repo-proofer 0.2.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/LICENSE +21 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/PKG-INFO +283 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/README.md +253 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/proofer.py +2044 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/pyproject.toml +60 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/PKG-INFO +283 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +10 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/entry_points.txt +2 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/requires.txt +3 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/repo_proofer.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
- repo_proofer-0.2.0/setup.cfg +4 -0
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 bootproof
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: repo-proofer
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Version: 0.2.0
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Summary: Brutally honest verdicts for AI-generated GitHub repos. 100% deterministic. No LLMs.
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Author: bootproof
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License: MIT
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer
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Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer
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Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer/issues
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Keywords: security,supply-chain,sandbox,docker,strace,sbom,ai-slop,deterministic
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Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
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Classifier: Environment :: Console
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Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
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Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
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Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
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Classifier: Topic :: Security
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Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance
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Classifier: Topic :: System :: Systems Administration
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Requires-Python: >=3.10
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Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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License-File: LICENSE
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Requires-Dist: typer>=0.12.0
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Requires-Dist: rich>=13.7.0
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Requires-Dist: GitPython>=3.1.40
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Dynamic: license-file
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# repo-proofer
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[](https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer/actions)
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[](LICENSE)
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[](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
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[](https://pypi.org/project/repo-proofer/)
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Find out if a repo will steal your keys before you run it.
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GitHub is flooded with AI-generated "slop" — repositories with impressive READMEs that don't actually run, or worse, quietly phone home to a C2 server the moment you `npm install` them. `repo-proofer` clones a repo, drops it into a zero-network, read-only sandbox, executes it, and tells you — deterministically, no AI — whether it booted and whether it tried to read your SSH keys.
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<p align="center">
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<i>The slop-repo fixture being caught red-handed.</i>
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</p>
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```
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$ repo-proofer file://$(pwd)/tests/fixtures/slop-repo
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╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
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│ Repository file://.../slop-repo │
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│ Detected Stack Python │
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│ BOOTS NO │
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│ Detail exited 1 (crash) │
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│ Network Egress BLOCKED │
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│ Filesystem READ-ONLY │
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│ Warnings [!] App crashed when network was │
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│ blocked. May require external API │
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│ to function. │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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╭─ Sensitive File Access (3) ──────────────────────────╮
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│ - /etc/passwd │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_rsa │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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[!] Sensitive file access detected — primary indicator of malicious intent.
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```
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## Highlights
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- **Runs untrusted code safely.** Every execution is sandboxed with the network disabled and the filesystem read-only. The repo can't phone home. It can't write outside `/tmp`. It can't read `~/.ssh`.
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- **Catches what static analysis can't.** Snyk, Socket, and GitHub Advanced Security read code to see if it *looks* malicious. `repo-proofer` runs it and watches what it *does*. Obfuscation can fool a linter. It cannot fool a kernel that refuses to open a socket.
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- **100% deterministic, zero AI.** Pure subprocess + filesystem + strace. No LLMs, no API calls, no prompt-injection surface. Same answer every time, free to run forever.
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- **No Docker required.** The default `--sandbox auto` uses a native bubblewrap sandbox on Linux — millisecond startup, no image pulls. Docker is the fallback for macOS/Windows or `--sandbox docker` for full clean-room isolation.
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- **Three-color verdicts.** Green `BOOTS: YES` (it ran), red `BOOTS: NO` (it crashed or tried to steal secrets), yellow `NO RUNNABLE ENTRYPOINT` (it's a library, not slop). Libraries don't get the same red as malware.
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- **Runtime Behavior Report.** strace traces every syscall inside the sandbox. You get an SBOM-style report based on *actual execution*: files read, files written, processes spawned, network calls attempted, sensitive paths touched.
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- **Installable in one command.** `uvx --from git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git repo-proofer <url>` — no clone, no venv, no setup. Works today, straight from GitHub.
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## Installation
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Run `repo-proofer` instantly with `uvx` — no clone, no venv, no setup:
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```bash
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uvx --from "git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git" repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
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```
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That's it. `uvx` creates an ephemeral isolated environment, installs `typer`/`rich`/`GitPython`, clones the target repo, spins up the sandbox, runs the strace, prints the verdict, and cleans up after itself.
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Once published to PyPI, the command shortens to:
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```bash
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uvx repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
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```
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Other install methods:
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```bash
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# Install permanently with pipx (from GitHub):
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pipx install "git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git"
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repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
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# Or from source (for development):
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git clone https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git
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cd repo-proofer
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pip install -e .
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```
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Requires Python 3.10+. The native sandbox (default on Linux) needs `bubblewrap` — install it with `apt install bubblewrap` (Debian/Ubuntu) or `dnf install bubblewrap` (Fedora). No Docker needed.
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## Documentation
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See the [Limitations](#limitations) section for honest gaps, and the [FAQ](#faq) for common questions. The command-line reference is available with `repo-proofer --help`.
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## Features
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### Triage a repo
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Point `repo-proofer` at any Git URL. It clones, detects the stack, installs deps, executes the entrypoint in a locked sandbox, and prints a verdict.
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```console
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$ repo-proofer https://github.com/pallets/markupsafe.git
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Cloning https://github.com/pallets/markupsafe.git (depth=1)...
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Detected stack: Python | Native sandbox (bubblewrap)
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Installing dependencies (network ON, timeout 60s)...
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Executing entrypoint (network OFF, read-only FS, timeout 30s)...
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╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
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│ Repository https://github.com/pallets/mar… │
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│ Detected Stack Python │
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│ BOOTS NO RUNNABLE ENTRYPOINT │
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│ Detail no runnable entrypoint │
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│ (looks like a library) │
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│ Network Egress BLOCKED │
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│ Filesystem READ-ONLY │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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```
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`markupsafe` is a library — no `main.py`, nothing to run. The yellow verdict is correct: it's not slop, it just has no entrypoint. CI exits 0.
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### Catch a malicious repo
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The `slop-repo` fixture impersonates an AI startup while quietly reading `~/.ssh/id_rsa` and `/etc/passwd`, then phoning home to a C2 server. Under `repo-proofer`'s `--network none` sandbox, the phone-home fails and strace catches the secret reads:
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```console
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$ repo-proofer file://$(pwd)/tests/fixtures/slop-repo
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╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
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│ BOOTS NO │
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│ Detail exited 1 (crash) │
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│ Warnings [!] App crashed when network was │
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│ blocked. │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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╭─ Runtime Behavior Report ────────────────────────────╮
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│ Files Read 2 │
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│ Network Calls Attempted 1 │
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│ Sensitive File Access 3 (see below) │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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╭─ Network Calls Attempted (1) ────────────────────────╮
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│ - connect 203.0.113.42:443 │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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╭─ Sensitive File Access (3) ──────────────────────────╮
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│ - /etc/passwd │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_rsa │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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[!] Sensitive file access detected — primary indicator of malicious intent.
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```
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Exit code 1. The verdict is unambiguous: this repo tried to steal your keys.
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### The sandbox
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Two backends, same moat:
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```console
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$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox native # bubblewrap (Linux, no Docker, milliseconds)
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$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox docker # Docker (clean-room images, memory/CPU limits)
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$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox auto # default: prefer native, fall back to Docker
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```
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Both backends enforce the same security constraints:
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| Constraint | Docker mode | Native mode |
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|---|---|---|
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| Network | `--network none` | `--unshare-net` |
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| Filesystem | `--read-only` + `--tmpfs /tmp` | `--ro-bind /usr` + `--tmpfs /tmp` |
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| SSH keys | not mounted | `--tmpfs /home` + `--tmpfs /root` (empty) |
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| Capabilities | `--cap-drop ALL` | bubblewrap drops all by default |
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| Repo | `-v repo:/app:ro` | `--ro-bind repo /app` |
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If the app crashes because it can't reach the network, **that is a successful detection of a hidden dependency, not a tool failure.**
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### Stack detection
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`repo-proofer` detects the stack from marker files and resolves the entrypoint:
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```console
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$ repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/my-cli.git
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Detected stack: Python | Native sandbox (bubblewrap)
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Executing entrypoint (network OFF, read-only FS, timeout 30s)...
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```
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| Marker | Stack | Entrypoint resolution |
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|---|---|---|
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| `package.json` | Node.js | `scripts.start`, `main`, `bin`, then `index.js`/`app.js`/`server.js` |
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| `requirements.txt` / `pyproject.toml` / `setup.py` / `setup.cfg` | Python | `[project.scripts]`, `console_scripts`, `main.py`/`app.py`/`server.py`/`run.py`, `manage.py check`, `src/` layout, `python -m <pkg>` |
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| `go.mod` | Go (experimental) | `go run main.go` |
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| `Cargo.toml` | Rust (experimental) | `cargo run --offline` |
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A modern CLI that declares its entrypoint only in `[project.scripts]` (no `main.py`) is correctly detected as runnable — not mislabeled as a library.
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### Exit codes
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```console
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$ repo-proofer <url>; echo "exit: $?"
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exit: 0 # boots cleanly, OR is a library (yellow)
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exit: 1 # crashed, or attempted sensitive file access (red)
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exit: 2 # clone failed
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exit: 3 # sandbox unavailable (no Docker / no bubblewrap)
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exit: 4 # could not detect project stack
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exit: 5 # failed to pull Docker image
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```
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The exit code is CI-friendly: wire it into a GitHub Actions workflow and any repo that crashes or touches secrets blocks the PR.
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## How it works
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```
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1. Clone git clone --depth=1 (network ON)
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2. Detect filesystem checks for marker files (deterministic)
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3. Install sandbox ... <install_cmd> (network ON, 60s)
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4. Execute sandbox --network=none --read-only ... (network OFF)
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└─ strace -ff -e trace=openat,connect,... (behavior report)
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5. Analyze regex on stdout/stderr + strace trace (deterministic)
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6. Verdict three-color panel + exit code
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```
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No LLMs. No AI APIs. Pure subprocess + filesystem + strace. An LLM-based analyzer would be slower, more expensive, and gameable via prompt injection in the repo's own README. Pure determinism is the core feature.
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## Limitations
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This tool is honest about what it can and can't do.
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- **First run is minutes in Docker mode.** The Docker backend pulls base images and builds a strace image. The native backend (default on Linux) has no image pulls — it uses the host's runtimes and starts in milliseconds.
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- **Go and Rust are experimental.** Both run under `--network none` with no install step, so projects with external dependencies can't fetch them at runtime. Only zero-dependency or pre-vendored Go/Rust projects boot.
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- **Hostname-based C2 detection is indirect.** Under `--network none`, DNS resolution fails *before* `connect()`, so a hostname-based egress target shows up as a DNS query to the resolver, not the actual hostname. Hardcoded-IP malware produces a clean `connect <IP>:<port>` line. The **Sensitive File Access** list is the strong, unambiguous signal regardless.
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- **Install-phase residual risk.** The install phase runs with network ON (it has to, to fetch packages). npm's supply-chain window is closed with `--ignore-scripts`; pip is pushed toward wheels with `--prefer-binary`. sdist-only packages still trigger a PEP 517 build — a known residual risk.
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- **Native sandbox is Linux-only.** Bubblewrap doesn't exist on macOS/Windows. On those platforms, `--sandbox auto` falls back to Docker. The native sandbox also has no memory/CPU limits — use `--sandbox docker` for the full isolation profile.
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## FAQ
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#### Why not just read the code myself?
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You can — and you should, for repos you trust. But for the 95% case ("a stranger's repo with a flashy README"), reading every line of `setup.py` and `postinstall.sh` takes longer than running `repo-proofer`, and obfuscation can hide intent from a human reader. `repo-proofer` watches physics: if the app opens a socket, the kernel tells us. You can't obfuscate a syscall.
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#### How is this different from Snyk / Socket / GitHub Advanced Security?
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Those tools do *static analysis* — they read code to see if it looks malicious. `repo-proofer` does *dynamic execution* — it runs the code in a locked box and watches what it actually does. Static analysis is bypassable (obfuscated code, environment-triggered payloads). Dynamic execution is not: if a malicious repo needs to phone home to download its payload, it physically cannot do that inside `--network none`.
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#### What does "BOOTS: YES" mean for a server that never exits?
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A process that times out without crashing is a healthy long-running process (server, daemon, bot). The verdict is `BOOTS: YES (long-running)`. If it also printed a readiness signal (`"listening on port 8080"`, `"Uvicorn running"`), the verdict upgrades to `BOOTS: YES (server detected)` with the matched signal shown.
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#### Can it run on macOS?
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Yes, with Docker. `--sandbox auto` falls back to Docker on macOS (bubblewrap is Linux-only). `uvx repo-proofer <url>` works — it just needs Docker Desktop running.
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#### Is it ready for production?
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The engine is stable and the deterministic test suite (56 tests) passes on every commit. The native bubblewrap sandbox is new and should be considered beta — the Docker sandbox is the production-grade path. See the [CI badge](https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer/actions) for current status.
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## Contributing
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Contributions are welcome. See the [test suite](scripts/smoke_test.py) for the deterministic core, and [tests/integration_test.py](tests/integration_test.py) for the Docker integration tests. Run `python scripts/smoke_test.py` to verify before submitting a PR.
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## License
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[MIT](LICENSE)
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# repo-proofer
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[](https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer/actions)
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[](LICENSE)
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[](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
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[](https://pypi.org/project/repo-proofer/)
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Find out if a repo will steal your keys before you run it.
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GitHub is flooded with AI-generated "slop" — repositories with impressive READMEs that don't actually run, or worse, quietly phone home to a C2 server the moment you `npm install` them. `repo-proofer` clones a repo, drops it into a zero-network, read-only sandbox, executes it, and tells you — deterministically, no AI — whether it booted and whether it tried to read your SSH keys.
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<p align="center">
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<i>The slop-repo fixture being caught red-handed.</i>
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</p>
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```
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$ repo-proofer file://$(pwd)/tests/fixtures/slop-repo
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╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
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│ Repository file://.../slop-repo │
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│ Detected Stack Python │
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│ BOOTS NO │
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│ Detail exited 1 (crash) │
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│ Network Egress BLOCKED │
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│ Filesystem READ-ONLY │
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│ Warnings [!] App crashed when network was │
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│ blocked. May require external API │
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│ to function. │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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╭─ Sensitive File Access (3) ──────────────────────────╮
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│ - /etc/passwd │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 │
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│ - /root/.ssh/id_rsa │
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╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
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[!] Sensitive file access detected — primary indicator of malicious intent.
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```
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## Highlights
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- **Runs untrusted code safely.** Every execution is sandboxed with the network disabled and the filesystem read-only. The repo can't phone home. It can't write outside `/tmp`. It can't read `~/.ssh`.
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- **Catches what static analysis can't.** Snyk, Socket, and GitHub Advanced Security read code to see if it *looks* malicious. `repo-proofer` runs it and watches what it *does*. Obfuscation can fool a linter. It cannot fool a kernel that refuses to open a socket.
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- **100% deterministic, zero AI.** Pure subprocess + filesystem + strace. No LLMs, no API calls, no prompt-injection surface. Same answer every time, free to run forever.
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- **No Docker required.** The default `--sandbox auto` uses a native bubblewrap sandbox on Linux — millisecond startup, no image pulls. Docker is the fallback for macOS/Windows or `--sandbox docker` for full clean-room isolation.
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- **Three-color verdicts.** Green `BOOTS: YES` (it ran), red `BOOTS: NO` (it crashed or tried to steal secrets), yellow `NO RUNNABLE ENTRYPOINT` (it's a library, not slop). Libraries don't get the same red as malware.
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- **Runtime Behavior Report.** strace traces every syscall inside the sandbox. You get an SBOM-style report based on *actual execution*: files read, files written, processes spawned, network calls attempted, sensitive paths touched.
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- **Installable in one command.** `uvx --from git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git repo-proofer <url>` — no clone, no venv, no setup. Works today, straight from GitHub.
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## Installation
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Run `repo-proofer` instantly with `uvx` — no clone, no venv, no setup:
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|
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```bash
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uvx --from "git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git" repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
|
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```
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+
|
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That's it. `uvx` creates an ephemeral isolated environment, installs `typer`/`rich`/`GitPython`, clones the target repo, spins up the sandbox, runs the strace, prints the verdict, and cleans up after itself.
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|
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Once published to PyPI, the command shortens to:
|
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|
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```bash
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uvx repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
|
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|
+
```
|
|
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|
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Other install methods:
|
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|
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```bash
|
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# Install permanently with pipx (from GitHub):
|
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pipx install "git+https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git"
|
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repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/repo.git
|
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|
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# Or from source (for development):
|
|
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git clone https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer.git
|
|
75
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cd repo-proofer
|
|
76
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pip install -e .
|
|
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|
+
```
|
|
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+
|
|
79
|
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Requires Python 3.10+. The native sandbox (default on Linux) needs `bubblewrap` — install it with `apt install bubblewrap` (Debian/Ubuntu) or `dnf install bubblewrap` (Fedora). No Docker needed.
|
|
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|
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|
|
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## Documentation
|
|
82
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|
|
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See the [Limitations](#limitations) section for honest gaps, and the [FAQ](#faq) for common questions. The command-line reference is available with `repo-proofer --help`.
|
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|
|
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## Features
|
|
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|
|
87
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### Triage a repo
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
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Point `repo-proofer` at any Git URL. It clones, detects the stack, installs deps, executes the entrypoint in a locked sandbox, and prints a verdict.
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
```console
|
|
92
|
+
$ repo-proofer https://github.com/pallets/markupsafe.git
|
|
93
|
+
Cloning https://github.com/pallets/markupsafe.git (depth=1)...
|
|
94
|
+
Detected stack: Python | Native sandbox (bubblewrap)
|
|
95
|
+
Installing dependencies (network ON, timeout 60s)...
|
|
96
|
+
Executing entrypoint (network OFF, read-only FS, timeout 30s)...
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
|
|
99
|
+
│ Repository https://github.com/pallets/mar… │
|
|
100
|
+
│ Detected Stack Python │
|
|
101
|
+
│ BOOTS NO RUNNABLE ENTRYPOINT │
|
|
102
|
+
│ Detail no runnable entrypoint │
|
|
103
|
+
│ (looks like a library) │
|
|
104
|
+
│ Network Egress BLOCKED │
|
|
105
|
+
│ Filesystem READ-ONLY │
|
|
106
|
+
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
|
|
107
|
+
```
|
|
108
|
+
|
|
109
|
+
`markupsafe` is a library — no `main.py`, nothing to run. The yellow verdict is correct: it's not slop, it just has no entrypoint. CI exits 0.
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
111
|
+
### Catch a malicious repo
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
The `slop-repo` fixture impersonates an AI startup while quietly reading `~/.ssh/id_rsa` and `/etc/passwd`, then phoning home to a C2 server. Under `repo-proofer`'s `--network none` sandbox, the phone-home fails and strace catches the secret reads:
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
```console
|
|
116
|
+
$ repo-proofer file://$(pwd)/tests/fixtures/slop-repo
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
╭─ repo-proofer verdict ──────────────────────────────╮
|
|
119
|
+
│ BOOTS NO │
|
|
120
|
+
│ Detail exited 1 (crash) │
|
|
121
|
+
│ Warnings [!] App crashed when network was │
|
|
122
|
+
│ blocked. │
|
|
123
|
+
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
|
|
124
|
+
|
|
125
|
+
╭─ Runtime Behavior Report ────────────────────────────╮
|
|
126
|
+
│ Files Read 2 │
|
|
127
|
+
│ Network Calls Attempted 1 │
|
|
128
|
+
│ Sensitive File Access 3 (see below) │
|
|
129
|
+
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
╭─ Network Calls Attempted (1) ────────────────────────╮
|
|
132
|
+
│ - connect 203.0.113.42:443 │
|
|
133
|
+
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
|
|
134
|
+
|
|
135
|
+
╭─ Sensitive File Access (3) ──────────────────────────╮
|
|
136
|
+
│ - /etc/passwd │
|
|
137
|
+
│ - /root/.ssh/id_ed25519 │
|
|
138
|
+
│ - /root/.ssh/id_rsa │
|
|
139
|
+
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
|
|
140
|
+
|
|
141
|
+
[!] Sensitive file access detected — primary indicator of malicious intent.
|
|
142
|
+
```
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
Exit code 1. The verdict is unambiguous: this repo tried to steal your keys.
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
### The sandbox
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
Two backends, same moat:
|
|
149
|
+
|
|
150
|
+
```console
|
|
151
|
+
$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox native # bubblewrap (Linux, no Docker, milliseconds)
|
|
152
|
+
$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox docker # Docker (clean-room images, memory/CPU limits)
|
|
153
|
+
$ repo-proofer <url> --sandbox auto # default: prefer native, fall back to Docker
|
|
154
|
+
```
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
Both backends enforce the same security constraints:
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
| Constraint | Docker mode | Native mode |
|
|
159
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
160
|
+
| Network | `--network none` | `--unshare-net` |
|
|
161
|
+
| Filesystem | `--read-only` + `--tmpfs /tmp` | `--ro-bind /usr` + `--tmpfs /tmp` |
|
|
162
|
+
| SSH keys | not mounted | `--tmpfs /home` + `--tmpfs /root` (empty) |
|
|
163
|
+
| Capabilities | `--cap-drop ALL` | bubblewrap drops all by default |
|
|
164
|
+
| Repo | `-v repo:/app:ro` | `--ro-bind repo /app` |
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
If the app crashes because it can't reach the network, **that is a successful detection of a hidden dependency, not a tool failure.**
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
### Stack detection
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
`repo-proofer` detects the stack from marker files and resolves the entrypoint:
|
|
171
|
+
|
|
172
|
+
```console
|
|
173
|
+
$ repo-proofer https://github.com/owner/my-cli.git
|
|
174
|
+
Detected stack: Python | Native sandbox (bubblewrap)
|
|
175
|
+
Executing entrypoint (network OFF, read-only FS, timeout 30s)...
|
|
176
|
+
```
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
| Marker | Stack | Entrypoint resolution |
|
|
179
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
180
|
+
| `package.json` | Node.js | `scripts.start`, `main`, `bin`, then `index.js`/`app.js`/`server.js` |
|
|
181
|
+
| `requirements.txt` / `pyproject.toml` / `setup.py` / `setup.cfg` | Python | `[project.scripts]`, `console_scripts`, `main.py`/`app.py`/`server.py`/`run.py`, `manage.py check`, `src/` layout, `python -m <pkg>` |
|
|
182
|
+
| `go.mod` | Go (experimental) | `go run main.go` |
|
|
183
|
+
| `Cargo.toml` | Rust (experimental) | `cargo run --offline` |
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
A modern CLI that declares its entrypoint only in `[project.scripts]` (no `main.py`) is correctly detected as runnable — not mislabeled as a library.
|
|
186
|
+
|
|
187
|
+
### Exit codes
|
|
188
|
+
|
|
189
|
+
```console
|
|
190
|
+
$ repo-proofer <url>; echo "exit: $?"
|
|
191
|
+
exit: 0 # boots cleanly, OR is a library (yellow)
|
|
192
|
+
exit: 1 # crashed, or attempted sensitive file access (red)
|
|
193
|
+
exit: 2 # clone failed
|
|
194
|
+
exit: 3 # sandbox unavailable (no Docker / no bubblewrap)
|
|
195
|
+
exit: 4 # could not detect project stack
|
|
196
|
+
exit: 5 # failed to pull Docker image
|
|
197
|
+
```
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
The exit code is CI-friendly: wire it into a GitHub Actions workflow and any repo that crashes or touches secrets blocks the PR.
|
|
200
|
+
|
|
201
|
+
## How it works
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
```
|
|
204
|
+
1. Clone git clone --depth=1 (network ON)
|
|
205
|
+
2. Detect filesystem checks for marker files (deterministic)
|
|
206
|
+
3. Install sandbox ... <install_cmd> (network ON, 60s)
|
|
207
|
+
4. Execute sandbox --network=none --read-only ... (network OFF)
|
|
208
|
+
└─ strace -ff -e trace=openat,connect,... (behavior report)
|
|
209
|
+
5. Analyze regex on stdout/stderr + strace trace (deterministic)
|
|
210
|
+
6. Verdict three-color panel + exit code
|
|
211
|
+
```
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
No LLMs. No AI APIs. Pure subprocess + filesystem + strace. An LLM-based analyzer would be slower, more expensive, and gameable via prompt injection in the repo's own README. Pure determinism is the core feature.
|
|
214
|
+
|
|
215
|
+
## Limitations
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
This tool is honest about what it can and can't do.
|
|
218
|
+
|
|
219
|
+
- **First run is minutes in Docker mode.** The Docker backend pulls base images and builds a strace image. The native backend (default on Linux) has no image pulls — it uses the host's runtimes and starts in milliseconds.
|
|
220
|
+
- **Go and Rust are experimental.** Both run under `--network none` with no install step, so projects with external dependencies can't fetch them at runtime. Only zero-dependency or pre-vendored Go/Rust projects boot.
|
|
221
|
+
- **Hostname-based C2 detection is indirect.** Under `--network none`, DNS resolution fails *before* `connect()`, so a hostname-based egress target shows up as a DNS query to the resolver, not the actual hostname. Hardcoded-IP malware produces a clean `connect <IP>:<port>` line. The **Sensitive File Access** list is the strong, unambiguous signal regardless.
|
|
222
|
+
- **Install-phase residual risk.** The install phase runs with network ON (it has to, to fetch packages). npm's supply-chain window is closed with `--ignore-scripts`; pip is pushed toward wheels with `--prefer-binary`. sdist-only packages still trigger a PEP 517 build — a known residual risk.
|
|
223
|
+
- **Native sandbox is Linux-only.** Bubblewrap doesn't exist on macOS/Windows. On those platforms, `--sandbox auto` falls back to Docker. The native sandbox also has no memory/CPU limits — use `--sandbox docker` for the full isolation profile.
|
|
224
|
+
|
|
225
|
+
## FAQ
|
|
226
|
+
|
|
227
|
+
#### Why not just read the code myself?
|
|
228
|
+
|
|
229
|
+
You can — and you should, for repos you trust. But for the 95% case ("a stranger's repo with a flashy README"), reading every line of `setup.py` and `postinstall.sh` takes longer than running `repo-proofer`, and obfuscation can hide intent from a human reader. `repo-proofer` watches physics: if the app opens a socket, the kernel tells us. You can't obfuscate a syscall.
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230
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+
|
|
231
|
+
#### How is this different from Snyk / Socket / GitHub Advanced Security?
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|
232
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+
|
|
233
|
+
Those tools do *static analysis* — they read code to see if it looks malicious. `repo-proofer` does *dynamic execution* — it runs the code in a locked box and watches what it actually does. Static analysis is bypassable (obfuscated code, environment-triggered payloads). Dynamic execution is not: if a malicious repo needs to phone home to download its payload, it physically cannot do that inside `--network none`.
|
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234
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+
|
|
235
|
+
#### What does "BOOTS: YES" mean for a server that never exits?
|
|
236
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+
|
|
237
|
+
A process that times out without crashing is a healthy long-running process (server, daemon, bot). The verdict is `BOOTS: YES (long-running)`. If it also printed a readiness signal (`"listening on port 8080"`, `"Uvicorn running"`), the verdict upgrades to `BOOTS: YES (server detected)` with the matched signal shown.
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238
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+
|
|
239
|
+
#### Can it run on macOS?
|
|
240
|
+
|
|
241
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+
Yes, with Docker. `--sandbox auto` falls back to Docker on macOS (bubblewrap is Linux-only). `uvx repo-proofer <url>` works — it just needs Docker Desktop running.
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242
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+
|
|
243
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+
#### Is it ready for production?
|
|
244
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+
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|
245
|
+
The engine is stable and the deterministic test suite (56 tests) passes on every commit. The native bubblewrap sandbox is new and should be considered beta — the Docker sandbox is the production-grade path. See the [CI badge](https://github.com/bootproof/repo-proofer/actions) for current status.
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246
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+
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247
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+
## Contributing
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248
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+
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249
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+
Contributions are welcome. See the [test suite](scripts/smoke_test.py) for the deterministic core, and [tests/integration_test.py](tests/integration_test.py) for the Docker integration tests. Run `python scripts/smoke_test.py` to verify before submitting a PR.
|
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250
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+
|
|
251
|
+
## License
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252
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+
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253
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+
[MIT](LICENSE)
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