span-panel-api 3.3.0__tar.gz → 3.4.1__tar.gz

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,37 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 Pre-releases are not listed separately. A beta is a step towards the next public version, so its changes are folded into that version's entry as they land and are described against the **last public release**, never against the beta before it. What one
 beta corrected in an earlier beta does not appear at all: from the point of view of somebody upgrading between released versions, it never happened.
 
+## [3.4.1]
+
+A panel that merely advertises itself on the network no longer produces the plaintext-transport warning when discovery probes it, closing the remaining way issue span#264's log line reached an operator who could do nothing about it.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The status endpoint no longer emits the plaintext-transport warning**, for the CA download's reason from the other side: it is the detection probe made against devices nobody has configured, where no pin can exist and the only action is configuring the
+  panel — whose flow pins before any credential moves. It carries no credential in either direction, and it no longer spends the once-per-host warning slot, which it previously claimed first in every flow so that a genuinely credential-bearing call behind
+  it said nothing. Registration, passphrase rotation, and the schema fetch warn exactly as before.
+
+## [3.4.0]
+
+A consumer that pinned the panel's CA could not put its schema fetches behind that pin, because the one port `SpanMqttClient` took served two transports with opposite security properties — the schema fetch, which should ride the pinned HTTPS transport, and
+the bridge's CA download, which is plaintext by design because it fetches the very anchor everything else is checked against. This release splits them.
+
+### Added
+
+- **`SpanMqttClient` takes `panel_https_port`**, and its schema fetches — the one at connect and every redispatch refetch — move to HTTPS on that port whenever an `ssl_context` is supplied, leaving the bridge's deliberately-plaintext CA fetches on
+  `panel_http_port` exactly where they were. Naming the HTTPS port without an anchor is refused rather than left silently plaintext, for the same reason `_build_url` refuses port 80 with a context.
+- **`SpanPanelTLSVerificationError` names a bootstrap REST call that failed certificate verification**, as a subclass of `SpanPanelConnectionError` so every existing except clause keeps its meaning — raised only when an `ssl.SSLCertVerificationError` is in
+  the cause chain, because ambiguous evidence must not look terminal, and exported so a consumer that fails closed on an untrusted certificate can catch it before the parent.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`create_span_client`'s `port` lands in the slot its transport needs**: with an `ssl_context` it was already read as the HTTPS port by every REST call the factory makes, so it now reaches the client's HTTPS slot and the CA download takes the plaintext
+  default, instead of the TLS port being handed to a plaintext fetch.
+- **The redispatch schema refetch no longer retries a certificate-verification failure**, which cannot succeed on a later attempt under the same anchor; it is left to raise and logged once per trigger, instead of a background task fetching every thirty
+  seconds forever while the log blames a slow boot.
+- **The CA download no longer emits the plaintext-transport warning**, because the fetch of the anchor itself is unverifiable by construction and carries no credential — its trust posture is stated by each caller in its own voice, and the warning as it
+  stood named credentials that call never carries. Every other bootstrap call still warns, and the CA download no longer spends the once-per-host slot a genuinely plaintext call needs later.
+
 ## [3.3.0]
 
 A pinned panel that has moved is no longer reported the same way as a panel whose clock reset, so a consumer can put the remedy in front of a user instead of retrying in silence.

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: span-panel-api
-Version: 3.3.0
+Version: 3.4.1
 Summary: A client library for SPAN Panel API
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/SpanPanel/span-panel-api
 Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/SpanPanel/span-panel-api/issues

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [project]
 name = "span-panel-api"
-version = "3.3.0"
+version = "3.4.1"
 description = "A client library for SPAN Panel API"
 authors = [
     {name = "SpanPanel"}

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/__init__.py

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ from .exceptions import (
     SpanPanelServerError,
     SpanPanelStaleDataError,
     SpanPanelTimeoutError,
+    SpanPanelTLSVerificationError,
     SpanPanelValidationError,
 )
 from .factory import create_span_client
@@ -200,6 +201,11 @@ __all__ = [  # noqa: RUF022
     "SpanPanelError",
     "SpanPanelServerError",
     "SpanPanelStaleDataError",
+    # Added 2026-08-31 (3.4.0): a bootstrap REST call that failed verification
+    # rather than connection. A subclass of SpanPanelConnectionError, so every
+    # existing except clause keeps its meaning; a consumer that fails closed on
+    # an untrusted certificate catches this one before the parent.
+    "SpanPanelTLSVerificationError",
     "SpanPanelTimeoutError",
     "SpanPanelValidationError",
 ]

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/_http.py

@@ -12,7 +12,13 @@ from typing import Literal
 
 import httpx
 
-from .exceptions import SpanPanelAPIError, SpanPanelConnectionError, SpanPanelTimeoutError, SpanPanelValidationError
+from .exceptions import (
+    SpanPanelAPIError,
+    SpanPanelConnectionError,
+    SpanPanelTimeoutError,
+    SpanPanelTLSVerificationError,
+    SpanPanelValidationError,
+)
 
 _LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -25,9 +31,16 @@ DEFAULT_HTTPS_PORT = 443
 #: The one bootstrap path two modules request: the detector probes it to decide
 #: whether the panel speaks v2 at all, and `get_v2_status` reads the same answer
 #: for a caller that already knows it does. Named here rather than spelled out in
-#: each, so the two cannot drift apart the way their parsers had.
+#: each, so the two cannot drift apart the way their parsers had. Load-bearing
+#: for `_warn_plaintext_transport`'s exemption: a request to this path is the
+#: one the warning stays silent for, so a change here changes what warns.
 V2_STATUS_PATH = "/api/v2/status"
 
+#: Exempt from the plaintext warning alongside `V2_STATUS_PATH`, named here
+#: because the transport is what grants the exemption. See
+#: `_warn_plaintext_transport`.
+CA_CERT_PATH = "/api/v2/certificate/ca"
+
 #: The verbs the bootstrap API uses. Spelled as a `Literal` rather than passed
 #: through to `client.request()` so the dispatch below stays exhaustive and each
 #: call still reaches the named httpx method.
@@ -161,9 +174,37 @@ def _reset_plaintext_warnings() -> None:
     _warned_plaintext_hosts.clear()
 
 
-def _warn_plaintext_transport(host: str, ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None) -> None:
+def _warn_plaintext_transport(host: str, path: str, ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None) -> None:
     """Say out loud, once per panel, that its bootstrap traffic is not encrypted.
 
+    **Two endpoints are exempt, and neither claims the once-per-host slot.**
+    The warning exists so an operator can tell a security property is off when
+    it could be on, and for both there is no "on". The CA download fetches the
+    very anchor verification would need — an unverified-TLS wrapping is
+    readable and forgeable by the same active on-path attacker, the payload is
+    a public certificate, and its authenticity control is the leaf check
+    callers run *after* the fetch. The status endpoint is the detection probe:
+    most prominently the request discovery makes against a device nobody has
+    configured, where no pin can exist because trust-on-first-use has not
+    happened and the only action available is configuring the panel — whose
+    flow pins before any credential moves, with a person confirming the
+    fingerprint. Neither call carries a credential in either direction, and
+    warning on them named credentials they never carry: the CA download's line
+    is what issue span#264 reported, and the status probe's is what a merely
+    *advertising* unconfigured panel produced at every boot.
+
+    Two limits of the status exemption, stated rather than implied. The body
+    informs decisions — `proximityProven`, the serial an identity check reads —
+    and a plaintext answer is one anything on the path can write; the controls
+    for that are the panel's own registration gate and the pin the consumer's
+    flow acquires before a credential moves, not a log line. And a consumer
+    *can* probe a configured, pinned panel's status without its context; the
+    exemption means no warning will point that out, so a consumer owes every
+    probe of a configured host the entry's own transport. Not marking the host matters as
+    much as not warning — the probe runs first in every flow and a diagnostic
+    re-read runs on pinned entries, and neither may spend the slot a
+    credential-bearing call needs later.
+
     In the same voice as the MQTT bridge's unpinned-CA warning, and for the same
     reason: a security property that is off by default is only a decision if the
     operator can tell it is off. ``ssl_context=None`` puts the request on
@@ -190,6 +231,8 @@ def _warn_plaintext_transport(host: str, ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None) ->
     """
     if ssl_context is not None:
         return
+    if path in (CA_CERT_PATH, V2_STATUS_PATH):
+        return
     if host in _warned_plaintext_hosts:
         return
     _warned_plaintext_hosts.add(host)
@@ -299,7 +342,7 @@ async def _request(
     caller that supplied it.
     """
     url = _build_url(host, port, path, ssl_context)
-    _warn_plaintext_transport(host, ssl_context)
+    _warn_plaintext_transport(host, path, ssl_context)
     try:
         async with _get_client(httpx_client, timeout, ssl_context) as client:
             match method:
@@ -314,5 +357,31 @@ async def _request(
     except httpx.TimeoutException as exc:
         raise SpanPanelTimeoutError(f"Timed out connecting to {host}") from exc
     except httpx.TransportError as exc:
+        if _is_certificate_verification_failure(exc):
+            raise SpanPanelTLSVerificationError(
+                f"{host} answered {path} with a certificate the supplied trust anchor rejects: {exc}"
+            ) from exc
         raise SpanPanelConnectionError(f"Cannot reach panel at {host}: {exc}") from exc
     return _Reply(host=host, endpoint=path, response=response)
+
+
+def _is_certificate_verification_failure(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
+    """Whether this transport failure is demonstrably about certificate verification.
+
+    httpx wraps the underlying ``ssl.SSLCertVerificationError`` rather than
+    exposing it, so the evidence lives in the cause chain. Only that exact class
+    counts: a handshake that dies any other way -- a reset, a protocol mismatch,
+    an alert from a peer that is not TLS at all -- is indistinguishable from a
+    panel mid-reboot, and calling ambiguous evidence "verification failed" would
+    let a transient outage masquerade as the one failure consumers treat as
+    terminal. The walk is capped because ``__context__`` chains are
+    caller-assembled and nothing here should trust one to be finite.
+    """
+    seen = 0
+    current: BaseException | None = exc
+    while current is not None and seen < 10:
+        if isinstance(current, ssl.SSLCertVerificationError):
+            return True
+        current = current.__cause__ if current.__cause__ is not None else current.__context__
+        seen += 1
+    return False

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/auth.py

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import uuid
 
 import httpx
 
-from ._http import V2_STATUS_PATH, _request
+from ._http import CA_CERT_PATH, V2_STATUS_PATH, _request
 from .exceptions import SpanPanelAPIError, SpanPanelAuthError, SpanPanelServerError
 from .models import HomieSchemaTypes, V2AuthResponse, V2HomieSchema, V2StatusInfo
 
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ async def download_ca_cert(
             "GET",
             host,
             port,
-            "/api/v2/certificate/ca",
+            CA_CERT_PATH,
             timeout=timeout,
             httpx_client=httpx_client,
             ssl_context=ssl_context,

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/exceptions.py

@@ -13,6 +13,25 @@ class SpanPanelConnectionError(SpanPanelError):
     """Connection to SPAN panel failed."""
 
 
+class SpanPanelTLSVerificationError(SpanPanelConnectionError):
+    """Something answered a bootstrap REST call with a certificate the supplied anchor rejects.
+
+    A subclass of `SpanPanelConnectionError` on purpose: every consumer that
+    catches the parent and retries keeps doing exactly what it did, because
+    nothing raised this before an `ssl_context` reached the bootstrap calls. The
+    subclass exists for the consumer that wants the opposite of a retry — a
+    verification failure is not "the panel is not up yet", it is "whatever is up
+    does not hold a key the pin signs", and retrying that is waiting to succeed
+    against whatever is answering. Catch this before the parent to fail closed.
+
+    Raised only when the failure is demonstrably about verification — an
+    `ssl.SSLCertVerificationError` in the cause chain. Every other transport
+    failure, TLS handshakes that die for other reasons included, stays a plain
+    `SpanPanelConnectionError`, because ambiguous evidence must not look
+    terminal.
+    """
+
+
 class SpanPanelTimeoutError(SpanPanelError):
     """Request timed out."""
 

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/factory.py

@@ -45,7 +45,14 @@ async def create_span_client(
         serial_number: Panel serial number (extracted from detection/registration if omitted).
         port: Port of the panel bootstrap API used for registration, detection and the
             schema fetch. ``None`` takes the scheme default -- 80 plaintext, 443 with a
-            context.
+            context. It reaches the constructed client in the slot matching its
+            transport: ``panel_https_port`` with a context, ``panel_http_port`` without
+            -- so a pinned client's plaintext CA fetches never dial the TLS port.
+            The corollary is stated rather than hidden: under a context the bridge's
+            diagnostic CA re-read takes the plaintext default, port 80. A pinned
+            caller whose panel serves plaintext on a nonstandard port has no way to
+            say so through this factory; construct ``SpanMqttClient`` directly and
+            pass both ports.
         httpx_client: Optional shared ``httpx.AsyncClient``, used for every request this
             makes and handed to the client it builds. Not closed here; its timeouts and
             limits are the caller's, which is why the per-call ``timeout`` defaults are
@@ -115,11 +122,17 @@ async def create_span_client(
     # `adapters` — none of it is safe to run on an event loop.
     adapter_cls = await asyncio.to_thread(resolve_adapter, adapter_key, dispatch_reason)
 
+    # `port` follows the transport the factory's own REST calls just used it
+    # for: with an ssl_context it was the HTTPS port (`_build_url` accepts no
+    # other reading), so it lands in the HTTPS slot and the bridge's
+    # deliberately-plaintext CA download keeps its own default. Without one it
+    # is the plaintext port, exactly as before.
     client = SpanMqttClient(
         host,
         serial_number,
         mqtt_config,
-        panel_http_port=port,
+        panel_http_port=None if ssl_context is not None else port,
+        panel_https_port=port if ssl_context is not None else None,
         adapter_factory=adapter_cls,
         data_model_version=schema.data_model_version,
         schema_dispatch_reason=dispatch_reason,

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/src/span_panel_api/mqtt/client.py

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ from ..exceptions import (
     SpanPanelServerError,
     SpanPanelStaleDataError,
     SpanPanelTimeoutError,
+    SpanPanelTLSVerificationError,
+    SpanPanelValidationError,
 )
 from ..models import AdoptedProperty, ControlTarget, FieldMetadata, HomieSchemaTypes, SpanPanelSnapshot, V2HomieSchema
 from ..protocol import PanelCapability, SchemaAdapter
@@ -131,6 +133,7 @@ class SpanMqttClient:
         broker_config: MqttClientConfig,
         snapshot_interval: float = 1.0,
         panel_http_port: int | None = None,
+        panel_https_port: int | None = None,
         adapter_factory: Callable[[str, V2HomieSchema], SchemaAdapter] | None = None,
         data_model_version: str | None = None,
         schema_dispatch_reason: str | None = None,
@@ -139,11 +142,29 @@ class SpanMqttClient:
         ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = None,
         control_deadlines: ControlDeadlines | None = None,
     ) -> None:
+        if panel_https_port is not None and ssl_context is None:
+            # A TLS port with nothing to verify against is a decision nobody
+            # made: accepted silently, the schema fetch would run plaintext HTTP
+            # against a port the caller believes is TLS. The same misreading
+            # `_build_url` refuses for port 80 with a context, from the other
+            # direction.
+            raise SpanPanelValidationError(
+                f"panel_https_port={panel_https_port} was passed without an ssl_context for {host}. "
+                "Supply the pinned CA as ssl_context, or omit panel_https_port to stay on plaintext HTTP."
+            )
         self._host = host
         self._serial_number = serial_number
         self._broker_config = broker_config
         self._snapshot_interval = snapshot_interval
+        # Two ports because they serve transports with opposite security
+        # properties. `panel_http_port` is the plaintext one, and it belongs to
+        # the bridge: the CA download is unauthenticated by construction — it
+        # fetches the very anchor everything else is checked against — so it
+        # never follows the pin. `panel_https_port` carries this client's own
+        # schema fetches once an `ssl_context` anchors them; `None` with a
+        # context means `_build_url`'s TLS default, 443.
         self._panel_http_port = panel_http_port
+        self._panel_https_port = panel_https_port
         self._adapter_factory = adapter_factory
         # Shared by the caller, owned by the caller: never closed here, and its
         # policy -- timeouts, limits, headers -- is whatever the caller set. That
@@ -222,10 +243,18 @@ class SpanMqttClient:
         four arguments spelled out separately, and adding the trust anchor to one
         and not the other is exactly how a session ends up bootstrapping over
         HTTPS and refetching over HTTP for the rest of its life. One call site.
+
+        The port follows the transport. With an anchor the fetch is HTTPS and
+        takes ``panel_https_port``; without one it is plaintext and takes
+        ``panel_http_port``, exactly as it always did. Handing the HTTP port to
+        a TLS call is the combination ``_build_url`` refuses, and handing the
+        TLS port to the plaintext one is the constructor refusal -- so by the
+        time this runs, the pairing is already known good.
         """
+        port = self._panel_https_port if self._ssl_context is not None else self._panel_http_port
         return await get_homie_schema(
             self._host,
-            port=self._panel_http_port,
+            port=port,
             httpx_client=self._httpx_client,
             ssl_context=self._ssl_context,
         )
@@ -1465,6 +1494,16 @@ class SpanMqttClient:
         while True:
             try:
                 return await self._fetch_schema()
+            except SpanPanelTLSVerificationError:
+                # Before its parent, which the next clause would retry forever.
+                # A verification failure cannot succeed on a later attempt --
+                # the anchor is fixed for the session -- so it is precisely the
+                # "error that is not the panel still coming up" this loop's
+                # contract leaves to raise. The redispatch wrapper logs it once
+                # per trigger, and escalation belongs to the MQTT side: a
+                # rotated CA surfaces through the bridge's own diagnosis and
+                # fatal-error channel, which reconnects share with this trigger.
+                raise
             except (
                 SpanPanelConnectionError,
                 SpanPanelTimeoutError,
@@ -1516,6 +1555,23 @@ class SpanMqttClient:
         """
         try:
             await self._redispatch_once()
+        except SpanPanelTLSVerificationError:
+            # Before the catch-all, whose text blames a slow boot. This is the
+            # one refetch failure that is not one: the schema endpoint answered
+            # with a certificate the session's anchor rejects, which cannot fix
+            # itself on a later attempt and must not steer a user investigating
+            # an interception toward waiting. Still non-fatal here for the
+            # catch-all's reason -- nothing may escape a fire-and-forget task --
+            # and the next reconnect edge re-arms the attempt.
+            _LOGGER.error(
+                "Could not follow the panel's schema-generation change: the schema refetch "
+                "failed certificate verification against the pinned CA, so the %r parser is "
+                "unchanged. If the panel's CA rotated with the firmware, the broker "
+                "connection will surface it; otherwise check what answers the panel's "
+                "HTTPS port.",
+                self._data_model_version,
+                exc_info=True,
+            )
         except Exception:  # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
             # Nothing may escape here. This runs as a fire-and-forget task, so an
             # escaping exception becomes "Task exception was never retrieved" in

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/tests/test_plaintext_warning.py

@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
 import httpx
 import pytest
 
-from span_panel_api.auth import download_ca_cert, regenerate_passphrase, register_v2
+from span_panel_api.auth import download_ca_cert, get_v2_status, regenerate_passphrase, register_v2
+from span_panel_api.detection import detect_api_version
 from span_panel_api.mqtt.models import MqttClientConfig
 
 HOST = "panel.invalid"
@@ -135,13 +136,23 @@ class TestItIsSaidOnce:
         assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 1
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
-    async def test_repeated_ca_fetches_on_fresh_clients_warn_once(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
-        """The reconnect path, and the reason this is scoped to the panel.
-
-        `download_ca_cert` is called on every MQTT reconnect with no injected
-        client, so each call builds its own. Anything keyed on the client object
-        would warn once per reconnect — exactly the log the bridge's own
-        once-per-bridge warning exists to avoid.
+    async def test_the_ca_download_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Reversed in 3.4.0, deliberately: this endpoint is unverifiable by construction.
+
+        The warning exists so an operator can tell a security property is *off*
+        when it could be on, and for the first fetch of the anchor itself there
+        is no "on": any verification would require the anchor being fetched, an
+        unverified-TLS wrapping would be readable and forgeable by the same
+        active on-path attacker, and the payload is a public certificate with no
+        credential in either direction — the authenticity control is the leaf
+        check its callers run *after* the fetch. Every caller also already says
+        so in its own voice: the bridge's once-per-bridge unpinned warning, the
+        config flow's fingerprint confirmation, and the deferred pin's
+        trust-on-first-use log line. Until 3.3.x this endpoint warned like the
+        rest, naming credentials it never carries; that line is what issue
+        span#264 reported. A caller that already holds the anchor and wants a
+        verified second copy passes ``ssl_context``, and no warning was ever in
+        question there.
         """
         with patch("span_panel_api._http.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_cls:
             dedicated = AsyncMock()
@@ -154,6 +165,78 @@ class TestItIsSaidOnce:
                 for _ in range(5):
                     await download_ca_cert(HOST)
 
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_status_probe_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Exempted in 3.4.1, for the CA download's reason from the other side.
+
+        The status endpoint is the detection probe — the request zeroconf
+        discovery makes against a device nobody has configured, once per boot,
+        where no pin can exist because trust-on-first-use has not happened and
+        there is nothing the operator can do but configure the panel. It
+        carries no credential in either direction, and the flows that probe it
+        on a configured-but-unpinned entry acquire the pin before any
+        credential moves, with a human confirming the fingerprint. The warning
+        here named credentials the call never carries and pointed at an action
+        nobody could take — the line that made an operator remove a healthy
+        emulator. The exemption's limits live in `_warn_plaintext_transport`'s
+        docstring: a consumer probing a *configured* host owes that probe the
+        entry's own transport, because no warning will say so anymore.
+        """
+        answer = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await get_v2_status(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", answer))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_detection_probe_never_warns(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Detection reads the same endpoint, and must be equally silent."""
+        answer = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await detect_api_version(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", answer))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_status_probe_does_not_swallow_a_later_warning(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """The probe fires first in every flow, so it must not spend the slot.
+
+        Today it does exactly that: a reauth's status probe claims the
+        once-per-host warning, and the credential-bearing call behind it says
+        nothing. The warning belongs to whichever call actually deserves it.
+        """
+        status = _json_response({"serialNumber": "SYN-0000-0001", "firmwareVersion": "f"}, method="GET")
+        rotate = _json_response({"ebusBrokerPassword": "new-pass"}, method="PUT")
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+            await get_v2_status(HOST, httpx_client=_client("get", status))
+            # The midpoint is the assertion: the slot must still be unspent
+            # here, so the warning below demonstrably belongs to the rotation.
+            assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 0
+            await regenerate_passphrase(HOST, "jwt", httpx_client=_client("put", rotate))
+        assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 1
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_ca_download_does_not_swallow_a_later_warning(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        """Skipping the warning must not mark the host as already warned.
+
+        The diagnostic CA re-read runs on a *pinned* entry whose other calls are
+        HTTPS; if it claimed the once-per-host slot, a genuinely plaintext call
+        made later — a reauth on an entry that lost its pin — would say nothing.
+        """
+        answer = _json_response({"ebusBrokerPassword": "new-pass"}, method="PUT")
+        # Built before the patch below replaces `httpx.AsyncClient`; a spec
+        # against the patched class is a spec against a Mock, which mock refuses.
+        injected = _client("put", answer)
+        with patch("span_panel_api._http.httpx.AsyncClient") as mock_cls:
+            dedicated = AsyncMock()
+            dedicated.__aenter__ = AsyncMock(return_value=dedicated)
+            dedicated.__aexit__ = AsyncMock(return_value=False)
+            dedicated.get = AsyncMock(return_value=_text_response(PEM))
+            mock_cls.return_value = dedicated
+            with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
+                await download_ca_cert(HOST)
+                await regenerate_passphrase(HOST, "jwt", httpx_client=injected)
+
         assert len(_warnings(caplog)) == 1
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio

{span_panel_api-3.3.0 → span_panel_api-3.4.1}/tests/test_public_api_unchanged.py

@@ -155,6 +155,11 @@ EXPECTED_PUBLIC_API = {
     "SpanPanelError",
     "SpanPanelServerError",
     "SpanPanelStaleDataError",
+    # Added 2026-08-31 (3.4.0): a bootstrap REST call that failed *verification*
+    # rather than connection. A subclass of SpanPanelConnectionError, so every
+    # existing except clause keeps its meaning; a consumer that wants to fail
+    # closed on an untrusted certificate catches this one first.
+    "SpanPanelTLSVerificationError",
     "SpanPanelTimeoutError",
     "SpanPanelValidationError",
 }

span_panel_api-3.4.1/tests/test_schema_fetch_transport_split.py

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+"""The schema fetch and the CA download need different ports, and had one.
+
+`panel_http_port` serves two transports with opposite security properties: the
+bridge's CA download, which is plaintext by design because it fetches the very
+anchor everything else is checked against, and the client's schema fetch, which
+should ride the pinned HTTPS transport whenever the caller holds one. One
+parameter fed both, so a consumer that pinned a CA could not move its schema
+fetch to HTTPS without simultaneously pointing the CA download at a TLS port it
+speaks plaintext to.
+
+The split: `panel_https_port` carries the schema fetch when an `ssl_context` is
+supplied, and `panel_http_port` keeps the bridge's deliberately-plaintext CA
+fetches exactly where they were.
+
+Alongside it, a TLS verification failure on a bootstrap REST call gets its own
+exception class. A consumer that fails closed on an untrusted certificate needs
+to tell "something answered with a certificate the pin does not sign" apart from
+"nothing answered" — the first is terminal and needs a person, the second clears
+itself when the panel finishes rebooting.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import logging
+import ssl
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from span_panel_api._http import _reset_plaintext_warnings
+from span_panel_api.auth import get_homie_schema
+from span_panel_api.exceptions import (
+    SpanPanelConnectionError,
+    SpanPanelTLSVerificationError,
+    SpanPanelValidationError,
+)
+from span_panel_api.mqtt import MqttClientConfig
+from span_panel_api.mqtt.client import SpanMqttClient
+
+from conftest import flat_schema
+
+HOST = "192.168.1.1"
+SERIAL = "sp3-242424-001"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _fresh_warning_state() -> None:
+    """Keep the once-per-host warning set from leaking between tests."""
+    _reset_plaintext_warnings()
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def context() -> ssl.SSLContext:
+    """Any context object will do — nothing here completes a handshake."""
+    return ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT)
+
+
+class _Schema:
+    def __init__(self, version: str | None) -> None:
+        self.data_model_version = version
+
+
+def _client(**kwargs: object) -> SpanMqttClient:
+    return SpanMqttClient(
+        host=HOST,
+        serial_number=SERIAL,
+        broker_config=MqttClientConfig(broker_host="broker.local", username="u", password="p"),
+        **kwargs,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+
+async def _run_connect_fetch(client: SpanMqttClient, fetch: AsyncMock) -> None:
+    """Drive connect() far enough to make its schema fetch, and no further."""
+    with (
+        patch("span_panel_api.mqtt.client.get_homie_schema", fetch),
+        patch.object(client, "_preload_adapter", AsyncMock()),
+        patch.object(client, "_build_adapter", MagicMock()),
+    ):
+        with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+            await client.connect()
+    assert fetch.await_count >= 1
+
+
+class TestSchemaFetchPortSelection:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_a_pinned_client_fetches_the_schema_on_the_https_port(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        client = _client(panel_http_port=80, panel_https_port=8443, ssl_context=context)
+        fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=_Schema("1.0"))
+        await _run_connect_fetch(client, fetch)
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["port"] == 8443
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["ssl_context"] is context
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_a_pinned_client_without_a_named_port_takes_the_scheme_default(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        """`None` reaches `_build_url`, whose default for a TLS call is 443."""
+        client = _client(panel_http_port=80, ssl_context=context)
+        fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=_Schema("1.0"))
+        await _run_connect_fetch(client, fetch)
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["port"] is None
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["ssl_context"] is context
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_an_unpinned_client_keeps_the_plaintext_port(self) -> None:
+        client = _client(panel_http_port=8080)
+        fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=_Schema("1.0"))
+        await _run_connect_fetch(client, fetch)
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["port"] == 8080
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["ssl_context"] is None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_upgrade_refetch_uses_the_same_transport(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        """One call site for both fetches is the point; prove the retry loop kept it."""
+        client = _client(panel_http_port=80, panel_https_port=8443, ssl_context=context)
+        client._loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=_Schema("1.0"))
+        with patch("span_panel_api.mqtt.client.get_homie_schema", fetch):
+            assert await client._fetch_schema_with_retry() is not None
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["port"] == 8443
+        assert fetch.await_args.kwargs["ssl_context"] is context
+
+    def test_an_https_port_without_an_anchor_is_refused(self) -> None:
+        """A TLS port with nothing to verify against is a decision nobody made.
+
+        Accepting it silently would put the schema fetch on plaintext HTTP at a
+        port the caller believes is TLS — the same misreading `_build_url`
+        refuses for port 80 with a context, from the other direction.
+        """
+        with pytest.raises(SpanPanelValidationError):
+            _client(panel_https_port=8443)
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_bridge_keeps_the_plaintext_port_when_the_schema_fetch_moves(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        """The CA download is plaintext by design and must not follow the pin."""
+        client = _client(panel_http_port=8080, panel_https_port=8443, ssl_context=context)
+        # A real schema, because this test needs connect() to get all the way
+        # to bridge construction rather than stopping at the fetch.
+        fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=flat_schema(32))
+        bridge_cls = MagicMock()
+        with (
+            patch("span_panel_api.mqtt.client.get_homie_schema", fetch),
+            patch("span_panel_api.mqtt.client.AsyncMqttBridge", bridge_cls),
+            patch.object(client, "_preload_adapter", AsyncMock()),
+            patch.object(client, "_build_adapter", MagicMock()),
+        ):
+            with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
+                await client.connect()
+        assert bridge_cls.call_args is not None
+        assert bridge_cls.call_args.kwargs["panel_http_port"] == 8080
+
+
+class TestFactoryPortRouting:
+    """`create_span_client`'s one `port` lands in the slot its transport needs.
+
+    The factory's REST calls already read `port` as "the HTTPS port" when an
+    `ssl_context` rides along — `_build_url` refuses anything else — but it then
+    handed the same number to `panel_http_port`, pointing the bridge's
+    deliberately-plaintext CA download at a TLS port.
+    """
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_a_pinned_factory_call_routes_its_port_to_the_https_slot(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        from span_panel_api.adapters import _reset_adapter_cache
+        from span_panel_api.factory import create_span_client
+
+        _reset_adapter_cache()
+        config = MqttClientConfig(broker_host="broker.local", username="u", password="p")
+        with (
+            patch("span_panel_api.factory.SpanMqttClient") as mock_cls,
+            patch("span_panel_api.factory.get_homie_schema", return_value=_Schema(None)),
+        ):
+            mock_cls.return_value.connect = AsyncMock()
+            await create_span_client(
+                HOST,
+                mqtt_config=config,
+                serial_number=SERIAL,
+                port=8443,
+                ssl_context=context,
+            )
+        kwargs = mock_cls.call_args.kwargs
+        assert kwargs["panel_https_port"] == 8443
+        assert kwargs["ssl_context"] is context
+        # The CA download takes the plaintext default rather than the TLS port.
+        assert kwargs["panel_http_port"] is None
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_an_unpinned_factory_call_keeps_its_port_on_the_plaintext_slot(self) -> None:
+        from span_panel_api.adapters import _reset_adapter_cache
+        from span_panel_api.factory import create_span_client
+
+        _reset_adapter_cache()
+        config = MqttClientConfig(broker_host="broker.local", username="u", password="p")
+        with (
+            patch("span_panel_api.factory.SpanMqttClient") as mock_cls,
+            patch("span_panel_api.factory.get_homie_schema", return_value=_Schema(None)),
+        ):
+            mock_cls.return_value.connect = AsyncMock()
+            await create_span_client(HOST, mqtt_config=config, serial_number=SERIAL, port=8080)
+        kwargs = mock_cls.call_args.kwargs
+        assert kwargs["panel_http_port"] == 8080
+        assert kwargs.get("panel_https_port") is None
+
+
+class TestRedispatchRetryDoesNotRetryVerificationFailures:
+    """The retry loop's contract is 'the panel still coming up', and this is not that.
+
+    A verification failure cannot succeed on a later attempt under the same
+    context — the anchor is fixed for the session — so retrying it is a
+    background task GETting the panel every thirty seconds forever while the
+    log blames a slow boot. Left to raise, the redispatch wrapper logs the
+    failure once per trigger, and the MQTT side owns the escalation: a rotated
+    CA surfaces through the bridge's own diagnosis and fatal-error channel.
+    """
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_a_verification_failure_raises_out_of_the_retry_loop(self, context: ssl.SSLContext) -> None:
+        client = _client(panel_https_port=8443, ssl_context=context)
+        client._loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        fetch = AsyncMock(side_effect=SpanPanelTLSVerificationError("cert rejected by the pin"))
+        with patch("span_panel_api.mqtt.client.get_homie_schema", fetch):
+            # wait_for, because the defect this guards against is an infinite
+            # retry loop with real backoff sleeps: without it, a regression
+            # hangs the suite instead of failing it.
+            with pytest.raises(SpanPanelTLSVerificationError):
+                await asyncio.wait_for(client._fetch_schema_with_retry(), timeout=5)
+        # One attempt, no backoff loop: the failure is not retried at all.
+        assert fetch.await_count == 1
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_the_escaping_failure_is_logged_as_what_it_is(
+        self, context: ssl.SSLContext, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture
+    ) -> None:
+        """The wrapper's catch-all blamed a slow boot; verification is not that.
+
+        'Reload once the panel is fully back up' is accidentally workable advice
+        — a reload does surface the repair — but the sentence points at the
+        wrong cause, and the wrong cause is the one a user investigating an
+        interception must not be steered away from.
+        """
+        client = _client(panel_https_port=8443, ssl_context=context)
+        client._loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+        failure = SpanPanelTLSVerificationError("cert rejected by the pin")
+        with patch.object(client, "_redispatch_once", AsyncMock(side_effect=failure)):
+            with caplog.at_level(logging.ERROR):
+                await client._redispatch_if_generation_changed()
+        assert "certificate verification" in caplog.text
+        assert "fully back up" not in caplog.text
+
+
+class TestTLSVerificationFailureIsNamed:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_a_certificate_verification_failure_is_its_own_error(self) -> None:
+        """The one transport failure that must not be retried into submission."""
+        verify_failure = ssl.SSLCertVerificationError("certificate verify failed: unable to get local issuer certificate")
+        wrapped = httpx.ConnectError("[SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED]")
+        wrapped.__cause__ = verify_failure
+        injected = MagicMock()
+        injected.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=wrapped)
+
+        with pytest.raises(SpanPanelTLSVerificationError) as excinfo:
+            await get_homie_schema(HOST, httpx_client=injected)
+        # Still a connection error, so a consumer holding the 3.x contract —
+        # catch SpanPanelConnectionError, retry — keeps working unchanged.
+        assert isinstance(excinfo.value, SpanPanelConnectionError)
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_an_ordinary_connect_failure_stays_a_connection_error(self) -> None:
+        """A refused socket is 'not up yet', and must not look terminal."""
+        injected = MagicMock()
+        injected.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("connection refused"))
+
+        with pytest.raises(SpanPanelConnectionError) as excinfo:
+            await get_homie_schema(HOST, httpx_client=injected)
+        assert not isinstance(excinfo.value, SpanPanelTLSVerificationError)