replylayer 0.22.1__tar.gz → 0.23.0__tar.gz

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: replylayer
-Version: 0.22.1
+Version: 0.23.0
 Summary: Official Python SDK for ReplyLayer — email for AI agents
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://replylayer.ai
 Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/replylayer/rly
@@ -187,12 +187,12 @@ if draft["worst_decision"] == "allow":
     print(f"Sent {result['message_id']}")
 ```
 
-The send/reply/draft-send response carries two additive, nullable keys that explain a held send inline (no second `messages.get` call). `result["scan"]` is the vendor-neutral scanner verdict (`ScanSummary`); `result["hold_context"]` (`{"trigger_source", "summary_reasons"}` or `None`) is the policy/HITL reason, non-null only when the delivery `status` diverges from `scan["verdict"]` because of a policy/HITL hold — a clean scan held for review by your mailbox policy, or a scanner review-flag held as quarantine on a plan without the review queue (`trigger_source`: `mailbox_policy` | `scanner` | `both`).
+The send/reply/draft-send response carries two additive, nullable keys that explain a held send inline (no second `messages.get` call). `result["scan"]` is the vendor-neutral scanner verdict (`ScanSummary`); `result["hold_context"]` (`{"trigger_source", "summary_reasons"}` or `None`) is the policy/human-review reason, non-null only when the delivery `status` diverges from `scan["verdict"]` because of a policy/human-review hold — a clean scan held for review by your mailbox policy, or a scanner review-flag held as quarantine on a plan without the review queue (`trigger_source`: `mailbox_policy` | `scanner` | `both`).
 
 By default `drafts.send()`, `messages.send()`, and `messages.reply()` return only once the scanner verdict is known, with `scan` and `hold_context` inline. Pass `async_dispatch=True` to `drafts.send()` to send the `Prefer: respond-async` hint. **The hint is advisory — the server decides.** When async dispatch is available the server returns `202` with `status="queued_for_dispatch"` (`AsyncSendAck`); otherwise it ignores the hint and returns a normal `200` `SendMessageResponse`. **Always branch on the result**: `result["status"] == "queued_for_dispatch"` ⇒ `AsyncSendAck`, otherwise `SendMessageResponse`. Poll `messages.get(message_id)` (or handle the lifecycle webhook) until `state` is terminal. Attachment-bearing drafts fail closed on the async path (`400 ATTACHMENTS_REQUIRE_SYNC_SEND`). (`messages.wait()` is a mailbox long-poll for new *inbound* mail, not a way to observe a specific message by ID.)
 
 The send endpoint raises `ReplyLayerError` with distinct `.code` values on 409:
-- `DRAFT_REJECTED_BY_RESCAN` — send-time scan flipped the verdict to `block`/`quarantine`. The draft stays in `draft` state; edit the body and retry. `err.details` carries `scan`, `releasable` (`True` for a `quarantine` hold the customer can release via `POST /v1/drafts/:id/release-and-send`, `False` for a terminal `block`), and, when a policy/HITL decision drove the hold, `hold_context`.
+- `DRAFT_REJECTED_BY_RESCAN` — send-time scan flipped the verdict to `block`/`quarantine`. The draft stays in `draft` state; edit the body and retry. `err.details` carries `scan`, `releasable` (`True` for a `quarantine` hold the customer can release via `POST /v1/drafts/:id/release-and-send`, `False` for a terminal `block`), and, when a policy/human-review decision drove the hold, `hold_context`.
 - `DRAFT_ALREADY_SENT` — the draft was already sent (race or retry after success).
 
 ```python
@@ -387,11 +387,11 @@ Images are a separately confirmed raw-download family. When `allowed_file_famili
 
 Human dashboard sessions and admin/pre-scoping keys can download clean stored `metadata_only` attachments, including attachments held back from agent raw-download policy. Agent-role keys remain bound to the mailbox policy gate plus hard safety checks; all callers remain blocked by infected AV verdicts, non-terminal message states, missing stored bytes, and hard attachment blocks.
 
-See ENDPOINTS.md for the full contract and known limitations.
+See the Mailboxes API reference at https://replylayer.ai/docs/api/mailboxes for the full contract and known limitations.
 
 ### Recipient allowlist (mailbox containment)
 
-A mailbox is in `blocklist` mode by default — the pre-send gate rejects `suppressed_addresses` hits and allows everyone else. Switching to `allowlist` mode restricts outbound to a pre-approved list; an agent (or a compromised API key) physically cannot email outside the list.
+A mailbox is in `blocklist` mode by default — the pre-send gate rejects `suppressed_addresses` hits and allows everyone else. Switching to `allowlist` mode contains **agent-origin** outbound to a pre-approved list (plus thread participants): a prompt-injected or compromised **agent key** cannot email outside the list. It is a containment boundary against a hijacked agent, not an all-origin lock — a human send (your dashboard session or an admin API key) is not restricted by the allowlist; only your do-not-contact (suppression) list binds a human send.
 
 ```python
 # Populate the allowlist first. Admin-only — agent keys get 403 INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE.
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ rl.mailboxes.allowlist.delete(mailbox["id"], "partner@corp.com", force_empty=Tru
 
 A send/reply/draft-send to a recipient on your do-not-contact (suppression) list raises `ReplyLayerError` with `.code == "RECIPIENT_SUPPRESSED"` (HTTP 403, `details["reason"] == "suppressed"`). This is terminal — escalate, don't retry; remove the suppression or send to a different recipient.
 
-Allowlist mutations are admin-only — granting send permission to an LLM defeats the containment boundary. Agents *can* `list` (so they can see what they're allowed to email) but not `add`/`add_bulk`/`delete`. Three new webhook events: `recipient_allowlist.added`, `recipient_allowlist.removed`, `mailbox.recipient_policy_changed`.
+Allowlist mutations are admin-only — granting mutation to an LLM defeats the agent-containment boundary. Agents *can* `list` (so they can see what they're allowed to email) but not `add`/`add_bulk`/`delete`. Three new webhook events: `recipient_allowlist.added`, `recipient_allowlist.removed`, `mailbox.recipient_policy_changed`.
 
 ### Domain entries
 
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ if ctx and ctx.get("instruction_trust"):
     # content-safety judgment.
     print(ctx["guidance"])
     print(ctx["instruction_trust"])
-    # {"version": "v1", "match": "address", "verified_domain": ..., "verdict": "verified_aligned", "provenance": "mailgun"}
+    # {"version": "v1", "match": "address", "verified_domain": ..., "verdict": "verified_aligned", "provenance": "managed"}
 ```
 
 A human account owner enables the mailbox mode and the key's capability, and designates the trusted sender, from the dashboard (each a loosening change requiring session re-auth). Both the mailbox mode and the per-key capability default to off, so existing integrations are unaffected until a customer opts in. This is a read-path signal only — a copied or hijacked API key cannot self-grant the capability, and there is nothing for a client to set to request it.
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ Error classes: `ReplyLayerError` (base), `AuthenticationError` (401), `Forbidden
 
 ## Webhook signature verification
 
-> For a full integration guide (event catalog, retry behavior, idempotency, security, troubleshooting), see the hosted webhook docs (coming).
+> For a full integration guide (event catalog, retry behavior, idempotency, security, troubleshooting), see https://replylayer.ai/docs/webhooks.
 
 ```python
 from replylayer import verify_webhook_signature

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/README.md

@@ -167,12 +167,12 @@ if draft["worst_decision"] == "allow":
     print(f"Sent {result['message_id']}")
 ```
 
-The send/reply/draft-send response carries two additive, nullable keys that explain a held send inline (no second `messages.get` call). `result["scan"]` is the vendor-neutral scanner verdict (`ScanSummary`); `result["hold_context"]` (`{"trigger_source", "summary_reasons"}` or `None`) is the policy/HITL reason, non-null only when the delivery `status` diverges from `scan["verdict"]` because of a policy/HITL hold — a clean scan held for review by your mailbox policy, or a scanner review-flag held as quarantine on a plan without the review queue (`trigger_source`: `mailbox_policy` | `scanner` | `both`).
+The send/reply/draft-send response carries two additive, nullable keys that explain a held send inline (no second `messages.get` call). `result["scan"]` is the vendor-neutral scanner verdict (`ScanSummary`); `result["hold_context"]` (`{"trigger_source", "summary_reasons"}` or `None`) is the policy/human-review reason, non-null only when the delivery `status` diverges from `scan["verdict"]` because of a policy/human-review hold — a clean scan held for review by your mailbox policy, or a scanner review-flag held as quarantine on a plan without the review queue (`trigger_source`: `mailbox_policy` | `scanner` | `both`).
 
 By default `drafts.send()`, `messages.send()`, and `messages.reply()` return only once the scanner verdict is known, with `scan` and `hold_context` inline. Pass `async_dispatch=True` to `drafts.send()` to send the `Prefer: respond-async` hint. **The hint is advisory — the server decides.** When async dispatch is available the server returns `202` with `status="queued_for_dispatch"` (`AsyncSendAck`); otherwise it ignores the hint and returns a normal `200` `SendMessageResponse`. **Always branch on the result**: `result["status"] == "queued_for_dispatch"` ⇒ `AsyncSendAck`, otherwise `SendMessageResponse`. Poll `messages.get(message_id)` (or handle the lifecycle webhook) until `state` is terminal. Attachment-bearing drafts fail closed on the async path (`400 ATTACHMENTS_REQUIRE_SYNC_SEND`). (`messages.wait()` is a mailbox long-poll for new *inbound* mail, not a way to observe a specific message by ID.)
 
 The send endpoint raises `ReplyLayerError` with distinct `.code` values on 409:
-- `DRAFT_REJECTED_BY_RESCAN` — send-time scan flipped the verdict to `block`/`quarantine`. The draft stays in `draft` state; edit the body and retry. `err.details` carries `scan`, `releasable` (`True` for a `quarantine` hold the customer can release via `POST /v1/drafts/:id/release-and-send`, `False` for a terminal `block`), and, when a policy/HITL decision drove the hold, `hold_context`.
+- `DRAFT_REJECTED_BY_RESCAN` — send-time scan flipped the verdict to `block`/`quarantine`. The draft stays in `draft` state; edit the body and retry. `err.details` carries `scan`, `releasable` (`True` for a `quarantine` hold the customer can release via `POST /v1/drafts/:id/release-and-send`, `False` for a terminal `block`), and, when a policy/human-review decision drove the hold, `hold_context`.
 - `DRAFT_ALREADY_SENT` — the draft was already sent (race or retry after success).
 
 ```python
@@ -367,11 +367,11 @@ Images are a separately confirmed raw-download family. When `allowed_file_famili
 
 Human dashboard sessions and admin/pre-scoping keys can download clean stored `metadata_only` attachments, including attachments held back from agent raw-download policy. Agent-role keys remain bound to the mailbox policy gate plus hard safety checks; all callers remain blocked by infected AV verdicts, non-terminal message states, missing stored bytes, and hard attachment blocks.
 
-See ENDPOINTS.md for the full contract and known limitations.
+See the Mailboxes API reference at https://replylayer.ai/docs/api/mailboxes for the full contract and known limitations.
 
 ### Recipient allowlist (mailbox containment)
 
-A mailbox is in `blocklist` mode by default — the pre-send gate rejects `suppressed_addresses` hits and allows everyone else. Switching to `allowlist` mode restricts outbound to a pre-approved list; an agent (or a compromised API key) physically cannot email outside the list.
+A mailbox is in `blocklist` mode by default — the pre-send gate rejects `suppressed_addresses` hits and allows everyone else. Switching to `allowlist` mode contains **agent-origin** outbound to a pre-approved list (plus thread participants): a prompt-injected or compromised **agent key** cannot email outside the list. It is a containment boundary against a hijacked agent, not an all-origin lock — a human send (your dashboard session or an admin API key) is not restricted by the allowlist; only your do-not-contact (suppression) list binds a human send.
 
 ```python
 # Populate the allowlist first. Admin-only — agent keys get 403 INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE.
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ rl.mailboxes.allowlist.delete(mailbox["id"], "partner@corp.com", force_empty=Tru
 
 A send/reply/draft-send to a recipient on your do-not-contact (suppression) list raises `ReplyLayerError` with `.code == "RECIPIENT_SUPPRESSED"` (HTTP 403, `details["reason"] == "suppressed"`). This is terminal — escalate, don't retry; remove the suppression or send to a different recipient.
 
-Allowlist mutations are admin-only — granting send permission to an LLM defeats the containment boundary. Agents *can* `list` (so they can see what they're allowed to email) but not `add`/`add_bulk`/`delete`. Three new webhook events: `recipient_allowlist.added`, `recipient_allowlist.removed`, `mailbox.recipient_policy_changed`.
+Allowlist mutations are admin-only — granting mutation to an LLM defeats the agent-containment boundary. Agents *can* `list` (so they can see what they're allowed to email) but not `add`/`add_bulk`/`delete`. Three new webhook events: `recipient_allowlist.added`, `recipient_allowlist.removed`, `mailbox.recipient_policy_changed`.
 
 ### Domain entries
 
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ if ctx and ctx.get("instruction_trust"):
     # content-safety judgment.
     print(ctx["guidance"])
     print(ctx["instruction_trust"])
-    # {"version": "v1", "match": "address", "verified_domain": ..., "verdict": "verified_aligned", "provenance": "mailgun"}
+    # {"version": "v1", "match": "address", "verified_domain": ..., "verdict": "verified_aligned", "provenance": "managed"}
 ```
 
 A human account owner enables the mailbox mode and the key's capability, and designates the trusted sender, from the dashboard (each a loosening change requiring session re-auth). Both the mailbox mode and the per-key capability default to off, so existing integrations are unaffected until a customer opts in. This is a read-path signal only — a copied or hijacked API key cannot self-grant the capability, and there is nothing for a client to set to request it.
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ Error classes: `ReplyLayerError` (base), `AuthenticationError` (401), `Forbidden
 
 ## Webhook signature verification
 
-> For a full integration guide (event catalog, retry behavior, idempotency, security, troubleshooting), see the hosted webhook docs (coming).
+> For a full integration guide (event catalog, retry behavior, idempotency, security, troubleshooting), see https://replylayer.ai/docs/webhooks.
 
 ```python
 from replylayer import verify_webhook_signature

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "replylayer"
-version = "0.22.1"
+version = "0.23.0"
 description = "Official Python SDK for ReplyLayer — email for AI agents"
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "MIT"

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/replylayer/__init__.py

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ from .types import (
     ScannerPolicy,
 )
 
-__version__ = "0.22.1"
+__version__ = "0.23.0"
 
 __all__ = [
     # Message delete response (0.20.0).

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/replylayer/_http.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import httpx
 
 from .errors import ReplyLayerError, error_from_response
 
-_VERSION = "0.22.1"
+_VERSION = "0.23.0"
 _USER_AGENT = f"replylayer-sdk-py/{_VERSION}"
 _PROTECTED_HEADER_KEYS = frozenset({"authorization", "content-type", "user-agent"})
 

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/replylayer/resources/mailboxes.py

@@ -464,8 +464,9 @@ class SyncMailboxes:
         # the field". Mutually exclusive with raw recipient_policy_mode/
         # agent_send_containment in the same call (the server returns 400).
         agent_send_policy: AgentSendPolicy | None = None,
-        # Consent for opening the agent on an allowlist mailbox (also opens
-        # human sends). None/False omits it.
+        # Deprecated + ignored by the server: opening the agent on an allowlist
+        # mailbox no longer requires consent (the allowlist only bound the
+        # agent). Kept for back-compat. None/False omits it.
         confirm_open_human_sends: bool | None = None,
         # PR 8.1 — per-detector redaction visibility. Pass {} to reset to
         # platform default; pass a partial map (e.g.
@@ -555,11 +556,12 @@ class SyncMailboxes:
         stored field). ``"open"`` lets the agent send to any new recipient;
         ``"restricted"`` gates it. Session/admin only server-side.
 
-        Opening on an allowlist mailbox also opens human sends, so the server
-        returns 409 ``OPEN_AGENT_REQUIRES_OPEN_MAILBOX`` (with
-        ``details.also_opens_human_sends = True``) on the first call. Re-issue
-        with ``confirm_open_human_sends=True`` to atomically flip the mailbox to
-        blocklist + containment off.
+        Opening on an allowlist mailbox now succeeds directly — the server
+        atomically flips the mailbox to blocklist and clears agent containment.
+        No consent is required (the allowlist only ever bound the agent, so
+        opening it does not affect human sends). ``confirm_open_human_sends`` is
+        **deprecated and ignored** by the server; it is still accepted here for
+        back-compat.
         """
         return self.update(
             id,
@@ -707,8 +709,9 @@ class AsyncMailboxes:
         # Mutually exclusive with raw recipient_policy_mode/agent_send_containment
         # in the same call (the server returns 400).
         agent_send_policy: AgentSendPolicy | None = None,
-        # Consent for opening the agent on an allowlist mailbox (also opens
-        # human sends). None/False omits it.
+        # Deprecated + ignored by the server: opening the agent on an allowlist
+        # mailbox no longer requires consent (the allowlist only bound the
+        # agent). Kept for back-compat. None/False omits it.
         confirm_open_human_sends: bool | None = None,
         # PR 8.1 — per-detector redaction visibility. Pass {} to reset to
         # platform default; pass a partial map to disable redaction on
@@ -796,10 +799,11 @@ class AsyncMailboxes:
 
         ``"open"`` lets the agent send to any new recipient; ``"restricted"``
         gates it. Session/admin only server-side. Opening on an allowlist
-        mailbox also opens human sends, so the server returns 409
-        ``OPEN_AGENT_REQUIRES_OPEN_MAILBOX``; re-issue with
-        ``confirm_open_human_sends=True`` to atomically flip to blocklist +
-        containment off.
+        mailbox now succeeds directly — the server atomically flips the mailbox
+        to blocklist and clears agent containment, with no consent required
+        (human sends are never allowlist-restricted). ``confirm_open_human_sends``
+        is **deprecated and ignored** by the server; still accepted for
+        back-compat.
         """
         return await self.update(
             id,

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/replylayer/types.py

@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ RecipientPolicyMode = Literal["blocklist", "allowlist"]
 AgentSendPolicy = Literal["restricted", "open"]
 
 # When agent_send_policy == "restricted", WHY:
-#   - "mailbox_allowlist": the whole mailbox is allowlist (humans too); opening
-#     the agent would also open human sends.
+#   - "mailbox_allowlist": the mailbox is in allowlist mode — the AGENT is
+#     restricted to the allowlist; human sends are unaffected (agent-only).
 #   - "agent_containment": blocklist mailbox + the R3 containment overlay.
 #   - None: agent_send_policy == "open".
 AgentSendRestrictedBy = Literal["mailbox_allowlist", "agent_containment"] | None
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ class FirewallBlock(TypedDict):
     matched_field: Literal["envelope", "from"] | None
     matched_pattern: str | None
     reason_code: Literal["SENDER_BLOCKED", "SENDER_NOT_ON_ALLOWLIST"]
-    source_table: Literal["inbound_sender_blocklists", "inbound_sender_allowlists"] | None
+    matched_list: Literal["account_blocklist", "mailbox_allowlist"] | None
     mode: SenderPolicyMode
 
 # Sprint 039 — allowlist + suppression entries may be either an exact email
@@ -413,30 +413,32 @@ class Mailbox(TypedDict):
     status: MailboxStatus
     scanner_policy: ScannerPolicy | None
     pii_mode: PiiMode
-    # Legacy attachment-access acceptance flag (migration 034). Retained for
-    # backward-compatible reads and audit history, but effective attachment
-    # exposure now comes from `attachment_exposure_mode` when set; otherwise
-    # the mailbox behaves as `metadata_only`.
-    attachment_access_enabled: bool
-    attachment_access_accepted_at: str | None
-    attachment_access_accepted_version: str | None
+    # Attachment / outbound-attachment CONSENT bookkeeping. SESSION-ONLY: the
+    # API returns these only to a dashboard (session-cookie) caller and strips
+    # them from every Bearer / API-key response — which includes this SDK. They
+    # drive the human re-acceptance banner and an agent cannot act on them (the
+    # acceptance routes are session + re-auth only), so they are NotRequired and,
+    # for SDK callers, always absent. Read `attachment_exposure_mode` instead.
+    attachment_access_enabled: NotRequired[bool]
+    attachment_access_accepted_at: NotRequired[str | None]
+    attachment_access_accepted_version: NotRequired[str | None]
     attachment_exposure_mode: AttachmentExposureMode
     attachment_allowed_file_families: list[AttachmentAllowedFileFamily]
-    attachment_reauth_at: str | None
-    attachment_policy_version: str | None
-    image_raw_download_confirmed: bool
-    current_image_risk_version: str
-    attachment_image_access_accepted_at: str | None
-    attachment_image_access_accepted_version: str | None
-    # Always the current disclaimer version. Compare to accepted_version to
-    # detect when a "disclaimer updated" banner should render.
-    current_disclaimer_version: str
+    attachment_reauth_at: NotRequired[str | None]
+    attachment_policy_version: NotRequired[str | None]
+    image_raw_download_confirmed: NotRequired[bool]
+    current_image_risk_version: NotRequired[str]
+    attachment_image_access_accepted_at: NotRequired[str | None]
+    attachment_image_access_accepted_version: NotRequired[str | None]
+    # The current disclaimer version, for the dashboard re-acceptance banner.
+    # Session-only (see the consent note above) — absent on SDK/API-key reads.
+    current_disclaimer_version: NotRequired[str]
     # True when the mailbox is on the legacy compat path
     # (attachment_exposure_mode is null but attachment_access_enabled is true).
     # Drives the dashboard re-acceptance banner; flips to false after the
-    # customer accepts an explicit mode. See
-    # docs/runbooks/legacy-attachment-access-migration.md.
-    legacy_wildcard_active: bool
+    # customer accepts an explicit mode. Session-only — absent on SDK/API-key
+    # reads. See docs/runbooks/legacy-attachment-access-migration.md.
+    legacy_wildcard_active: NotRequired[bool]
     # Migration 035 — default outbound sub-addressing rewrite mode.
     default_subaddress_mode: SubaddressMode
     # Migration 036 — recipient policy mode.
@@ -1034,7 +1036,7 @@ class InstructionTrustBasis(TypedDict):
     # Verified sender's domain; None under pii_mode=redacted.
     verified_domain: str | None
     verdict: Literal["verified_aligned"]
-    provenance: Literal["mailgun"]
+    provenance: Literal["managed"]
 
 
 class AgentSafetyContext(TypedDict):
@@ -1073,7 +1075,7 @@ class SenderAuthentication(TypedDict):
     verdict: SenderAuthVerdict
     from_domain: str | None
     signing_domain: str | None
-    provenance: Literal["mailgun", "self_hosted_imap"]
+    provenance: Literal["managed", "self_hosted_imap"]
 
 
 class SenderAuthenticationCompact(TypedDict):

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/tests/test_hitl_review_types.py

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ def test_review_queued_payload_constructs_with_required_fields() -> None:
         "direction": "outbound",
         "subject": "Quarterly review",
         "recipient": "ceo@corp.example",
-        "summary_reasons": ["Mailbox requires human approval for outbound mail (hitl_mode=all_outbound)"],
+        "summary_reasons": ['This mailbox requires human approval for all outbound mail (review setting: "All outbound").'],
         "origin": "fresh_send",
     }
     assert payload["origin"] == "fresh_send"

{replylayer-0.22.1 → replylayer-0.23.0}/tests/test_instruction_trust.py

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ def test_instruction_trust_basis_type_is_exported():
         "match": "address",
         "verified_domain": "partner.com",
         "verdict": "verified_aligned",
-        "provenance": "mailgun",
+        "provenance": "managed",
     }
     assert basis["verified_domain"] == "partner.com"