redline-evals 0.2.0__tar.gz

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  1. redline_evals-0.2.0/PKG-INFO +73 -0
  2. redline_evals-0.2.0/README.md +31 -0
  3. redline_evals-0.2.0/pyproject.toml +72 -0
  4. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/__init__.py +0 -0
  5. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/__main__.py +3 -0
  6. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/__init__.py +0 -0
  7. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/baseline_agent.py +33 -0
  8. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/debate_agent.py +45 -0
  9. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/interface.py +18 -0
  10. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/system_prompt.py +83 -0
  11. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/tool_loop.py +73 -0
  12. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/agents/tools.py +63 -0
  13. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/__init__.py +0 -0
  14. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/routes_evals.py +43 -0
  15. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/routes_health.py +18 -0
  16. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/routes_public.py +586 -0
  17. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/routes_runs.py +240 -0
  18. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/api/routes_testcases.py +39 -0
  19. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/cli.py +404 -0
  20. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/core/__init__.py +0 -0
  21. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/core/config.py +92 -0
  22. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/core/logging.py +25 -0
  23. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/core/security.py +238 -0
  24. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/__init__.py +0 -0
  25. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/env.py +55 -0
  26. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0001_initial.py +78 -0
  27. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0002_agent_endpoint.py +24 -0
  28. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0003_analytics_events.py +34 -0
  29. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0004_invite_tokens.py +30 -0
  30. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0005_run_stream_token.py +22 -0
  31. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0006_analytics_submitter_endpoint.py +28 -0
  32. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0007_run_result_judge_reasoning.py +23 -0
  33. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0008_testcase_pack.py +19 -0
  34. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0009_run_case_sets.py +29 -0
  35. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0010_drop_trace_injection_detected.py +19 -0
  36. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0011_run_excluded_categories.py +20 -0
  37. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0012_run_invite_token_hash.py +21 -0
  38. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic/versions/0013_run_system_prompt_mode.py +23 -0
  39. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/alembic.ini +35 -0
  40. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/base.py +54 -0
  41. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/models.py +148 -0
  42. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/db/session.py +15 -0
  43. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/__init__.py +0 -0
  44. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/case_sets.py +100 -0
  45. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/comparison.py +233 -0
  46. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/data/jbb_behaviors.json +150 -0
  47. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/generators.py +49 -0
  48. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/injection_cases.py +285 -0
  49. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/injection_checks.py +70 -0
  50. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/metrics.py +110 -0
  51. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/packs/__init__.py +10 -0
  52. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/packs/financial_services.py +167 -0
  53. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/plain.py +186 -0
  54. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/redaction.py +67 -0
  55. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/release.py +318 -0
  56. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/run_info.py +77 -0
  57. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/runner.py +329 -0
  58. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/sampling.py +95 -0
  59. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/scoring.py +132 -0
  60. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/significance.py +50 -0
  61. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/evals/testcases.py +1148 -0
  62. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/llm/__init__.py +0 -0
  63. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/llm/judge.py +281 -0
  64. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/llm/prompts.py +5 -0
  65. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/llm/provider.py +557 -0
  66. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/llm/schemas.py +40 -0
  67. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/local.py +411 -0
  68. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/main.py +66 -0
  69. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/models.py +228 -0
  70. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/queue/__init__.py +0 -0
  71. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/queue/tasks.py +63 -0
  72. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/queue/worker.py +25 -0
  73. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/reports/__init__.py +0 -0
  74. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/reports/html_report.py +545 -0
  75. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/try_cmd.py +149 -0
  76. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/__init__.py +0 -0
  77. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/hashing.py +40 -0
  78. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/ids.py +5 -0
  79. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/refusal.py +41 -0
  80. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/tiers.default.toml +60 -0
  81. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/tiers.py +177 -0
  82. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/utils/time.py +7 -0
  83. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline/version.py +32 -0
  84. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/PKG-INFO +73 -0
  85. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +115 -0
  86. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
  87. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/entry_points.txt +2 -0
  88. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/requires.txt +27 -0
  89. redline_evals-0.2.0/redline_evals.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
  90. redline_evals-0.2.0/setup.cfg +4 -0
  91. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_api_smoke.py +85 -0
  92. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_bundled_jbb.py +44 -0
  93. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_canary.py +209 -0
  94. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_cli.py +371 -0
  95. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_demo_and_reports.py +282 -0
  96. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_deployment.py +158 -0
  97. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_exclude_categories.py +84 -0
  98. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_financial_pack.py +83 -0
  99. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_hardening.py +72 -0
  100. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_injection_detection.py +43 -0
  101. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_invite_reads.py +87 -0
  102. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_key_encryption.py +85 -0
  103. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_packaging.py +36 -0
  104. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_plain_and_try.py +244 -0
  105. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_real_injection.py +299 -0
  106. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_refusal_heuristic.py +34 -0
  107. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_report_review.py +389 -0
  108. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_rerun_cases.py +202 -0
  109. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_run_info.py +92 -0
  110. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_runner_reproducible.py +51 -0
  111. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_scoring.py +115 -0
  112. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_significance.py +126 -0
  113. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_system_prompt_mode.py +169 -0
  114. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_tiers.py +164 -0
  115. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_timeouts.py +58 -0
  116. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_tool_providers_block_format.py +200 -0
  117. redline_evals-0.2.0/tests/test_ui_static.py +126 -0
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+ Metadata-Version: 2.4
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+ Name: redline-evals
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+ Version: 0.2.0
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+ Summary: Did your fine-tune get less safe? Run the same adversarial tests on two model versions and get a before/after safety report.
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+ License-Expression: MIT
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+ Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval
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+ Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval/issues
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+ Project-URL: Sample report, https://kush0o7.github.io/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval/sample-report.html
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+ Keywords: ai-safety,llm-evaluation,red-teaming,prompt-injection,jailbreak,fine-tuning
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+ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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+ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
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+ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
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+ Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
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+ Classifier: Topic :: Scientific/Engineering :: Artificial Intelligence
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+ Classifier: Topic :: Security
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+ Requires-Python: >=3.11
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+ Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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+ Requires-Dist: sqlalchemy>=2.0
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+ Requires-Dist: pydantic>=2.6
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+ Requires-Dist: pydantic-settings>=2.2
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+ Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27
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+ Requires-Dist: litellm>=1.0
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+ Requires-Dist: instructor>=1.0
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+ Provides-Extra: server
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+ Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.110; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: uvicorn>=0.29; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: alembic>=1.13; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: psycopg[binary]>=3.1; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: redis>=5.0; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: arq>=0.26; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: boto3>=1.34; extra == "server"
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+ Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42.0; extra == "server"
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+ Provides-Extra: test
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+ Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0; extra == "test"
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+ Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.23; extra == "test"
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+ Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27; extra == "test"
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+ Provides-Extra: dev
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+ Requires-Dist: redline-evals[server]; extra == "dev"
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+ Requires-Dist: pytest>=8.0; extra == "dev"
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+ Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.23; extra == "dev"
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+ Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27; extra == "dev"
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+
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+ # redline-evals
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+
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+ **Did your fine-tune just get less safe? Find out in one command.**
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ pip install redline-evals
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+ redline try # 2-3 minutes, one free Groq or OpenRouter key, no downloads
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+ redline compare ollama/llama3.1 ollama/hermes3 # your own models
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+ ```
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+
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+ The first line of every result is one plain sentence, e.g. "❌ Don't ship hermes3. It's less safe than llama3.1: 9 tests that llama3.1 passed, hermes3 failed."
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+
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+ Redline runs the same adversarial test cases (jailbreaks, prompt injection through tool results, made-up facts, over-refusal and a finance pack) on two versions of a model. It grades each answer and tells you whether the new version is safe to release. A statistics test (McNemar) says whether the change is real or noise.
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+
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+ - **Exit codes for CI:** 0 = pass, 1 = the release fails, 2 = error.
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+ - **Output** (in `./redline-out`): a terminal summary, `report.html`, `results.jsonl` and `summary.json`. Answers to harmful requests are redacted.
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+ - **Grader:** a local Ollama judge if you have a suitable model pulled (`ollama pull qwen2.5:7b`), otherwise keyword rules with a warning. Every report names the grader. Judge accuracy hasn't been measured against human labels yet.
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+ - **Resume:** run the same command again after Ctrl-C or an error. Answers are cached, so re-grading doesn't re-generate them.
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+
62
+ Models: `ollama/x`, `openai/x`, `anthropic/x`, `groq/x`, `gemini/x`, `openrouter/x`, `hf/org/x`, any OpenAI-compatible server (`http://host:port/v1#model`), and `fake-safe` / `fake-degraded` (simulated, offline).
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ redline compare fake-safe fake-degraded # offline demo, no models needed
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+ redline scan ollama/llama3.1 --cases 60 # one model against the tier criteria
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+ redline compare A B --judge groq/openai/gpt-oss-120b # free-tier judge: public test cases only
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+ redline report ./redline-out # print the summary and rewrite the files
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+ ```
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+
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+ The self-hosted server (API, Postgres, worker, UI) is in the `server` extra: `pip install "redline-evals[server]"`.
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+
73
+ Docs, methodology and limitations: https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval
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+ # redline-evals
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+
3
+ **Did your fine-tune just get less safe? Find out in one command.**
4
+
5
+ ```bash
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+ pip install redline-evals
7
+ redline try # 2-3 minutes, one free Groq or OpenRouter key, no downloads
8
+ redline compare ollama/llama3.1 ollama/hermes3 # your own models
9
+ ```
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+
11
+ The first line of every result is one plain sentence, e.g. "❌ Don't ship hermes3. It's less safe than llama3.1: 9 tests that llama3.1 passed, hermes3 failed."
12
+
13
+ Redline runs the same adversarial test cases (jailbreaks, prompt injection through tool results, made-up facts, over-refusal and a finance pack) on two versions of a model. It grades each answer and tells you whether the new version is safe to release. A statistics test (McNemar) says whether the change is real or noise.
14
+
15
+ - **Exit codes for CI:** 0 = pass, 1 = the release fails, 2 = error.
16
+ - **Output** (in `./redline-out`): a terminal summary, `report.html`, `results.jsonl` and `summary.json`. Answers to harmful requests are redacted.
17
+ - **Grader:** a local Ollama judge if you have a suitable model pulled (`ollama pull qwen2.5:7b`), otherwise keyword rules with a warning. Every report names the grader. Judge accuracy hasn't been measured against human labels yet.
18
+ - **Resume:** run the same command again after Ctrl-C or an error. Answers are cached, so re-grading doesn't re-generate them.
19
+
20
+ Models: `ollama/x`, `openai/x`, `anthropic/x`, `groq/x`, `gemini/x`, `openrouter/x`, `hf/org/x`, any OpenAI-compatible server (`http://host:port/v1#model`), and `fake-safe` / `fake-degraded` (simulated, offline).
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ redline compare fake-safe fake-degraded # offline demo, no models needed
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+ redline scan ollama/llama3.1 --cases 60 # one model against the tier criteria
25
+ redline compare A B --judge groq/openai/gpt-oss-120b # free-tier judge: public test cases only
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+ redline report ./redline-out # print the summary and rewrite the files
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+ ```
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+
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+ The self-hosted server (API, Postgres, worker, UI) is in the `server` extra: `pip install "redline-evals[server]"`.
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+
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+ Docs, methodology and limitations: https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval
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+ [build-system]
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+ requires = ["setuptools>=77", "wheel"]
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+ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
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+
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+ [project]
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+ name = "redline-evals"
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+ version = "0.2.0"
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+ description = "Did your fine-tune get less safe? Run the same adversarial tests on two model versions and get a before/after safety report."
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+ readme = "README.md"
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+ license = "MIT"
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+ requires-python = ">=3.11"
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+ keywords = ["ai-safety", "llm-evaluation", "red-teaming", "prompt-injection", "jailbreak", "fine-tuning"]
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+ classifiers = [
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+ "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
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+ "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11",
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+ "Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12",
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+ "Operating System :: OS Independent",
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+ "Topic :: Scientific/Engineering :: Artificial Intelligence",
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+ "Topic :: Security",
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+ ]
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+ # Core = the `redline` CLI + library: SQLite (via SQLAlchemy), httpx, pydantic, and the LLM judge.
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+ dependencies = [
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+ "sqlalchemy>=2.0",
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+ "pydantic>=2.6",
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+ "pydantic-settings>=2.2",
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+ "httpx>=0.27",
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+ "litellm>=1.0",
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+ "instructor>=1.0",
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+ ]
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+
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+ [project.optional-dependencies]
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+ # The self-hosted API server, worker and UI (Postgres, Redis, ARQ, Bedrock).
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+ server = [
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+ "fastapi>=0.110",
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+ "uvicorn>=0.29",
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+ "alembic>=1.13",
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+ "psycopg[binary]>=3.1",
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+ "redis>=5.0",
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+ "arq>=0.26",
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+ "boto3>=1.34",
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+ "cryptography>=42.0",
42
+ ]
43
+ test = [
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+ "pytest>=8.0",
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+ "pytest-asyncio>=0.23",
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+ "httpx>=0.27",
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+ ]
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+ # `pip install -e "backend[server,dev]"` for working on the repo (the server tests need [server]).
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+ dev = [
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+ "redline-evals[server]",
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+ "pytest>=8.0",
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+ "pytest-asyncio>=0.23",
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+ "httpx>=0.27",
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+ ]
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+
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+ [project.scripts]
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+ redline = "redline.cli:main"
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+
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+ [project.urls]
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+ Homepage = "https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval"
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+ Issues = "https://github.com/kush0o7/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval/issues"
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+ "Sample report" = "https://kush0o7.github.io/Redline-Agent-Safety-Eval/sample-report.html"
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+
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+ [tool.setuptools.packages.find]
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+ include = ["redline*"]
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+
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+ [tool.setuptools.package-data]
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+ redline = ["utils/*.toml", "evals/data/*.json", "db/alembic.ini", "db/alembic/*.py", "db/alembic/*.mako", "db/alembic/versions/*.py"]
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+
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+ [tool.pytest.ini_options]
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+ pythonpath = ["."]
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+ asyncio_mode = "auto"
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+ from redline.cli import main
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+
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+ raise SystemExit(main())
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+ from __future__ import annotations
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+
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+ from redline.agents.interface import AgentResponse, AgentUnderTest
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+ from redline.agents.tool_loop import run_tool_scenario
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+ from redline.llm.provider import get_provider
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+ from redline.llm.prompts import BASELINE_SYSTEM_PROMPT
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+ from redline.llm.schemas import LLMMessage
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+ from redline.utils.refusal import is_refusal
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+
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+
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+ class BaselineAgent(AgentUnderTest):
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+ async def run(self, prompt: str, context: dict, seed: int, provider=None) -> AgentResponse:
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+ if provider is None:
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+ provider = get_provider()
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+ # The runner always sets "system_prompt" (None = send no system message, the
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+ # system_prompt_mode=none case); callers that don't get the Redline default.
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+ system_prompt = context.get("system_prompt", BASELINE_SYSTEM_PROMPT)
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+ if context.get("tool_outputs"):
19
+ return await run_tool_scenario(
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+ provider=provider,
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+ system_prompt=system_prompt,
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+ user_task=prompt,
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+ tool_outputs=context["tool_outputs"],
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+ tool_names=context.get("tool_names", []),
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+ model=context["model"],
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+ seed=seed,
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+ trace_events=context.setdefault("trace_events", []),
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+ )
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+ messages = ([LLMMessage(role="system", content=system_prompt)] if system_prompt else []) + [
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+ LLMMessage(role="user", content=prompt),
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+ ]
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+ output = await provider.complete(messages=messages, model=context["model"], temperature=0.2, seed=seed)
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+ return AgentResponse(output_text=output, refusal=is_refusal(output), confidence=None, used_tools=False)
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+ from __future__ import annotations
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+
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+ from redline.agents.interface import AgentResponse, AgentUnderTest
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+ from redline.llm.provider import get_provider
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+ from redline.llm.prompts import DEBATE_CRITIC_PROMPT, DEBATE_PROPOSER_PROMPT, DEBATE_REVISE_PROMPT
6
+ from redline.llm.schemas import LLMMessage
7
+ from redline.utils.refusal import is_refusal
8
+ from redline.utils.time import now_iso
9
+
10
+
11
+ class DebateAgent(AgentUnderTest):
12
+ async def run(self, prompt: str, context: dict, seed: int, provider=None) -> AgentResponse:
13
+ if provider is None:
14
+ provider = get_provider()
15
+ trace_events = context.setdefault("trace_events", [])
16
+ if context.get("tool_outputs"):
17
+ # Tool scenarios grade the agent's actions; a proposer/critic text pipeline
18
+ # has no actions to grade, so these cases run as a single tool-using agent.
19
+ trace_events.append({"t": "system", "msg": "debate mode not applied to tool scenario; ran baseline tool loop", "ts": now_iso()})
20
+ from redline.agents.baseline_agent import BaselineAgent
21
+
22
+ return await BaselineAgent().run(prompt, context, seed, provider=provider)
23
+
24
+ proposer_msgs = [
25
+ LLMMessage(role="system", content=DEBATE_PROPOSER_PROMPT),
26
+ LLMMessage(role="user", content=prompt),
27
+ ]
28
+ proposer_text = await provider.complete(proposer_msgs, model=context["model"], temperature=0.2, seed=seed)
29
+ trace_events.append({"t": "assistant", "msg": proposer_text, "role": "proposer", "ts": now_iso()})
30
+
31
+ critic_msgs = [
32
+ LLMMessage(role="system", content=DEBATE_CRITIC_PROMPT),
33
+ LLMMessage(role="user", content=proposer_text),
34
+ ]
35
+ critic_text = await provider.complete(critic_msgs, model=context["model"], temperature=0.2, seed=seed + 1)
36
+ trace_events.append({"t": "assistant", "msg": critic_text, "role": "critic", "ts": now_iso()})
37
+
38
+ revise_msgs = [
39
+ LLMMessage(role="system", content=DEBATE_REVISE_PROMPT),
40
+ LLMMessage(role="user", content=f"Prompt: {prompt}\nCritique: {critic_text}\nAnswer: {proposer_text}"),
41
+ ]
42
+ final_text = await provider.complete(revise_msgs, model=context["model"], temperature=0.2, seed=seed + 2)
43
+ trace_events.append({"t": "assistant", "msg": final_text, "role": "final", "ts": now_iso()})
44
+
45
+ return AgentResponse(output_text=final_text, refusal=is_refusal(final_text), confidence=None, used_tools=False)
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
1
+ from __future__ import annotations
2
+
3
+ from dataclasses import dataclass, field
4
+
5
+
6
+ @dataclass
7
+ class AgentResponse:
8
+ output_text: str
9
+ refusal: bool
10
+ confidence: float | None
11
+ used_tools: bool
12
+ # Tool calls the agent itself made (seeded calls excluded): [{name, arguments}]
13
+ tool_calls: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)
14
+
15
+
16
+ class AgentUnderTest:
17
+ async def run(self, prompt: str, context: dict, seed: int, provider=None) -> AgentResponse:
18
+ raise NotImplementedError
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
1
+ """Which system prompt the target receives (per run: ``system_prompt_mode``).
2
+
3
+ - ``none``: no system message. The agent is tested as its users get it; an agent behind
4
+ ``agent_endpoint_url`` already applies its own prompt server-side. Default for those runs.
5
+ - ``redline``: Redline's generic ``BASELINE_SYSTEM_PROMPT``. Default for a plain model
6
+ (it was the only behaviour before this option existed).
7
+ - ``custom``: ``custom_system_prompt``, e.g. the production prompt of the agent being tested.
8
+
9
+ Debate mode is Redline's own proposer/critic/reviser pipeline with its own role prompts,
10
+ so it always records ``redline`` and rejects ``none``/``custom``.
11
+
12
+ Runs created before the option existed have ``NULL`` and used the Redline default.
13
+ """
14
+ from __future__ import annotations
15
+
16
+ import hashlib
17
+
18
+ from redline.llm.prompts import BASELINE_SYSTEM_PROMPT
19
+
20
+ MODES = ("none", "redline", "custom")
21
+ MAX_CUSTOM_CHARS = 8000
22
+
23
+
24
+ class SystemPromptError(ValueError):
25
+ pass
26
+
27
+
28
+ def resolve(requested: str | None, custom: str | None, *, mode: str, agent_endpoint_url: str | None) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
29
+ """Validated (system_prompt_mode, custom_system_prompt) for a new run."""
30
+ custom = custom if custom is None else custom.strip()
31
+ if requested is not None and requested not in MODES:
32
+ raise SystemPromptError(f"system_prompt_mode must be one of: {', '.join(MODES)}")
33
+ if mode == "debate":
34
+ if requested not in (None, "redline") or custom:
35
+ raise SystemPromptError("debate mode uses Redline's own proposer/critic prompts; "
36
+ "use mode=baseline to choose system_prompt_mode")
37
+ return "redline", None
38
+ if requested is None:
39
+ requested = "custom" if custom else ("none" if agent_endpoint_url else "redline")
40
+ if requested == "custom":
41
+ if not custom:
42
+ raise SystemPromptError("system_prompt_mode=custom needs a non-empty custom_system_prompt")
43
+ if len(custom) > MAX_CUSTOM_CHARS:
44
+ raise SystemPromptError(f"custom_system_prompt may be at most {MAX_CUSTOM_CHARS} characters")
45
+ return "custom", custom
46
+ if custom:
47
+ raise SystemPromptError("custom_system_prompt is only used with system_prompt_mode=custom")
48
+ return requested, None
49
+
50
+
51
+ def prompt_text(mode: str | None, custom: str | None) -> str | None:
52
+ """The system message to send, or None for no system message."""
53
+ if mode == "none":
54
+ return None
55
+ if mode == "custom":
56
+ return custom
57
+ return BASELINE_SYSTEM_PROMPT # "redline" and legacy NULL
58
+
59
+
60
+ def fingerprint(custom: str | None) -> str | None:
61
+ return hashlib.sha256(custom.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:12] if custom else None
62
+
63
+
64
+ def describe(mode: str | None, custom: str | None) -> dict:
65
+ """What reports and APIs show. The custom prompt's text is never included, only its size and hash."""
66
+ if mode == "none":
67
+ label = "none"
68
+ elif mode == "custom":
69
+ label = f"custom ({len(custom or ''):,} characters, sha256 {fingerprint(custom)})"
70
+ elif mode == "redline":
71
+ label = "Redline default"
72
+ else:
73
+ label = "Redline default (recorded before system_prompt_mode existed)"
74
+ return {
75
+ "mode": mode or "redline",
76
+ "label": label,
77
+ "custom_chars": len(custom) if mode == "custom" and custom else None,
78
+ "custom_sha256": fingerprint(custom) if mode == "custom" else None,
79
+ }
80
+
81
+
82
+ def describe_run(run) -> dict:
83
+ return describe(getattr(run, "system_prompt_mode", None), getattr(run, "custom_system_prompt", None))
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
1
+ """Run an agent through a tool-using scenario where injected text arrives as a real tool result.
2
+
3
+ Conversation shape sent to the model:
4
+ [system →] user task → assistant(tool_call: seeded data tool) → tool(result with injection)
5
+ → model turn(s) … each model tool call is executed against stubs and fed back,
6
+ up to MAX_STEPS model turns.
7
+
8
+ Every tool call the model makes is recorded and returned, so scoring can check
9
+ in code whether the agent attempted the attacker's action.
10
+ """
11
+ from __future__ import annotations
12
+
13
+ from redline.agents.interface import AgentResponse
14
+ from redline.agents.tools import execute_stub, render_result, specs_for
15
+ from redline.llm.schemas import LLMMessage, ToolCall
16
+ from redline.utils.refusal import is_refusal
17
+ from redline.utils.time import now_iso
18
+
19
+ MAX_STEPS = 4
20
+
21
+
22
+ async def run_tool_scenario(
23
+ *,
24
+ provider,
25
+ system_prompt: str | None,
26
+ user_task: str,
27
+ tool_outputs: list[dict],
28
+ tool_names: list[str],
29
+ model: str,
30
+ seed: int,
31
+ trace_events: list[dict],
32
+ temperature: float = 0.2,
33
+ ) -> AgentResponse:
34
+ tools = specs_for(tool_names, tool_outputs)
35
+ messages: list[LLMMessage] = ([LLMMessage(role="system", content=system_prompt)] if system_prompt else []) + [
36
+ LLMMessage(role="user", content=user_task),
37
+ ]
38
+
39
+ # Seeded calls: the agent "already" fetched the data the task needs, and the
40
+ # attacker-controlled content comes back as a genuine tool result.
41
+ for i, out in enumerate(tool_outputs):
42
+ call = ToolCall(id=f"seed_{i}", name=out.get("name", "unknown"), arguments=out.get("arguments", {}) or {})
43
+ content = render_result(out.get("result", ""))
44
+ messages.append(LLMMessage(role="assistant", content="", tool_calls=[call]))
45
+ messages.append(LLMMessage(role="tool", content=content, tool_call_id=call.id, name=call.name))
46
+ trace_events.append({"t": "tool_call", "name": call.name, "arguments": call.arguments, "seeded": True, "ts": now_iso()})
47
+ trace_events.append({"t": "tool_result", "name": call.name, "result": content, "ts": now_iso()})
48
+
49
+ made: list[ToolCall] = []
50
+ final_text = ""
51
+ for step in range(MAX_STEPS):
52
+ reply = await provider.complete_with_tools(messages, model=model, temperature=temperature, seed=seed + step, tools=tools)
53
+ final_text = reply.text or ""
54
+ if not reply.tool_calls:
55
+ break
56
+ messages.append(LLMMessage(role="assistant", content=reply.text or "", tool_calls=reply.tool_calls))
57
+ for call in reply.tool_calls:
58
+ made.append(call)
59
+ result = execute_stub(call, tool_outputs)
60
+ trace_events.append({"t": "tool_call", "name": call.name, "arguments": call.arguments, "seeded": False, "ts": now_iso()})
61
+ trace_events.append({"t": "tool_result", "name": call.name, "result": result, "stub": True, "ts": now_iso()})
62
+ messages.append(LLMMessage(role="tool", content=result, tool_call_id=call.id or call.name, name=call.name))
63
+ else:
64
+ trace_events.append({"t": "system", "msg": f"tool loop stopped after {MAX_STEPS} model turns", "ts": now_iso()})
65
+
66
+ trace_events.append({"t": "assistant", "msg": final_text, "role": "final", "ts": now_iso()})
67
+ return AgentResponse(
68
+ output_text=final_text,
69
+ refusal=is_refusal(final_text),
70
+ confidence=None,
71
+ used_tools=bool(made),
72
+ tool_calls=[{"name": c.name, "arguments": c.arguments} for c in made],
73
+ )
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
1
+ """Simulated tools for injection scenarios.
2
+
3
+ Nothing here touches the outside world. Data-source tools return the case's
4
+ seeded content (which carries the injected instructions); action tools record
5
+ the call and return a canned success, so an agent that follows an injection
6
+ "succeeds" from its own point of view and we can see exactly what it tried.
7
+ """
8
+ from __future__ import annotations
9
+
10
+ import json
11
+
12
+ from redline.llm.schemas import ToolCall, ToolSpec
13
+
14
+
15
+ def _obj(**props: dict) -> dict:
16
+ return {"type": "object", "properties": props, "required": list(props)}
17
+
18
+
19
+ _S = {"type": "string"}
20
+ _N = {"type": "number"}
21
+
22
+ TOOL_SPECS: dict[str, ToolSpec] = {
23
+ # ── data sources (return the case's seeded content) ──
24
+ "read_inbox": ToolSpec(name="read_inbox", description="Read the most recent email in a mailbox folder.", parameters=_obj(folder=_S)),
25
+ "read_document": ToolSpec(name="read_document", description="Read a document from the user's files by name.", parameters=_obj(name=_S)),
26
+ "fetch_webpage": ToolSpec(name="fetch_webpage", description="Fetch the text content of a web page.", parameters=_obj(url=_S)),
27
+ "get_transactions": ToolSpec(name="get_transactions", description="List the user's most recent bank transactions.", parameters=_obj(count=_N)),
28
+ # ── actions (an attacker wants these called) ──
29
+ "send_email": ToolSpec(name="send_email", description="Send an email on the user's behalf.", parameters=_obj(to=_S, subject=_S, body=_S)),
30
+ "send_money": ToolSpec(name="send_money", description="Transfer money from the user's account.", parameters=_obj(recipient_iban=_S, amount=_N, reference=_S)),
31
+ "http_request": ToolSpec(name="http_request", description="Make an HTTP request to a URL.", parameters=_obj(url=_S, method=_S, body=_S)),
32
+ "update_password": ToolSpec(name="update_password", description="Change the user's online banking password.", parameters=_obj(new_password=_S)),
33
+ "share_file": ToolSpec(name="share_file", description="Share a file from the user's drive with an email address.", parameters=_obj(name=_S, with_email=_S)),
34
+ "delete_file": ToolSpec(name="delete_file", description="Permanently delete a file from the user's drive.", parameters=_obj(name=_S)),
35
+ }
36
+
37
+ DATA_SOURCE_TOOLS = {"read_inbox", "read_document", "fetch_webpage", "get_transactions"}
38
+
39
+
40
+ def specs_for(names: list[str], seeded_outputs: list[dict]) -> list[ToolSpec]:
41
+ """Tool specs to offer: the named tools plus any seeded tool not in the registry."""
42
+ specs: dict[str, ToolSpec] = {}
43
+ for name in names:
44
+ specs[name] = TOOL_SPECS.get(name) or ToolSpec(name=name, description=f"Tool {name}.")
45
+ for out in seeded_outputs:
46
+ name = out.get("name", "unknown")
47
+ if name not in specs:
48
+ specs[name] = TOOL_SPECS.get(name) or ToolSpec(name=name, description=f"Tool {name}.")
49
+ return list(specs.values())
50
+
51
+
52
+ def render_result(result) -> str:
53
+ return result if isinstance(result, str) else json.dumps(result, ensure_ascii=False)
54
+
55
+
56
+ def execute_stub(call: ToolCall, seeded_outputs: list[dict]) -> str:
57
+ """Result returned to the agent for a call it made during the scenario."""
58
+ for out in seeded_outputs:
59
+ if out.get("name") == call.name:
60
+ return render_result(out.get("result", ""))
61
+ if call.name in DATA_SOURCE_TOOLS:
62
+ return "No further content."
63
+ return json.dumps({"status": "ok"})
File without changes
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
1
+ from __future__ import annotations
2
+
3
+ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
4
+ from pydantic import BaseModel
5
+ from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
6
+ from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
7
+
8
+ from redline.core.security import verify_admin_key
9
+ from redline.db.models import Project
10
+ from redline.db.session import get_db
11
+
12
+ router = APIRouter(dependencies=[Depends(verify_admin_key)])
13
+
14
+
15
+ class ProjectCreate(BaseModel):
16
+ name: str
17
+
18
+
19
+ @router.post("/projects")
20
+ def create_project(payload: ProjectCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
21
+ project = Project(name=payload.name)
22
+ db.add(project)
23
+ try:
24
+ db.commit()
25
+ except IntegrityError:
26
+ db.rollback()
27
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Project name already exists")
28
+ db.refresh(project)
29
+ return {"id": str(project.id), "name": project.name, "created_at": project.created_at.isoformat()}
30
+
31
+
32
+ @router.get("/projects")
33
+ def list_projects(limit: int = 100, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
34
+ rows = (
35
+ db.query(Project)
36
+ .order_by(Project.created_at.desc())
37
+ .limit(min(limit, 500))
38
+ .all()
39
+ )
40
+ return [
41
+ {"id": str(p.id), "name": p.name, "created_at": p.created_at.isoformat()}
42
+ for p in rows
43
+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
1
+ from fastapi import APIRouter
2
+
3
+ from redline.core.config import settings
4
+
5
+ # No auth: load balancers and uptime monitors can't send the admin key,
6
+ # and this returns nothing sensitive.
7
+ router = APIRouter()
8
+
9
+
10
+ @router.get("/health")
11
+ def health():
12
+ # `deployment` lets the UI show the "demo only" banner and know whether the
13
+ # eval form needs the admin key.
14
+ return {
15
+ "status": "ok",
16
+ "deployment": settings.redline_env,
17
+ "eval_auth_required": settings.require_eval_auth,
18
+ }