, a page on evil.com can open an
 # authenticated socket. Opens the realtime WS with a FORGED Origin and checks for connection_ack.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/appsync-introspection.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # appsync-introspection.sh — confirm AppSync GraphQL introspection is reachable AND, if a WAF
 # "blocks" it, that the block is bypassable (REF-PENTEST #2). AppSync can't disable introspection
 # at the API layer, so a WAF string-match is the only control — and string-match is evadable.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/appsync-subscription-bola.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # appsync-subscription-bola.sh — broken subscription authorization / cross-group BOLA (REF-PENTEST
 # #5). Open a subscription bound to ANOTHER tenant's groupId and see if the server streams events you
 # must not receive. The pen test did exactly this with `onEvent(groupId)` from a low-priv user.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/bola-cross-tenant.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # BOLA / cross-tenant READ probe — FACTS-driven. Role A uses its OWN token against
 # tenant B's id (and B→A), on this app's tenant-scoped routes (from probe-context.json).
 # Expect 401/403/404. A 200 that returns the OTHER tenant's data = cross-tenant BOLA

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/bola-write-verbs.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """BOLA / cross-tenant WRITE probe — FACTS-driven and generic.
 
 As role A, send each mutating verb (PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE) at tenant B's resources

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/client-integrity-checklist.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # client-integrity-checklist.sh — man-in-the-browser posture for a page that displays a fund-
 # redirecting value (wallet/receive address, QR, routing #). Auto-checks Layer A (strict CSP); prints
 # the Layer B (out-of-band anchor) checklist for the human. Honest limit: on-screen display can't be

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/compare-roles.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # compare-roles.sh — diff two ZAP role-scoped SARIF reports.
 #
 # Usage:

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/dlp-bypass-offline.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """
 DLP bypass corpus — OFFLINE regex analysis.
 

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/error-disclosure-probe.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # error-disclosure-probe.sh — force the app to throw, then check the 500 body for a stack trace /
 # internal file paths / dependency versions (REF-PENTEST #7). Sends malformed input (bad JSON,
 # wrong types) to the write endpoints recon flagged, and greps the response for leak markers.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/forged-token.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # forged-token — does this app actually VERIFY JWT signatures? Forge a token with a BOGUS
 # signature + far-future exp and present it to each route that is GATED without auth. A route
 # that returns 401/403 with NO token but REACHES THE HANDLER (200/400/404/422/…) WITH the

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/hs256-brute-force.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """
 HS256 JWT secret brute-force probe.
 

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/jwt-attacks.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # jwt-attacks.sh — manual JWT attack probe (FACTS-driven; no app-specific login).
 #
 # Five classic JWT attacks, run against a protected endpoint with a token YOU supply:

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/mass-assignment.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """Mass assignment / BOPLA (OWASP API #3) — FACTS-driven.
 
 Injects THIS app's privileged model fields (from probe-context.json → sensitive_fields,

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/password-reuse.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # password-reuse.sh — password history / reuse control (REF-PENTEST #6). Change the password to the
 # SAME value, and to a value used one change ago, on EVERY set-password path (self-service change,
 # admin set, profile update, SCIM/SSO-JIT) — coverage gaps BETWEEN paths are the usual bug. Expect a

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/pii-output-diff.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # pii-output-diff.sh — unmasked-PII detector by VALUE SHAPE, not field name (REF-PENTEST #8). As a
 # NON-privileged caller, fetch each data endpoint and assert NO phone (/\+?\d{7,}/) or email value
 # appears ANYWHERE in the JSON — including nested objects, composed IDs (the `providerMessageId` carrier),

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/race-conditions.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """
 Race condition probe — fires N parallel requests at race-prone endpoints
 and checks if the server's invariants hold.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/rate-limit-burst.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # rate-limit-burst — verify rate limiters actually fire, and that they can't be bypassed by
 # spoofing X-Forwarded-For. FACTS-driven: reads the login route + base URL from
 # ./probe-context.json (written by websec) — no separate .env needed.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/s3-assess.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # S3 bucket posture assessment.
 # ZAP can't meaningfully test an S3 bucket, so this checks it directly with the AWS CLI:
 # public-access posture, ACL/policy exposure, CORS, encryption, and anonymous reachability.

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/ssrf-probes.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # ssrf-probes.sh — SSRF probe, FACTS-driven. For each url-accepting endpoint the recon
 # flagged (probe-context.json → ssrf_candidates), inject classic SSRF targets into that
 # param and watch for IMDS/file/redis evidence or a tell-tale slow fetch. Expect

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/unauth-baseline.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # unauth-baseline — the cheapest, highest-value probe: hit every MUTATING route with
 # NO credentials and expect 401/403. Any 2xx (or a non-401 that reached the handler)
 # is a missing-authentication lead. Run this FIRST — it confirms the auth model before

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/upload-matrix.sh

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 # upload-matrix.sh — unrestricted-upload + serve-side stored-XSS matrix (REF-PENTEST #2b). For each
 # upload endpoint: send a polyglot (valid image magic bytes + trailing script) named `.php`, a spoofed
 # Content-Type (HTML body declared image/png), a double-extension, and a raw SVG — then FETCH THE

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/src/websec_validator/templates/probes/webhook-forgery.py

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
+# ⚠ DEFENSIVE CHECK — run only against a system you own/operate, with consent. Not for production or third-party targets.
 """
 Webhook forgery probe — signature verification for inbound webhooks.
 

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3/src/websec_validator.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: websec-validator
-Version: 0.6.1
-Summary: Local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent: facts + tailored probe scripts, code-in / artifacts-out. No LLM, no server, no running app.
+Version: 0.6.3
+Summary: Defensive, local-first security recon that briefs your AI coding agent on your own codebase — read-only by default (code in, artifacts out): facts + tailored probe scripts, no LLM, no server, no running app.
 Author: Ricardo Accioly
 License: MIT
 Keywords: security,pentest,sast,dast,bola,ai-agent,appsec
@@ -29,10 +29,15 @@ how" handoff. How it works + the reasoning behind every check: [`docs/METHODOLOG
 
 **Simplest: tell your AI agent.** In Claude Code (or any coding agent), open your project and say:
 
-> *"Install and run the security tool at github.com/raccioly/websec-validator on this repo, then follow its briefing."*
+> *"Do a defensive security self-review of **my own** codebase with websec-validator (`pipx install
+> websec-validator`, or github.com/raccioly/websec-validator). It's local and read-only — read the
+> repo and follow its briefing. I own this code and authorize the review."*
 
 It installs, runs, and walks the findings with you. There's nothing to host and no website — it's
-local. The four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
+local. (Phrasing it as a *defensive review of your own code* matters: it's the difference between an
+agent that just gets to work and one that stops to confirm you're authorized — the tool is local and
+read-only by default, but a generic "pentest this" can read as a request to attack something.) The
+four ways to get there, all ending in the same `AGENT-BRIEFING.md` your agent acts on:
 
 | Path | One-time setup | Then |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ upload, cross-tenant BOLA, role/authz gaps).
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash
-python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 136 tests
+python3 -m unittest discover -s tests    # stdlib only, no Noir/network — 139 tests
 ```
 
 ## Releasing (maintainer)

{websec_validator-0.6.1 → websec_validator-0.6.3}/tests/test_pentest_regressions.py

@@ -618,5 +618,24 @@ class ProviderSecretTierTests(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("ROTATE", row["title"])
 
 
+class CookieReportPassTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """0.6.2 report-the-passes: cookie HttpOnly+Secure+SameSite → a PASS; a missing flag → a finding."""
+
+    def test_all_flags_is_a_pass_no_finding(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts":
+            "res.headers.set('Set-Cookie', 'sid=x; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax');\n"}), {})
+        self.assertTrue(any("HttpOnly" in p for p in out["passes"]))
+        self.assertFalse(any(f["kind"] == "cookie-flags" for f in out["findings"]))
+
+    def test_missing_flag_is_a_finding(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts": "res.cookie('sid', v, {httpOnly:true});\n"}), {})
+        self.assertTrue(any(f["attack_class"] == "insecure-cookie" for f in out["findings"]))
+
+    def test_no_cookie_no_noise(self):
+        out = TransportSecurityExtractor().extract(repo({"a.ts": "const x = 1;\n"}), {})
+        self.assertEqual(out["passes"], [])
+        self.assertIsNone(out["cookie_security"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()