trust-path 0.2.0__tar.gz → 0.4.0__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (49) hide show
  1. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/MANIFEST.in +2 -0
  2. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/PKG-INFO +6 -3
  3. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/README.md +5 -2
  4. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/agents-only.json +5 -0
  5. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/corpus.json +13 -0
  6. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/expected.json +31 -0
  7. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-gated.yml +15 -0
  8. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-open.yml +17 -0
  9. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-restricted.yml +20 -0
  10. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/codex-gated.yml +16 -0
  11. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/codex-read-only.yml +17 -0
  12. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/gemini-author-check.yml +16 -0
  13. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/gemini.yml +15 -0
  14. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/no-credential.yml +13 -0
  15. trust_path-0.4.0/benchmark/run.py +164 -0
  16. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  17. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/test_analyze.py +113 -19
  18. trust_path-0.4.0/tests/test_benchmark.py +133 -0
  19. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path/__init__.py +1 -1
  20. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path/analyze.py +59 -11
  21. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path.egg-info/PKG-INFO +6 -3
  22. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +13 -0
  23. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/.github/workflows/release.yml +0 -0
  24. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/.github/workflows/test.yml +0 -0
  25. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
  26. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
  27. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  28. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/agent/.github/workflows/triage.yml +0 -0
  29. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/head_checkout/.github/workflows/build.yml +0 -0
  30. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/missing_call/.github/workflows/call.yml +0 -0
  31. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/pr_title/.github/workflows/greet.yml +0 -0
  32. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/reusable/.github/workflows/on-comment.yml +0 -0
  33. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/reusable/.github/workflows/reply.yml +0 -0
  34. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/echo-title.yml +0 -0
  35. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/label.yml +0 -0
  36. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/release.yml +0 -0
  37. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/test.yml +0 -0
  38. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/tags/.github/workflows/a.yml +0 -0
  39. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/ci.yml +0 -0
  40. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/publish.yml +0 -0
  41. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/stage.yml +0 -0
  42. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/test_cli.py +0 -0
  43. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/tests/test_yamlsubset.py +0 -0
  44. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path/__main__.py +0 -0
  45. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path/cli.py +0 -0
  46. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path/yamlsubset.py +0 -0
  47. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
  48. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
  49. {trust_path-0.2.0 → trust_path-0.4.0}/trust_path.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2
2
  # The sdist carries the test suite and everything it reads, so the tests run from it.
3
3
  graft tests
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+ graft benchmark
4
5
  graft .github/workflows
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6
  prune tests/__pycache__
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+ prune benchmark/__pycache__
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: trust-path
3
- Version: 0.2.0
3
+ Version: 0.4.0
4
4
  Summary: List the paths by which untrusted input can reach secrets and publishing credentials in GitHub Actions workflows.
5
5
  License-Expression: Apache-2.0
6
6
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path
@@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ pip installs `trust-path` as a console script. Without installing, it runs from
71
71
  workflow or after a `pull_request` workflow (followed through chains), or when it is a local
72
72
  reusable workflow called from such a run.
73
73
  3. **Find where input enters each job.** A step enters untrusted input when it uses a context such
74
- as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:`, `with:` or `env:`, checks out or fetches the pull
75
- request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, or is an AI agent action.
74
+ as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:` or `with:` (directly, or through
75
+ `${{ env.NAME }}`), checks out or fetches the pull request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, expands the changed file names of a pull
76
+ request, or is an AI agent action.
76
77
  4. **Collect what it reaches.** The entry step and every later step of the same job are reached.
77
78
  trust-path collects the secrets they use and the job's write permissions, `id-token: write`,
78
79
  environment and AI agent actions holding a credential.
@@ -123,6 +124,8 @@ key and can write text into issues that other workflows and agents read. Run `tr
123
124
  list and the YAML subset.
124
125
  - [Command](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/commands.md): output fields, JSON, exit status and an example across workflows.
125
126
  - [Limitations and security](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/limitations-and-security.md): what trust-path does not see, read or do.
127
+ - [Benchmark](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/benchmark.md): a repeatable run on pinned public workflows, with a
128
+ per-file comparison against zizmor
126
129
  - [Using it with other tools](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/other-tools.md): a tested stack with git surface
127
130
  and git-overlap, and what zizmor and poutine cover and what trust-path adds.
128
131
  - [Contributing](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): running the tests and contributing a change.
@@ -50,8 +50,9 @@ pip installs `trust-path` as a console script. Without installing, it runs from
50
50
  workflow or after a `pull_request` workflow (followed through chains), or when it is a local
51
51
  reusable workflow called from such a run.
52
52
  3. **Find where input enters each job.** A step enters untrusted input when it uses a context such
53
- as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:`, `with:` or `env:`, checks out or fetches the pull
54
- request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, or is an AI agent action.
53
+ as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:` or `with:` (directly, or through
54
+ `${{ env.NAME }}`), checks out or fetches the pull request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, expands the changed file names of a pull
55
+ request, or is an AI agent action.
55
56
  4. **Collect what it reaches.** The entry step and every later step of the same job are reached.
56
57
  trust-path collects the secrets they use and the job's write permissions, `id-token: write`,
57
58
  environment and AI agent actions holding a credential.
@@ -102,6 +103,8 @@ key and can write text into issues that other workflows and agents read. Run `tr
102
103
  list and the YAML subset.
103
104
  - [Command](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/commands.md): output fields, JSON, exit status and an example across workflows.
104
105
  - [Limitations and security](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/limitations-and-security.md): what trust-path does not see, read or do.
106
+ - [Benchmark](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/benchmark.md): a repeatable run on pinned public workflows, with a
107
+ per-file comparison against zizmor
105
108
  - [Using it with other tools](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/other-tools.md): a tested stack with git surface
106
109
  and git-overlap, and what zizmor and poutine cover and what trust-path adds.
107
110
  - [Contributing](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): running the tests and contributing a change.
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
1
+ [
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+ {
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+ "path": "fixtures/agents"
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+ }
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+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
1
+ [
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+ {
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+ "url": "https://github.com/messypoutine/gravy-overflow",
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+ "commit": "cbff1a67a804d10e2fe00e18e9c4b2f4bf9d89ce"
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+ },
6
+ {
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+ "url": "https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat",
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+ "commit": "4da23c8602b4589bacdf7de77240113e02cdb884"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "path": "fixtures/agents"
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+ }
13
+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1
+ {
2
+ "agents": {
3
+ "agent_files_by_gate": {
4
+ "anyone": 3,
5
+ "none": 2,
6
+ "write-access": 2
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+ },
8
+ "by_category": {
9
+ "agent": 23
10
+ },
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+ "records": 23,
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+ "refused": 0
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+ },
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+ "github-actions-goat": {
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+ "agent_files_by_gate": {},
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+ "by_category": {
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+ "head-code": 2
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+ },
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+ "records": 2,
20
+ "refused": 0
21
+ },
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+ "gravy-overflow": {
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+ "agent_files_by_gate": {},
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+ "by_category": {
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+ "expression": 52,
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+ "head-code": 19
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+ },
28
+ "records": 71,
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+ "refused": 1
30
+ }
31
+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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+ # The action's default: only users with write access start the agent.
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+ name: claude-gated
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+ on:
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+ issue_comment:
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+ types: [created]
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: write
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+ pull-requests: write
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+ jobs:
10
+ assist:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
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+ with:
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+ anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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+ # Any user can start the agent; its tools are not limited.
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+ name: claude-open
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+ on:
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+ issues:
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+ types: [opened]
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+ permissions:
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+ issues: write
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+ jobs:
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+ triage:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Label issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
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+ anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
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+ github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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+ allowed_non_write_users: "*"
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
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+ # Any user can start the agent; the workflow limits its tools.
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+ name: claude-restricted
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+ on:
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+ issues:
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+ types: [opened]
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+ permissions:
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+ issues: write
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+ jobs:
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+ triage:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Label issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
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+ anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
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+ github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
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+ allowed_non_write_users: "*"
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+ claude_args: |
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+ --permission-mode auto
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+ --disallowedTools "WebFetch,WebSearch,Write,Edit"
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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+ # The action's default gate, and a sandbox that can write the workspace.
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+ name: codex-gated
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+ on:
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+ issue_comment:
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+ types: [created]
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+ permissions:
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+ contents: write
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+ jobs:
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+ assist:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: openai/codex-action@v1
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Help with issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
15
+ openai-api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
16
+ sandbox: workspace-write
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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+ # Any user can start the agent; it runs in a read-only sandbox.
2
+ name: codex-read-only
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+ on:
4
+ issues:
5
+ types: [opened]
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+ permissions:
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+ issues: read
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+ jobs:
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+ classify:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: openai/codex-action@v1
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Classify issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
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+ openai-api-key: ${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
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+ allow-users: "*"
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+ sandbox: read-only
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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+ # The action has no gate of its own; the job's condition tests the author.
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+ name: gemini-author-check
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+ on:
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+ issue_comment:
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+ types: [created]
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+ permissions:
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+ id-token: write
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+ issues: write
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+ jobs:
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+ assist:
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+ if: contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Help with issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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+ # The action has no gate of its own and the workflow adds none.
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+ name: gemini
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+ on:
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+ issue_comment:
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+ types: [created]
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+ permissions:
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+ id-token: write
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+ issues: write
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+ jobs:
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+ assist:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Help with issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
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+ # An agent that holds nothing: no secret, no token scope. Nothing to report.
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+ name: no-credential
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+ on:
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+ issues:
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+ types: [opened]
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+ permissions: {}
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+ jobs:
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+ summarise:
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+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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+ steps:
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+ - uses: actions/ai-inference@v1
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+ with:
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+ prompt: Summarise issue ${{ github.event.issue.number }}.
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
1
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2
+ """Run trust-path, and zizmor when it is installed, on pinned commits of
3
+ public repositories and on the agent workflows kept beside this script, and
4
+ compare what they report per workflow file.
5
+
6
+ python3 benchmark/run.py [--corpus FILE] [--expected FILE] [--cache DIR] [--update]
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+
8
+ Exit status: 0 the trust-path counts match the expected file, 1 they differ,
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+ 2 a repository could not be fetched or a tool failed.
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+ """
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+
12
+ import argparse
13
+ import collections
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+ import json
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+ import os
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+ import re
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+ import shutil
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+ import subprocess
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+ import sys
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+ import tempfile
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+
22
+ HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
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+ ZIZMOR = ["zizmor", "--offline", "--no-config", "--persona", "auditor", "--format", "json"]
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+ _WORKFLOW = re.compile(r"workflows/([\w.-]+\.ya?ml)")
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+
26
+
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+ def category(source):
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+ """The kind of entry a trust-path source field names."""
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+ what = source.rsplit(":", 1)[-1]
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+ if what == "event text read by agent":
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+ return "agent"
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+ if what.endswith("of pull request head"):
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+ return "head-code"
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+ if what == "artifact from upstream run":
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+ return "artifact"
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+ return "expression"
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+
38
+
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+ def summarise(records, refused):
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+ """The counts kept in the expected file for one repository."""
41
+ by = collections.Counter(category(r["source"]) for r in records)
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+ return {"records": len(records), "refused": refused, "by_category": dict(sorted(by.items())),
43
+ "agent_files_by_gate": agent_gates(records)}
44
+
45
+
46
+ def agent_gates(records):
47
+ """Number of workflow files with an agent path, for each gate value."""
48
+ gates = collections.defaultdict(set)
49
+ for r in records:
50
+ if category(r["source"]) == "agent":
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+ gate = r.get("detail", "").split(";")[0].replace("gate=", "") or "unknown"
52
+ gates[gate].add(os.path.basename(r["workflow"]))
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+ return dict((g, len(files)) for g, files in sorted(gates.items()))
54
+
55
+
56
+ def injection_files(records):
57
+ """Workflow files where trust-path reports pasted text or fork code."""
58
+ return set(os.path.basename(r["workflow"]) for r in records
59
+ if category(r["source"]) in ("expression", "head-code"))
60
+
61
+
62
+ def agent_files(records):
63
+ return set(os.path.basename(r["workflow"]) for r in records
64
+ if category(r["source"]) == "agent")
65
+
66
+
67
+ def zizmor_files(findings, ident="template-injection"):
68
+ """Workflow files where zizmor reports a finding of kind `ident`."""
69
+ out = set()
70
+ for f in findings:
71
+ if f.get("ident") == ident:
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+ out.update(_WORKFLOW.findall(json.dumps(f.get("locations", []))))
73
+ return out
74
+
75
+
76
+ def compare(ours, theirs):
77
+ return {"both": len(ours & theirs), "trust-path only": len(ours - theirs),
78
+ "zizmor only": len(theirs - ours)}
79
+
80
+
81
+ def _run(cmd, cwd=None, ok=(0,)):
82
+ p = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
83
+ universal_newlines=True)
84
+ if p.returncode not in ok:
85
+ raise RuntimeError("%s: exit %d: %s" % (" ".join(cmd[:2]), p.returncode,
86
+ p.stderr.strip()[:200]))
87
+ return p
88
+
89
+
90
+ def fetch(url, commit, dest):
91
+ """Check out .github/workflows of `url` at `commit` into `dest`."""
92
+ if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(dest, ".github", "workflows")):
93
+ return
94
+ os.makedirs(dest)
95
+ _run(["git", "init", "-q"], dest)
96
+ _run(["git", "fetch", "-q", "--depth", "1", "--filter=blob:none", url, commit], dest)
97
+ _run(["git", "checkout", "-q", "FETCH_HEAD", "--", ".github/workflows"], dest)
98
+
99
+
100
+ def main(argv=None):
101
+ parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n\n")[0])
102
+ parser.add_argument("--corpus", default=os.path.join(HERE, "corpus.json"))
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+ parser.add_argument("--expected", default=os.path.join(HERE, "expected.json"))
104
+ parser.add_argument("--cache", help="directory to keep the fetched workflows in")
105
+ parser.add_argument("--update", action="store_true", help="rewrite the expected file")
106
+ args = parser.parse_args(argv)
107
+ with open(args.corpus) as f:
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+ corpus = json.load(f)
109
+ cache = args.cache or tempfile.mkdtemp()
110
+ have_zizmor = shutil.which("zizmor") is not None
111
+ actual = {}
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+ try:
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+ if have_zizmor:
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+ print("zizmor: %s" % _run(["zizmor", "--version"]).stdout.strip())
115
+ else:
116
+ print("zizmor: not installed, comparison skipped")
117
+ for repo in corpus:
118
+ if "path" in repo: # workflows kept beside the corpus file
119
+ name, at = os.path.basename(repo["path"]), "local"
120
+ dest = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(args.corpus)), repo["path"])
121
+ else:
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+ name, at = repo["url"].rstrip("/").split("/")[-1], repo["commit"][:12]
123
+ dest = os.path.join(cache, name + "-" + at)
124
+ fetch(repo["url"], repo["commit"], dest)
125
+ p = _run([sys.executable, "-m", "trust_path", "--json", dest],
126
+ cwd=os.path.dirname(HERE), ok=(0, 1, 2))
127
+ records = json.loads(p.stdout)
128
+ refused = len(p.stderr.splitlines())
129
+ actual[name] = summarise(records, refused)
130
+ files = os.listdir(os.path.join(dest, ".github", "workflows"))
131
+ print("\n%s @ %s (%d workflow files)" % (name, at, len(files)))
132
+ print(" trust-path: %(records)d records, %(refused)d files refused, "
133
+ "%(by_category)s" % actual[name])
134
+ print(" trust-path: %d files with an agent path, by gate %s" % (
135
+ len(agent_files(records)), actual[name]["agent_files_by_gate"]))
136
+ if have_zizmor:
137
+ findings = json.loads(_run(ZIZMOR + [dest], ok=tuple(range(15))).stdout or "[]")
138
+ print(" injection, by workflow file: %s" % compare(
139
+ injection_files(records), zizmor_files(findings)))
140
+ except (RuntimeError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
141
+ sys.stderr.write("benchmark: %s\n" % e)
142
+ return 2
143
+ finally:
144
+ if not args.cache:
145
+ shutil.rmtree(cache, ignore_errors=True)
146
+ if args.update:
147
+ with open(args.expected, "w") as f:
148
+ json.dump(actual, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
149
+ f.write("\n")
150
+ return 0
151
+ with open(args.expected) as f:
152
+ expected = json.load(f)
153
+ if actual != expected:
154
+ print("\nDIFFERENT from %s:" % args.expected)
155
+ for name in sorted(set(actual) | set(expected)):
156
+ if actual.get(name) != expected.get(name):
157
+ print(" %s: expected %s, got %s" % (name, expected.get(name), actual.get(name)))
158
+ return 1
159
+ print("\ntrust-path counts match %s" % os.path.basename(args.expected))
160
+ return 0
161
+
162
+
163
+ if __name__ == "__main__":
164
+ sys.exit(main())
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
5
5
 
6
6
  [project]
7
7
  name = "trust-path"
8
- version = "0.2.0"
8
+ version = "0.4.0"
9
9
  description = "List the paths by which untrusted input can reach secrets and publishing credentials in GitHub Actions workflows."
10
10
  readme = "README.md"
11
11
  requires-python = ">=3.9"
@@ -66,10 +66,47 @@ class AgentDetailTests(unittest.TestCase):
66
66
  self.assertEqual(agent("openai/codex-action@v1", "allow-users: ${{ vars.USERS }}"),
67
67
  ["gate=expression; sandbox=action-default; safety-strategy=drop-sudo"])
68
68
 
69
- def test_gate_not_modelled_for_other_actions(self):
70
- self.assertEqual(agent("google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0"), ["gate=not-modelled"])
69
+ def test_gate_of_other_actions(self):
70
+ self.assertEqual(agent("google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0"), ["gate=none"])
71
+ self.assertEqual(agent("actions/ai-inference@v1"), ["gate=none"])
71
72
  self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-base-action@v1"),
72
- ["gate=not-modelled; tools=action-default"])
73
+ ["gate=none; tools=action-default"])
74
+ self.assertEqual(agent("warpdotdev/oz-agent-action@v1"), ["gate=not-modelled"])
75
+
76
+ CONDITION = """
77
+ on: issue_comment
78
+ permissions:
79
+ id-token: write
80
+ jobs:
81
+ j:
82
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest%s
83
+ steps:
84
+ - uses: google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0%s
85
+ """
86
+
87
+ def conditions(self, job="", step=""):
88
+ job = job and "\n if: " + job
89
+ step = step and "\n if: " + step
90
+ return details(analyse(w=self.CONDITION % (job, step), detail=True))
91
+
92
+ def test_if_conditions_that_test_who_started_the_run(self):
93
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(), ["gate=none"])
94
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(
95
+ job="contains(fromJSON('[\"OWNER\",\"MEMBER\"]'), "
96
+ "github.event.comment.author_association)"),
97
+ ["gate=none; if=author_association"])
98
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(step="${{ github.actor == 'octocat' }}"),
99
+ ["gate=none; if=actor"])
100
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(
101
+ job="github.event.sender.login == 'octocat'",
102
+ step="github.event.comment.author_association == 'OWNER'"),
103
+ ["gate=none; if=actor+author_association"])
104
+
105
+ def test_other_if_conditions_are_not_reported(self):
106
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(job="github.event_name == 'issue_comment'"),
107
+ ["gate=none"])
108
+ self.assertEqual(self.conditions(step="contains(github.event.comment.body, '@bot')"),
109
+ ["gate=none"])
73
110
 
74
111
  def test_claude_tool_flags(self):
75
112
  self.assertEqual(agent(
@@ -166,26 +203,83 @@ class SourceTests(unittest.TestCase):
166
203
  """)
167
204
  self.assertEqual(recs, [])
168
205
 
169
- def test_job_env_enters_at_first_step(self):
170
- recs = analyse(w="""
171
- on: issues
172
- permissions: {}
173
- jobs:
174
- j:
175
- runs-on: ubuntu-latest
206
+ ENV = """
207
+ on: issues
208
+ permissions: {}
209
+ jobs:
210
+ j:
211
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
212
+ env:
213
+ TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
214
+ steps:
215
+ - name: first
216
+ run: %s
217
+ - name: second
218
+ run: %s
176
219
  env:
177
- TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
178
- steps:
179
- - name: first
180
- run: true
181
- - name: second
182
- run: ./x
183
- env:
184
- T: ${{ secrets.T }}
185
- """)
220
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}%s
221
+ """
222
+
223
+ def test_env_variable_alone_is_not_an_entry(self):
224
+ # The recommended pattern: the text reaches the script as data.
225
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % ("true", 'echo "$TITLE"', "")), [])
226
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % (
227
+ "true", 'echo "$BODY"', "\n BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}")), [])
228
+
229
+ def test_env_expression_is_an_entry_where_it_is_expanded(self):
230
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % ("true", "echo ${{ env.TITLE }}", ""))
231
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
232
+ [("issues:github.event.issue.title", "second", "secrets.T")])
233
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % ("echo ${{ env.title }}", "./x", ""))
186
234
  self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
187
235
  [("issues:github.event.issue.title", "second", "secrets.T")])
188
236
 
237
+ def test_step_env_expression_and_override(self):
238
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % (
239
+ "true", "echo ${{ env.BODY }}",
240
+ "\n BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}"))
241
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
242
+ [("issues:github.event.issue.body", "second", "secrets.T")])
243
+ # A step that sets the variable to a fixed value no longer carries the title.
244
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % (
245
+ "true", "echo ${{ env.TITLE }}", "\n TITLE: fixed")), [])
246
+
247
+ FILES = """
248
+ on: %s
249
+ jobs:
250
+ j:
251
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
252
+ steps:
253
+ - id: Changed
254
+ uses: %s
255
+ - name: list
256
+ run: for f in ${{ steps.changed.outputs.%s }}; do echo "$f"; done
257
+ env:
258
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}%s
259
+ """
260
+
261
+ def test_changed_file_names_are_an_entry(self):
262
+ for action in ("tj-actions/changed-files@v40", "Ana06/get-changed-files@v2",
263
+ "jitterbit/get-changed-files@v1"):
264
+ recs = analyse(w=self.FILES % ("pull_request_target", action, "all_changed_files", ""))
265
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs], [
266
+ ("pull_request_target:changed file names", "list", "permissions:default"),
267
+ ("pull_request_target:changed file names", "list", "secrets.T")])
268
+
269
+ def test_changed_file_counts_and_other_steps_are_not(self):
270
+ for output in ("all_changed_files_count", "any_changed", "only_modified"):
271
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.FILES % (
272
+ "pull_request_target", "tj-actions/changed-files@v40", output, "")), [])
273
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.FILES % (
274
+ "pull_request_target", "actions/setup-python@v5", "all_changed_files", "")), [])
275
+
276
+ def test_changed_file_names_through_env_are_data(self):
277
+ text = (self.FILES % ("pull_request_target", "tj-actions/changed-files@v40", "x", "")
278
+ ).replace("${{ steps.changed.outputs.x }}", '"$FILES"').replace(
279
+ "T: ${{ secrets.T }}",
280
+ "T: ${{ secrets.T }}\n FILES: ${{ steps.changed.outputs.all }}")
281
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=text), [])
282
+
189
283
  def test_secret_before_entry_is_not_reached(self):
190
284
  recs = analyse(w="""
191
285
  on: pull_request_target
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
1
+ import contextlib
2
+ import importlib.util
3
+ import io
4
+ import json
5
+ import os
6
+ import shutil
7
+ import tempfile
8
+ import unittest
9
+
10
+ ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
11
+ spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
12
+ "benchmark_run", os.path.join(ROOT, "benchmark", "run.py"))
13
+ bench = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
14
+ spec.loader.exec_module(bench)
15
+
16
+ WORKFLOW = """\
17
+ on: pull_request_target
18
+ jobs:
19
+ j:
20
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
21
+ steps:
22
+ - run: echo "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
23
+ env:
24
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}
25
+ """
26
+
27
+
28
+ def rec(source, workflow=".github/workflows/a.yml"):
29
+ return {"source": source, "workflow": workflow}
30
+
31
+
32
+ class PureTests(unittest.TestCase):
33
+ def test_category(self):
34
+ self.assertEqual(bench.category("issues:event text read by agent"), "agent")
35
+ self.assertEqual(bench.category("pull_request_target:checkout of pull request head"),
36
+ "head-code")
37
+ self.assertEqual(bench.category("pull_request_target:fetch of pull request head"),
38
+ "head-code")
39
+ self.assertEqual(bench.category("a@b>workflow_run:artifact from upstream run"), "artifact")
40
+ self.assertEqual(bench.category("issues:github.event.issue.title"), "expression")
41
+
42
+ def test_summarise(self):
43
+ records = [rec("issues:github.event.issue.title"), rec("issues:event text read by agent")]
44
+ self.assertEqual(bench.summarise(records, 1), {
45
+ "records": 2, "refused": 1, "by_category": {"agent": 1, "expression": 1},
46
+ "agent_files_by_gate": {"unknown": 1}})
47
+
48
+ def test_agent_gates_count_files(self):
49
+ def agent(workflow, detail):
50
+ return {"source": "issues:event text read by agent", "workflow": workflow,
51
+ "detail": detail}
52
+ records = [agent("a.yml", "gate=anyone; tools=action-default"),
53
+ agent("a.yml", "gate=anyone; tools=action-default"),
54
+ agent("b.yml", "gate=anyone; sandbox=read-only"),
55
+ agent("c.yml", "gate=write-access"),
56
+ {"source": "issues:github.event.issue.title", "workflow": "d.yml",
57
+ "detail": "-"}]
58
+ self.assertEqual(bench.agent_gates(records), {"anyone": 2, "write-access": 1})
59
+
60
+ def test_files_and_compare(self):
61
+ records = [rec("issues:github.event.issue.title", ".github/workflows/a.yml"),
62
+ rec("issues:event text read by agent", ".github/workflows/b.yml")]
63
+ self.assertEqual(bench.injection_files(records), {"a.yml"})
64
+ self.assertEqual(bench.agent_files(records), {"b.yml"})
65
+ findings = [
66
+ {"ident": "template-injection",
67
+ "locations": [{"symbolic": {"key": {"Local": {"given_path": "x/.github/workflows/c.yaml"}}}}]},
68
+ {"ident": "unpinned-uses",
69
+ "locations": [{"symbolic": {"key": {"Local": {"given_path": "x/.github/workflows/a.yml"}}}}]},
70
+ ]
71
+ self.assertEqual(bench.zizmor_files(findings), {"c.yaml"})
72
+ self.assertEqual(bench.compare({"a.yml", "b.yml"}, {"b.yml", "c.yml"}),
73
+ {"both": 1, "trust-path only": 1, "zizmor only": 1})
74
+
75
+
76
+ class LocalCorpusTests(unittest.TestCase):
77
+ def test_shipped_agent_workflows_match_the_expected_file(self):
78
+ """The agent workflows beside the script need no network."""
79
+ tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
80
+ self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, tmp)
81
+ here = os.path.join(ROOT, "benchmark")
82
+ corpus = os.path.join(here, "agents-only.json")
83
+ with open(os.path.join(here, "expected.json")) as f:
84
+ expected = {"agents": json.load(f)["agents"]}
85
+ with open(os.path.join(tmp, "expected.json"), "w") as f:
86
+ json.dump(expected, f)
87
+ out = io.StringIO()
88
+ with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out):
89
+ code = bench.main(["--corpus", corpus, "--expected",
90
+ os.path.join(tmp, "expected.json")])
91
+ self.assertEqual(code, 0, out.getvalue())
92
+ self.assertEqual(expected["agents"]["agent_files_by_gate"],
93
+ {"anyone": 3, "none": 2, "write-access": 2})
94
+
95
+
96
+ class RunTests(unittest.TestCase):
97
+ """main() on a workflow already in the cache, so nothing is fetched."""
98
+
99
+ def setUp(self):
100
+ self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
101
+ self.addCleanup(shutil.rmtree, self.tmp)
102
+ commit = "0123456789abcdef0123"
103
+ wdir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "cache", "repo-" + commit[:12], ".github", "workflows")
104
+ os.makedirs(wdir)
105
+ with open(os.path.join(wdir, "w.yml"), "w") as f:
106
+ f.write(WORKFLOW)
107
+ self.corpus = os.path.join(self.tmp, "corpus.json")
108
+ with open(self.corpus, "w") as f:
109
+ json.dump([{"url": "https://example.invalid/owner/repo", "commit": commit}], f)
110
+ self.expected = os.path.join(self.tmp, "expected.json")
111
+
112
+ def run_main(self, *extra):
113
+ out = io.StringIO()
114
+ with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out):
115
+ code = bench.main(["--corpus", self.corpus, "--expected", self.expected,
116
+ "--cache", os.path.join(self.tmp, "cache")] + list(extra))
117
+ return code, out.getvalue()
118
+
119
+ def test_update_then_match_then_differ(self):
120
+ self.assertEqual(self.run_main("--update")[0], 0)
121
+ with open(self.expected) as f:
122
+ self.assertEqual(json.load(f), {"repo": {
123
+ "records": 2, "refused": 0, "by_category": {"expression": 2},
124
+ "agent_files_by_gate": {}}})
125
+ code, out = self.run_main()
126
+ self.assertEqual(code, 0)
127
+ self.assertIn("trust-path counts match", out)
128
+ with open(self.expected, "w") as f:
129
+ json.dump({"repo": {"records": 3, "refused": 0, "by_category": {"expression": 3},
130
+ "agent_files_by_gate": {}}}, f)
131
+ code, out = self.run_main()
132
+ self.assertEqual(code, 1)
133
+ self.assertIn("DIFFERENT", out)
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
1
1
  """trust-path: map paths from untrusted input to secrets in GitHub Actions workflows."""
2
2
 
3
- __version__ = "0.2.0"
3
+ __version__ = "0.4.0"
@@ -85,11 +85,31 @@ AGENT_GATES = {
85
85
  "anthropics/claude-code-action": "allowed_non_write_users",
86
86
  "openai/codex-action": "allow-users",
87
87
  }
88
+ # Agent actions with no input or check of their own for who starts them:
89
+ # whoever can trigger the workflow starts the agent.
90
+ AGENT_UNGATED = (
91
+ "actions/ai-inference",
92
+ "anthropics/claude-code-base-action",
93
+ "google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli",
94
+ )
95
+ # What an `if:` condition tests when it restricts who started the run.
96
+ _IF_TESTS = (
97
+ ("actor", re.compile(r"github\.(triggering_)?actor\b|\b(sender|user)\.login\b")),
98
+ ("author_association", re.compile(r"\bauthor_association\b")),
99
+ )
88
100
  _CLAUDE_FLAGS = re.compile(
89
101
  r"--(allowed-?tools|disallowed-?tools|permission-mode|dangerously-skip-permissions)"
90
102
  r"(?:(?:\s+|=)(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s-]\S*))?", re.I)
91
103
  _CLAUDE_NAMES = {"allowedtools": "allowedTools", "disallowedtools": "disallowedTools"}
92
104
 
105
+ # Actions whose outputs list the names of the files a pull request changes.
106
+ # The author of the pull request chooses those names.
107
+ FILENAME_ACTIONS = (
108
+ "ana06/get-changed-files",
109
+ "jitterbit/get-changed-files",
110
+ "tj-actions/changed-files",
111
+ )
112
+
93
113
  # Actions that download artifacts from another workflow run.
94
114
  ARTIFACT_ACTIONS = ("actions/download-artifact", "dawidd6/action-download-artifact")
95
115
 
@@ -101,7 +121,7 @@ WRITE_SCOPES = ("actions", "contents", "discussions", "id-token", "issues", "pac
101
121
 
102
122
  _EXPR = re.compile(r"\$\{\{(.*?)\}\}", re.S)
103
123
  _CONTEXT = re.compile(
104
- r"(?<![\w.-])(github|inputs|secrets)((?:\.[A-Za-z_*][\w*-]*|\[[^\]]*\])*)")
124
+ r"(?<![\w.-])(github|inputs|secrets|env|steps)((?:\.[A-Za-z_*][\w*-]*|\[[^\]]*\])*)")
105
125
 
106
126
 
107
127
  def _norm(name):
@@ -169,9 +189,11 @@ def _action(uses):
169
189
  return "/".join(uses.split("@")[0].split("/")[:2]).lower()
170
190
 
171
191
 
172
- def agent_detail(action, with_):
173
- """What the workflow sets on an agent action: who may start it (gate)
174
- and what it may do. Values are the workflow's own, not a judgement."""
192
+ def agent_detail(action, with_, conditions=()):
193
+ """What the workflow sets on an agent action: who may start it (gate),
194
+ what the job's and step's `if:` conditions test about the person who
195
+ started the run, and what the agent may do. Values are the workflow's
196
+ own, not a judgement; conditions are not evaluated."""
175
197
  def text(key):
176
198
  return with_[key].strip() if isinstance(with_.get(key), str) else ""
177
199
 
@@ -181,7 +203,11 @@ def agent_detail(action, with_):
181
203
  parts.append("gate=" + ("write-access" if not gate else "anyone" if gate == "*"
182
204
  else "expression" if "${{" in gate else "listed-users"))
183
205
  else:
184
- parts.append("gate=not-modelled")
206
+ parts.append("gate=none" if action in AGENT_UNGATED else "gate=not-modelled")
207
+ text_if = " ".join(c for c in conditions if isinstance(c, str))
208
+ tests = [name for name, pattern in _IF_TESTS if pattern.search(text_if)]
209
+ if tests:
210
+ parts.append("if=" + "+".join(tests))
185
211
  if action.startswith("anthropics/"):
186
212
  flags = []
187
213
  for m in _CLAUDE_FLAGS.finditer(text("claude_args")):
@@ -416,16 +442,38 @@ class Repo(object):
416
442
  job_sinks.add("environment:" + env)
417
443
  job_sinks |= allowed(secret_names(shared_env))
418
444
 
445
+ def tainted(env):
446
+ """Environment variable name -> the untrusted contexts its value
447
+ expands. A variable only carries the text as data; it becomes an
448
+ entry where a ${{ env.NAME }} expression pastes it into a step."""
449
+ out = {}
450
+ for key in sorted(env) if isinstance(env, dict) else ():
451
+ out[key.upper()] = untrusted(contexts(env[key]), ctx.trigger, ctx.tainted_inputs)
452
+ return out
453
+
454
+ shared = {}
455
+ for env in shared_env:
456
+ shared.update(tainted(env))
457
+
419
458
  # Where untrusted input enters the job: (step index, source).
420
459
  entries = set()
421
460
  details = {}
422
- if steps:
423
- for name in untrusted(contexts(shared_env), ctx.trigger, ctx.tainted_inputs):
424
- entries.add((0, name))
461
+ listers = set(s["id"].lower() for s in steps if isinstance(s.get("id"), str)
462
+ and _action(s.get("uses")) in FILENAME_ACTIONS)
425
463
  for i, step in enumerate(steps):
426
- fields = [step.get("run"), step.get("with"), step.get("env")]
427
- for name in untrusted(contexts(fields), ctx.trigger, ctx.tainted_inputs):
464
+ variables = dict(shared, **tainted(step.get("env")))
465
+ used = contexts([step.get("run"), step.get("with")])
466
+ for name in untrusted(used, ctx.trigger, ctx.tainted_inputs):
428
467
  entries.add((i, name))
468
+ for name in used:
469
+ if name.startswith("env."):
470
+ for origin in variables.get(name[4:].upper(), ()):
471
+ entries.add((i, origin))
472
+ part = name.lower().split(".")
473
+ if part[0] == "steps" and len(part) > 3 and part[1] in listers and \
474
+ part[2] == "outputs" and not part[3].endswith("_count") and \
475
+ not part[3].startswith(("any_", "only_")):
476
+ entries.add((i, "changed file names"))
429
477
  action = _action(step.get("uses"))
430
478
  with_ = step.get("with") if isinstance(step.get("with"), dict) else {}
431
479
  head = ctx.trigger not in _REVIEW
@@ -439,7 +487,7 @@ class Repo(object):
439
487
  entries.add((i, "artifact from upstream run"))
440
488
  if action in AGENT_ACTIONS:
441
489
  entries.add((i, "event text read by agent"))
442
- details[i] = agent_detail(action, with_)
490
+ details[i] = agent_detail(action, with_, (job.get("if"), step.get("if")))
443
491
 
444
492
  for start, what in sorted(entries):
445
493
  source = "%s:%s" % (ctx.chain, what)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: trust-path
3
- Version: 0.2.0
3
+ Version: 0.4.0
4
4
  Summary: List the paths by which untrusted input can reach secrets and publishing credentials in GitHub Actions workflows.
5
5
  License-Expression: Apache-2.0
6
6
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path
@@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ pip installs `trust-path` as a console script. Without installing, it runs from
71
71
  workflow or after a `pull_request` workflow (followed through chains), or when it is a local
72
72
  reusable workflow called from such a run.
73
73
  3. **Find where input enters each job.** A step enters untrusted input when it uses a context such
74
- as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:`, `with:` or `env:`, checks out or fetches the pull
75
- request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, or is an AI agent action.
74
+ as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:` or `with:` (directly, or through
75
+ `${{ env.NAME }}`), checks out or fetches the pull request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, expands the changed file names of a pull
76
+ request, or is an AI agent action.
76
77
  4. **Collect what it reaches.** The entry step and every later step of the same job are reached.
77
78
  trust-path collects the secrets they use and the job's write permissions, `id-token: write`,
78
79
  environment and AI agent actions holding a credential.
@@ -123,6 +124,8 @@ key and can write text into issues that other workflows and agents read. Run `tr
123
124
  list and the YAML subset.
124
125
  - [Command](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/commands.md): output fields, JSON, exit status and an example across workflows.
125
126
  - [Limitations and security](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/limitations-and-security.md): what trust-path does not see, read or do.
127
+ - [Benchmark](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/benchmark.md): a repeatable run on pinned public workflows, with a
128
+ per-file comparison against zizmor
126
129
  - [Using it with other tools](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/other-tools.md): a tested stack with git surface
127
130
  and git-overlap, and what zizmor and poutine cover and what trust-path adds.
128
131
  - [Contributing](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): running the tests and contributing a change.
@@ -4,8 +4,21 @@ README.md
4
4
  pyproject.toml
5
5
  .github/workflows/release.yml
6
6
  .github/workflows/test.yml
7
+ benchmark/agents-only.json
8
+ benchmark/corpus.json
9
+ benchmark/expected.json
10
+ benchmark/run.py
11
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-gated.yml
12
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-open.yml
13
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/claude-restricted.yml
14
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/codex-gated.yml
15
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/codex-read-only.yml
16
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/gemini-author-check.yml
17
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/gemini.yml
18
+ benchmark/fixtures/agents/.github/workflows/no-credential.yml
7
19
  tests/__init__.py
8
20
  tests/test_analyze.py
21
+ tests/test_benchmark.py
9
22
  tests/test_cli.py
10
23
  tests/test_yamlsubset.py
11
24
  tests/fixtures/agent/.github/workflows/triage.yml
File without changes
File without changes
File without changes
File without changes
File without changes