shellui-django 0.5.1__tar.gz → 0.6.0__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (41) hide show
  1. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/CHANGELOG.md +36 -0
  2. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/PKG-INFO +1 -1
  3. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  4. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/__init__.py +1 -1
  5. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/gateway.py +22 -22
  6. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/identity_jwks.py +74 -5
  7. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/internal.py +2 -1
  8. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/routing.py +57 -1
  9. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/server.py +176 -24
  10. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/mcp_routing_urlconf.py +11 -2
  11. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/rs256_helpers.py +27 -0
  12. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_gateway.py +74 -43
  13. shellui_django-0.6.0/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_identity_jwks_fetch.py +110 -0
  14. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_internal_assertions.py +20 -0
  15. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_routing.py +28 -1
  16. shellui_django-0.6.0/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_server_hardening.py +257 -0
  17. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_server_routing.py +31 -7
  18. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/.gitignore +0 -0
  19. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
  20. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/README.md +0 -0
  21. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/SECURITY.md +0 -0
  22. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/__init__.py +0 -0
  23. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/decorators.py +0 -0
  24. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/delegation.py +0 -0
  25. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/masking.py +0 -0
  26. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/openapi_mcp.py +0 -0
  27. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/openapi_tools.py +0 -0
  28. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/rate_limit.py +0 -0
  29. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/resources.py +0 -0
  30. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  31. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_approval_authority.py +0 -0
  32. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_delegation.py +0 -0
  33. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_identity_jwks_decode.py +0 -0
  34. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_internal_revocation.py +0 -0
  35. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_masking.py +0 -0
  36. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_openapi_tools.py +0 -0
  37. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_package.py +0 -0
  38. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_resources.py +0 -0
  39. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/tests/test_write_gate_mcp.py +0 -0
  40. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/mcp/write_gate.py +0 -0
  41. {shellui_django-0.5.1 → shellui_django-0.6.0}/src/shellui_django/testing/__init__.py +0 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,42 @@ Breaking changes bump the major version (minor while below 1.0.0), so services c
23
23
  See for sample https://raw.githubusercontent.com/favoloso/conventional-changelog-emoji/master/CHANGELOG.md
24
24
  -->
25
25
 
26
+ ## [0.6.0] - 2026-11-21
27
+
28
+ Breaking: services must pass the new `McpServer` settings listed under Changed before upgrading.
29
+
30
+ ### 🛠 Improvements
31
+
32
+ - MCP `tools/call` checks tenant fields (`company_id`, `companyId`, `company-id`) in tool arguments, including nested objects, against the verified token `company_id`. The aggregating gateway applies the same check before it forwards a call. `0` is a real company id.
33
+ - `McpServer.handle` verifies the bearer token (RS256, `identity_issuer`, `mcp_audience`, JWKS) and authenticates the inner view with those claims.
34
+ - `identity_revocation_check` runs on every request. A missing hook, or a hook that raises, is rejected with HTTP 403 `revocation_unavailable`.
35
+ - Identity JWKS fetch uses the configured URL only: redirects are not followed, `https` is required unless Django `DEBUG` is true, other schemes are rejected, the body is capped at 256 KiB, and the timeout must be positive (default 10 seconds).
36
+ - Internal assertion verification requires `target` to equal `expected_target`. An empty or missing `target` does not match.
37
+ - `mcp_gateway_delegated` skips a second approval only for the tool named in `action` while `exp` is still in the future.
38
+
39
+ ### 🚨 Changed
40
+
41
+ - `McpServer` needs `identity_issuer`, `mcp_audience`, and `identity_jwks` or `identity_jwks_url`, plus `identity_revocation_check`. `handle` does not authorize from the `agent_claims` argument. Inner `request.user` is the verified agent principal, and `request.auth` is the verified claims.
42
+ - `mcp_gateway_delegated` must be an object `{"action": "<tool name>", "exp": <unix seconds>}`. A boolean value does not skip approval.
43
+ - JWKS clients that used plain `http` while `DEBUG` is false, or that followed a redirect, now get an error from `get_jwks_document`.
44
+
45
+ ### 🏗 Chore
46
+
47
+ - PyPI publishing checks that the release tag matches the package version before upload.
48
+
49
+ ## [0.5.3] - 2026-11-11
50
+
51
+ ### 🐛 Bug Fixes
52
+
53
+ - MCP `tools/call`: honor `mcp_gateway_delegated` on agent tokens so downstream services do not open a second human approval after the AI company gateway already approved and consumed the grant.
54
+
55
+ ## [0.5.2] - 2026-11-11
56
+
57
+ ### 🐛 Bug Fixes
58
+
59
+ - MCP `tools/list`: keep registry `_meta` (path, method, read_only, destructive) on the wire. Services publish flat agent schemas without transport arguments; the AI gateway needs `_meta` to route `tools/call`. Other private `_` keys are still stripped.
60
+ - MCP argument validation: ignore DRF `format` query noise so legacy nested `tools/call` envelopes from older MCP clients do not fail with `Unexpected query fields: format`.
61
+
26
62
  ## [0.5.1] - 2026-11-09
27
63
 
28
64
  ### 🐛 Bug Fixes
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.5
2
2
  Name: shellui-django
3
- Version: 0.5.1
3
+ Version: 0.6.0
4
4
  Summary: Shared Django libraries for Shellui services
5
5
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://shellui.com
6
6
  Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/shellui/django-commons
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  [project]
2
2
  name = "shellui-django"
3
- version = "0.5.1"
3
+ version = "0.6.0"
4
4
  description = "Shared Django libraries for Shellui services"
5
5
  readme = "README.md"
6
6
  license = "MIT"
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
1
1
  """Shared Django libraries for Shellui services."""
2
2
 
3
- __version__ = '0.5.1'
3
+ __version__ = '0.6.0'
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from django.core.cache import cache as django_cache
13
13
  from django.http import HttpRequest, JsonResponse
14
14
 
15
15
  from shellui_django.mcp.openapi_tools import tools_from_schema
16
- from shellui_django.mcp.rate_limit import check_agent_rate_limit
16
+ from shellui_django.mcp.routing import tool_arguments_match_company
17
17
  from shellui_django.mcp.server import McpServer
18
18
 
19
19
  logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -42,11 +42,20 @@ def service_allowed(agent_services: list[str] | None, service_id: str) -> bool:
42
42
 
43
43
 
44
44
  def public_mcp_tools(raw: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
45
+ """Strip private ``_`` keys from tools/list rows, but keep registry ``_meta``.
46
+
47
+ Downstream services publish flat agent schemas without ``method``/``path``
48
+ arguments. Gateways need ``_meta.path`` / ``_meta.method`` to route calls.
49
+ """
45
50
  out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
46
51
  for tool in raw:
47
52
  if not isinstance(tool, dict):
48
53
  continue
49
- out.append({k: v for k, v in tool.items() if not str(k).startswith('_')})
54
+ row = {k: v for k, v in tool.items() if not str(k).startswith('_')}
55
+ meta = tool.get('_meta')
56
+ if isinstance(meta, dict):
57
+ row['_meta'] = meta
58
+ out.append(row)
50
59
  return out
51
60
 
52
61
 
@@ -178,25 +187,12 @@ class AggregatingMcpServer(McpServer):
178
187
  self._cache().set(cache_key, public, self._gateway.tools_cache_ttl_seconds)
179
188
  return public
180
189
 
181
- def handle(self, request: HttpRequest, *, agent_claims: dict[str, Any] | None) -> JsonResponse:
182
- if request.method != 'POST':
183
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'method_not_allowed'}, status=405)
184
- if agent_claims is None:
185
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'unauthorized'}, status=401)
186
- agent_id = str(agent_claims.get('agent_id') or '')
187
- if not agent_id:
188
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'unauthorized'}, status=401)
189
- if check_agent_rate_limit(agent_id):
190
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'rate_limited'}, status=429)
191
- company_id = agent_claims.get('company_id')
192
- try:
193
- company_id_int = int(company_id) if company_id is not None else None
194
- except (TypeError, ValueError):
195
- company_id_int = None
196
- if self.identity_revocation_check and self.identity_revocation_check(agent_id, company_id_int):
197
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'agent_revoked'}, status=403)
198
- if not self._service_allowed(agent_claims, self.service_name):
199
- return JsonResponse({'error': 'forbidden'}, status=403)
190
+ def handle(self, request: HttpRequest, *, agent_claims: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> JsonResponse:
191
+ del agent_claims
192
+ prepared = self._prepare(request)
193
+ if isinstance(prepared, JsonResponse):
194
+ return prepared
195
+ agent_claims = prepared
200
196
  try:
201
197
  payload = json.loads(request.body.decode('utf-8') or '{}')
202
198
  except json.JSONDecodeError:
@@ -228,7 +224,7 @@ class AggregatingMcpServer(McpServer):
228
224
  forwarded = self._maybe_forward_tool_call(request, req_id, params, agent_claims)
229
225
  if forwarded is not None:
230
226
  return forwarded
231
- return super().handle(request, agent_claims=agent_claims)
227
+ return self._handle_prepared(request, agent_claims)
232
228
 
233
229
  def _aggregated_tools_list(self, req_id: Any, agent_claims: dict[str, Any]) -> JsonResponse:
234
230
  agent = self._gateway.resolve_agent(agent_claims)
@@ -272,6 +268,10 @@ class AggregatingMcpServer(McpServer):
272
268
  tool_name = str(params.get('name') or '')
273
269
  if not tool_name:
274
270
  return None
271
+ company_raw = agent_claims.get('company_id')
272
+ company_id = company_raw if isinstance(company_raw, int) and not isinstance(company_raw, bool) else None
273
+ if not tool_arguments_match_company(params.get('arguments'), company_id):
274
+ return JsonResponse(self._error(req_id, -32602, 'company_id does not match the authenticated company'))
275
275
  route = self._lookup_route(tool_name)
276
276
  local_id = self._gateway.local_service_id
277
277
  if route is None:
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import time
8
8
  import urllib.error
9
9
  import urllib.request
10
10
  from typing import Any
11
+ from urllib.parse import urlsplit
11
12
 
12
13
  import jwt
13
14
  from jwt.algorithms import RSAAlgorithm
@@ -15,6 +16,8 @@ from jwt.algorithms import RSAAlgorithm
15
16
  _CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300
16
17
  # Match ``INTERNAL_ASSERTION_LEEWAY_SECONDS`` in ``internal`` for Identity JWT verification.
17
18
  IDENTITY_RS256_LEEWAY_SECONDS = 5
19
+ JWKS_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES = 256 * 1024
20
+ _DEFAULT_JWKS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10.0
18
21
  _cache_lock = threading.Lock()
19
22
  _jwks_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = {}
20
23
 
@@ -51,13 +54,79 @@ def identity_jwks_url_for_issuer(issuer: str) -> str:
51
54
  return f'{base}/.well-known/jwks.json'
52
55
 
53
56
 
57
+ def _allow_insecure_jwks_url() -> bool:
58
+ """``http`` JWKS URLs are accepted only when Django ``DEBUG`` is on."""
59
+ try:
60
+ from django.conf import settings
61
+
62
+ return bool(settings.DEBUG)
63
+ except Exception:
64
+ return False
65
+
66
+
67
+ def _validated_jwks_url(url: str) -> str:
68
+ """Return ``url`` when it is the exact document to fetch."""
69
+ raw = (url or '').strip()
70
+ if not raw or any(char in raw for char in ('\r', '\n', '\t', ' ')):
71
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS URL is invalid.')
72
+ parsed = urlsplit(raw)
73
+ if parsed.username or parsed.password or parsed.fragment:
74
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS URL is invalid.')
75
+ if not parsed.hostname or not parsed.netloc:
76
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS URL is invalid.')
77
+ if parsed.scheme == 'https':
78
+ return raw
79
+ if parsed.scheme == 'http' and _allow_insecure_jwks_url():
80
+ return raw
81
+ if parsed.scheme == 'http':
82
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS URL must use https.')
83
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS URL is invalid.')
84
+
85
+
86
+ def _positive_timeout(timeout: float) -> float:
87
+ if isinstance(timeout, bool) or not isinstance(timeout, (int, float)):
88
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS timeout is required.')
89
+ if timeout <= 0:
90
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS timeout is required.')
91
+ return float(timeout)
92
+
93
+
94
+ def _jwks_opener() -> urllib.request.OpenerDirector:
95
+ """HTTP(S) opener that does not follow redirects or local URL schemes."""
96
+ opener = urllib.request.OpenerDirector()
97
+ opener.add_handler(urllib.request.HTTPHandler())
98
+ opener.add_handler(urllib.request.HTTPSHandler())
99
+ opener.add_handler(urllib.request.HTTPErrorProcessor())
100
+ opener.add_handler(urllib.request.HTTPDefaultErrorHandler())
101
+ return opener
102
+
103
+
54
104
  def _fetch_jwks_document(url: str, *, timeout: float) -> dict[str, Any]:
55
- request = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
105
+ fetch_url = _validated_jwks_url(url)
106
+ timeout_s = _positive_timeout(timeout)
107
+ request = urllib.request.Request(fetch_url, headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
56
108
  try:
57
- with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
58
- raw = response.read()
59
- except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as exc:
109
+ response = _jwks_opener().open(request, timeout=timeout_s)
110
+ except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
111
+ if 300 <= int(getattr(exc, 'code', 0) or 0) < 400:
112
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS redirects are not allowed.') from exc
113
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Failed to fetch Identity JWKS.') from exc
114
+ except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError) as exc:
60
115
  raise IdentityJwksError('Failed to fetch Identity JWKS.') from exc
116
+ with response:
117
+ final_url = response.geturl()
118
+ if urlsplit(final_url) != urlsplit(fetch_url):
119
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS redirects are not allowed.')
120
+ declared = response.headers.get('Content-Length')
121
+ if declared is not None:
122
+ try:
123
+ if int(declared) > JWKS_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
124
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS response is too large.')
125
+ except ValueError as exc:
126
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS response is too large.') from exc
127
+ raw = response.read(JWKS_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES + 1)
128
+ if len(raw) > JWKS_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES:
129
+ raise IdentityJwksError('Identity JWKS response is too large.')
61
130
  try:
62
131
  document = json.loads(raw.decode('utf-8'))
63
132
  except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
@@ -67,7 +136,7 @@ def _fetch_jwks_document(url: str, *, timeout: float) -> dict[str, Any]:
67
136
  return document
68
137
 
69
138
 
70
- def get_jwks_document(*, jwks_url: str | None = None, jwks: dict[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: float = 10.0) -> dict[str, Any]:
139
+ def get_jwks_document(*, jwks_url: str | None = None, jwks: dict[str, Any] | None = None, timeout: float = _DEFAULT_JWKS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> dict[str, Any]:
71
140
  if jwks is not None:
72
141
  if not isinstance(jwks.get('keys'), list):
73
142
  raise IdentityJwksError('Inline JWKS document is invalid.')
@@ -515,8 +515,9 @@ def verify_rs256_mcp_assertion(
515
515
  elif str(aud or '') != expected_audience:
516
516
  raise InternalAssertionError('Assertion audience mismatch.')
517
517
  if expected_target:
518
+ expected = str(expected_target).rstrip('/')
518
519
  target = str(payload.get('target') or '').rstrip('/')
519
- if target and target != expected_target.rstrip('/'):
520
+ if not target or target != expected:
520
521
  raise InternalAssertionError('Assertion target mismatch.')
521
522
  _assert_lifetime_within_limit(payload, max_lifetime_seconds=max_lifetime_seconds)
522
523
  jti = str(payload.get('jti') or '').strip()
@@ -3,10 +3,13 @@
3
3
  from __future__ import annotations
4
4
 
5
5
  import re
6
+ from collections.abc import Iterator
6
7
  from typing import Any
7
8
  from urllib.parse import quote
8
9
 
9
10
  _PATH_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'\{([^}]+)\}')
11
+ # DRF browsable-API content negotiation; never an MCP tool argument.
12
+ _IGNORED_QUERY_FIELDS = frozenset({'format'})
10
13
 
11
14
 
12
15
  class McpToolArgumentError(ValueError):
@@ -71,14 +74,67 @@ def _validate_param_object(
71
74
  raise McpToolArgumentError(f'Missing required {label} fields: {", ".join(missing)}')
72
75
 
73
76
 
77
+ def _is_tenant_key(key: str) -> bool:
78
+ normalized = str(key).replace('-', '_').lower()
79
+ return normalized in {'company_id', 'companyid'}
80
+
81
+
82
+ def _iter_tenant_values(node: Any) -> Iterator[Any]:
83
+ if isinstance(node, dict):
84
+ for key, value in node.items():
85
+ if _is_tenant_key(str(key)):
86
+ yield value
87
+ else:
88
+ yield from _iter_tenant_values(value)
89
+ elif isinstance(node, list):
90
+ for item in node:
91
+ yield from _iter_tenant_values(item)
92
+
93
+
94
+ def _company_value_matches(value: Any, company_id: int) -> bool:
95
+ if isinstance(value, bool):
96
+ return False
97
+ if isinstance(value, int):
98
+ return value == company_id
99
+ if isinstance(value, str):
100
+ text = value.strip()
101
+ if not text.isdigit():
102
+ return False
103
+ return int(text) == company_id
104
+ return False
105
+
106
+
107
+ def tool_arguments_match_company(arguments: Any, company_id: int | None) -> bool:
108
+ """True when every tenant id in tool arguments matches ``company_id``.
109
+
110
+ Tenant keys are ``company_id``, ``companyId``, and ``company-id``, at any
111
+ depth in the arguments object. A missing authenticated company does not
112
+ match a tenant field. ``0`` is a real company id.
113
+ """
114
+ if arguments is None:
115
+ return True
116
+ if not isinstance(arguments, dict):
117
+ return False
118
+ for value in _iter_tenant_values(arguments):
119
+ if company_id is None or isinstance(company_id, bool) or not isinstance(company_id, int):
120
+ return False
121
+ if not _company_value_matches(value, company_id):
122
+ return False
123
+ return True
124
+
125
+
74
126
  def validate_mcp_tool_arguments(arguments: dict[str, Any], meta: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
75
127
  path_params = arguments.get('path_params')
76
128
  if path_params is None:
77
129
  path_params = {}
78
130
  materialize_openapi_path(str(meta.get('path') or ''), path_params)
131
+ query = arguments.get('query')
132
+ if isinstance(query, dict) and _IGNORED_QUERY_FIELDS & set(query):
133
+ query = {key: value for key, value in query.items() if key not in _IGNORED_QUERY_FIELDS}
134
+ arguments['query'] = query
79
135
  _validate_param_object(
80
136
  'query',
81
- arguments.get('query'),
137
+ query,
82
138
  meta.get('query_fields'),
83
139
  required=meta.get('query_required') or None,
84
140
  )
@@ -5,24 +5,101 @@ from __future__ import annotations
5
5
  import hashlib
6
6
  import json
7
7
  import logging
8
+ import time
8
9
  from collections.abc import Callable
9
10
  from typing import Any
10
11
 
11
12
  from django.http import HttpRequest, JsonResponse
12
13
  from rest_framework.test import APIRequestFactory, force_authenticate
13
14
 
15
+ from shellui_django.mcp.identity_jwks import (
16
+ IdentityJwksError,
17
+ decode_identity_rs256_jwt,
18
+ jwt_unix_timestamp_claim_strict,
19
+ )
14
20
  from shellui_django.mcp.masking import redact_mapping
15
21
  from shellui_django.mcp.openapi_mcp import marker_tree_for_operation_request, marker_tree_for_operation_response
16
22
  from shellui_django.mcp.openapi_tools import tools_from_schema
17
23
  from shellui_django.mcp.rate_limit import check_agent_rate_limit
18
- from shellui_django.mcp.routing import McpToolArgumentError, materialize_openapi_path, validate_mcp_tool_arguments
19
- from shellui_django.mcp.write_gate import decide_write, is_destructive_operation
24
+ from shellui_django.mcp.resources import access_token_audience_matches
25
+ from shellui_django.mcp.routing import (
26
+ McpToolArgumentError,
27
+ materialize_openapi_path,
28
+ tool_arguments_match_company,
29
+ validate_mcp_tool_arguments,
30
+ )
31
+ from shellui_django.mcp.write_gate import WriteGateDecision, decide_write, is_destructive_operation
20
32
 
21
33
  logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
22
34
 
23
35
  _BODYLESS_METHODS = frozenset({'GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS', 'TRACE'})
24
36
 
25
37
 
38
+ class VerifiedTokenUser:
39
+ """Authenticated principal for the bearer token checked in ``McpServer.handle``."""
40
+
41
+ is_authenticated = True
42
+ is_anonymous = False
43
+ is_active = True
44
+
45
+ def __init__(self, agent_id: str):
46
+ self.agent_id = agent_id
47
+ self.pk = agent_id
48
+ self.id = agent_id
49
+
50
+ def __str__(self) -> str:
51
+ return self.agent_id
52
+
53
+
54
+ def _strict_company_id(value: Any) -> int:
55
+ """Non-negative company id. Rejects bool and float so values are not coerced."""
56
+ if isinstance(value, bool) or isinstance(value, float):
57
+ raise ValueError
58
+ if isinstance(value, int):
59
+ if value < 0:
60
+ raise ValueError
61
+ return value
62
+ if isinstance(value, str):
63
+ text = value.strip()
64
+ if text.isdigit():
65
+ return int(text)
66
+ raise ValueError
67
+
68
+
69
+ def _claim_company_id(agent_claims: dict[str, Any]) -> int | None:
70
+ if 'company_id' not in agent_claims or agent_claims.get('company_id') is None:
71
+ return None
72
+ return _strict_company_id(agent_claims['company_id'])
73
+
74
+
75
+ def _delegated_approval_covers(agent_claims: dict[str, Any], tool_name: str) -> bool:
76
+ """True when ``mcp_gateway_delegated`` names this tool and has not expired.
77
+
78
+ The claim must be an object ``{"action": "<tool name>", "exp": <unix seconds>}``.
79
+ A boolean or any other shape does not skip approval.
80
+ """
81
+ claim = agent_claims.get('mcp_gateway_delegated')
82
+ if not isinstance(claim, dict):
83
+ return False
84
+ action = claim.get('action')
85
+ if not isinstance(action, str) or not action or action != tool_name:
86
+ return False
87
+ try:
88
+ exp = jwt_unix_timestamp_claim_strict(claim.get('exp'), field='exp')
89
+ except IdentityJwksError:
90
+ return False
91
+ return exp > int(time.time())
92
+
93
+
94
+ def _tool_list_row(tool: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
95
+ """Public tools/list row: drop private ``_`` keys except registry ``_meta``."""
96
+ row = {k: v for k, v in tool.items() if not str(k).startswith('_')}
97
+ meta = tool.get('_meta')
98
+ if isinstance(meta, dict):
99
+ row['_meta'] = meta
100
+ return row
101
+
102
+
26
103
  class McpServer:
27
104
  def __init__(
28
105
  self,
@@ -35,6 +112,10 @@ class McpServer:
35
112
  approval_handler: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
36
113
  approval_state: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], str | None] | None = None,
37
114
  approval_consume: Callable[..., bool] | None = None,
115
+ identity_issuer: str | None = None,
116
+ identity_jwks_url: str | None = None,
117
+ identity_jwks: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
118
+ mcp_audience: str | None = None,
38
119
  ):
39
120
  self.schema_provider = schema_provider
40
121
  self.urlconf = urlconf
@@ -44,11 +125,28 @@ class McpServer:
44
125
  self.approval_handler = approval_handler
45
126
  self.approval_state = approval_state
46
127
  self.approval_consume = approval_consume
128
+ self.identity_issuer = identity_issuer
129
+ self.identity_jwks_url = identity_jwks_url
130
+ self.identity_jwks = identity_jwks
131
+ self.mcp_audience = mcp_audience
47
132
  self._factory = APIRequestFactory()
48
133
 
49
- def handle(self, request: HttpRequest, *, agent_claims: dict[str, Any] | None) -> JsonResponse:
134
+ def handle(self, request: HttpRequest, *, agent_claims: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> JsonResponse:
135
+ """Dispatch one MCP JSON-RPC request.
136
+
137
+ ``agent_claims`` is accepted so existing callers keep working. Authorization
138
+ uses the verified bearer token only.
139
+ """
140
+ del agent_claims
141
+ prepared = self._prepare(request)
142
+ if isinstance(prepared, JsonResponse):
143
+ return prepared
144
+ return self._handle_prepared(request, prepared)
145
+
146
+ def _prepare(self, request: HttpRequest) -> dict[str, Any] | JsonResponse:
50
147
  if request.method != 'POST':
51
148
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'method_not_allowed'}, status=405)
149
+ agent_claims = self._claims_from_bearer(request)
52
150
  if agent_claims is None:
53
151
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'unauthorized'}, status=401)
54
152
  agent_id = str(agent_claims.get('agent_id') or '')
@@ -56,15 +154,64 @@ class McpServer:
56
154
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'unauthorized'}, status=401)
57
155
  if check_agent_rate_limit(agent_id):
58
156
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'rate_limited'}, status=429)
59
- company_id = agent_claims.get('company_id')
60
157
  try:
61
- company_id_int = int(company_id) if company_id is not None else None
62
- except (TypeError, ValueError):
63
- company_id_int = None
64
- if self.identity_revocation_check and self.identity_revocation_check(agent_id, company_id_int):
158
+ company_id_int = _claim_company_id(agent_claims)
159
+ except ValueError:
160
+ return JsonResponse({'error': 'unauthorized'}, status=401)
161
+ if company_id_int is None:
162
+ agent_claims.pop('company_id', None)
163
+ else:
164
+ agent_claims['company_id'] = company_id_int
165
+ if self.identity_revocation_check is None:
166
+ return JsonResponse({'error': 'revocation_unavailable'}, status=403)
167
+ try:
168
+ revoked = bool(self.identity_revocation_check(agent_id, company_id_int))
169
+ except Exception as exc:
170
+ logger.warning(
171
+ 'MCP revocation check failed agent_id=%s err=%s',
172
+ agent_id,
173
+ type(exc).__name__,
174
+ )
175
+ return JsonResponse({'error': 'revocation_unavailable'}, status=403)
176
+ if revoked:
65
177
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'agent_revoked'}, status=403)
66
178
  if not self._service_allowed(agent_claims, self.service_name):
67
179
  return JsonResponse({'error': 'forbidden'}, status=403)
180
+ return agent_claims
181
+
182
+ def _claims_from_bearer(self, request: HttpRequest) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
183
+ issuer = (self.identity_issuer or '').strip().rstrip('/')
184
+ audience = (self.mcp_audience or '').strip()
185
+ if not issuer or not audience:
186
+ return None
187
+ if self.identity_jwks is None and not (self.identity_jwks_url or '').strip():
188
+ return None
189
+ header = str(request.META.get('HTTP_AUTHORIZATION') or '')
190
+ if not header.lower().startswith('bearer '):
191
+ return None
192
+ token = header[7:].strip()
193
+ if not token:
194
+ return None
195
+ try:
196
+ claims = decode_identity_rs256_jwt(
197
+ token,
198
+ audience=audience,
199
+ issuer=issuer,
200
+ jwks_url=(self.identity_jwks_url or '').strip() or None,
201
+ jwks=self.identity_jwks,
202
+ require_claims=('agent_id',),
203
+ )
204
+ except IdentityJwksError:
205
+ return None
206
+ if not access_token_audience_matches(claims, audience):
207
+ return None
208
+ agent_id = claims.get('agent_id')
209
+ if not isinstance(agent_id, str) or not agent_id.strip():
210
+ return None
211
+ claims['agent_id'] = agent_id.strip()
212
+ return claims
213
+
214
+ def _handle_prepared(self, request: HttpRequest, agent_claims: dict[str, Any]) -> JsonResponse:
68
215
  try:
69
216
  payload = json.loads(request.body.decode('utf-8') or '{}')
70
217
  except json.JSONDecodeError:
@@ -76,7 +223,9 @@ class McpServer:
76
223
  return JsonResponse(self._result(req_id, {'protocolVersion': '2024-11-05', 'capabilities': {'tools': {}}}))
77
224
  if method == 'tools/list':
78
225
  schema = self.schema_provider()
79
- tools = [{k: v for k, v in t.items() if not k.startswith('_')} for t in tools_from_schema(schema)]
226
+ # Keep ``_meta`` (path/method/read_only): flat agent schemas omit transport
227
+ # fields, and the AI gateway needs registry metadata to route tools/call.
228
+ tools = [_tool_list_row(t) for t in tools_from_schema(schema)]
80
229
  return JsonResponse(self._result(req_id, {'tools': tools}))
81
230
  if method == 'tools/call':
82
231
  return self._tools_call(request, req_id, params, agent_claims)
@@ -90,7 +239,15 @@ class McpServer:
90
239
  agent_claims: dict[str, Any],
91
240
  ) -> JsonResponse:
92
241
  tool_name = str(params.get('name') or '')
93
- arguments = params.get('arguments') or {}
242
+ arguments = params.get('arguments')
243
+ if arguments is None:
244
+ arguments = {}
245
+ try:
246
+ company_id = _claim_company_id(agent_claims)
247
+ except ValueError:
248
+ return JsonResponse(self._error(req_id, -32602, 'company_id does not match the authenticated company'))
249
+ if not tool_arguments_match_company(arguments, company_id):
250
+ return JsonResponse(self._error(req_id, -32602, 'company_id does not match the authenticated company'))
94
251
  schema = self.schema_provider()
95
252
  tools = tools_from_schema(schema)
96
253
  tool = next((t for t in tools if t['name'] == tool_name), None)
@@ -123,6 +280,9 @@ class McpServer:
123
280
  allow_destructive_without_asking=bool(agent_claims.get('mcp_destructive')),
124
281
  tool_read_only=tool_read_only,
125
282
  )
283
+ # Skip a second approval only when the token names this tool and the grant has not expired.
284
+ if decision.needs_approval and _delegated_approval_covers(agent_claims, tool_name):
285
+ decision = WriteGateDecision(allowed=True)
126
286
  if decision.needs_approval:
127
287
  args_hash = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(arguments, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode()).hexdigest()
128
288
  approval_payload = {
@@ -205,7 +365,7 @@ class McpServer:
205
365
  body = arguments.get('body')
206
366
  inner_kwargs['data'] = body if body is not None else {}
207
367
  drf_request = self._factory.generic(method, resolved_path, **inner_kwargs)
208
- self._attach_request_principal(drf_request, request, agent_claims)
368
+ self._attach_request_principal(drf_request, agent_claims)
209
369
  from django.urls import resolve
210
370
 
211
371
  match = resolve(resolved_path, urlconf=self.urlconf)
@@ -245,19 +405,11 @@ class McpServer:
245
405
  )
246
406
 
247
407
  @staticmethod
248
- def _attach_request_principal(
249
- target_request,
250
- source_request: HttpRequest,
251
- agent_claims: dict[str, Any],
252
- ) -> None:
253
- user = getattr(source_request, 'user', None)
254
- auth = getattr(source_request, 'auth', None)
255
- if auth is None and agent_claims:
256
- auth = agent_claims
257
- if user is not None or auth is not None:
258
- force_authenticate(target_request, user=user, token=auth)
259
- if auth is not None:
260
- target_request.auth = auth
408
+ def _attach_request_principal(target_request, agent_claims: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
409
+ """Authenticate the inner view as the verified token, not the outer request user."""
410
+ agent_id = str(agent_claims.get('agent_id') or '')
411
+ force_authenticate(target_request, user=VerifiedTokenUser(agent_id), token=agent_claims)
412
+ target_request.auth = agent_claims
261
413
 
262
414
  @staticmethod
263
415
  def _service_allowed(agent_claims: dict[str, Any], service_name: str) -> bool:
@@ -15,8 +15,17 @@ class CompanyItemView(APIView):
15
15
  underlying = getattr(request, '_request', request)
16
16
  auth = getattr(underlying, 'auth', None) or getattr(underlying, '_force_auth_token', None)
17
17
  agent_id = auth.get('agent_id') if isinstance(auth, dict) else None
18
- user_ok = bool(getattr(request.user, 'is_authenticated', False))
19
- return Response({'company_id': company_id, 'agent_id': agent_id, 'user_ok': user_ok})
18
+ user = getattr(request, 'user', None)
19
+ user_ok = bool(getattr(user, 'is_authenticated', False))
20
+ return Response(
21
+ {
22
+ 'company_id': company_id,
23
+ 'agent_id': agent_id,
24
+ 'user_ok': user_ok,
25
+ 'user_agent_id': getattr(user, 'agent_id', None),
26
+ 'user_marker': getattr(user, 'marker', None),
27
+ }
28
+ )
20
29
 
21
30
 
22
31
  class RenderPreviewView(APIView):