safeuploads 2.2.0__tar.gz → 3.0.0__tar.gz

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/.agents/skills/safeuploads-library/references/code-standards.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Code standards
 
 ## Python
-- Python 3.13 syntax (`requires-python = ">=3.13"`): `int | None`, `list[str]`, `dict[str, Any]`; no `typing.Optional/List/Dict`.
+- Python 3.11 syntax and standard library (`requires-python = ">=3.11"`): `int | None`, `list[str]`, `dict[str, Any]`; no `typing.Optional/List/Dict`, and no 3.12+ features such as PEP 695 type parameters, `type` aliases or `typing.override`. The 3.11 CI job is the check.
 - Lines up to 79 characters, enforced by `ruff format` (`line-length = 79`); keep comments and docstrings within it too.
 - Imports grouped stdlib / third-party / local; `TYPE_CHECKING` to avoid cycles.
 - Every module has a top-level docstring.

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/.github/workflows/test-matrix-safeuploads.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Test matrix safeuploads
 
 # Portability matrix on top of the fast default `Lint & Test` workflow:
-#   * every supported Python version (3.13, 3.14, 3.15) with the full
+#   * every supported Python version (3.11 to 3.15) with the full
 #     dependency set (dev group + fastapi extra), proving the suite
 #     passes on every Python the package declares support for; and
 #   * a bare `import safeuploads` with only the base dependencies
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:
-        python: ["3.13", "3.14", "3.15"]
+        python: ["3.11", "3.12", "3.13", "3.14", "3.15"]
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/AGENTS.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # safeuploads
 
-Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications.
+Secure file upload validation for Python 3.11+ applications.
 Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, compression bombs, polyglots and unsafe XML before an upload is accepted.
 Runtime dependencies are minimal (`python-magic`, `defusedxml`; FastAPI behind the `fastapi` extra).
 Published to PyPI; the public API is governed by SemVer.
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ docs/           Documentation site (mkdocs)
 
 ## Commands
 
-From the repository root (Python 3.13+, `uv`, system `libmagic`):
+From the repository root (Python 3.11+, `uv`, system `libmagic`):
 
 ```bash
 uv sync --dev --extra fastapi
@@ -97,4 +97,4 @@ uv run pytest
 - Never build a filesystem path from an uploaded filename.
 - Logging uses `logging.getLogger(__name__)` and the `SecurityAuditLogger`; never log file contents.
 - Comments and docstrings state what the code does now, not what it used to do.
-- Python 3.13 syntax, 79-character lines (`pyproject.toml`), PEP 257 docstrings with `Args`, `Returns`, `Raises` where applicable.
+- Python 3.11 syntax and standard library (no 3.12+ features), 79-character lines (`pyproject.toml`), PEP 257 docstrings with `Args`, `Returns`, `Raises` where applicable.

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented in this file.
 
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
 
+## [3.0.0] - 2026-11-05
+
+### Added
+
+- Support for Python 3.11 and 3.12; `requires-python` is now `>=3.11` and CI tests 3.11 to 3.15. A Python version stays supported until its CPython end of life and is dropped in the next minor release after that. The Unicode checks use the running Python's Unicode database, so a character assigned after that database's version is rejected as unassigned (for example U+1FAE8 on 3.11).
+
+### Removed
+
+- **Breaking:** the `ConfigValidationError` alias, deprecated in 2.2.0, is removed from `safeuploads` and `safeuploads.exceptions`. Use `ConfigValidationIssue`.
+
+### Security
+
+- ZIP entry names now get the filename checks a top-level upload gets ([GHSA-jjqv-c38c-fjf3](https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/security/advisories/GHSA-jjqv-c38c-fjf3)). `ZipContentInspector` checked entries only against `ZipThreatCategory.EXECUTABLE_FILES`, `SCRIPT_FILES` and `SYSTEM_FILES`, so an entry such as `invoice.docm`, `a.hta`, `CON.txt` or a name with a right-to-left override was accepted although the same name is rejected as an upload. Each entry name is now checked against `DANGEROUS_UNICODE_CHARS` and the rejected Unicode categories, each path component against `WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES`, and a file's base name against `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` and `COMPOUND_BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS`, on the NFC and NFKC forms, all taken from `FileSecurityConfig`. A failing entry raises `ZipContentError` with `ZIP_CONTENT_THREAT`.
+- The blocked-extension check ignores trailing dots and spaces, as Windows drops them when it saves a file. A filename such as `run.exe ` or `invoice.docm` followed by U+3000 or U+00A0 (which NFKC folds to a space) was accepted as an upload or a ZIP entry; it is now rejected with `EXTENSION_BLOCKED`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **Breaking:** the ZIP entry name checks under Security reject archives that 2.2.0 accepted under the default configuration, for example archives with `.docm`, `.xlsm`, `.hta`, `.min.css` or `CON.txt` entries. Uploads and entries whose name ends in a blocked extension followed by spaces, such as `run.exe `, are rejected as well. An entry named `.jar`, `.war` or `.ear` whose content is a ZIP now reports `ZIP_CONTENT_THREAT` first instead of `ZIP_NESTED_ARCHIVE`.
+
 ## [2.2.0] - 2026-11-05
 
 ### Added
@@ -223,6 +242,8 @@ Initial release.
 - **MIME type verification:** magic-number validation for common file types.
 - Framework-agnostic async validation, a rich exception hierarchy with machine-readable error codes, secure defaults, and full type hints.
 
+[3.0.0]: https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/compare/v2.2.0...v3.0.0
+[2.2.0]: https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/compare/v2.1.0...v2.2.0
 [2.1.0]: https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/compare/v2.0.0...v2.1.0
 [2.0.0]: https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/compare/v1.1.3...v2.0.0
 [1.1.3]: https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/compare/v1.1.2...v1.1.3

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ PRs that are too large to review efficiently will be asked to be split before th
    docs: update the integration checklist
    ```
    Commit subjects and PR titles are validated in CI; see `.agents/skills/conventional-commits/SKILL.md` for the allowed types and scopes.
-5. **Run the checks** from the repository root (Python 3.13+, [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) and the system `libmagic`):
+5. **Run the checks** from the repository root (Python 3.11+, [uv](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) and the system `libmagic`):
    ```bash
    uv sync --dev --extra fastapi
    uv run ruff check safeuploads tests examples

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: safeuploads
-Version: 2.2.0
+Version: 3.0.0
 Summary: A comprehensive file security system for validating uploads and preventing attacks
 Author-email: João Vitória Silva <joao@endurain.com>
 License: MIT
 License-File: LICENSE.md
-Requires-Python: >=3.13
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
 Requires-Dist: defusedxml<1.0.0,>=0.7.1
 Requires-Dist: python-magic<0.5.0,>=0.4.27
 Provides-Extra: fastapi
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@ Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
 [![Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/endurain-project/safeuploads?label=release&color=blue)](https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/releases)
 [![PyPI version](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/safeuploads)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
 [![PyPI downloads](https://img.shields.io/pypi/dm/safeuploads)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
-[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.13%2B-blue)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.11%2B-blue)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
 [![Docs](https://img.shields.io/badge/docs-safeuploads.endurain.com-blue)](https://safeuploads.endurain.com/)
 [![Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/endurain-project/safeuploads?label=stars&logo=github)](https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads)
 
-Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
+Secure file upload validation for Python 3.11+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
 
 ## Features
 
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications. Catches dangerous f
 pip install safeuploads
 ```
 
+safeuploads supports Python 3.11 and newer. A Python version stays supported until its CPython end of life and is dropped in the next minor release after that.
+
 For FastAPI integration:
 ```bash
 pip install safeuploads[fastapi]

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/README.md

@@ -4,11 +4,11 @@
 [![Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/endurain-project/safeuploads?label=release&color=blue)](https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads/releases)
 [![PyPI version](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/safeuploads)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
 [![PyPI downloads](https://img.shields.io/pypi/dm/safeuploads)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
-[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.13%2B-blue)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.11%2B-blue)](https://pypi.org/project/safeuploads/)
 [![Docs](https://img.shields.io/badge/docs-safeuploads.endurain.com-blue)](https://safeuploads.endurain.com/)
 [![Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/endurain-project/safeuploads?label=stars&logo=github)](https://github.com/endurain-project/safeuploads)
 
-Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
+Secure file upload validation for Python 3.11+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
 
 ## Features
 
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications. Catches dangerous f
 pip install safeuploads
 ```
 
+safeuploads supports Python 3.11 and newer. A Python version stays supported until its CPython end of life and is dropped in the next minor release after that.
+
 For FastAPI integration:
 ```bash
 pip install safeuploads[fastapi]

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/docs/index.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
     </a>
 </div>
 
-Secure file upload validation for Python 3.13+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
+Secure file upload validation for Python 3.11+ applications. Catches dangerous filenames, malicious extensions, Windows reserved names, and compression-based attacks before you accept an upload.
 
 ## Features
 

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/docs/security/architecture.md

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ safeuploads/
 | `CompressionSecurityValidator` | Checks compression ratio, uncompressed size, entry count, and nested archive limits, and that the listed entries fill the file exactly. |
 | `XmlSecurityValidator` | Parses XML with `defusedxml`, blocking DTDs and external entities (raises `XmlSecurityError`). |
 | `FitSecurityValidator` | Checks the FIT container: headers, header CRC, data size, CRC-16 per section, and that the sections cover the file exactly. |
-| `ZipContentInspector` | Iterates ZIP entries checking for traversal, executables, scripts, symlinks, and recursive structures. With `allow_nested_archives`, inspects every inner ZIP like the top level. |
+| `ZipContentInspector` | Iterates ZIP entries checking for traversal, executables, scripts, symlinks, and recursive structures, and runs the top-level Unicode, Windows reserved-name and blocked-extension checks on each entry name. With `allow_nested_archives`, inspects every inner ZIP like the top level. |
 | `GzipContentInspector` | Streams gzip decompression, checking ratio and size progressively. |
 | `ContentSecurityInspector` | Scans raw bytes for structurally verified executable headers, web shells, and polyglot patterns (image and activity uploads). |
 | `ResourceMonitor` | Context manager enforcing wall-clock time and peak-RSS memory limits at loop boundaries and on exit. |
@@ -181,7 +181,11 @@ UploadFile
 │    │   ├── Null bytes       │
 │    │   ├── Path traversal   │
 │    │   ├── Absolute paths   │
-│    │   └── Symlinks         │
+│    │   ├── Symlinks         │
+│    │   └── Top-level name   │
+│    │       checks (Unicode, │
+│    │       Windows names,   │
+│    │       blocked exts)    │
 │    ├── Dangerous entry types│
 │    ├── Binary signatures    │
 │    ├── Nested archive magic │

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/docs/security/threat-model.md

@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ is `.exe`.
   rejected with `UnicodeSecurityError`; none is stripped. A
   filename containing an emoji ZWJ sequence is therefore
   rejected.
+- Categories come from the running Python's Unicode database
+  (14.0 on Python 3.11, 15.0 on 3.12, 15.1 on 3.13), so a
+  character assigned in a later Unicode version is unassigned
+  (Cn) and rejected on an older Python. Older versions only
+  reject more.
 - The Windows reserved-name and extension checks run on the NFC
   name and on its NFKC form, so fullwidth letters or
   superscript digits cannot disguise `CON`, `COM1` or `.php`.
@@ -99,6 +104,11 @@ improperly.
   files, drivers, themes, and help files.
 - Compound extensions (`.tar.gz`, `.user.js`, `.min.css`) are
   checked via `CompoundExtensionCategory`.
+- Trailing dots and spaces are ignored by the blocked-extension
+  check, because Windows drops them when it saves a file. The
+  check also runs on the NFKC form, so `run.exe ` or
+  `invoice.docm` followed by U+3000 (an ideographic space that
+  NFKC folds to a space) is rejected.
 - Allowed extensions are validated against a configurable
   allowlist per file type.
 
@@ -285,6 +295,32 @@ outside the extraction directory (Zip Slip).
   bypasses (CWE-158). Python's `zipfile` truncates `filename`
   at the first NUL, so the raw name is needed.
 
+### Spoofed or Blocked Entry Names (CWE-184, CWE-434)
+
+**Attack:** A file refused as a standalone upload (a
+macro-enabled Office document, an `.hta`, a name with a
+right-to-left override, `CON.txt`) is wrapped in a ZIP so that a
+host extracting or listing the entries stores it anyway.
+
+**Mitigations:**
+
+- Every entry name gets the filename checks a top-level upload
+  gets, driven by the same `FileSecurityConfig` fields, so a
+  configuration that extends a list covers entries too:
+  - the whole name is checked against `DANGEROUS_UNICODE_CHARS`
+    and the rejected Unicode categories, and its NFKC form must
+    not introduce a path separator or `..`;
+  - every path component is checked against
+    `WINDOWS_RESERVED_NAMES`;
+  - a file's base name is checked against `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS`
+    (every extension in the name) and
+    `COMPOUND_BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS`.
+- The reserved-name and extension checks run on the NFC name and
+  its NFKC form, after stripping trailing dots and spaces that
+  Windows drops on extraction.
+- A failing name is reported as `ZIP_CONTENT_THREAT`; the message
+  shows the name with control and bidi characters escaped.
+
 ### Executable Content in ZIP
 
 **Attack:** Executables, scripts, system files, or shortcuts
@@ -292,10 +328,11 @@ hidden inside ZIP archives.
 
 **Mitigations:**
 
-- The entry's final extension, after stripping trailing dots
-  and spaces, is checked against
-  `ZipThreatCategory.EXECUTABLE_FILES`, `SCRIPT_FILES`, and
-  `SYSTEM_FILES`.
+- Besides `BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS` (see above), the entry's final
+  extension, after stripping trailing dots and spaces, is checked
+  against `ZipThreatCategory.EXECUTABLE_FILES`, `SCRIPT_FILES`,
+  and `SYSTEM_FILES`, which also cover configuration files such
+  as `.ini`, `.cfg` and `.conf`.
 - Binary content is scanned for executable magic bytes from
   `SuspiciousFilePattern.EXECUTABLE_SIGNATURES`. The first 512
   bytes of each entry are read for this scan.

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 [project]
 name = "safeuploads"
-version = "2.2.0"
+version = "3.0.0"
 description = "A comprehensive file security system for validating uploads and preventing attacks"
 authors = [
     {name = "João Vitória Silva",email = "joao@endurain.com"}
 ]
 license = {text = "MIT"}
 readme = "README.md"
-requires-python = ">=3.13"
+requires-python = ">=3.11"
 dependencies = [
     "python-magic>=0.4.27,<0.5.0",
     "defusedxml>=0.7.1,<1.0.0",
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ exclude-newer = "7 days"
 
 [tool.ruff]
 line-length = 79
-target-version = "py313"
+target-version = "py311"
 
 [tool.ruff.lint]
 select = [
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ exclude_lines = [
 ]
 
 [tool.mypy]
-python_version = "3.13"
+python_version = "3.11"
 incremental = false
 # strict = true enables the full strict bundle, including
 # disallow_any_generics, warn_return_any, disallow_untyped_calls,
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ ignore_missing_imports = true
 # ``ty`` runs beside mypy as an advisory, non-blocking CI job (it is pre-1.0);
 # mypy stays the gate. Same scope as ``[tool.mypy]``.
 [tool.ty.environment]
-python-version = "3.13"
+python-version = "3.11"
 
 [tool.ty.src]
 include = ["safeuploads"]

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/safeuploads/__init__.py

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ validating uploads and preventing attacks.
 """
 
 from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError, version
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
 from .audit import (
     AuditEvent,
@@ -76,16 +75,6 @@ from .validators import (
     XmlSecurityValidator,
 )
 
-if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    # Deprecated alias, resolved by ``__getattr__`` at runtime
-    from .exceptions import ConfigValidationError as ConfigValidationError
-else:
-    from .exceptions import _resolve_deprecated
-
-    def __getattr__(name: str) -> object:
-        """Resolve deprecated package attributes (PEP 562)."""
-        return _resolve_deprecated(__name__, name)
-
 # Configuration is validated explicitly rather than at import
 # time: FileValidator validates its config on construction, and
 # callers can invoke FileSecurityConfig.validate_and_report() or

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/safeuploads/exceptions.py

@@ -1,9 +1,7 @@
 """File security exception classes and error codes."""
 
-import warnings
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from enum import StrEnum
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
 # ============================================================================
 # Configuration Validation
@@ -34,47 +32,6 @@ class ConfigValidationIssue:
     recommendation: str = ""
 
 
-_DEPRECATED_NAMES = {"ConfigValidationError": "ConfigValidationIssue"}
-
-if TYPE_CHECKING:
-    # Deprecated alias; at runtime ``__getattr__`` resolves it with a
-    # DeprecationWarning. Removed in 3.0.
-    ConfigValidationError = ConfigValidationIssue
-else:
-
-    def _resolve_deprecated(module: str, name: str) -> object:
-        """
-        Return the object a deprecated name stands for, with a warning.
-
-        Args:
-            module: Name of the module the attribute was looked up on.
-            name: Attribute name being looked up.
-
-        Returns:
-            The object that replaces the deprecated name.
-
-        Raises:
-            AttributeError: ``name`` is not a deprecated name.
-        """
-        new_name = _DEPRECATED_NAMES.get(name)
-        if new_name is None:
-            raise AttributeError(
-                f"module {module!r} has no attribute {name!r}"
-            )
-        warnings.warn(
-            f"{name} is deprecated and will be removed in safeuploads"
-            f" 3.0; use {new_name}",
-            DeprecationWarning,
-            # Skip this helper and the module ``__getattr__``
-            stacklevel=3,
-        )
-        return globals()[new_name]
-
-    def __getattr__(name: str) -> object:
-        """Resolve deprecated module attributes (PEP 562)."""
-        return _resolve_deprecated(__name__, name)
-
-
 class FileSecurityConfigurationError(Exception):
     """
     Configuration validation failed with aggregated errors.

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/safeuploads/inspectors/zip_inspector.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from ..enums import (
 from ..exceptions import (
     CompressionSecurityError,
     ErrorCode,
+    FilenameSecurityError,
     FileProcessingError,
     ResourceLimitError,
     ZipBombError,
@@ -35,6 +36,9 @@ from ..validators.compression_validator import (
     ZIP_PARSE_ERRORS,
     CompressionSecurityValidator,
 )
+from ..validators.extension_validator import ExtensionSecurityValidator
+from ..validators.unicode_validator import UnicodeSecurityValidator
+from ..validators.windows_validator import WindowsSecurityValidator
 from .base import BaseInspector
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -127,6 +131,10 @@ class ZipContentInspector(BaseInspector):
         # Nested archives get the same compression checks as the
         # top-level archive
         self._compression = CompressionSecurityValidator(config)
+        # Entry names get the filename checks a top-level upload gets
+        self._unicode = UnicodeSecurityValidator(config)
+        self._windows = WindowsSecurityValidator(config)
+        self._extensions = ExtensionSecurityValidator(config)
 
     def inspect_zip_content(self, file_obj: SeekableFile) -> None:
         """
@@ -278,8 +286,9 @@ class ZipContentInspector(BaseInspector):
 
         Checks the raw name for null bytes, then the name for traversal,
         absolute paths, symlinks, length limits, suspicious patterns,
-        nested archive extensions and dangerous file extensions. The
-        content is inspected when ``scan_zip_content`` is enabled.
+        nested archive extensions, the top-level filename checks and
+        dangerous file extensions. The content is inspected when
+        ``scan_zip_content`` is enabled.
 
         Args:
             entry: ZIP entry metadata.
@@ -367,13 +376,16 @@ class ZipContentInspector(BaseInspector):
                 )
             )
 
-        # 9. Check for executable, script and system file extensions
+        # 9. Check the name as a top-level filename is checked
+        threats.extend(self._check_entry_name(entry))
+
+        # 10. Check for executable, script and system file extensions
         if self._extension(filename) in self._dangerous_exts:
             threats.append(
                 _content_threat(f"Dangerous file type detected: '{filename}'")
             )
 
-        # 10. Check file content if enabled
+        # 11. Check file content if enabled
         # Only first 512 bytes are read, so no size gate needed
         if self.config.limits.scan_zip_content and not entry.is_dir():
             content_threats = self._inspect_entry_content(entry, zip_file)
@@ -527,6 +539,46 @@ class ZipContentInspector(BaseInspector):
         """
         return self._extension(filename) in self._nested_archive_exts
 
+    def _check_entry_name(self, entry: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> list[_Threat]:
+        """
+        Apply the top-level filename checks to an entry name.
+
+        The whole name gets the Unicode checks, every path component
+        the Windows reserved-name check and a file's base name the
+        blocked and compound extension checks, all driven by the
+        configuration. Name checks run on the NFC name and on its NFKC
+        form; both validators ignore the trailing dots and spaces that
+        Windows drops on extraction.
+
+        Args:
+            entry: ZIP entry whose name is checked.
+
+        Returns:
+            One threat if the name fails a check, otherwise none.
+        """
+        try:
+            name = self._unicode.validate_unicode_security(entry.filename)
+            self._unicode.compatibility_form(name)
+            components = name.replace("\\", "/").split("/")
+            for component in components:
+                for form in (
+                    component,
+                    self._unicode.compatibility_form(component),
+                ):
+                    self._windows.validate_windows_reserved_names(form)
+            if not entry.is_dir():
+                base = components[-1]
+                for form in (base, self._unicode.compatibility_form(base)):
+                    self._extensions.validate_extensions(form)
+        except FilenameSecurityError as err:
+            # repr escapes control and bidi characters in the message
+            return [
+                _content_threat(
+                    f"Unsafe file name {entry.filename!r}: {err.message}"
+                )
+            ]
+        return []
+
     @staticmethod
     def _extension(filename: str) -> str:
         """

{safeuploads-2.2.0 → safeuploads-3.0.0}/safeuploads/validators/extension_validator.py

@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ class ExtensionSecurityValidator(BaseValidator):
         """
         Validate filename against blocked extensions.
 
+        Trailing dots and spaces are ignored, because Windows drops
+        them when it saves a file, so ``run.exe .`` is checked as
+        ``run.exe``.
+
         Args:
             filename: Name of the file to validate.
 
@@ -53,10 +57,10 @@ class ExtensionSecurityValidator(BaseValidator):
             ExtensionSecurityError: If blocked compound or single
                 extension detected in filename.
         """
+        filename_lower = filename.rstrip(". ").lower()
+        logger.debug("Validating extensions in filename")
         # Check for compound dangerous extensions first
         # (e.g., .tar.xz, .user.js)
-        filename_lower = filename.lower()
-        logger.debug("Validating extensions in filename")
         for compound_ext in self._compound_blocked:
             if filename_lower.endswith(compound_ext):
                 logger.warning(
@@ -80,10 +84,10 @@ class ExtensionSecurityValidator(BaseValidator):
                 )
 
         # Check ALL extensions in the filename for dangerous ones
-        parts = filename.split(".")
+        parts = filename_lower.split(".")
         if len(parts) > 1:
             for i in range(1, len(parts)):
-                ext = f".{parts[i].lower()}"
+                ext = f".{parts[i]}"
                 if ext in self._blocked:
                     logger.warning(
                         "Dangerous extension detected",