streamlit-nightly 1.53.2.dev20260202__tar.gz → 1.53.2.dev20260203__tar.gz

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202/streamlit_nightly.egg-info → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: streamlit-nightly
-Version: 1.53.2.dev20260202
+Version: 1.53.2.dev20260203
 Summary: A faster way to build and share data apps
 Author-email: Snowflake Inc <hello@streamlit.io>
 License-Expression: Apache-2.0

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/pyproject.toml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "streamlit-nightly"
-version = "1.53.2.dev20260202"
+version = "1.53.2.dev20260203"
 description = "A faster way to build and share data apps"
 # Note: README.md is in the repo root. The build process copies it to lib/
 # before building. See .github/workflows/release.yml.

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/streamlit/commands/logo.py

@@ -108,13 +108,13 @@ def logo(
 
     Parameters
     ----------
-    image: Anything supported by st.image (except list), emoji, or icon
+    image: Anything supported by st.image (except list) or str
         The image to display in the upper-left corner of your app and its
         sidebar. If ``icon_image`` is also provided, then Streamlit will only
         display ``image`` in the sidebar.
 
-        In addition to any of the types supported by |st.image|_ (except list),
-        the following strings are valid:
+        ``image`` can be any of the types supported by |st.image|_ except
+        a list. Additionally, the following strings are valid:
 
         - A single-character emoji. For example, you can set ``image="🏠"``
           or ``image="🚀"``. Emoji short codes are not supported.
@@ -146,19 +146,15 @@ def logo(
         The external URL to open when a user clicks on the logo. The URL must
         start with "\http://" or "\https://". If ``link`` is ``None`` (default),
         the logo will not include a hyperlink.
-    icon_image: Anything supported by st.image (except list), emoji, icon, or None
+    icon_image: Anything supported by st.image (except list), str, or None
         An optional, typically smaller image to replace ``image`` in the
-        upper-left corner when the sidebar is closed. If ``icon_image`` is
+        upper-left corner when the sidebar is closed. This can be any of the
+        types allowed for the ``image`` parameter. If ``icon_image`` is
         ``None`` (default), Streamlit will always display ``image`` in the
         upper-left corner, regardless of whether the sidebar is open or closed.
         Otherwise, Streamlit will render ``icon_image`` in the upper-left
         corner of the app when the sidebar is closed.
 
-        In addition to any of the types supported by ``st.image`` (except list),
-        this also accepts single-character emojis (e.g., ``"🏠"``) and Material
-        icons (e.g., ``":material/home:"``). See the ``image`` parameter for
-        more details on these formats.
-
         Streamlit scales the image to a max height set by ``size`` and a max
         width to fit within the sidebar. If the sidebar is closed, the max
         width is retained from when it was last open.

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/streamlit/components/v2/component_path_utils.py

@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ outside of a declared package root.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
 from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Final
 
 from streamlit.errors import StreamlitComponentRegistryError
 from streamlit.logger import get_logger
+from streamlit.path_security import is_unsafe_path_pattern
 
 _LOGGER: Final = get_logger(__name__)
 
@@ -132,7 +132,12 @@ class ComponentPathUtils:
 
     @staticmethod
     def _assert_relative_no_traversal(path: str, *, label: str) -> None:
-        """Raise if ``path`` is absolute or contains ``..`` segments.
+        """Raise if ``path`` is absolute, contains traversal, or has unsafe patterns.
+
+        This method uses the shared ``is_unsafe_path_pattern`` function to ensure
+        consistent security checks across the codebase. The shared function also
+        checks for additional patterns like null bytes, forward-slash UNC paths,
+        and drive-relative paths (e.g., ``C:foo``).
 
         Parameters
         ----------
@@ -141,34 +146,17 @@ class ComponentPathUtils:
         label : str
             Human-readable label used in error messages (e.g., "component paths").
         """
-        # Absolute path checks (POSIX, Windows drive-letter, UNC)
-        is_windows_drive_abs = (
-            len(path) >= 3
-            and path[0].isalpha()
-            and path[1] == ":"
-            and path[2] in {"/", "\\"}
-        )
-        is_unc_abs = path.startswith("\\\\")
-
-        # Consider rooted backslash paths "\\dir" as absolute on Windows-like inputs
-        is_rooted_backslash = path.startswith("\\") and not is_unc_abs
-
-        if (
-            os.path.isabs(path)
-            or is_windows_drive_abs
-            or is_unc_abs
-            or is_rooted_backslash
-        ):
-            raise StreamlitComponentRegistryError(
-                f"Absolute paths are not allowed in {label}: {path}"
-            )
-
-        # Segment-based traversal detection to avoid false positives (e.g. "file..js")
-        normalized = path.replace("\\", "/")
-        segments = [seg for seg in normalized.split("/") if seg != ""]
-        if any(seg == ".." for seg in segments):
+        if is_unsafe_path_pattern(path):
+            # Determine appropriate error message based on pattern.
+            # Use segment-based check to avoid false positives like "file..js"
+            normalized = path.replace("\\", "/")
+            segments = [seg for seg in normalized.split("/") if seg]
+            if ".." in segments:
+                raise StreamlitComponentRegistryError(
+                    f"Path traversal attempts are not allowed in {label}: {path}"
+                )
             raise StreamlitComponentRegistryError(
-                f"Path traversal attempts are not allowed in {label}: {path}"
+                f"Unsafe paths are not allowed in {label}: {path}"
             )
 
     @staticmethod

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/streamlit/config.py

@@ -621,8 +621,10 @@ _create_option(
     "client.showErrorLinks",
     description="""
         Controls whether to show external help links (Google, ChatGPT) in
-        error displays. Can be "auto" (shows on localhost only), true (always
-        show), or false (never show).
+        error displays. The following values are valid:
+        - "auto" (default): Links are shown only on localhost.
+        - True: Links are shown on all domains.
+        - False: Links are never shown.
     """,
     default_val="auto",
     type_=str,

streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203/streamlit/path_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+# Copyright (c) Streamlit Inc. (2018-2022) Snowflake Inc. (2022-2026)
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+
+"""Shared path security utilities for preventing path traversal and SSRF attacks.
+
+This module provides a centralized implementation for path validation that is
+used by multiple parts of the codebase. Having a single implementation ensures
+consistent security checks and avoids divergent behavior between components.
+
+Security Context
+----------------
+These checks are designed to run BEFORE any filesystem operations (like
+``os.path.realpath()``) to prevent Windows from triggering SMB connections
+to attacker-controlled servers when resolving UNC paths. This prevents
+SSRF attacks and NTLM hash disclosure.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import string
+
+
+def is_unsafe_path_pattern(path: str) -> bool:
+    r"""Return True if path contains UNC, absolute, drive, or traversal patterns.
+
+    This function checks for dangerous path patterns that could lead to:
+    - SSRF attacks via Windows UNC path resolution
+    - NTLM hash disclosure via SMB connections
+    - Path traversal outside intended directories
+    - Path truncation via null bytes
+
+    IMPORTANT: This check must run BEFORE any ``os.path.realpath()`` calls
+    to prevent Windows from triggering SMB connections to attacker-controlled
+    servers.
+
+    Parameters
+    ----------
+    path : str
+        The path string to validate.
+
+    Returns
+    -------
+    bool
+        True if the path contains unsafe patterns, False if it appears safe
+        for further processing.
+
+    Examples
+    --------
+    >>> is_unsafe_path_pattern("subdir/file.js")
+    False
+    >>> is_unsafe_path_pattern("\\\\server\\share")
+    True
+    >>> is_unsafe_path_pattern("../../../etc/passwd")
+    True
+    >>> is_unsafe_path_pattern("C:\\Windows\\system32")
+    True
+    """
+    # Null bytes can be used for path truncation attacks
+    if "\x00" in path:
+        return True
+
+    # UNC paths (Windows network shares, including \\?\ and \\.\ prefixes)
+    if path.startswith(("\\\\", "//")):
+        return True
+
+    # Windows drive paths (e.g. C:\, D:foo) - on Windows, os.path.realpath() on a
+    # drive path can trigger SMB connections if the drive is mapped to a network share.
+    # This enables SSRF attacks and NTLM hash disclosure. We reject all drive-qualified
+    # paths including drive-relative paths like "C:foo" which resolve against the current
+    # directory of that drive. Checked on all platforms for defense-in-depth and
+    # testability (CI runs on Linux).
+    if len(path) >= 2 and path[0] in string.ascii_letters and path[1] == ":":
+        return True
+
+    # Rooted backslash or forward slash (absolute paths)
+    if path.startswith(("\\", "/")):
+        return True
+
+    # Also check os.path.isabs for platform-specific absolute path detection
+    if os.path.isabs(path):
+        return True
+
+    # Path traversal - check segments after normalizing separators
+    normalized = path.replace("\\", "/")
+    segments = [seg for seg in normalized.split("/") if seg]
+    return ".." in segments

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/streamlit/runtime/app_session.py

@@ -1009,13 +1009,21 @@ def _get_toolbar_mode() -> Config.ToolbarMode.ValueType:
 
 def _get_show_error_links() -> Config.ShowErrorLinks.ValueType:
     config_key = "client.showErrorLinks"
+    config_value = config.get_option(config_key)
+
+    # Handle boolean values (from st.set_option or programmatic setting)
+    if config_value is True:
+        return Config.ShowErrorLinks.SHOW_ERROR_LINKS_TRUE
+    if config_value is False:
+        return Config.ShowErrorLinks.SHOW_ERROR_LINKS_FALSE
+
+    # Handle string values (from config.toml or command-line)
     allowed_values = ["auto", "true", "false"]
     value_to_enum = {
         "auto": Config.ShowErrorLinks.SHOW_ERROR_LINKS_AUTO,
         "true": Config.ShowErrorLinks.SHOW_ERROR_LINKS_TRUE,
         "false": Config.ShowErrorLinks.SHOW_ERROR_LINKS_FALSE,
     }
-    config_value = config.get_option(config_key)
     if config_value not in allowed_values:
         raise ValueError(
             f"Config {config_key!r} expects to have one of "

{streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260202 → streamlit_nightly-1.53.2.dev20260203}/streamlit/static/index.html

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
     <script>
       window.prerenderReady = false
     </script>
-    <script type="module" crossorigin src="./static/js/index.y5HxPwg9.js"></script>
+    <script type="module" crossorigin src="./static/js/index.BHyzKS4e.js"></script>
     <link rel="stylesheet" crossorigin href="./static/css/index.C8MrxwGF.css">
   </head>
   <body>