sourcecode 5.9.4__tar.gz → 5.9.7__tar.gz

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,22 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [5.9.6] — 2026-08-27
+
+*Roadmap correction and release-alignment patch release.*
+
+**Fixed**
+
+- Makes explicit cache warming durable across processes.
+- Reconciles Spring presence detection for foreign member annotations.
+- Removes split Markdown badge fragments from README-derived summaries.
+- Makes empty baseline history an explicit `no_history` result.
+- Explains the intentional CLI/MCP population difference in `self-audit`.
+
+**Validation**
+
+- Added dedicated regression coverage using `/Users/user/Documents/workspace/testing/teavm`.
+- Updated README, English and Spanish guides, roadmap, ledger and CLI version output.
+
 ## [5.9.4] — 2026-08-27
 
 *External-audit reliability and contract-alignment release.*
@@ -9200,3 +9217,13 @@ implementors.
 - 3 `--slim` tests verifying the option is absent from help and CLI surface.
 - 6 `angular_version` parsing tests covering `dependencies`, `devDependencies`,
   `peerDependencies`, `null` JSON values, and version prefix stripping.
+## [5.9.7] — 2026-08-27
+
+### Fixed
+- Exposed functional root options in `ask --help` and aligned help discoverability tests.
+- Unified empty `--files -` handling for `pr-impact` and `pr-risk`.
+- Normalized Git reference failures to `GIT_REF_NOT_FOUND`.
+- Corrected the `cold-start --compact` size contract and endpoint omission disclosure.
+- Added delayed liveness warnings for long non-interactive runs.
+- Improved natural-language routing for unsecured endpoint questions.
+- Kept unresolved impact symbols explicitly unscored.

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: sourcecode
-Version: 5.9.4
+Version: 5.9.7
 Summary: Persistent structural context and ultra-fast repeated analysis for AI coding agents
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/HarounDominique/sourcecode
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/HarounDominique/sourcecode
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
 > question. All analysis is local and deterministic; see [Privacy](#configuration--privacy)
 > before inspecting a repository whose telemetry policy you need to control.
 
-![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-5.9.4-blue)
+![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-5.9.7-blue)
 ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.9%2B-green)
 
 Copyright (c) 2026 Dominique Haroun. All rights reserved. ASK Engine 5.7.0 and
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ set `ASK_MAX_RSS_MB=<megabytes>`; if the process exceeds it, ASK refuses the
 answer with `MEMORY_TOO_LARGE`, including the observed peak and limit. Leave it
 unset, or set it to `0`, to disable the ceiling explicitly.
 
-**Current performance status.** Release 5.9.4 retains the shared Canonical IR
+**Current performance status.** Release 5.9.7 retains the shared Canonical IR
 path used by `validation` and now passes that same CIR into labelled `data-exposure`
 runs; the no-label path remains parse-free. These are implementation properties,
 not duration promises. A controlled external warm-path audit has opened performance
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ in `overlapping_paths`; a missing or non-directory path is rejected as structure
 invalid input rather than treated as an empty repository. This prevents silent
 entitlement errors in CI and does not change per-repository gates or billing.
 
-Release 5.9.4 also hardens the boundary contracts: missing consumer repositories,
+Release 5.9.7 also hardens the boundary contracts: missing consumer repositories,
 malformed CVE feeds and unresolved `pack gate --since` refs fail as structured
 input errors; duplicate same-commit baselines are never overwritten. `posture
 --diff` validates unknown profiles when the repository declares profiles. In
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ brew tap haroundominique/sourcecode && brew install sourcecode
 # pip / pipx
 pipx install sourcecode        # or: pip install sourcecode
 
-ask version                    # ask 5.9.4 — and, on a build that has aged,
+ask version                    # ask 5.9.7 — and, on a build that has aged,
                                # how many releases have probably shipped since
 ```
 

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/README.md

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 > question. All analysis is local and deterministic; see [Privacy](#configuration--privacy)
 > before inspecting a repository whose telemetry policy you need to control.
 
-![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-5.9.4-blue)
+![Version](https://img.shields.io/badge/version-5.9.7-blue)
 ![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.9%2B-green)
 
 Copyright (c) 2026 Dominique Haroun. All rights reserved. ASK Engine 5.7.0 and
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ set `ASK_MAX_RSS_MB=<megabytes>`; if the process exceeds it, ASK refuses the
 answer with `MEMORY_TOO_LARGE`, including the observed peak and limit. Leave it
 unset, or set it to `0`, to disable the ceiling explicitly.
 
-**Current performance status.** Release 5.9.4 retains the shared Canonical IR
+**Current performance status.** Release 5.9.7 retains the shared Canonical IR
 path used by `validation` and now passes that same CIR into labelled `data-exposure`
 runs; the no-label path remains parse-free. These are implementation properties,
 not duration promises. A controlled external warm-path audit has opened performance
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ in `overlapping_paths`; a missing or non-directory path is rejected as structure
 invalid input rather than treated as an empty repository. This prevents silent
 entitlement errors in CI and does not change per-repository gates or billing.
 
-Release 5.9.4 also hardens the boundary contracts: missing consumer repositories,
+Release 5.9.7 also hardens the boundary contracts: missing consumer repositories,
 malformed CVE feeds and unresolved `pack gate --since` refs fail as structured
 input errors; duplicate same-commit baselines are never overwritten. `posture
 --diff` validates unknown profiles when the repository declares profiles. In
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ brew tap haroundominique/sourcecode && brew install sourcecode
 # pip / pipx
 pipx install sourcecode        # or: pip install sourcecode
 
-ask version                    # ask 5.9.4 — and, on a build that has aged,
+ask version                    # ask 5.9.7 — and, on a build that has aged,
                                # how many releases have probably shipped since
 ```
 

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/docs/DEFECT-LEDGER.md

@@ -16,6 +16,100 @@ The facts these rows are keyed to are published: `ask schema facts-v1` prints th
 
 ## Current Synchronization
 
+**Field simulation on TeaVM, 2026-08-27 — `ASK-FIELD`.** A deep, non-destructive
+run of ASK `5.9.5` against `/Users/user/Documents/workspace/testing/teavm`
+(4,024 files; 3,539 Java files) exercised the main analysis commands, packs,
+baseline lifecycle, contracts and cache lifecycle. The checkout stayed clean
+and the prior release closure set showed no regression. Three behaviours were
+reproduced and are now closed below: cache warming was not visible to subsequent
+processes, root README summary extraction emitted a Markdown-link fragment, and
+Spring presence disagreed between `spring-audit` and `migrate-check`. The run
+also confirmed that endpoint zero-result disclosure, legal input refusals,
+baseline collision protection, pack `UNVERIFIED` semantics and target
+non-mutation remain intact. This is field evidence, not an external audit; it
+must not be represented as a release certification.
+
+| ID | Severity | Status | Evidence and required closure |
+|---|---:|---|---|
+| `ASK-FIELD-01` | P1 | **closed 5.9.6 (`829f9fa`)** | Explicit warm persists synchronously in its declared namespace; the fresh-process TeaVM lifecycle battery passes. |
+| `ASK-FIELD-02` | P1 | **closed 5.9.6 (`6a659fa`)** | Member annotation imports resolve from the declaring class and confirmed Spring evidence drives presence; TeaVM and Spring control parity passes. |
+| `ASK-FIELD-03` | P2 | **closed 5.9.6 (`55b0d51`)** | Split Markdown badge continuations are discarded without changing normal inline-link unwrapping; the real TeaVM summary regression passes. |
+
+The simulation did not open the Kotlin/Java/Node classification as a defect:
+the signals were explicitly confidence-scored and may represent a legitimate
+polyglot repository. It also did not open zero endpoints, minimum token-budget
+refusal, unsupported `explain --compact`, or contractless `verify`: each matched
+the declared contract and non-coverage in the observed run.
+
+**External audit intake AUD-611, re-audit of release 5.9.6 — 2026-08-27.**
+The external scope was restricted to repositories under Documents/workspace/testing
+and covered about 250 real invocations across seven forks, with 104/104 CLI
+commands exercised. The auditor reports zero target-repository writes, commits
+or dirty worktrees. The final score was 7.4/10; an earlier interim pass recorded
+8/10, so 7.4/10 is the governing result.
+
+The three TeaVM field fixes are confirmed across eight or more control
+repositories with no regressions. The new and still-relevant queue is:
+
+| ID | Severity | Status | Evidence / closure boundary |
+|---|---:|---|---|
+| AUD-611-B01 | Critical | open | With stdout redirected to /dev/null, an invalid invocation returned exit 0 and empty stderr in 5/5 runs; normal files, pipes and command substitution retained exit 1. Scope is currently INVALID_INPUT only. Fix error transport and exit status independently, then test every error class and redirection form. |
+| AUD-611-B02 | Critical | open | tutorials has 24,073 Java files; cold root compact ran 240.092 seconds, ended with external timeout exit 124 and zero stdout/stderr. CPU was active, so deadlock versus extreme analysis cost is unresolved. Reproduce on supported Windows/Git Bash and POSIX environments, add progress/deadline/partial diagnostics and define a scale contract. |
+| AUD-611-B03 | High | open | Root compact/agent YAML took 85-380 seconds and reported served_from_cache false on repeated unchanged runs. Add a format/view cache regression and publish latency expectations. |
+| AUD-611-B04 | High | open | One selftest hang occurred in about 16 aggregate runs. Other suspected hangs were retracted after adequate-timeout reruns. Add phase correlation, bounded execution and structured timeout failure. |
+| AUD-611-B05 | High | closed | Root help now exposes all 22 accepted functional flags. Dedicated parity coverage and a real TeaVM execution of `--tree --compact` pass; future internal-only options must be explicitly deprecated or hidden. |
+| AUD-611-B06 | Medium | closed | `pr-risk --files -` now rejects an empty list with the same `INVALID_INPUT` stderr envelope and `exit 1` as `pr-impact`; dedicated TeaVM regression passes. No-diff behavior from implicit Git sources remains separately scoped. |
+| AUD-611-B07 | Medium | closed | Shared Git-ref failures now publish canonical `GIT_REF_NOT_FOUND`; TeaVM regressions cover delta and contract-diff, and existing ref consumers were aligned. |
+| AUD-611-B08 | Medium | closed | `cold-start --compact` now qualifies its size as snapshot-dependent instead of claiming `~10K`; the TeaVM no-RIS path and compact identity regressions pass. A hard ceiling remains an optional future product requirement. |
+| AUD-611-B09 | Medium-high | closed | Non-interactive long runs now emit one delayed stderr warning after 60 seconds by default, configurable with `ASK_PROGRESS_WARNING_SECONDS`; short runs remain silent. TeaVM stdout JSON remains valid under the regression. |
+| AUD-611-B10 | Medium | closed | Added the missing `which endpoints have no security` anchor for `security-surface`; natural TeaVM resolution succeeds without scanning, while equal security-intent questions still refuse deterministically. |
+| AUD-611-B11 | Medium | closed | Missing-symbol `impact-chain` results now use `risk_score: null` and `risk_score_raw: null`, matching `impact`'s unscored semantics; both TeaVM command paths return `not_found`, `unknown`, and `exit 1`. |
+| AUD-611-B12 | Medium | open | Compact endpoint omission now carries explicit `population_total` and an inline measured-population note; the JUnit4 project-type classification half remains open. |
+| AUD-611-B13 | Medium | investigation | retrieve endpoint-security failed silently once in 15 runs (6.7%), exit 1 and zero bytes. Add phase/correlation capture and repeated/concurrent reproduction before closure. |
+
+Commercially, the audit supports normal repositories up to several thousand
+files and keeps a provisional $35-50/developer/month range, but B01/B02 block
+annual-grade reliability and enterprise-scale positioning until resolved.
+
+**External audit intake `AUD-610`, release 5.9.3 — 2026-08-27.** The attached
+report scored the build **7.2/10** after five parallel batches and approximately
+120 invocations. It verified a clean target repository, no Java-file changes,
+no commits and no unauthorized persistence. The report praised structured errors,
+output bounding for agents and dry-run safety, but identified 17 defects or
+follow-ups. The full future closure criteria are maintained in
+[`DEVELOPMENT-ROADMAP.md`](DEVELOPMENT-ROADMAP.md); the ledger records their
+status boundary here so a later fix cannot silently close only one consumer.
+
+The report's P1 reliability cluster was `AUD-610-B01` (root YAML compact/agent
+zero-byte failure), `AUD-610-B02` (all `audit-report` formats zero-byte failure),
+`AUD-610-B03` (`risk --limit 0` legal-boundary crash) and `AUD-610-B04`
+(`timeline --since` pays for work then fails silently). None reproduced in the
+TeaVM `5.9.5` simulation; they are held as release-artifact verification items,
+not open deterministic defects.
+
+The remaining rows are: `AUD-610-B05` consumer-path admission (**closed
+5.9.4**, `86ed0a3`); `AUD-610-B06` invalid-input exit parity (**closed**,
+`ae2e8b1`, `f4b4f77`); `AUD-610-B07` command/path typo disambiguation
+(**closed**, `178aa6d`); `AUD-610-B08` pack
+gate ref admission (**closed 5.9.4**, `6690a7f`); `AUD-610-B09` inaccurate
+root help for `--files -` (**closed**, `f66cd28`, `52bcc36`); `AUD-610-B10`
+not-found envelope parity (**closed**, `c07581a`);
+`AUD-610-B11` malformed CVE feed status (**closed 5.9.4**, `abc6319`);
+`AUD-610-B12` unknown posture profiles (**closed 5.9.4**, `f7335b1`, `6e75646`);
+`AUD-610-B13` baseline overwrite (**closed 5.9.4**, `cbe4da9`);
+`AUD-610-B14` CLI/MCP population explanation (**closed**, `7c9b23e`);
+`AUD-610-B15` no-history contract parity (**closed**, `a130637`);
+`AUD-610-B16` UTF-8 replacement character (**platform verification hold**);
+and `AUD-610-B17` one-off retrieve silent failure (**investigation hold, not
+reproduced**).
+
+Commercially, the report recommends conditional pilot/adoption and a provisional
+`$35-50/developer/month` band, requiring closure of the flagship zero-byte paths
+before an annual commitment. This is recorded as external market evidence, not
+as a pricing approval or a product claim. The destructive commands excluded by
+the auditor remain outside the evidence set because only their dry-run paths were
+executed.
+
 **External `5.9.0` audit received, 2026-08-26 - `AUD-608`; corrections shipped in `5.9.1`.** The audited
 revision is the released `5.9.0` commit. The three confirmed corrections are
 closed: `AUD-608-C01` (P1, `cve` now declares its static inventory scope,

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/docs/DEVELOPMENT-ROADMAP.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 *Chief-engineer development record. This is the internal, dev-facing counterpart to the
 customer-facing `docs/EXECUTIVE-ROADMAP.md`.*
 
-> **CURRENT QUEUE — release `5.9.4`; external reconciliation `AUD-610` is implemented for the reproducible fixes.**
+> **CURRENT QUEUE — release `5.9.7`; external reconciliation `AUD-611` adds the next correction queue.**
 > The 2026-08-27 external review adds `AUD-610-B01` through `AUD-610-B10`, led by
 > silent `selftest` nondeterminism, silent root/audit-report failures, a legal-zero
 > `risk --limit 0` crash, an unvalidated consumer path and contradictory Spring
@@ -11,14 +11,29 @@ customer-facing `docs/EXECUTIVE-ROADMAP.md`.*
 > admission (`86ed0a3`), CVE feed integrity (`abc6319`), gate ref admission
 > (`6690a7f`), posture profile admission (`f7335b1`, `6e75646`), baseline
 > collision protection (`cbe4da9`), compact endpoint disclosure (`8a1936f`)
-> and unresolved impact exits (`c07581a`). The non-reproduced reliability and
-> Spring observations remain open and must not be presented as fixed. Full triage is in
+> and unresolved impact exits (`c07581a`). The remaining external-only reliability
+> observations are held for release-artifact verification and must not be presented
+> as product defects. Full triage is in
 > [`AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.3.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.3.md).
 > The 2026-08-27 external review adds `AUD-609-B01` (overlapping workspace paths
 > double-count Java files) and `AUD-609-B02` (missing workspace paths accepted as
 > empty repositories); both are fixed in `5.9.3`. It reports no regression in the
 > prior closure set. Evidence and the commercial interpretation are in
 > [`AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.2.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.2.md).
+
+> **FIELD SIMULATION — TeaVM, 2026-08-27.** A deep real-use simulation of the
+> released `5.9.6` build was run against
+> `/Users/user/Documents/workspace/testing/teavm` (4,024 files, 3,539 Java
+> files, clean checkout before and after, 96 persisted artefacts). It exercised
+> root JSON/YAML, `spring-audit`, `migrate-check`, `endpoints`, `risk`, `impact`,
+> `impact-chain`, `posture --diff`, audit reports, self-audit, packs, contracts,
+> baselines, attestation and cache lifecycle. No regression was found in the
+> previously closed contract fixes, and the target repository was not modified.
+> It did, however, confirm three follow-up defects: cache persistence across
+> processes, a split Markdown badge fragment in the README summary, and divergent
+> Spring-presence signals. All three are now closed below as `ASK-FIELD-01` through
+> `ASK-FIELD-03`; the fix evidence does not imply that TeaVM is a supported Spring
+> target.
 > `AUD-608-C01` is closed in `fe1f624`: `cve` declares static
 > dependency-inventory coverage and non-coverage. `AUD-608-P01` is closed in
 > `b479465`: `pr-risk --since` constructs its base context and surfaces failures
@@ -129,6 +144,118 @@ triage is in [`AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.2.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.
 | `AUD-609-C01` | P2 | Signed evidence and historical attestation use different integrity contracts. | Decide whether `baseline attest` gains the existing signing mechanism or clearly publishes that it is unsigned; document the choice in help, schema and buyer-facing material. Do not call unsigned output a certificate or compliance proof. | **Queued, commercial validation.** No implementation claim until the signing boundary and key model are explicit. |
 | `AUD-609-C02` | P3 | Translate technical evidence into concrete ENS/CRA controls. | Define a named control mapping with source evidence, missing evidence and `legal_claim: false`; validate it with a named compliance buyer or auditor before presenting it as a market capability. | **Queued, buyer-gated.** `audit-report --pack ens` remains evidence mapping only. |
 
+### Field Follow-up — TeaVM simulation, 2026-08-27
+
+These rows are engineering follow-ups from a controlled real-repository
+simulation, not findings from an external auditor. They are intentionally
+separate from `AUD-610`: the earlier release audit's non-reproduced observations
+remain non-reproduced, while these three behaviours were reproduced directly on
+the TeaVM checkout. The simulation also confirms that the normal structured-error
+paths, pack verdicts, baseline collision protection, output bounds and target
+repository cleanliness continue to behave as documented.
+
+| ID | Priority | Finding | Acceptance criteria | Status/order |
+|---|---:|---|---|---|
+| `ASK-FIELD-01` | P1 | `cache warm` failed to make the next process observe persisted cache state. | Use one canonical cache namespace and target identity; a fresh process must observe the declared warm state and persisted entries. | **Closed in `5.9.6` (`829f9fa`).** Explicit warm persistence is synchronous and the TeaVM lifecycle battery passes. |
+| `ASK-FIELD-02` | P1 | TeaVM exposed divergent Spring-presence signals between `spring-audit` and `migrate-check`. | Resolve member annotation imports and require confirmed Spring evidence for cross-command presence. | **Closed in `5.9.6` (`6a659fa`).** TeaVM and a Spring control repository now agree; no heuristic broadening was added. |
+| `ASK-FIELD-03` | P2 | Root compact summary leaked a split Markdown Discord badge continuation. | README summaries must never emit URL delimiters or badge fragments while preserving normal inline links. | **Closed in `5.9.6` (`55b0d51`).** The TeaVM README regression and summarizer battery pass. |
+
+**Observed but not opened as defects:** TeaVM was classified as Kotlin
+full-stack with Java as a low-confidence secondary signal and Node.js from a
+manifest; this may be expected multi-language evidence but needs corpus review
+before changing classification. `endpoints` returning zero was accompanied by
+the declared zero-result/non-coverage explanation. `repo-ir --budget-tokens`
+refusing a budget below its minimum estimate, `explain --compact` rejecting an
+unsupported flag, and `verify` returning `UNVERIFIED` without contracts all
+matched their documented contracts. These behaviours must remain in regression
+coverage, but are not roadmap bugs from this run.
+
+### External Audit Intake — `AUD-611` re-audit, release 5.9.6
+
+The external re-audit covered only repositories under the testing corpus:
+antlr4, netty, junit4, struts, spring-petclinic, spring-framework-petclinic,
+thingsboard, dropwizard, quarkus-quickstarts, vertx-examples, byte-buddy,
+aspectj, mall, spring-security, openmrs-core and tutorials. It reports
+approximately 250 real invocations across seven forks, 104/104 CLI commands
+exercised, no target-repository writes, no commits and clean Git status
+throughout. The final score is 7.4/10 (an interim pass recorded 8/10); the
+final score is the governing assessment.
+
+The audit confirms the previous cache, Spring-presence and README-badge fixes
+across multiple repositories with no regression. It also confirms that
+audit-report, risk --limit 0, timeline, consumer-path admission, CVE validation,
+baseline collision protection, MCP population disclosure and empty baseline
+handling now behave correctly. The following queue captures the new defects and
+the older findings that remain materially relevant:
+
+| ID | Severity | Finding | Required future closure |
+|---|---:|---|---|
+| AUD-611-B01 | Critical | Redirecting an invalid invocation with ask <bad-input> >/dev/null suppresses both the structured error and the non-zero exit: 5/5 reproductions returned exit 0 with empty stderr. Pipes and command substitution retained exit 1. Only INVALID_INPUT was tested; other error classes remain unverified. | Make error emission and process status independent of stdout destination. Test /dev/null, regular files, pipes, merged streams and all error codes; require structured stderr and non-zero status. |
+| AUD-611-B02 | Critical | Cold root ask . --compact on tutorials (24,073 Java files) ran for exactly 240 seconds until external timeout, returned exit 124 and produced zero bytes on stdout/stderr. The process consumed CPU; no progress or partial answer was available. Windows/Git Bash signal handling may contribute and must be distinguished from analysis cost. | Reproduce on the supported matrix, publish phase progress/heartbeat, enforce an internal deadline that preserves diagnostics, and establish an explicit scale ceiling or bounded execution mode before enterprise-scale claims. |
+| AUD-611-B03 | High | Three consecutive root --compact/--agent -f yaml runs took 85-380 seconds and reported served_from_cache false every time on the same unchanged repository. Output eventually completed, so this is cache/performance correctness rather than a crash. | Include format/view/mode in the canonical cache key or share the context cache correctly; add a cold/warm multi-process benchmark and document expected latency. |
+| AUD-611-B04 | High | selftest still hung once in approximately 16 aggregate executions across three evaluators. Prior suspected hangs for pr-risk, pack gate and audit-report were retracted after isolated reruns with adequate timeouts. | Instrument phase/correlation IDs, enforce bounded child execution and preserve a structured failure envelope; distinguish tool hangs from auditor timeout artefacts. |
+| AUD-611-B05 | High | **Closed in this fix.** Root --help now exposes the 22 functional root flags accepted by the callback, including architecture, tree, symbol, graph, dependency and docs flags. | Keep the live help/registry parity test green; internal-only options must be explicitly deprecated or hidden rather than silently omitted. |
+| AUD-611-B06 | Medium | **Closed in this fix.** Empty `--files -` now yields the same `INVALID_INPUT` structured stderr envelope and `exit 1` in `pr-impact` and `pr-risk`. | Keep both command contracts covered; no-diff paths not sourced from `--files` remain a separate policy surface. |
+| AUD-611-B07 | Medium | **Closed in this fix.** Shared Git reference failures now publish `GIT_REF_NOT_FOUND` across delta, contract-diff and the other ref-consuming surfaces. | Keep the cross-command error-code vocabulary test green. |
+| AUD-611-B08 | Medium | **Closed in this fix.** `cold-start --compact` no longer promises a fixed `~10K` ceiling; help and command documentation now state that the bounded orientation subset depends on stored snapshot size. No data is silently truncated to satisfy a false bound. | If a hard token ceiling becomes a product requirement, implement it with explicit omission metadata and corpus benchmarks. |
+| AUD-611-B09 | Medium-high | **Closed in this fix.** Non-interactive runs now emit one delayed stderr liveness warning after 60 seconds by default (configurable with `ASK_PROGRESS_WARNING_SECONDS`), while short runs remain byte-silent and stdout stays machine-readable. | Keep the warning opt-out and periodic `--progress` heartbeat contracts covered. |
+| AUD-611-B10 | Medium | **Closed in this fix.** The natural question `which endpoints have no security` now maps deterministically to `security-surface`; equal security intents continue to refuse with both candidates named. | Keep lexical anchors and equal-score refusal tests synchronized with the retrieve registry. |
+| AUD-611-B11 | Medium | **Closed in this fix.** For missing symbols, `impact-chain` now publishes null risk scores instead of the misleading numeric zero and preserves the same `not_found`/`unknown`/`exit 1` policy as `impact`. | Keep the shared not-found risk semantics covered; `impact`'s existing omission of `risk_score_raw` remains a separate schema choice. |
+| AUD-611-B12 | Medium | **Partially closed in this fix.** Compact endpoint output now publishes an explicit `population_total` beside the omitted rows and repeats the measured population in the inline note, so `endpoints: []` cannot be read as “no endpoints”. JUnit4 classification remains open. | Add evidence-backed JUnit4 project classification without heuristic overreach. |
+| AUD-611-B13 | Medium | retrieve endpoint-security failed silently once in 15 consecutive attempts (6.7%), exit 1 and zero bytes, with normal timing and no traceback. | Capture correlation/phase failures and reproduce under repeated/concurrent cache-control tests before claiming deterministic closure. |
+
+**Commercial interpretation.** The audit supports adoption for normal repositories up
+to several thousand files and values the product at a provisional $35-50 per
+developer/month, but the final score and the critical /dev/null and extreme-scale
+findings block an annual-grade reliability claim. Pricing and enterprise
+positioning remain hypotheses until AUD-611-B01 and AUD-611-B02 are closed and
+the latency contract is explicit.
+
+### External Audit Intake — `AUD-610` detail, release 5.9.3
+
+The attached external report audited ASK `5.9.3` in five parallel batches
+(approximately 120 invocations), scored it **7.2/10**, and found the audited
+repository clean: no Java files, commits or unauthorized persisted files were
+changed. Its strongest positive evidence was structured error quality (9.0),
+agent-oriented output bounding (9.5) and default non-destructiveness (9.0).
+Its commercial conclusion was **conditional adoption/pilot**, with a suggested
+price band of `$35-50/developer/month`, contingent on closing the flagship
+silent-failure paths before an annual commitment. That price is an external
+hypothesis, not an ASK pricing decision.
+
+The detailed intake below preserves every reported error and its future closure
+boundary. Status is evaluated against the current `5.9.6` documentation and the
+TeaVM simulation above, not blindly copied from the audited `5.9.3` build.
+
+| ID | Severity | Reported issue | Roadmap disposition and future closure |
+|---|---:|---|---|
+| `AUD-610-B01` | P1 | Root YAML compact/agent reportedly returned zero bytes and progress reportedly exited 127. | **Not reproduced in `5.9.5` TeaVM; held as release-artifact verification, not an open product defect.** Current usage/error batteries require structured stderr on failure. |
+| `AUD-610-B02` | P1 | `audit-report` reportedly returned zero bytes across formats and output modes. | **Not reproduced in `5.9.5` TeaVM; held as release-artifact verification.** JSON, YAML, Markdown and file-output paths completed with evidence. |
+| `AUD-610-B03` | P1 | `risk --limit 0` reportedly crashed silently. | **Not reproduced in `5.9.5` TeaVM; held as release-artifact verification.** TeaVM accepted zero as a legal empty-list bound and the boundary battery passes. |
+| `AUD-610-B04` | P1 | `timeline --since HEAD~5` reportedly paid for work and then returned empty output. | **Not reproduced in `5.9.5` TeaVM; held as release-artifact verification.** Timeline failures publish structured diagnostics and sampled failures retain per-sample reasons. |
+| `AUD-610-B05` | P1 | `endpoints --consumer <missing-path>` reportedly behaved like a valid consumer path and produced the same oversized result. | **Closed in `5.9.4` (`86ed0a3`).** Consumer paths now have explicit admission and fail closed; retain the missing-path and valid-path differential battery. |
+| `AUD-610-B06` | P2 | Semantic input errors reportedly had inconsistent process exits. | **Closed by the shared error contract (`ae2e8b1`, `f4b4f77`).** `INVALID_INPUT` is exit 1 and parser/grammar failures are exit 2; usage and subprocess parity batteries pass. |
+| `AUD-610-B07` | P2 | Unknown subcommands were reportedly swallowed as repository paths. | **Closed (`178aa6d`).** Registry-derived dispatch rejects the typo before path fallback and preserves valid lone path arguments. |
+| `AUD-610-B08` | P2 | `pack gate --since <missing-ref>` reportedly collapsed the actionable Git ref error into generic `UNVERIFIED`, unlike direct `pr-impact`. | **Closed in `5.9.4` (`6690a7f`).** Unresolved refs are rejected at admission with structured input evidence; preserve direct-vs-pack parity coverage. |
+| `AUD-610-B09` | P2 | Root help reportedly described `--files -` ambiguously. | **Closed (`f66cd28`, `52bcc36`).** Root and subcommand help state path-list stdin, file and comma-separated shapes; real unified diffs are rejected as invalid input. |
+| `AUD-610-B10` | P2 | Missing symbols reportedly produced divergent impact risk/score semantics. | **Closed (`c07581a` plus `tests/test_direct_callers_unit.py`).** Unresolved paths use the shared `not_found` vocabulary, unknown risk, null score where arithmetic is not applicable and consistent non-zero exit. |
+| `AUD-610-B11` | P2 | Malformed CVE feed reportedly yielded `status: ok` with the parse problem buried in `limitations`. | **Closed in `5.9.4` (`abc6319`).** Feed integrity is fail-closed and statically scoped; preserve malformed, empty and mixed-validity feed tests so a security feed cannot silently degrade to “clean”. |
+| `AUD-610-B12` | P2 | Invented posture profile names were accepted and returned a normal-looking result. | **Closed in `5.9.4` (`f7335b1`, `6e75646`).** Unknown declared populations are rejected; retain profile-admission and cross-command tests. |
+| `AUD-610-B13` | P2 | Repeated baseline capture at the same commit reportedly overwrote the prior evidence without warning or `--force`. | **Closed in `5.9.4` (`cbe4da9`).** Same-commit collisions are rejected; retain duplicate, explicit overwrite and cross-kind tests. |
+| `AUD-610-B14` | P2 | `self-audit` reported a different CLI/MCP count without explaining the populations. | **Closed in `5.9.6` (`7c9b23e`).** `self-audit` publishes both populations, native MCP additions and the relationship formula; TeaVM process regression passes. |
+| `AUD-610-B15` | P3 | `baseline diff`/`trend` failed on no history while `baseline attest` returned `no_history`. | **Closed in `5.9.6` (`a130637`).** Diff, trend and attest now return `status: no_history`, exit 0 and explicit `non_coverage` for empty history. |
+| `AUD-610-B16` | P3 | A replacement character (`�`) reportedly appeared in production JSON around a UTF-8 boundary in posture non-coverage text. | **Open reproduction follow-up.** Run byte-level UTF-8 tests on the exact payload and supported platforms, including em dash/arrow boundaries. If confirmed, fix serialization/truncation at code-point boundaries; if not, record the platform cause and keep the claim withdrawn. |
+| `AUD-610-B17` | P3 | One `retrieve endpoint-security` invocation reportedly failed silently, then succeeded immediately on retry; no second reproduction was obtained. | **Investigation only.** Add correlation IDs, phase-level failure capture and a repeated/concurrent cache-control test. Do not classify a transient single sample as a deterministic defect until reproduced. |
+
+**Audit exclusions and interpretation:** destructive `rename-class` without
+`--dry-run` and `migrate-apply --write` were not executed for safety; the latter
+was additionally blocked by the auditor's sandbox heuristic, not by an ASK
+failure. The report found no regression in the previously closed surfaces and
+confirmed dry-run/non-destructive behaviour. Until `AUD-610-B01` through
+`AUD-610-B04` and the remaining consistency rows are independently closed, ASK
+must retain conditional-pilot positioning and must not promise silent-failure
+freedom or annual-grade reliability.
+
 ### Explicitly Rejected
 
 These are not roadmap work: `--format` and `--compact` remain separate contracts;

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/docs/EXECUTIVE-ROADMAP.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 > `pack assessment` and `pack gate`, and make evidence and safe change the
 > product surface. This roadmap must not introduce a competing product thesis.
 
-> **CURRENT UPDATE — release `5.9.4`, following the external `5.9.3` reconciliation.**
+> **CURRENT UPDATE — release `5.9.7`, following the external `5.9.3` reconciliation.**
 > The commercial increment adds stateless context budgets, a reproducible context-cost harness,
 > source-level migration SARIF and an opt-in workspace entitlement pilot. Advisory behaviour remains
 > the default; named-buyer validation is still required before broad enforcement.
@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@
 > non-reproduction did not cover the payload shape now identified. Details are
 > in [`AUDIT-2026-08-26-EXTERNAL-5.9.0.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-26-EXTERNAL-5.9.0.md).
 
+> **RE-AUDIT — 5.9.6, received 2026-08-27.** Seven independent forks exercised
+> approximately 250 invocations across the testing corpus with no target-repository
+> mutation or regression in the three latest fixes. The final score is **7.4/10**.
+> Commercial adoption remains suitable for normal repositories, provisionally
+> `$35-50/developer/month`, but annual-grade reliability is blocked by two new
+> critical findings: invalid-input errors can be suppressed by redirecting stdout
+> to `/dev/null`, and the root compact scan of a 24,073-Java-file repository timed
+> out after 240 seconds with no output. Additional roadmap debt covers root help
+> parity, cache reuse for YAML/view combinations, default progress signals, intent
+> tie semantics, impact not-found parity, compact sizing and one intermittent
+> retrieve failure. Full engineering detail is recorded in `AUD-611` in the
+> development roadmap and defect ledger.
+
 > **EXTERNAL REVIEW — 5.9.2, received 2026-08-27.** No regression was reported in the
 > previously closed surface. Two `auth workspace` defects are now open: overlapping
 > parent/child paths can double-count Java files, and nonexistent paths are accepted as
@@ -45,7 +58,7 @@
 > posture is conditional pilot until the flagship failures are fixed and re-tested.
 > Full triage: [`AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.3.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-27-EXTERNAL-5.9.3.md).
 
-> **5.9.4 reliability correction.** The reproducible contract defects from the
+> **5.9.6 reliability correction.** The reproducible contract defects from the
 > latest review are closed: missing consumer paths and malformed CVE feeds now
 > fail closed; `pack gate` rejects unresolved refs; posture profile diffs reject
 > unknown declared-population names; baselines refuse same-commit overwrite;

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/docs/MANUAL-USUARIO.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Manual de usuario — ASK Engine
 
-> Versión de la herramienta: **5.9.4**  ·  El comando que se ejecuta es `ask`.
+> Versión de la herramienta: **5.9.7**  ·  El comando que se ejecuta es `ask`.
 > (`sourcecode` sigue funcionando como alias en desactivación y reenvía a `ask`.)
 > Público: personas que van a usar `ask` por primera vez, sin conocimiento previo.
 
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 ## 1. ¿Qué es ASK Engine?
 
-### Contratos de fiabilidad de la versión 5.9.4
+### Contratos de fiabilidad de la versión 5.9.7
 
 Las entradas inválidas se rechazan antes del análisis costoso mediante el
 envelope estructurado `INVALID_INPUT`: un `--consumer` inexistente, un feed CVE

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/docs/USER_GUIDE.md

@@ -46,16 +46,16 @@ CLI commands        — impact, endpoints, spring-audit, explain, … each a pro
 The key idea: the extraction is **content-addressed**. Commands reuse the parse cache and,
 where their analysed scope matches, the shared Canonical IR; `ask cache model` names what a
 warm buys for each command rather than implying that every projection costs the same. In
-5.9.4, `validation` enters through that shared CIR and `data-exposure` reuses one semantic
+5.9.7, `validation` enters through that shared CIR and `data-exposure` reuses one semantic
 model across all declared label seeds. (The extraction and consumption contract is fixed in
 the architecture ADRs 0001–0004 under `docs/architecture/`.)
 
 The current external pack audit intake is tracked in
 [`AUDIT-2026-08-26-EXTERNAL-5.8.28-PACK.md`](AUDIT-2026-08-26-EXTERNAL-5.8.28-PACK.md);
-the two pack fixes are included in release 5.9.4, with release-artifact verification
+the two pack fixes are included in release 5.9.7, with release-artifact verification
 remaining for detached execution and pack evidence.
 
-### Reliability contracts in 5.9.4
+### Reliability contracts in 5.9.7
 
 Invalid analysis inputs fail before expensive work and use the structured
 `INVALID_INPUT` envelope: a missing `--consumer` repository, a malformed CVE
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ pipx install sourcecode   # isolated install, no venv needed
 
 # Verify
 ask version
-# ask 5.9.4
+# ask 5.9.7
 ```
 
 Requires Python 3.9+.

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "sourcecode"
-version = "5.9.4"
+version = "5.9.7"
 description = "Persistent structural context and ultra-fast repeated analysis for AI coding agents"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.9"

{sourcecode-5.9.4 → sourcecode-5.9.7}/src/sourcecode/__init__.py

@@ -4,4 +4,4 @@ ASK Engine is the product. ``ask`` is the canonical CLI command; ``sourcecode``
 the legacy compatibility alias and the Python/PyPI package name. See
 docs/PRODUCT_IDENTITY.md (normative)."""
 
-__version__ = "5.9.4"
+__version__ = "5.9.7"