secure-code-agent 0.5.0__tar.gz → 0.6.0__tar.gz

{secure_code_agent-0.5.0/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: secure-code-agent
-Version: 0.5.0
+Version: 0.6.0
 Summary: Deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompt generator. NIST SSDF / OWASP ASVS / CWE Top 25 anchored.
 Author: Marshall Guillory
 License: MIT
@@ -119,17 +119,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -431,6 +512,7 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.5.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/README.md

@@ -73,17 +73,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -385,6 +466,7 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.5.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: secure-code-agent
-Version: 0.5.0
+Version: 0.6.0
 Summary: Deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompt generator. NIST SSDF / OWASP ASVS / CWE Top 25 anchored.
 Author: Marshall Guillory
 License: MIT
@@ -119,17 +119,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -431,6 +512,7 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.5.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ src/secure_code_audit/cli.py
 src/secure_code_audit/config.py
 src/secure_code_audit/findings.py
 src/secure_code_audit/git_tools.py
+src/secure_code_audit/history.py
 src/secure_code_audit/instructions.py
 src/secure_code_audit/pillar.py
 src/secure_code_audit/practice.py
@@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ src/secure_code_audit/scanner_status.py
 src/secure_code_audit/scoring.py
 src/secure_code_audit/standards.py
 src/secure_code_audit/suppressions.py
+src/secure_code_audit/triage.py
+src/secure_code_audit/verify.py
 src/secure_code_audit/data/semgrep-offline.yaml
 src/secure_code_audit/scanners/__init__.py
 src/secure_code_audit/scanners/bandit_scanner.py

{secure_code_agent-0.5.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/src/secure_code_audit/__init__.py

@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@
 #:
 #: PyPI is immutable, so 0.4.0 stays wrong. 0.5.0 is the first build whose
 #: artifacts name their own producer correctly.
-__version__ = "0.5.0"
+__version__ = "0.6.0"