updo-sdk 0.6.1__tar.gz → 0.6.2__tar.gz

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,24 @@ Format: [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/1.1.0/).
 Versioning: [SemVer](https://semver.org/) — on the SDK's own surface, not on the
 platform's. A backwards-compatible server change never forces a major bump here.
 
+## [0.6.2] — 2026-10-18
+
+Follows Qlaris delivery 14 (which carries the end of delivery 13), checked
+against the OpenAPI document production serves on 2026-10-18: no new route and
+no new shape, one new refusal code. The contract fixture is refreshed to it.
+
+### A delete refused for what it would reach
+
+- `CascadeDeleteRefused` -- 403 `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`: deleting the record
+  would remove (cascade) or rewrite (set to null) dependent records this token
+  may not delete or change, or only through an approval. The WHOLE delete is
+  refused, before anything is written. Not a refusal of the record itself:
+  deal with those records first, or ask someone who may; `exc.detail` says
+  which. A `PermissionDenied`, promoted only on a 403 with the code, so
+  `except PermissionDenied` keeps catching it. Sync and async.
+
+---
+
 ## [0.6.1] — 2026-10-18
 
 Fix only.

{updo_sdk-0.6.1/src/updo_sdk.egg-info → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: updo-sdk
-Version: 0.6.1
+Version: 0.6.2
 Summary: Python SDK for the Updo360 (Qlaris) public ERP API
 Author: UPDO Technologies Inc.
 License-Expression: MIT
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -841,6 +842,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/README.md

@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -805,6 +806,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/__init__.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from .errors import (
     ApprovalRequired,
     ApprovalRequiredElsewhere,
     AuthenticationError,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     ConflictError,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     EntityNotCreatable,
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "ApprovalRequired",
     "AsyncUpdoClient",
     "AuthenticationError",
+    "CascadeDeleteRefused",
     "ClientConfig",
     "ConflictError",
     "DocumentTemplate",

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/_version.py

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """Single source of truth for the package version (read by ``pyproject.toml``)."""
 
-__version__ = "0.6.1"
+__version__ = "0.6.2"

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/errors.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from typing import Any
 import httpx
 
 __all__ = [
+    "CascadeDeleteRefused",
     "EntityNotCreatable",
     "ListFieldEquality",
     "SiteNotAllowed",
@@ -267,6 +268,17 @@ class EntityNotCreatable(PermissionDenied):
         return None if value is None else str(value)
 
 
+class CascadeDeleteRefused(PermissionDenied):
+    """403 ``CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`` -- the delete would reach records this token may not touch.
+
+    Deleting the record would remove (cascade) or rewrite (set to null) other
+    records that the caller may not delete or change, or only through an
+    approval. The WHOLE delete is refused before anything is written. Not a
+    refusal of the record itself: handle the dependent records first, each
+    through its own door, or ask someone who may. ``exc.detail`` says which.
+    """
+
+
 class SiteNotAllowed(PermissionDenied):
     """403 ``SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`` -- the ``X-Site-ID`` sent is not one this token may use.
 
@@ -579,6 +591,7 @@ _CODED_403: dict[str, type[PermissionDenied]] = {
     **_APPROVAL_CODES,
     "SITE_NOT_ALLOWED": SiteNotAllowed,
     "ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE": EntityNotCreatable,
+    "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED": CascadeDeleteRefused,
 }
 
 

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2/src/updo_sdk.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: updo-sdk
-Version: 0.6.1
+Version: 0.6.2
 Summary: Python SDK for the Updo360 (Qlaris) public ERP API
 Author: UPDO Technologies Inc.
 License-Expression: MIT
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -841,6 +842,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo_sdk.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ tests/__init__.py
 tests/conftest.py
 tests/test_approval_refusals.py
 tests/test_async.py
+tests/test_cascade_delete_refused.py
 tests/test_cli.py
 tests/test_client.py
 tests/test_codegen.py

{updo_sdk-0.6.1 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/tests/data/openapi.json

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@
         "description": "A refusal of the public API.",
         "properties": {
           "code": {
-            "description": "Stable machine code. Known codes: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ELSEWHERE`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`, `ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE`, `TENANT_MEMBERSHIP_REQUIRED`, `FEATURE_NOT_LICENSED`, `FEATURE_NOT_APPLICABLE`",
+            "description": "Stable machine code. Known codes: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ELSEWHERE`, `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`, `ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE`, `TENANT_MEMBERSHIP_REQUIRED`, `FEATURE_NOT_LICENSED`, `FEATURE_NOT_APPLICABLE`",
             "type": "string"
           },
           "detail": {
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@
                 }
               }
             },
-            "description": "Refused. `code` is one of: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`."
+            "description": "Refused. `code` is one of: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`."
           }
         },
         "security": [
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@
     },
     "/api/public/v1/me/": {
       "get": {
-        "description": "`GET /api/public/v1/me/` \u2014 what THIS token is, and what it can do.\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f This endpoint is the COUNTERPART of a rule: since the public API became\nmandatory, an API token no longer authenticates anywhere else. The only\nfrontend route integrations actually targeted was `/api/v1/users/context/`\n\u2014 blocking it without an equivalent would have REMOVED a capability\ninstead of relocating it, and \"mandatory\" only makes sense if the public\nsurface is sufficient.\n\nWe only return what a MACHINE client can act on: the organization the\ntoken is bound to, its scopes, and its expiry. Nothing from the screen\ncontext \u2014 no menus, preferences or builder capabilities: those are\ninterface needs, and they change with the interface.",
+        "description": "`GET /api/public/v1/me/` \u2014 what THIS token is, and what it can do.\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f This endpoint is the COUNTERPART of a rule: since the public API became\nmandatory, an API token no longer authenticates anywhere else. The only\nfrontend route integrations actually targeted was `/api/v1/users/context/`\n\u2014 blocking it without an equivalent would have REMOVED a capability\ninstead of relocating it, and \"mandatory\" only makes sense if the public\nsurface is sufficient.\n\nWe only return what a MACHINE client can act on: the organization the\ntoken is bound to, its scopes, and its expiry. Nothing from the screen\ncontext \u2014 no menus, preferences or Studio capabilities: those are\ninterface needs, and they change with the interface.",
         "operationId": "me_retrieve",
         "parameters": [
           {
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@
     },
     "/api/public/v1/webhooks/deliveries/{id}/": {
       "get": {
-        "description": "The delivery journal, read-only on the machine boundary.\n\nSame filters as the Atelier surface (``?binding=`` / ``?status=`` /\n``?event_id=``); rows arrive truncated + secret-masked from write time.",
+        "description": "The delivery journal, read-only on the machine boundary.\n\nSame filters as the Studio surface (``?binding=`` / ``?status=`` /\n``?event_id=``); rows arrive truncated + secret-masked from write time.",
         "operationId": "webhooks_deliveries_retrieve",
         "parameters": [
           {

updo_sdk-0.6.2/tests/test_cascade_delete_refused.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""403 CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED -- a delete that would reach records the token may not touch.
+
+Qlaris delivery 14 (security MR !70): the delete would remove or rewrite
+dependent records the caller may not delete or change, or only through an
+approval. The whole delete is refused before anything is written.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from updo import CascadeDeleteRefused
+from updo.errors import ApprovalNotPossible, EntityNotCreatable, PermissionDenied, SiteNotAllowed
+
+from .conftest import API_ROOT
+
+RECORD = "0f8fad5b-d9cb-469f-a165-70867728950e"
+URL = f"{API_ROOT}/data/customer/{RECORD}/"
+
+
+def _refusal(status: int = 403) -> httpx.Response:
+    return httpx.Response(
+        status,
+        json={
+            "code": "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED",
+            "detail": "Deleting this record would also delete 3 invoices you may not delete.",
+            "field_errors": None,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_a_delete_is_refused_with_its_own_class(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal())
+    with pytest.raises(CascadeDeleteRefused) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    error = excinfo.value
+    assert error.code == "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED"
+    assert "invoices" in error.detail
+    # A 403 like the others, but none of the other remedies applies.
+    assert isinstance(error, PermissionDenied)
+    assert not isinstance(error, (ApprovalNotPossible, SiteNotAllowed, EntityNotCreatable))
+    # A refusal of the server's judgment, not a transient fault: never replayed.
+    assert route.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_the_code_under_another_status_is_not_promoted(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal(400))
+    with pytest.raises(Exception) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    assert not isinstance(excinfo.value, CascadeDeleteRefused)
+
+
+def test_a_plain_access_denied_stays_a_plain_permission_denied(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(
+            403, json={"code": "ACCESS_DENIED", "detail": "x", "field_errors": None}
+        )
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    assert type(excinfo.value) is PermissionDenied
+
+
+async def test_async_promotes_it(respx_mock, async_client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal())
+    resource = await async_client.entity("customer")
+    with pytest.raises(CascadeDeleteRefused):
+        await resource.delete(RECORD)