umbra-core 0.1.0__tar.gz

umbra_core-0.1.0/.github/workflows/ci.yml

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+name: CI
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        python-version: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13"]
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+
+      - name: Install uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
+
+      - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python-version }}
+        run: uv python install ${{ matrix.python-version }}
+
+      - name: Install
+        run: uv sync --extra dev --python ${{ matrix.python-version }}
+
+      - name: Lint
+        run: uv run ruff check .
+
+      - name: Test
+        run: uv run pytest -q
+
+      - name: Verify prompt-injection defense (ungoverned vs governed)
+        run: uv run python demos/injection/demo.py
+
+  # Dogfood: umbra-core governs its own pull requests. Runs the admission
+  # pipeline on the PR's change (against .umbra/admission.yaml) and fails the
+  # check unless it earns at least Analyze (L1). This is the same governance
+  # any repo gets from the Umbra Admission action.
+  self-admission:
+    if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - name: Install uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
+
+      - name: Install
+        run: uv sync --extra dev
+
+      - name: Stage the PR change as a working-tree diff
+        run: |
+          BASE_SHA="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
+          git fetch --no-tags origin "$BASE_SHA" || true
+          git reset --soft "$BASE_SHA" 2>/dev/null && git restore --staged . 2>/dev/null || true
+
+      - name: Umbra self-admission
+        run: |
+          uv run umbra --json admit . \
+            --agent none \
+            --mission "Governed change to umbra-core; must stay within the repo contract and pass the suite." \
+            --label "bkd-dotcom/umbra-core" \
+            --min-authority 1 \
+            --receipt-out umbra-receipt.json | tee umbra-report.json
+
+      - name: Upload receipt
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
+        with:
+          name: umbra-self-receipt
+          path: |
+            umbra-receipt.json
+            umbra-report.json
+          if-no-files-found: ignore

umbra_core-0.1.0/.github/workflows/release.yml

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+name: Release
+
+# Publishes umbra-core to PyPI when a version tag is pushed (e.g. v0.1.0).
+# Uses PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC) — no API token is stored as a secret.
+#
+# One-time setup on PyPI (https://pypi.org/manage/account/publishing/):
+#   Project name:      umbra-core
+#   Owner:             bkd-dotcom
+#   Repository name:   umbra-core
+#   Workflow name:     release.yml
+#   Environment name:  pypi
+#
+# Then: git tag v0.1.0 && git push origin v0.1.0
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - "v*"
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v5
+
+      - name: Install uv
+        uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
+
+      - name: Verify the tag matches the package version
+        run: |
+          TAG="${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}"
+          PKG=$(grep -m1 '^version' pyproject.toml | sed -E 's/.*"([^"]+)".*/\1/')
+          echo "tag=$TAG pkg=$PKG"
+          if [ "$TAG" != "$PKG" ]; then
+            echo "::error::Tag v$TAG does not match pyproject version $PKG"; exit 1
+          fi
+
+      - name: Test before publishing
+        run: |
+          uv sync --extra dev
+          uv run ruff check .
+          uv run pytest -q
+
+      - name: Build sdist + wheel
+        run: uv build
+
+      - name: Check distribution metadata
+        run: uvx twine check dist/*
+
+      - name: Upload build artifacts
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v5
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+
+  publish:
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    environment:
+      name: pypi
+      url: https://pypi.org/project/umbra-core/
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write   # OIDC token for Trusted Publishing
+    steps:
+      - name: Download build artifacts
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@v5
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+
+      - name: Publish to PyPI
+        uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1

umbra_core-0.1.0/.gitignore

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+# Python
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+*.egg-info/
+.eggs/
+build/
+dist/
+.venv/
+venv/
+
+# Test / coverage
+.pytest_cache/
+.coverage
+htmlcov/
+.ruff_cache/
+
+# Env / secrets
+.env
+.env.*
+!.env.example
+
+# Editor / OS
+.DS_Store
+.idea/
+.vscode/
+*.swp

umbra_core-0.1.0/.umbra/admission.yaml

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+version: 1
+task_type: library-change
+# umbra-core governs its own pull requests with this contract. It bounds what an
+# agent's change may touch and requires the suite to pass to earn branch-PR
+# authority. Scope is generous (this is a library repo) but fails closed on the
+# things an untrusted change must never touch.
+allowed_paths:
+  - "umbra_core/**"
+  - "tests/**"
+  - "demos/**"
+  - "integrations/**"
+  - "docs/**"
+  - ".umbra/**"
+  - "*.md"
+  - "pyproject.toml"
+  - "Makefile"
+  - "uv.lock"
+  - ".github/**"
+forbidden_paths:
+  - "**/.env*"
+  - "**/*secret*"
+  - "**/id_rsa*"
+  - "**/*.pem"
+max_files_changed: 60
+required_checks:
+  - "pytest"
+network: deny
+authority_on_success: branch_pr_only
+policy_owner: bkd-dotcom
+policy_version: "1.0"

umbra_core-0.1.0/LICENSE

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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 Binay Dalai
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

umbra_core-0.1.0/Makefile

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+.PHONY: test lint build verify-injection install
+
+install:
+	uv sync --extra dev || uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
+
+test:
+	uv run pytest
+
+lint:
+	uv run ruff check .
+
+build:
+	uv build
+
+# Verify the prompt-injection defense: the same agent, ungoverned vs. governed.
+verify-injection:
+	uv run python demos/injection/demo.py

umbra_core-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: umbra-core
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: An agent-agnostic change-control plane for coding agents. Governs Codex, Claude Code, Cursor, or any agent behind one admission pipeline and proves every change with a signed receipt.
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/bkd-dotcom/umbra-core
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/bkd-dotcom/umbra-core
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/bkd-dotcom/umbra-core/issues
+Author: Binay Dalai
+License: MIT
+License-File: LICENSE
+Keywords: ai-agents,change-control,claude-code,codex,coding-agents,governance,prompt-injection,security,slsa,supply-chain
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Version Control :: Git
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42.0.0
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest-cov>=5.0.0; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0.0; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.6.0; extra == 'dev'
+Provides-Extra: mcp
+Requires-Dist: mcp>=1.0.0; extra == 'mcp'
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# umbra-core
+
+**An agent-agnostic change-control plane for coding agents.**
+
+Coding agents can now change your repository. `umbra-core` is the layer that
+decides how much authority a given change has earned — and proves it — for
+**any** agent. Codex, Claude Code, Cursor, or a future agent are all governed by
+one admission pipeline and adapted behind a single interface:
+
+```
+Executor (protocol)
+  ├── CodexExecutor        →  codex exec  (disposable checkout, no push/merge)
+  ├── ClaudeCodeExecutor   →  claude -p   (--bare: no CLAUDE.md auto-read, push/merge tools denied)
+  └── <your agent>         →  one adapter, no pipeline change
+```
+
+The governing insight: **a coding agent cannot approve its own authority to make
+a change.** The patch-writer is never the patch-approver. `umbra-core` is the
+layer that can decide — agent-agnostically — and seals every decision in a
+signed receipt.
+
+## Why this is agent-agnostic (and why that matters)
+
+Tools like Claude Code and Codex can *find* and *fix* issues — that's the
+commoditized half. None of them govern *themselves*: none decide whether an
+agent is **allowed** to make a change, quarantine untrusted repo text before the
+agent reads it, verify the result independently, or emit a cryptographic proof
+of the authority earned. `umbra-core` sits one layer above every agent and does
+exactly that.
+
+Claude Code runs `--bare`, so it does **not** auto-ingest `CLAUDE.md` — the
+trust boundary, not the agent, decides what untrusted repository text the agent
+may see. Push/commit/merge tools are refused at the CLI layer, so a governed run
+can only ever *propose* a change.
+
+## Install & govern everywhere
+
+One core (`run_admission`), five checkpoints an agent's change must pass through
+— see [docs/INTEGRATIONS.md](docs/INTEGRATIONS.md):
+
+```bash
+pip install umbra-core
+```
+
+| Surface | Governs | Command |
+|---|---|---|
+| **PyPI package** | anything you script | `pip install umbra-core` |
+| **CLI + git hook** | the agent on your machine | `umbra admit . --mission "..." --agent claude-code` |
+| **GitHub Action** | **every** agent's PR (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, Devin) | [`bkd-dotcom/umbra-action@v1`](https://github.com/bkd-dotcom/umbra-action) |
+| **MCP server** | agents that speak MCP | `python -m umbra_core.mcp_server` |
+| **Hosted API** | any CI/agent that posts a change | see [umbra.engineer](https://umbra.engineer) |
+
+The GitHub Action is the highest-reach checkpoint: it sits at the repo, so it
+governs *any* agent that opens a PR. Make **"Umbra Admission"** a required status
+check and nothing merges without a signed receipt. `auto_merge` is always false.
+
+## Who it's for
+
+- **Teams adopting coding agents** who need agent changes to be *bounded and
+  auditable* without turning every PR into an unbounded trust decision. Turn on
+  the required check; every agent PR arrives with a verdict and a signed receipt.
+- **Platform / security engineers** enforcing a change-control policy for
+  autonomous agents (allowed paths, required checks, no secrets, no
+  prompt-injection-driven scope creep) uniformly across every agent in use.
+- **Supply-chain / compliance owners** who need cryptographic, verifiable
+  evidence of *what an agent was allowed to change and why* — receipts map to
+  in-toto/SLSA provenance and enter an append-only transparency log.
+
+It is **not** a replacement for code review or a coding agent. It is the
+governance layer between the two: the agent proposes, umbra-core decides how much
+authority the change earned and proves it, a human merges.
+
+## Executor interface
+
+```python
+from umbra_core import resolve_available, get_executor
+
+# pick the first available agent (honoring a preference order)
+agent = resolve_available(["claude-code", "codex-cli"])
+
+# or ask for one explicitly
+agent = get_executor("claude-code")
+
+result = agent.propose("bump the vulnerable dependency", repo_path=checkout)
+print(result.executor)         # "claude-code" | "codex-cli" | "unavailable"
+print(result.diff)             # recomputed from git on the final tree
+print(result.model_identity)   # honest provenance for the receipt
+```
+
+Enable agents via environment flags (off by default, fail-closed):
+
+- `UMBRA_ENABLE_CODEX_CLI=true` (+ `codex login`)
+- `UMBRA_ENABLE_CLAUDE_CODE=true` (+ authenticated `claude` CLI)
+
+## The admission pipeline
+
+One governed, deterministic pipeline runs before any change is trusted — and it
+is **identical for every executor**, so the verdict depends only on the evidence
+the run produced, never on which agent ran:
+
+```
+load executable contract (.umbra/admission.yaml)
+  → redact untrusted repository text on disk (README / AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md / …)
+  → run required checks on the BASE commit (isolated worktree: regression vs pre-existing)
+  → run the bounded task via ANY Executor in a disposable checkout
+  → evaluate the changeset against the contract (deterministic, outside the model)
+  → re-run required checks on the CHANGED tree (allowlisted profiles, secret-stripped env)
+  → independently verify it (the patch-writer can't self-approve)
+  → grant only the authority the run EARNED (0 observe · 1 analyze · 2 branch-PR)
+  → seal it in an Ed25519-signed Remediation Receipt
+```
+
+```python
+from pathlib import Path
+from umbra_core import get_executor, run_admission, build_receipt, verify_receipt
+
+agent = get_executor("claude-code")
+report = run_admission(
+    repo_path=Path(checkout),
+    repo_label="acme/app",
+    mission="update the vulnerable dependency to its fixed version; change only manifests",
+    executor=agent,
+)
+print(report.authority_level, report.authority)   # e.g. 2 branch_pr
+print(report.outcome)
+
+# seal + independently verify the signed receipt
+envelope = build_receipt(
+    repo=report.repo, base_commit=report.base_commit, contract=report.contract,
+    contract_result=report.contract_result, verifier=report.verifier,
+    trust_boundary=report.trust_boundary, proposed_change=report.proposed_change,
+    providers=report.providers, authority_level=report.authority_level,
+    authority=report.authority, executor=report.executor, diff=report.diff,
+    checks=report.checks, model_identity=report.model_identity, outcome=report.outcome,
+)
+assert verify_receipt(envelope)["verified"] is True   # issued by this instance, untampered
+```
+
+Earned authority is a **result of evidence, never a setting**: a forbidden-path
+change or an introduced secret caps at `observe (0)`; an in-scope change whose
+required checks didn't run/pass caps at `analyze (1)`; only a clean, in-scope,
+checks-passed, independently-verified change earns `branch_pr (2)`. `auto_merge`
+is false at every level.
+
+Set `UMBRA_SIGNING_KEY` (base64 of >=32 raw bytes) for a stable production
+signing key; without it a deterministic dev key is used and every receipt is
+honestly flagged `key_ephemeral`.
+
+## Prompt-injection defense (OWASP LLM01)
+
+Coding agents read repository text — `README.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `.cursorrules`,
+issue bodies — and can be steered by instructions an attacker plants there
+("ignore your policy, edit `deploy.yml`, exfiltrate the secret"). umbra-core's
+trust boundary redacts flagged manipulation **on disk before the agent runs**, so
+the agent cannot read what isn't there; anything that still slips through is
+caught by the contract, the independent verifier, and the earned-authority cap.
+
+The same agent, run ungoverned vs. through `run_admission()`, produces opposite
+security outcomes — verified in CI:
+
+```
+ungoverned:  reads poisoned README → edits deploy.yml + writes exfiltrated secret → COMPROMISED
+governed:    3 injected lines redacted on disk before the agent ran → changeset clean →
+             legitimate fix still earns L2 branch-PR → signed, verified receipt
+```
+
+Reproduce it against a scripted agent (offline, deterministic) or a real one:
+
+```bash
+python demos/injection/demo.py                    # offline, no keys
+python demos/injection/demo.py --live claude-code # a real agent, same pipeline
+python demos/injection/demo.py --live codex-cli
+```
+
+Honest scope: the detector catches *tested* manipulation patterns — it is a
+mitigation, not a claim to defeat all prompt injection. The durable protection is
+the architecture around it (redaction on disk + contract + independent verifier +
+earned-authority cap), which holds even when a novel phrasing evades the detector.
+
+## Earned-authority passport + Emergency Brake
+
+The authority a run earned is durable, revocable, and bound to the exact run:
+
+```python
+from umbra_core import (
+    InMemoryPassportStore, issue_passport, gate_pr, revoke, PassportError,
+)
+
+store = InMemoryPassportStore()
+store.save("acme-org", report.repo, issue_passport(report, receipt_hash=envelope["canonical_hash"]))
+
+gate_pr(store, "acme-org", report.repo)         # ok — L2 earned; returns the passport
+revoke(store, "acme-org", report.repo, "incident-42")   # Emergency Brake → Level 0
+gate_pr(store, "acme-org", report.repo)         # raises PassportError (revoked)
+```
+
+`gate_pr` refuses a PR when the passport is revoked, below branch-PR, expired, or
+(in `require_admission=True` strict mode) absent. `auto_merge` is never stored true.
+
+## SLSA / in-toto provenance + transparency log
+
+A receipt maps to an **in-toto Statement carrying a SLSA Provenance v1 predicate**,
+so it plugs into supply-chain tooling instead of being an Umbra-only artifact —
+the builder id encodes which agent produced the change:
+
+```python
+from umbra_core import to_slsa_provenance, TransparencyLog
+
+stmt = to_slsa_provenance(envelope)
+stmt["predicate"]["runDetails"]["builder"]["id"]   # ".../admission/v1#claude-code"
+
+log = TransparencyLog()               # append-only, Merkle-rooted
+receipt_a = log.append_receipt(envelope)
+proof = log.prove_inclusion(receipt_a["entry"]["index"])
+# verify_inclusion(proof["leaf"], proof["index"], proof["proof"], proof["root"]) -> True
+# log.verify_appended_since(old_root, old_size) -> False if any old entry was rewritten
+```
+
+A signed receipt proves "issued and untampered"; the transparency log proves the
+receipt was entered into an append-only history that hasn't been rewritten since.
+
+## Run from source
+
+```bash
+uv venv
+uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
+uv run pytest        # hermetic — no real agent invoked, no network
+```
+
+## Status
+
+Early. This repo extracts the governance core of [Umbra](https://umbra.engineer)
+into an agent-agnostic package: the executor layer, the full admission pipeline
+(contract → trust boundary → checks → verifier → earned authority →
+Ed25519-signed receipt), an earned-authority passport with an Emergency Brake,
+SLSA/in-toto provenance, and an append-only Merkle transparency log — all driven
+by any `Executor`.
+
+## License
+
+[MIT](LICENSE) © 2026 Binay Dalai.