secure-code-agent 0.4.0__tar.gz → 0.6.0__tar.gz

{secure_code_agent-0.4.0/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: secure-code-agent
-Version: 0.4.0
+Version: 0.6.0
 Summary: Deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompt generator. NIST SSDF / OWASP ASVS / CWE Top 25 anchored.
 Author: Marshall Guillory
 License: MIT
@@ -119,17 +119,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -375,6 +456,31 @@ SARIF upload. Pin production usage to a full commit SHA; the version tag above
 is shown for readability. See [`action.yml`](action.yml) and
 [`examples/github-actions/`](examples/github-actions/) for full workflows.
 
+## maintainability-agent integration
+
+`maintainability-agent` declares Security a **delegated** pillar naming this
+tool, and reports it as `NotApplicable` so silence is never read as safety.
+This tool emits the artifact that completes the picture:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+maintainability-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+```
+
+Standalone use is unaffected — without the flag nothing is written and every
+other output is identical. MA never executes this tool, and this tool never
+imports MA; two independently releasable packages exchanging one document.
+
+The artifact carries **two values that are never averaged**: a practice level
+read from configuration and CI (*is anything preventing the next
+vulnerability?*) and a code condition read from the scanners (*what did they
+find?*). `condition` is `null` whenever scanner coverage is incomplete — this
+tool's score is a rate over findings, so removing scanners makes the raw number
+go **up**, and an unscanned repository must not arrive at MA looking measured.
+
+Full contract, invariants and the practice rubric:
+[`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md).
+
 ## What this is NOT
 
 - ❌ **Not a SAST engine.** We delegate to Semgrep / Bandit / CodeQL / etc. — we don't write yet another AST analyzer.
@@ -398,12 +504,15 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 
 - [`docs/product-intent.md`](docs/product-intent.md) — Why this exists, who it serves, what it refuses to become
 - [`docs/decisions.md`](docs/decisions.md)        — Decision register: rulings the code alone cannot answer
+- [`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md) — The `security-pillar.json` contract maintainability-agent reads
+- [`docs/calibration.md`](docs/calibration.md)   — The calibration study, its corpus, and what it found
 - [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md)              — Architecture + non-goals + scanner protocol
 - [`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md)  — Audit of the system as built + remediation sequence
 - [`docs/release-blockers.md`](docs/release-blockers.md) — Open v0.3.0 release blockers (do not tag until closed)
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.4.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/README.md

@@ -73,17 +73,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -329,6 +410,31 @@ SARIF upload. Pin production usage to a full commit SHA; the version tag above
 is shown for readability. See [`action.yml`](action.yml) and
 [`examples/github-actions/`](examples/github-actions/) for full workflows.
 
+## maintainability-agent integration
+
+`maintainability-agent` declares Security a **delegated** pillar naming this
+tool, and reports it as `NotApplicable` so silence is never read as safety.
+This tool emits the artifact that completes the picture:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+maintainability-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+```
+
+Standalone use is unaffected — without the flag nothing is written and every
+other output is identical. MA never executes this tool, and this tool never
+imports MA; two independently releasable packages exchanging one document.
+
+The artifact carries **two values that are never averaged**: a practice level
+read from configuration and CI (*is anything preventing the next
+vulnerability?*) and a code condition read from the scanners (*what did they
+find?*). `condition` is `null` whenever scanner coverage is incomplete — this
+tool's score is a rate over findings, so removing scanners makes the raw number
+go **up**, and an unscanned repository must not arrive at MA looking measured.
+
+Full contract, invariants and the practice rubric:
+[`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md).
+
 ## What this is NOT
 
 - ❌ **Not a SAST engine.** We delegate to Semgrep / Bandit / CodeQL / etc. — we don't write yet another AST analyzer.
@@ -352,12 +458,15 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 
 - [`docs/product-intent.md`](docs/product-intent.md) — Why this exists, who it serves, what it refuses to become
 - [`docs/decisions.md`](docs/decisions.md)        — Decision register: rulings the code alone cannot answer
+- [`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md) — The `security-pillar.json` contract maintainability-agent reads
+- [`docs/calibration.md`](docs/calibration.md)   — The calibration study, its corpus, and what it found
 - [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md)              — Architecture + non-goals + scanner protocol
 - [`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md)  — Audit of the system as built + remediation sequence
 - [`docs/release-blockers.md`](docs/release-blockers.md) — Open v0.3.0 release blockers (do not tag until closed)
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.4.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,15 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "secure-code-agent"
-version = "0.4.0"
+# Derived from `secure_code_audit.__version__`, which is the only place the
+# number is written. It used to be duplicated here, and the two drifted: this
+# file said 0.4.0 while the package said 0.3.0, so the released v0.4.0 wheel
+# stamped 0.3.0 into every SARIF document, JSON report, Markdown header,
+# `--version` and the pillar artifact handed to maintainability-agent. The
+# release workflow compared the tag against *this* line and never looked at the
+# package, so nothing caught it. A test asserting the two agree would only
+# police the duplication; removing it is the fix.
+dynamic = ["version"]
 description = "Deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompt generator. NIST SSDF / OWASP ASVS / CWE Top 25 anchored."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
@@ -86,6 +94,12 @@ Documentation = "https://github.com/marshallguillory86/secure-code-agent/tree/ma
 Issues        = "https://github.com/marshallguillory86/secure-code-agent/issues"
 Changelog     = "https://github.com/marshallguillory86/secure-code-agent/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md"
 
+[tool.setuptools.dynamic]
+# The single source of truth for the version. `src/secure_code_audit/__init__.py`
+# holds the literal; this reads it. The two cannot drift because there is only
+# one of them.
+version = { attr = "secure_code_audit.__version__" }
+
 [tool.setuptools.packages.find]
 where = ["src"]
 

{secure_code_agent-0.4.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: secure-code-agent
-Version: 0.4.0
+Version: 0.6.0
 Summary: Deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompt generator. NIST SSDF / OWASP ASVS / CWE Top 25 anchored.
 Author: Marshall Guillory
 License: MIT
@@ -119,17 +119,98 @@ This is a constrained task, not a refactor.
 10. Keep the patch small. If you find yourself rewriting a function
     rather than patching it, stop and report the structural issue.
 
-## §FINDINGS
+## §FIX — patch these
 ...
 ```
 
-Hand the prompt to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+Hand the work order to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, or any agent. The agent now has explicit boundaries. The full template + rationale lives in [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md).
+
+**It is written on every run**, alongside the report — no flag required. The
+report describes your code; the work order changes it. Set
+`outputs.prompt_path` to `null` if you do not want one.
+
+### Findings are tiered, because not all of them deserve equal attention
+
+A flat list gives a `shell=True` command injection and a
+`PASSWORD_FIELD = "password"` name-match the same billing, so an agent
+working top to bottom spends its care on noise.
+
+| tier | what it means | what the agent does |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| **§FIX** | the scanner is confident and the rule has not been measured producing noise | patch it |
+| **§REVIEW** | a rule measured producing non-defects, or a scanner reporting low confidence — the reason is stated per finding | confirm it is real first; a justified suppression is a *successful* outcome here |
+| **§ACCEPT** | test tree and documentation | propose a suppression, do not patch |
+
+A noisy rule is demoted, never dropped. Bandit's `B105` produced **zero**
+useful hits out of 22 across the calibration corpus — empty defaults, field
+names, `django-insecure-` — and still caught a planted hardcoded credential,
+so the *value* is judged as well as the rule.
+
+## Proving the work order actually helped
+
+A work order nobody checks is a suggestion. After the agent has worked:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --verify-against secure-code-report.json
+```
+
+This re-audits and reports what was **fixed**, what is **still open**, what
+was **silenced rather than repaired**, and what this work **introduced**. It
+exits nonzero unless the run passes, because a verification step that always
+passes verifies nothing.
+
+```
+work order verification  ·  not proven: 0 fixed, 2 silenced rather than fixed, 1 still open
+  SILENCED   B602    app.py:4
+  SILENCED   B324    app.py:7
+  ! 2 finding(s) disappeared without the code being repaired — a suppression
+    entry now covers them, or the reported line gained an inline marker such
+    as `# nosec`.
+```
+
+That last case is the one worth having. **Lint disable** is in the
+anti-pattern table above, hard constraint 6 forbids it, and forbidding is
+not detecting — Bandit honours `# nosec` itself, so a silenced finding
+simply stops arriving and reads as fixed. Verification reads the source back
+and calls it what it is.
+
+Findings in the test tree and documentation are **reported but not
+required**: §ACCEPT tells the agent not to patch them, so demanding them
+back would make any repository with fixtures impossible to verify.
+
+## Trend, which is what a score is actually for
+
+A single B− tells you little. A B− that was an A− three runs ago tells you
+something happened. Every run appends one line to
+`.secure-code/history.jsonl` and prints the movement:
+
+```
+trend: 3.90 (B+) — up 3.86 from 0.04 (F), 3 scored runs
+```
+
+A run whose coverage was too thin to grade records `null` and is skipped
+rather than plotted as a collapse to zero — the same rule the rest of the
+tool follows: absence of evidence is not a bad grade.
 
 ## Standards anchored, not invented
 
 Known rules map to fields from five public standards. Unmapped and scanner-control
 findings retain null standards fields rather than receiving invented mappings.
 
+A CWE comes from one of three places, in descending authority: an adapter's
+explicit override, the curated map in `standards.py`, then whatever the
+scanner itself declared. That last source was being discarded — Bandit
+publishes a CWE for all ~70 of its plugins and gosec for every rule, and both
+were dropped on the floor, leaving **14% of real findings with any CWE at
+all** against a corpus measurement. Reading them takes it to 100%, and the
+OWASP category is derived from the CWE using OWASP's own published
+category-to-CWE lists where the curated map has none.
+
+Derivation stops where the standard does. `CWE-703` — Bandit's classification
+for a bare `assert` — belongs to no OWASP Top 10 category, so that field stays
+null. 62% of findings carry an OWASP category and the rest say nothing, which
+is the honest answer.
+
 | Source                                       | What we use it for                                       |
 |----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
 | [NIST SSDF SP 800-218](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final) | Process practice id (e.g. `PW.5.1`) |
@@ -375,6 +456,31 @@ SARIF upload. Pin production usage to a full commit SHA; the version tag above
 is shown for readability. See [`action.yml`](action.yml) and
 [`examples/github-actions/`](examples/github-actions/) for full workflows.
 
+## maintainability-agent integration
+
+`maintainability-agent` declares Security a **delegated** pillar naming this
+tool, and reports it as `NotApplicable` so silence is never read as safety.
+This tool emits the artifact that completes the picture:
+
+```bash
+secure-code-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+maintainability-agent . --security-pillar security-pillar.json
+```
+
+Standalone use is unaffected — without the flag nothing is written and every
+other output is identical. MA never executes this tool, and this tool never
+imports MA; two independently releasable packages exchanging one document.
+
+The artifact carries **two values that are never averaged**: a practice level
+read from configuration and CI (*is anything preventing the next
+vulnerability?*) and a code condition read from the scanners (*what did they
+find?*). `condition` is `null` whenever scanner coverage is incomplete — this
+tool's score is a rate over findings, so removing scanners makes the raw number
+go **up**, and an unscanned repository must not arrive at MA looking measured.
+
+Full contract, invariants and the practice rubric:
+[`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md).
+
 ## What this is NOT
 
 - ❌ **Not a SAST engine.** We delegate to Semgrep / Bandit / CodeQL / etc. — we don't write yet another AST analyzer.
@@ -398,12 +504,15 @@ Full design philosophy in [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md).
 
 - [`docs/product-intent.md`](docs/product-intent.md) — Why this exists, who it serves, what it refuses to become
 - [`docs/decisions.md`](docs/decisions.md)        — Decision register: rulings the code alone cannot answer
+- [`docs/ma-integration.md`](docs/ma-integration.md) — The `security-pillar.json` contract maintainability-agent reads
+- [`docs/calibration.md`](docs/calibration.md)   — The calibration study, its corpus, and what it found
 - [`docs/design.md`](docs/design.md)              — Architecture + non-goals + scanner protocol
 - [`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md)  — Audit of the system as built + remediation sequence
 - [`docs/release-blockers.md`](docs/release-blockers.md) — Open v0.3.0 release blockers (do not tag until closed)
 - [`docs/standards.md`](docs/standards.md)        — NIST SSDF / OWASP / CWE / Scorecard / SARIF citations
 - [`docs/scoring.md`](docs/scoring.md)            — Weighting model + worked examples
 - [`docs/scanners.md`](docs/scanners.md)          — Per-scanner integrations + caveats
+- [`docs/work-orders.md`](docs/work-orders.md)    — **The first-class output**: audit → work order → fix → verify → trend
 - [`docs/remediation.md`](docs/remediation.md)    — The prompt template + failure-mode rationale
 - [`docs/threat-model.md`](docs/threat-model.md)  — What we defend against (and what we don't)
 

{secure_code_agent-0.4.0 → secure_code_agent-0.6.0}/src/secure_code_agent.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ src/secure_code_audit/cli.py
 src/secure_code_audit/config.py
 src/secure_code_audit/findings.py
 src/secure_code_audit/git_tools.py
+src/secure_code_audit/history.py
 src/secure_code_audit/instructions.py
+src/secure_code_audit/pillar.py
+src/secure_code_audit/practice.py
 src/secure_code_audit/remediation.py
 src/secure_code_audit/renderers.py
 src/secure_code_audit/ruleset.py
@@ -22,6 +25,8 @@ src/secure_code_audit/scanner_status.py
 src/secure_code_audit/scoring.py
 src/secure_code_audit/standards.py
 src/secure_code_audit/suppressions.py
+src/secure_code_audit/triage.py
+src/secure_code_audit/verify.py
 src/secure_code_audit/data/semgrep-offline.yaml
 src/secure_code_audit/scanners/__init__.py
 src/secure_code_audit/scanners/bandit_scanner.py

secure_code_agent-0.6.0/src/secure_code_audit/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+"""secure-code-agent — deterministic security gate + bounded AI remediation prompts."""
+
+#: The only place the version is written. `pyproject.toml` derives it via
+#: `[tool.setuptools.dynamic]`, so the two cannot drift.
+#:
+#: They did drift once, and it shipped: pyproject said 0.4.0 while this said
+#: 0.3.0, so the released v0.4.0 wheel stamped 0.3.0 into every SARIF document,
+#: every JSON report, the Markdown header, `--version`, and the
+#: `security-pillar.json` handed to maintainability-agent. The release workflow
+#: compared the tag against pyproject's line and never looked here — it
+#: verified the half that was right and shipped the half that was wrong.
+#:
+#: PyPI is immutable, so 0.4.0 stays wrong. 0.5.0 is the first build whose
+#: artifacts name their own producer correctly.
+__version__ = "0.6.0"