trust-path 0.1.0__tar.gz → 0.3.0__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (40) hide show
  1. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/.github/workflows/test.yml +1 -0
  2. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/MANIFEST.in +2 -0
  3. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/PKG-INFO +20 -13
  4. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/README.md +19 -12
  5. trust_path-0.3.0/benchmark/corpus.json +10 -0
  6. trust_path-0.3.0/benchmark/expected.json +17 -0
  7. trust_path-0.3.0/benchmark/run.py +147 -0
  8. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  9. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/agent/.github/workflows/triage.yml +2 -0
  10. {trust_path-0.1.0/tests/fixtures/anchors → trust_path-0.3.0/tests/fixtures/tags}/.github/workflows/a.yml +1 -2
  11. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/test_analyze.py +156 -19
  12. trust_path-0.3.0/tests/test_benchmark.py +98 -0
  13. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/test_cli.py +24 -19
  14. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/test_yamlsubset.py +48 -9
  15. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path/__init__.py +1 -1
  16. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path/analyze.py +90 -12
  17. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path/cli.py +2 -2
  18. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path/yamlsubset.py +65 -9
  19. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path.egg-info/PKG-INFO +20 -13
  20. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +5 -1
  21. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/.github/workflows/release.yml +0 -0
  22. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
  23. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
  24. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  25. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/head_checkout/.github/workflows/build.yml +0 -0
  26. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/missing_call/.github/workflows/call.yml +0 -0
  27. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/pr_title/.github/workflows/greet.yml +0 -0
  28. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/reusable/.github/workflows/on-comment.yml +0 -0
  29. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/reusable/.github/workflows/reply.yml +0 -0
  30. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/echo-title.yml +0 -0
  31. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/label.yml +0 -0
  32. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/release.yml +0 -0
  33. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/safe/.github/workflows/test.yml +0 -0
  34. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/ci.yml +0 -0
  35. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/publish.yml +0 -0
  36. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/tests/fixtures/workflow_run_chain/.github/workflows/stage.yml +0 -0
  37. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path/__main__.py +0 -0
  38. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
  39. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
  40. {trust_path-0.1.0 → trust_path-0.3.0}/trust_path.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ name: test
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  on:
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  push:
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+ branches: [main]
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  pull_request:
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  permissions:
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
1
1
  # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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  # The sdist carries the test suite and everything it reads, so the tests run from it.
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  graft tests
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+ graft benchmark
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  graft .github/workflows
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  prune tests/__pycache__
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+ prune benchmark/__pycache__
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
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  Name: trust-path
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- Version: 0.1.0
3
+ Version: 0.3.0
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4
  Summary: List the paths by which untrusted input can reach secrets and publishing credentials in GitHub Actions workflows.
5
5
  License-Expression: Apache-2.0
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6
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path
@@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ pip installs `trust-path` as a console script. Without installing, it runs from
71
71
  workflow or after a `pull_request` workflow (followed through chains), or when it is a local
72
72
  reusable workflow called from such a run.
73
73
  3. **Find where input enters each job.** A step enters untrusted input when it uses a context such
74
- as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:`, `with:` or `env:`, checks out or fetches the pull
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- request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, or is an AI agent action.
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+ as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:` or `with:` (directly, or through
75
+ `${{ env.NAME }}`), checks out or fetches the pull request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, expands the changed file names of a pull
76
+ request, or is an AI agent action.
76
77
  4. **Collect what it reaches.** The entry step and every later step of the same job are reached.
77
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  trust-path collects the secrets they use and the job's write permissions, `id-token: write`,
78
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  environment and AI agent actions holding a credential.
79
- 5. **Print one record per path.** Each record is `source`, `workflow`, `job`, `step` and `sink`,
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+ 5. **Print one record per path.** Each record is `source`, `workflow`, `job`, `step`, `sink` and `detail`,
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81
  tab-separated and sorted. Like `grep`, trust-path exits 1 when it finds a path, 0 when it finds
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  none and 2 on an error, including any refused file.
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@@ -100,18 +101,22 @@ trust-path tests/fixtures/agent
100
101
  ```
101
102
 
102
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  ```text
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- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action
104
- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write
105
- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
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- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action
107
- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write
108
- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
104
+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action gate=anyone; tools=action-default
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+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write gate=anyone; tools=action-default
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+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY gate=anyone; tools=action-default
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+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN gate=anyone; tools=action-default
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+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action gate=anyone; tools=action-default
109
+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write -
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+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY -
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+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN -
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  ```
110
113
 
111
114
  The workflow runs when an issue is opened and gives `anthropics/claude-code-action` the issue body
112
- in its prompt, an API key and a token that can write issues. Anyone who can open an issue writes
113
- that text, and the agent acts on it while holding the key and can write text into issues that
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- other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to check its workflows.
115
+ in its prompt, an API key and a token that can write issues. The last field shows how the workflow
116
+ sets the agent up: `gate=anyone` because `allowed_non_write_users` is `*`, so the agent runs for
117
+ users without write access, and `tools=action-default` because the workflow does not limit its
118
+ tools. Anyone who can open an issue writes that text, and the agent acts on it while holding the
119
+ key and can write text into issues that other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to check its workflows.
115
120
 
116
121
  ## Documentation
117
122
 
@@ -119,6 +124,8 @@ other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to
119
124
  list and the YAML subset.
120
125
  - [Command](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/commands.md): output fields, JSON, exit status and an example across workflows.
121
126
  - [Limitations and security](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/limitations-and-security.md): what trust-path does not see, read or do.
127
+ - [Benchmark](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/benchmark.md): a repeatable run on pinned public workflows, with a
128
+ per-file comparison against zizmor
122
129
  - [Using it with other tools](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/other-tools.md): a tested stack with git surface
123
130
  and git-overlap, and what zizmor and poutine cover and what trust-path adds.
124
131
  - [Contributing](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): running the tests and contributing a change.
@@ -50,12 +50,13 @@ pip installs `trust-path` as a console script. Without installing, it runs from
50
50
  workflow or after a `pull_request` workflow (followed through chains), or when it is a local
51
51
  reusable workflow called from such a run.
52
52
  3. **Find where input enters each job.** A step enters untrusted input when it uses a context such
53
- as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:`, `with:` or `env:`, checks out or fetches the pull
54
- request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, or is an AI agent action.
53
+ as `github.event.pull_request.title` in `run:` or `with:` (directly, or through
54
+ `${{ env.NAME }}`), checks out or fetches the pull request's head, downloads an artifact from the upstream run, expands the changed file names of a pull
55
+ request, or is an AI agent action.
55
56
  4. **Collect what it reaches.** The entry step and every later step of the same job are reached.
56
57
  trust-path collects the secrets they use and the job's write permissions, `id-token: write`,
57
58
  environment and AI agent actions holding a credential.
58
- 5. **Print one record per path.** Each record is `source`, `workflow`, `job`, `step` and `sink`,
59
+ 5. **Print one record per path.** Each record is `source`, `workflow`, `job`, `step`, `sink` and `detail`,
59
60
  tab-separated and sorted. Like `grep`, trust-path exits 1 when it finds a path, 0 when it finds
60
61
  none and 2 on an error, including any refused file.
61
62
 
@@ -79,18 +80,22 @@ trust-path tests/fixtures/agent
79
80
  ```
80
81
 
81
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  ```text
82
- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action
83
- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write
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- issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
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- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action
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- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write
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- issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
83
+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action gate=anyone; tools=action-default
84
+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write gate=anyone; tools=action-default
85
+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY gate=anyone; tools=action-default
86
+ issues:event text read by agent .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN gate=anyone; tools=action-default
87
+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 agent:anthropics/claude-code-action gate=anyone; tools=action-default
88
+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 permissions.issues:write -
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+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY -
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+ issues:github.event.issue.body .github/workflows/triage.yml triage anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN -
88
91
  ```
89
92
 
90
93
  The workflow runs when an issue is opened and gives `anthropics/claude-code-action` the issue body
91
- in its prompt, an API key and a token that can write issues. Anyone who can open an issue writes
92
- that text, and the agent acts on it while holding the key and can write text into issues that
93
- other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to check its workflows.
94
+ in its prompt, an API key and a token that can write issues. The last field shows how the workflow
95
+ sets the agent up: `gate=anyone` because `allowed_non_write_users` is `*`, so the agent runs for
96
+ users without write access, and `tools=action-default` because the workflow does not limit its
97
+ tools. Anyone who can open an issue writes that text, and the agent acts on it while holding the
98
+ key and can write text into issues that other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to check its workflows.
94
99
 
95
100
  ## Documentation
96
101
 
@@ -98,6 +103,8 @@ other workflows and agents read. Run `trust-path .` in a repository checkout to
98
103
  list and the YAML subset.
99
104
  - [Command](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/commands.md): output fields, JSON, exit status and an example across workflows.
100
105
  - [Limitations and security](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/limitations-and-security.md): what trust-path does not see, read or do.
106
+ - [Benchmark](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/benchmark.md): a repeatable run on pinned public workflows, with a
107
+ per-file comparison against zizmor
101
108
  - [Using it with other tools](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/docs/other-tools.md): a tested stack with git surface
102
109
  and git-overlap, and what zizmor and poutine cover and what trust-path adds.
103
110
  - [Contributing](https://github.com/jacob-adm/trust-path/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md): running the tests and contributing a change.
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
1
+ [
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+ {
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+ "url": "https://github.com/messypoutine/gravy-overflow",
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+ "commit": "cbff1a67a804d10e2fe00e18e9c4b2f4bf9d89ce"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "url": "https://github.com/step-security/github-actions-goat",
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+ "commit": "4da23c8602b4589bacdf7de77240113e02cdb884"
9
+ }
10
+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
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+ {
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+ "github-actions-goat": {
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+ "by_category": {
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+ "head-code": 2
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+ },
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+ "records": 2,
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+ "refused": 0
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+ },
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+ "gravy-overflow": {
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+ "by_category": {
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+ "expression": 52,
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+ "head-code": 19
13
+ },
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+ "records": 71,
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+ "refused": 1
16
+ }
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+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
1
+ # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2
+ """Run trust-path, and zizmor when it is installed, on pinned commits of
3
+ public repositories and compare what they report per workflow file.
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+
5
+ python3 benchmark/run.py [--corpus FILE] [--expected FILE] [--cache DIR] [--update]
6
+
7
+ Exit status: 0 the trust-path counts match the expected file, 1 they differ,
8
+ 2 a repository could not be fetched or a tool failed.
9
+ """
10
+
11
+ import argparse
12
+ import collections
13
+ import json
14
+ import os
15
+ import re
16
+ import shutil
17
+ import subprocess
18
+ import sys
19
+ import tempfile
20
+
21
+ HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
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+ ZIZMOR = ["zizmor", "--offline", "--no-config", "--persona", "auditor", "--format", "json"]
23
+ _WORKFLOW = re.compile(r"workflows/([\w.-]+\.ya?ml)")
24
+
25
+
26
+ def category(source):
27
+ """The kind of entry a trust-path source field names."""
28
+ what = source.rsplit(":", 1)[-1]
29
+ if what == "event text read by agent":
30
+ return "agent"
31
+ if what.endswith("of pull request head"):
32
+ return "head-code"
33
+ if what == "artifact from upstream run":
34
+ return "artifact"
35
+ return "expression"
36
+
37
+
38
+ def summarise(records, refused):
39
+ """The counts kept in the expected file for one repository."""
40
+ by = collections.Counter(category(r["source"]) for r in records)
41
+ return {"records": len(records), "refused": refused, "by_category": dict(sorted(by.items()))}
42
+
43
+
44
+ def injection_files(records):
45
+ """Workflow files where trust-path reports pasted text or fork code."""
46
+ return set(os.path.basename(r["workflow"]) for r in records
47
+ if category(r["source"]) in ("expression", "head-code"))
48
+
49
+
50
+ def agent_files(records):
51
+ return set(os.path.basename(r["workflow"]) for r in records
52
+ if category(r["source"]) == "agent")
53
+
54
+
55
+ def zizmor_files(findings, ident="template-injection"):
56
+ """Workflow files where zizmor reports a finding of kind `ident`."""
57
+ out = set()
58
+ for f in findings:
59
+ if f.get("ident") == ident:
60
+ out.update(_WORKFLOW.findall(json.dumps(f.get("locations", []))))
61
+ return out
62
+
63
+
64
+ def compare(ours, theirs):
65
+ return {"both": len(ours & theirs), "trust-path only": len(ours - theirs),
66
+ "zizmor only": len(theirs - ours)}
67
+
68
+
69
+ def _run(cmd, cwd=None, ok=(0,)):
70
+ p = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
71
+ universal_newlines=True)
72
+ if p.returncode not in ok:
73
+ raise RuntimeError("%s: exit %d: %s" % (" ".join(cmd[:2]), p.returncode,
74
+ p.stderr.strip()[:200]))
75
+ return p
76
+
77
+
78
+ def fetch(url, commit, dest):
79
+ """Check out .github/workflows of `url` at `commit` into `dest`."""
80
+ if os.path.isdir(os.path.join(dest, ".github", "workflows")):
81
+ return
82
+ os.makedirs(dest)
83
+ _run(["git", "init", "-q"], dest)
84
+ _run(["git", "fetch", "-q", "--depth", "1", "--filter=blob:none", url, commit], dest)
85
+ _run(["git", "checkout", "-q", "FETCH_HEAD", "--", ".github/workflows"], dest)
86
+
87
+
88
+ def main(argv=None):
89
+ parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.split("\n\n")[0])
90
+ parser.add_argument("--corpus", default=os.path.join(HERE, "corpus.json"))
91
+ parser.add_argument("--expected", default=os.path.join(HERE, "expected.json"))
92
+ parser.add_argument("--cache", help="directory to keep the fetched workflows in")
93
+ parser.add_argument("--update", action="store_true", help="rewrite the expected file")
94
+ args = parser.parse_args(argv)
95
+ with open(args.corpus) as f:
96
+ corpus = json.load(f)
97
+ cache = args.cache or tempfile.mkdtemp()
98
+ have_zizmor = shutil.which("zizmor") is not None
99
+ actual = {}
100
+ try:
101
+ if have_zizmor:
102
+ print("zizmor: %s" % _run(["zizmor", "--version"]).stdout.strip())
103
+ else:
104
+ print("zizmor: not installed, comparison skipped")
105
+ for repo in corpus:
106
+ name = repo["url"].rstrip("/").split("/")[-1]
107
+ dest = os.path.join(cache, name + "-" + repo["commit"][:12])
108
+ fetch(repo["url"], repo["commit"], dest)
109
+ p = _run([sys.executable, "-m", "trust_path", "--json", dest],
110
+ cwd=os.path.dirname(HERE), ok=(0, 1, 2))
111
+ records = json.loads(p.stdout)
112
+ refused = len(p.stderr.splitlines())
113
+ actual[name] = summarise(records, refused)
114
+ files = os.listdir(os.path.join(dest, ".github", "workflows"))
115
+ print("\n%s @ %s (%d workflow files)" % (name, repo["commit"][:12], len(files)))
116
+ print(" trust-path: %(records)d records, %(refused)d files refused, "
117
+ "%(by_category)s" % actual[name])
118
+ print(" trust-path: %d files with an agent path" % len(agent_files(records)))
119
+ if have_zizmor:
120
+ findings = json.loads(_run(ZIZMOR + [dest], ok=tuple(range(15))).stdout or "[]")
121
+ print(" injection, by workflow file: %s" % compare(
122
+ injection_files(records), zizmor_files(findings)))
123
+ except (RuntimeError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
124
+ sys.stderr.write("benchmark: %s\n" % e)
125
+ return 2
126
+ finally:
127
+ if not args.cache:
128
+ shutil.rmtree(cache, ignore_errors=True)
129
+ if args.update:
130
+ with open(args.expected, "w") as f:
131
+ json.dump(actual, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
132
+ f.write("\n")
133
+ return 0
134
+ with open(args.expected) as f:
135
+ expected = json.load(f)
136
+ if actual != expected:
137
+ print("\nDIFFERENT from %s:" % args.expected)
138
+ for name in sorted(set(actual) | set(expected)):
139
+ if actual.get(name) != expected.get(name):
140
+ print(" %s: expected %s, got %s" % (name, expected.get(name), actual.get(name)))
141
+ return 1
142
+ print("\ntrust-path counts match %s" % os.path.basename(args.expected))
143
+ return 0
144
+
145
+
146
+ if __name__ == "__main__":
147
+ sys.exit(main())
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
5
5
 
6
6
  [project]
7
7
  name = "trust-path"
8
- version = "0.1.0"
8
+ version = "0.3.0"
9
9
  description = "List the paths by which untrusted input can reach secrets and publishing credentials in GitHub Actions workflows."
10
10
  readme = "README.md"
11
11
  requires-python = ">=3.9"
@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ jobs:
14
14
  Label this issue:
15
15
  ${{ github.event.issue.body }}
16
16
  anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
17
+ github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
18
+ allowed_non_write_users: "*"
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
1
1
  on: push
2
2
  jobs:
3
- a: &job
3
+ a: !!map
4
4
  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
5
5
  steps:
6
6
  - run: true
7
- b: *job
@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ from trust_path.analyze import AnalysisError, Repo
9
9
 
10
10
  def analyse(**workflows):
11
11
  """Analyse a repository made of the given name=text workflow files and
12
- return its records as (source, workflow, job, step, sink) tuples."""
12
+ return its records as (source, workflow, job, step, sink) tuples; with
13
+ detail=True, as (source, workflow, job, step, sink, detail) tuples."""
14
+ width = 6 if workflows.pop("detail", False) else 5
13
15
  tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
14
16
  try:
15
17
  wdir = os.path.join(tmp, ".github", "workflows")
@@ -17,11 +19,89 @@ def analyse(**workflows):
17
19
  for name, text in workflows.items():
18
20
  with open(os.path.join(wdir, name + ".yml"), "w") as f:
19
21
  f.write(textwrap.dedent(text))
20
- return [tuple(r) for r in Repo(tmp).analyse()]
22
+ return sorted(set(tuple(r)[:width] for r in Repo(tmp).analyse()))
21
23
  finally:
22
24
  shutil.rmtree(tmp)
23
25
 
24
26
 
27
+ def details(recs):
28
+ return sorted(set(r[5] for r in recs))
29
+
30
+
31
+ AGENT = """
32
+ on: issue_comment
33
+ permissions:
34
+ id-token: write
35
+ jobs:
36
+ j:
37
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
38
+ steps:
39
+ - uses: %s
40
+ with:
41
+ %s
42
+ """
43
+
44
+
45
+ def agent(uses, *inputs):
46
+ lines = "\n".join(" " + line for line in inputs or ("x: y",))
47
+ return details(analyse(w=AGENT % (uses, lines), detail=True))
48
+
49
+
50
+ class AgentDetailTests(unittest.TestCase):
51
+ def test_default_gate_is_write_access(self):
52
+ self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-action@v1"),
53
+ ["gate=write-access; tools=action-default"])
54
+ self.assertEqual(agent("openai/codex-action@v1"),
55
+ ["gate=write-access; sandbox=action-default; safety-strategy=drop-sudo"])
56
+
57
+ def test_gate_open_to_anyone(self):
58
+ self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-action@v1", 'allowed_non_write_users: "*"'),
59
+ ["gate=anyone; tools=action-default"])
60
+ self.assertEqual(agent("openai/codex-action@v1", 'allow-users: "*"', "sandbox: read-only"),
61
+ ["gate=anyone; sandbox=read-only; safety-strategy=drop-sudo"])
62
+
63
+ def test_gate_listed_users_and_expression(self):
64
+ self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-action@v1", "allowed_non_write_users: a,b"),
65
+ ["gate=listed-users; tools=action-default"])
66
+ self.assertEqual(agent("openai/codex-action@v1", "allow-users: ${{ vars.USERS }}"),
67
+ ["gate=expression; sandbox=action-default; safety-strategy=drop-sudo"])
68
+
69
+ def test_gate_not_modelled_for_other_actions(self):
70
+ self.assertEqual(agent("google-github-actions/run-gemini-cli@v0"), ["gate=not-modelled"])
71
+ self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-base-action@v1"),
72
+ ["gate=not-modelled; tools=action-default"])
73
+
74
+ def test_claude_tool_flags(self):
75
+ self.assertEqual(agent(
76
+ "anthropics/claude-code-action@v1", "claude_args: |",
77
+ " --permission-mode auto", ' --disallowedTools "WebFetch,Write"',
78
+ " --allowed-tools=Read", " --model some-model", "settings: s.json"),
79
+ ["gate=write-access; allowedTools=Read; disallowedTools=WebFetch,Write; "
80
+ "permission-mode=auto; settings=set"])
81
+ self.assertEqual(agent("anthropics/claude-code-action@v1",
82
+ "claude_args: --dangerously-skip-permissions --max-turns 3"),
83
+ ["gate=write-access; dangerously-skip-permissions"])
84
+
85
+ def test_codex_profile_and_strategy(self):
86
+ self.assertEqual(agent("openai/codex-action@v1", "permission-profile: triage",
87
+ "safety-strategy: unsafe"),
88
+ ["gate=write-access; sandbox=action-default; permission-profile=triage; "
89
+ "safety-strategy=unsafe"])
90
+
91
+ def test_other_records_have_no_detail(self):
92
+ recs = analyse(detail=True, w="""
93
+ on: pull_request_target
94
+ jobs:
95
+ j:
96
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
97
+ steps:
98
+ - run: echo "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
99
+ env:
100
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}
101
+ """)
102
+ self.assertEqual(details(recs), ["-"])
103
+
104
+
25
105
  def sinks(recs):
26
106
  return sorted(set(r[4] for r in recs))
27
107
 
@@ -86,26 +166,83 @@ class SourceTests(unittest.TestCase):
86
166
  """)
87
167
  self.assertEqual(recs, [])
88
168
 
89
- def test_job_env_enters_at_first_step(self):
90
- recs = analyse(w="""
91
- on: issues
92
- permissions: {}
93
- jobs:
94
- j:
95
- runs-on: ubuntu-latest
169
+ ENV = """
170
+ on: issues
171
+ permissions: {}
172
+ jobs:
173
+ j:
174
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
175
+ env:
176
+ TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
177
+ steps:
178
+ - name: first
179
+ run: %s
180
+ - name: second
181
+ run: %s
96
182
  env:
97
- TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
98
- steps:
99
- - name: first
100
- run: true
101
- - name: second
102
- run: ./x
103
- env:
104
- T: ${{ secrets.T }}
105
- """)
183
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}%s
184
+ """
185
+
186
+ def test_env_variable_alone_is_not_an_entry(self):
187
+ # The recommended pattern: the text reaches the script as data.
188
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % ("true", 'echo "$TITLE"', "")), [])
189
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % (
190
+ "true", 'echo "$BODY"', "\n BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}")), [])
191
+
192
+ def test_env_expression_is_an_entry_where_it_is_expanded(self):
193
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % ("true", "echo ${{ env.TITLE }}", ""))
194
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
195
+ [("issues:github.event.issue.title", "second", "secrets.T")])
196
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % ("echo ${{ env.title }}", "./x", ""))
106
197
  self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
107
198
  [("issues:github.event.issue.title", "second", "secrets.T")])
108
199
 
200
+ def test_step_env_expression_and_override(self):
201
+ recs = analyse(w=self.ENV % (
202
+ "true", "echo ${{ env.BODY }}",
203
+ "\n BODY: ${{ github.event.issue.body }}"))
204
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs],
205
+ [("issues:github.event.issue.body", "second", "secrets.T")])
206
+ # A step that sets the variable to a fixed value no longer carries the title.
207
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.ENV % (
208
+ "true", "echo ${{ env.TITLE }}", "\n TITLE: fixed")), [])
209
+
210
+ FILES = """
211
+ on: %s
212
+ jobs:
213
+ j:
214
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
215
+ steps:
216
+ - id: Changed
217
+ uses: %s
218
+ - name: list
219
+ run: for f in ${{ steps.changed.outputs.%s }}; do echo "$f"; done
220
+ env:
221
+ T: ${{ secrets.T }}%s
222
+ """
223
+
224
+ def test_changed_file_names_are_an_entry(self):
225
+ for action in ("tj-actions/changed-files@v40", "Ana06/get-changed-files@v2",
226
+ "jitterbit/get-changed-files@v1"):
227
+ recs = analyse(w=self.FILES % ("pull_request_target", action, "all_changed_files", ""))
228
+ self.assertEqual([(r[0], r[3], r[4]) for r in recs], [
229
+ ("pull_request_target:changed file names", "list", "permissions:default"),
230
+ ("pull_request_target:changed file names", "list", "secrets.T")])
231
+
232
+ def test_changed_file_counts_and_other_steps_are_not(self):
233
+ for output in ("all_changed_files_count", "any_changed", "only_modified"):
234
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.FILES % (
235
+ "pull_request_target", "tj-actions/changed-files@v40", output, "")), [])
236
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=self.FILES % (
237
+ "pull_request_target", "actions/setup-python@v5", "all_changed_files", "")), [])
238
+
239
+ def test_changed_file_names_through_env_are_data(self):
240
+ text = (self.FILES % ("pull_request_target", "tj-actions/changed-files@v40", "x", "")
241
+ ).replace("${{ steps.changed.outputs.x }}", '"$FILES"').replace(
242
+ "T: ${{ secrets.T }}",
243
+ "T: ${{ secrets.T }}\n FILES: ${{ steps.changed.outputs.all }}")
244
+ self.assertEqual(analyse(w=text), [])
245
+
109
246
  def test_secret_before_entry_is_not_reached(self):
110
247
  recs = analyse(w="""
111
248
  on: pull_request_target
@@ -367,7 +504,7 @@ class ErrorTests(unittest.TestCase):
367
504
 
368
505
  def test_yaml_error_names_file_and_line(self):
369
506
  self.assertEqual(refused(w="on: push\njobs:\n a: !!map {}\n"), [(
370
- ".github/workflows/w.yml", "line 3: anchors, aliases and tags are not supported")])
507
+ ".github/workflows/w.yml", "line 3: tags are not supported")])
371
508
 
372
509
  def test_readable_files_are_still_analysed(self):
373
510
  good = """