updo-sdk 0.6.0__tar.gz → 0.6.2__tar.gz

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,42 @@ Format: [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/1.1.0/).
 Versioning: [SemVer](https://semver.org/) — on the SDK's own surface, not on the
 platform's. A backwards-compatible server change never forces a major bump here.
 
+## [0.6.2] — 2026-10-18
+
+Follows Qlaris delivery 14 (which carries the end of delivery 13), checked
+against the OpenAPI document production serves on 2026-10-18: no new route and
+no new shape, one new refusal code. The contract fixture is refreshed to it.
+
+### A delete refused for what it would reach
+
+- `CascadeDeleteRefused` -- 403 `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`: deleting the record
+  would remove (cascade) or rewrite (set to null) dependent records this token
+  may not delete or change, or only through an approval. The WHOLE delete is
+  refused, before anything is written. Not a refusal of the record itself:
+  deal with those records first, or ask someone who may; `exc.detail` says
+  which. A `PermissionDenied`, promoted only on a 403 with the code, so
+  `except PermissionDenied` keeps catching it. Sync and async.
+
+---
+
+## [0.6.1] — 2026-10-18
+
+Fix only.
+
+### A long `Retry-After` is raised, not replayed too early
+
+- The SDK caps a wait at 30 s, and used to replay even when the server asked
+  for longer -- before the moment it named, so certain to be refused again.
+  An hourly bucket answering `Retry-After: 3540` made every caller block about
+  90 s (three capped waits) for three failures.
+- Now, when `Retry-After` (in seconds) exceeds the cap, the error is raised AT
+  ONCE -- `RateLimitError` for a 429, `ServerError` for a 503 -- with
+  `retry_after` for the caller to schedule. Exactly 30 s is still waited; an
+  absent or unparsable header keeps the ordinary backoff. Sync, async, and
+  the download path (`export()`, `pdf()`).
+
+---
+
 ## [0.6.0] — 2026-10-16
 
 Follows Qlaris deliveries 11 and 12, in production since 2026-10-15. Checked

{updo_sdk-0.6.0/src/updo_sdk.egg-info → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: updo-sdk
-Version: 0.6.0
+Version: 0.6.2
 Summary: Python SDK for the Updo360 (Qlaris) public ERP API
 Author: UPDO Technologies Inc.
 License-Expression: MIT
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -841,6 +842,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/README.md

@@ -779,6 +779,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -805,6 +806,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/__init__.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from .errors import (
     ApprovalRequired,
     ApprovalRequiredElsewhere,
     AuthenticationError,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     ConflictError,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     EntityNotCreatable,
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "ApprovalRequired",
     "AsyncUpdoClient",
     "AuthenticationError",
+    "CascadeDeleteRefused",
     "ClientConfig",
     "ConflictError",
     "DocumentTemplate",

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/_transport.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ from .errors import (
 from .models import ApprovalPending
 
 __all__ = [
+    "waits_too_long",
     "export_truncated",
     "TRUNCATED_HEADER",
     "EXPORT_MAX_ROWS",
@@ -168,12 +169,25 @@ def prepare_params(*sources: Mapping[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
     return merged
 
 
-def should_retry_status(method: str, status: int, attempt: int, max_retries: int) -> bool:
+def should_retry_status(
+    method: str,
+    status: int,
+    attempt: int,
+    max_retries: int,
+    response: httpx.Response | None = None,
+) -> bool:
     """Whether to replay after an HTTP error response."""
     if attempt >= max_retries:
         return False
     if status not in RETRY_STATUSES:
         return False
+    if response is not None and waits_too_long(response):
+        # The server named a moment further away than this SDK will wait.
+        # Retrying earlier -- the wait is capped at _BACKOFF_CAP -- can only be
+        # refused again: an hourly bucket answered `Retry-After: 3540` made
+        # every caller block ~90 s for three certain failures. Raise now, and
+        # let the caller schedule with the error's `retry_after`.
+        return False
     if status == 429:
         # The request was rejected by the throttle BEFORE any side effect, so
         # replaying is safe even for a POST.
@@ -193,6 +207,16 @@ def should_retry_exception(method: str, exc: Exception, attempt: int, max_retrie
     return False
 
 
+def waits_too_long(response: httpx.Response) -> bool:
+    """Whether the response's ``Retry-After`` is beyond what the SDK waits.
+
+    Only an explicit number of seconds counts; an absent or unparsable header
+    leaves the ordinary backoff in charge.
+    """
+    explicit = parse_retry_after(response.headers.get("Retry-After"))
+    return explicit is not None and explicit > _BACKOFF_CAP
+
+
 def retry_delay(attempt: int, response: httpx.Response | None = None) -> float:
     """Seconds to wait before the next attempt (``Retry-After`` wins if sent)."""
     if response is not None:

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/_version.py

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 """Single source of truth for the package version (read by ``pyproject.toml``)."""
 
-__version__ = "0.6.0"
+__version__ = "0.6.2"

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/aio.py

@@ -247,7 +247,9 @@ class AsyncUpdoClient:
                     continue
                 raise wrap_transport_error(exc) from exc
 
-            if should_retry_status(method, response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries):
+            if should_retry_status(
+                method, response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries, response
+            ):
                 delay = retry_delay(attempt, response)
                 await response.aclose()
                 await asyncio.sleep(delay)
@@ -276,7 +278,7 @@ class AsyncUpdoClient:
                     "GET", url, params=query or None, headers=headers
                 ) as response:
                     if should_retry_status(
-                        "GET", response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries
+                        "GET", response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries, response
                     ):
                         delay = retry_delay(attempt, response)
                         await asyncio.sleep(delay)

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/client.py

@@ -251,7 +251,9 @@ class UpdoClient:
                     continue
                 raise wrap_transport_error(exc) from exc
 
-            if should_retry_status(method, response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries):
+            if should_retry_status(
+                method, response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries, response
+            ):
                 delay = retry_delay(attempt, response)
                 response.close()
                 time.sleep(delay)
@@ -281,7 +283,7 @@ class UpdoClient:
                     "GET", url, params=query or None, headers=headers
                 ) as response:
                     if should_retry_status(
-                        "GET", response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries
+                        "GET", response.status_code, attempt, self.config.max_retries, response
                     ):
                         delay = retry_delay(attempt, response)
                         time.sleep(delay)

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo/errors.py

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ from typing import Any
 import httpx
 
 __all__ = [
+    "CascadeDeleteRefused",
     "EntityNotCreatable",
     "ListFieldEquality",
     "SiteNotAllowed",
@@ -267,6 +268,17 @@ class EntityNotCreatable(PermissionDenied):
         return None if value is None else str(value)
 
 
+class CascadeDeleteRefused(PermissionDenied):
+    """403 ``CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`` -- the delete would reach records this token may not touch.
+
+    Deleting the record would remove (cascade) or rewrite (set to null) other
+    records that the caller may not delete or change, or only through an
+    approval. The WHOLE delete is refused before anything is written. Not a
+    refusal of the record itself: handle the dependent records first, each
+    through its own door, or ask someone who may. ``exc.detail`` says which.
+    """
+
+
 class SiteNotAllowed(PermissionDenied):
     """403 ``SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`` -- the ``X-Site-ID`` sent is not one this token may use.
 
@@ -464,7 +476,14 @@ class PlanLimitExceeded(UpdoAPIError):
 
 
 class RateLimitError(UpdoAPIError):
-    """429 -- one of the four throttle buckets is empty (token/tenant/user/burst)."""
+    """429 -- a throttle bucket is empty (token/tenant/user/burst, or a route's own).
+
+    The SDK replays a 429 by itself only when the server's ``Retry-After`` is
+    within its own wait cap (30 s). A longer one -- an hourly bucket can name
+    the better part of an hour -- is raised AT ONCE: retrying earlier than the
+    server allows can only be refused again. Schedule the next attempt with
+    :attr:`retry_after`.
+    """
 
     @property
     def retry_after(self) -> float | None:
@@ -572,6 +591,7 @@ _CODED_403: dict[str, type[PermissionDenied]] = {
     **_APPROVAL_CODES,
     "SITE_NOT_ALLOWED": SiteNotAllowed,
     "ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE": EntityNotCreatable,
+    "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED": CascadeDeleteRefused,
 }
 
 

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2/src/updo_sdk.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: updo-sdk
-Version: 0.6.0
+Version: 0.6.2
 Summary: Python SDK for the Updo360 (Qlaris) public ERP API
 Author: UPDO Technologies Inc.
 License-Expression: MIT
@@ -815,6 +815,7 @@ from updo import (
     ApprovalNotPossible,
     SiteNotAllowed,
     EntityNotCreatable,
+    CascadeDeleteRefused,
     PlanLimitExceeded,
     DownloadInterrupted,
     RateLimitError,
@@ -841,6 +842,7 @@ The server speaks **two error dialects** (the platform envelope
 | 402 | `PlanLimitExceeded` | subscription quota reached |
 | 403 | `PermissionDenied` | ABAC refusal, token scope ceiling, module disabled; `exc.resources` / `exc.feature` on a PDF; `exc.code == "IP_NOT_ALLOWED"` when the source IP is outside **the organisation's** security allowlist |
 | 403 | `EntityNotCreatable` | the entity's records are made by the platform (e.g. a public holiday entitlement): nobody creates one, whatever their rights — `exc.entity` names it |
+| 403 | `CascadeDeleteRefused` | a delete would remove or rewrite dependent records this token may not delete or change (or only through an approval): nothing is deleted — deal with those records first; `exc.detail` says which |
 | 403 | `SiteNotAllowed` | `X-Site-ID` names a site this token may not use — unknown, inactive, foreign or not assigned (see *Multi-site*) |
 | 403 | `ApprovalNotPossible` | the action needs an approval this request cannot wait for — `ServiceAccountCannotAwaitApproval` or `ApprovalRequiredElsewhere` (see *Writes subject to approval*) |
 | 404 | `NotFoundError` | entity or record does not exist |

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/src/updo_sdk.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ tests/__init__.py
 tests/conftest.py
 tests/test_approval_refusals.py
 tests/test_async.py
+tests/test_cascade_delete_refused.py
 tests/test_cli.py
 tests/test_client.py
 tests/test_codegen.py
@@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ tests/test_entity_not_creatable.py
 tests/test_errors.py
 tests/test_images.py
 tests/test_list_fields.py
+tests/test_long_retry_after.py
 tests/test_query.py
 tests/test_schema_hints.py
 tests/test_site_refusal.py

{updo_sdk-0.6.0 → updo_sdk-0.6.2}/tests/data/openapi.json

@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@
         "description": "A refusal of the public API.",
         "properties": {
           "code": {
-            "description": "Stable machine code. Known codes: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ELSEWHERE`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`, `ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE`, `TENANT_MEMBERSHIP_REQUIRED`, `FEATURE_NOT_LICENSED`, `FEATURE_NOT_APPLICABLE`",
+            "description": "Stable machine code. Known codes: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ELSEWHERE`, `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`, `ENTITY_NOT_CREATABLE`, `TENANT_MEMBERSHIP_REQUIRED`, `FEATURE_NOT_LICENSED`, `FEATURE_NOT_APPLICABLE`",
             "type": "string"
           },
           "detail": {
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@
                 }
               }
             },
-            "description": "Refused. `code` is one of: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`."
+            "description": "Refused. `code` is one of: `ACCESS_DENIED`, `SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CANNOT_AWAIT_APPROVAL`, `CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED`, `SITE_NOT_ALLOWED`, `IP_NOT_ALLOWED`."
           }
         },
         "security": [
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@
     },
     "/api/public/v1/me/": {
       "get": {
-        "description": "`GET /api/public/v1/me/` \u2014 what THIS token is, and what it can do.\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f This endpoint is the COUNTERPART of a rule: since the public API became\nmandatory, an API token no longer authenticates anywhere else. The only\nfrontend route integrations actually targeted was `/api/v1/users/context/`\n\u2014 blocking it without an equivalent would have REMOVED a capability\ninstead of relocating it, and \"mandatory\" only makes sense if the public\nsurface is sufficient.\n\nWe only return what a MACHINE client can act on: the organization the\ntoken is bound to, its scopes, and its expiry. Nothing from the screen\ncontext \u2014 no menus, preferences or builder capabilities: those are\ninterface needs, and they change with the interface.",
+        "description": "`GET /api/public/v1/me/` \u2014 what THIS token is, and what it can do.\n\n\u26a0\ufe0f This endpoint is the COUNTERPART of a rule: since the public API became\nmandatory, an API token no longer authenticates anywhere else. The only\nfrontend route integrations actually targeted was `/api/v1/users/context/`\n\u2014 blocking it without an equivalent would have REMOVED a capability\ninstead of relocating it, and \"mandatory\" only makes sense if the public\nsurface is sufficient.\n\nWe only return what a MACHINE client can act on: the organization the\ntoken is bound to, its scopes, and its expiry. Nothing from the screen\ncontext \u2014 no menus, preferences or Studio capabilities: those are\ninterface needs, and they change with the interface.",
         "operationId": "me_retrieve",
         "parameters": [
           {
@@ -2412,7 +2412,7 @@
     },
     "/api/public/v1/webhooks/deliveries/{id}/": {
       "get": {
-        "description": "The delivery journal, read-only on the machine boundary.\n\nSame filters as the Atelier surface (``?binding=`` / ``?status=`` /\n``?event_id=``); rows arrive truncated + secret-masked from write time.",
+        "description": "The delivery journal, read-only on the machine boundary.\n\nSame filters as the Studio surface (``?binding=`` / ``?status=`` /\n``?event_id=``); rows arrive truncated + secret-masked from write time.",
         "operationId": "webhooks_deliveries_retrieve",
         "parameters": [
           {

updo_sdk-0.6.2/tests/test_cascade_delete_refused.py

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"""403 CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED -- a delete that would reach records the token may not touch.
+
+Qlaris delivery 14 (security MR !70): the delete would remove or rewrite
+dependent records the caller may not delete or change, or only through an
+approval. The whole delete is refused before anything is written.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from updo import CascadeDeleteRefused
+from updo.errors import ApprovalNotPossible, EntityNotCreatable, PermissionDenied, SiteNotAllowed
+
+from .conftest import API_ROOT
+
+RECORD = "0f8fad5b-d9cb-469f-a165-70867728950e"
+URL = f"{API_ROOT}/data/customer/{RECORD}/"
+
+
+def _refusal(status: int = 403) -> httpx.Response:
+    return httpx.Response(
+        status,
+        json={
+            "code": "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED",
+            "detail": "Deleting this record would also delete 3 invoices you may not delete.",
+            "field_errors": None,
+        },
+    )
+
+
+def test_a_delete_is_refused_with_its_own_class(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal())
+    with pytest.raises(CascadeDeleteRefused) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    error = excinfo.value
+    assert error.code == "CASCADE_DELETE_REFUSED"
+    assert "invoices" in error.detail
+    # A 403 like the others, but none of the other remedies applies.
+    assert isinstance(error, PermissionDenied)
+    assert not isinstance(error, (ApprovalNotPossible, SiteNotAllowed, EntityNotCreatable))
+    # A refusal of the server's judgment, not a transient fault: never replayed.
+    assert route.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_the_code_under_another_status_is_not_promoted(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal(400))
+    with pytest.raises(Exception) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    assert not isinstance(excinfo.value, CascadeDeleteRefused)
+
+
+def test_a_plain_access_denied_stays_a_plain_permission_denied(respx_mock, client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(
+            403, json={"code": "ACCESS_DENIED", "detail": "x", "field_errors": None}
+        )
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(PermissionDenied) as excinfo:
+        client.entity("customer").delete(RECORD)
+    assert type(excinfo.value) is PermissionDenied
+
+
+async def test_async_promotes_it(respx_mock, async_client) -> None:
+    respx_mock.delete(URL).mock(return_value=_refusal())
+    resource = await async_client.entity("customer")
+    with pytest.raises(CascadeDeleteRefused):
+        await resource.delete(RECORD)

updo_sdk-0.6.2/tests/test_long_retry_after.py

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+"""A Retry-After longer than the SDK's own wait cap is raised, not replayed.
+
+The SDK caps a wait at 30 s. Replaying sooner than the server allows can only
+be refused again: an hourly bucket answering ``Retry-After: 3540`` used to make
+every caller block ~90 s (three capped waits) for three certain failures.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from updo import AsyncUpdoClient, UpdoClient
+from updo.errors import RateLimitError, ServerError
+
+from .conftest import API_ROOT, BASE_URL, TOKEN
+
+LIST_URL = f"{API_ROOT}/data/product/"
+PAGE = {"count": 0, "next": None, "previous": None, "results": []}
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def patient_client():
+    with UpdoClient(token=TOKEN, base_url=BASE_URL, max_retries=3) as client:
+        yield client
+
+
+def test_a_long_retry_after_is_raised_at_once(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(429, headers={"Retry-After": "3540"}, json={"detail": "x"})
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RateLimitError) as excinfo:
+        patient_client.entity("product").list()
+    assert route.call_count == 1  # no replay at all
+    assert excinfo.value.retry_after == 3540.0
+
+
+def test_a_short_retry_after_is_still_replayed(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        side_effect=[
+            httpx.Response(429, headers={"Retry-After": "5"}, json={"detail": "x"}),
+            httpx.Response(200, json=PAGE),
+        ]
+    )
+    patient_client.entity("product").list()
+    assert route.call_count == 2
+
+
+def test_the_cap_itself_is_still_replayed(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    # Boundary: exactly the cap is a wait the SDK makes.
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        side_effect=[
+            httpx.Response(429, headers={"Retry-After": "30"}, json={"detail": "x"}),
+            httpx.Response(200, json=PAGE),
+        ]
+    )
+    patient_client.entity("product").list()
+    assert route.call_count == 2
+
+
+def test_no_retry_after_keeps_the_ordinary_backoff(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        side_effect=[httpx.Response(429, json={"detail": "x"}), httpx.Response(200, json=PAGE)]
+    )
+    patient_client.entity("product").list()
+    assert route.call_count == 2
+
+
+def test_a_long_retry_after_on_a_503_too(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    # Not specific to throttling: any server that names a far moment.
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(503, headers={"Retry-After": "600"}, json={"detail": "x"})
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(ServerError):
+        patient_client.entity("product").list()
+    assert route.call_count == 1
+
+
+def test_the_download_path_too(respx_mock, patient_client) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(429, headers={"Retry-After": "3540"}, json={"detail": "x"})
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(RateLimitError):
+        patient_client.entity("product").export("csv", check_complete=False)
+    assert route.call_count == 1
+
+
+async def test_async_raises_at_once(respx_mock) -> None:
+    route = respx_mock.get(LIST_URL).mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(429, headers={"Retry-After": "3540"}, json={"detail": "x"})
+    )
+    async with AsyncUpdoClient(token=TOKEN, base_url=BASE_URL, max_retries=3) as client:
+        resource = await client.entity("product")
+        with pytest.raises(RateLimitError):
+            await resource.list()
+    assert route.call_count == 1