real-browser-cli 0.16.2__tar.gz → 0.16.3__tar.gz

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: real-browser-cli
-Version: 0.16.2
+Version: 0.16.3
 Summary: Control your real running browser from the terminal or Python SDK
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://git.yiprawr.dev/Automatisation/browser-cli
 Project-URL: Repository, https://git.yiprawr.dev/Automatisation/browser-cli
@@ -131,7 +131,6 @@ terminal / python script / remote client
 No local server needs to be running beforehand. The browser manages the native host's lifecycle. For cross-machine control, `browser-cli serve` starts an explicit TCP listener protected by Ed25519 public-key authentication unless you opt out with `--no-auth`.
 
 **Message format**
-
 Every command is a JSON object:
 ```json
 { "id": "uuid", "command": "tabs.list", "args": {} }
@@ -144,7 +143,6 @@ Every response:
 ---
 
 ## Installation
-
 **Requirements:** Python 3.10+, [uv](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv), Chrome, Chromium, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, or Firefox
 
 browser-cli has two parts: the **CLI / native host** (a Python package) and the **browser extension** (published on the public stores).
@@ -203,7 +201,6 @@ Only the `browser-cli` command needs to be on your `PATH`. The browser launches
 ---
 
 ## Project structure
-
 ```text
 browser-cli/
 ├── browser_cli/
@@ -239,7 +236,6 @@ browser-cli/
 ---
 
 ## CLI reference
-
 During source development, commands are usually run as `uv run browser-cli [--browser ALIAS] <command>`. After tool installation, use `browser-cli ...` directly. Add `--remote HOST[:PORT]` and optionally `--key PATH` to target a browser exposed by `browser-cli serve`.
 
 If exactly one browser instance is connected, commands auto-target it. Use `--browser ALIAS` when multiple browser instances are connected. `tabs list`, `tabs count`, `groups list`, `groups count`, `windows list`, and `session list` aggregate across all active browsers when `--browser` is omitted; in that mode they show the source browser alias or UUID. When local and saved remote browsers are mixed, tables group rows by source (`local` or the remote endpoint) and indent the browser profile below that group. You can inspect active instances with `browser-cli clients` and assign a persistent profile alias from inside the target browser with `browser-cli clients rename --browser <current-alias> <new-alias>`. Closed browsers are removed from the client registry automatically.
@@ -247,7 +243,6 @@ If exactly one browser instance is connected, commands auto-target it. Use `--br
 Important: profile aliases are browser-instance aliases, not window aliases. Window aliases created with `windows rename` are only for targeting windows in commands like `nav open --window work`. If a browser instance has no explicit profile alias set, the native host gives it a generated UUID alias so multiple unaliased browsers stay distinct.
 
 ### Navigation (`nav`)
-
 ```sh
 # Open a URL (no focus stealing by default)
 browser-cli nav open https://example.com
@@ -269,7 +264,6 @@ browser-cli nav focus github            # focuses first tab whose URL contains "
 ```
 
 ### Search
-
 Each search command opens the search results in your browser using the same flags as `nav open`.
 
 ```sh
@@ -293,7 +287,6 @@ browser-cli search so click choices
 ```
 
 ### Tabs
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli tabs list                        # list all open tabs (all windows)
 browser-cli tabs count                       # count all tabs
@@ -321,7 +314,6 @@ browser-cli tabs merge-windows               # pull all tabs into the current wi
 ```
 
 ### Tab groups
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli groups list                      # list all tab groups
 browser-cli groups count                     # count groups
@@ -343,7 +335,6 @@ browser-cli groups move 42 -l                # short left alias
 ```
 
 ### Windows
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli windows list                     # list all windows
 browser-cli windows open                     # open a new window
@@ -353,7 +344,6 @@ browser-cli windows close 1                  # close a window
 ```
 
 ### DOM
-
 These commands run on the **active tab**. The tab must be on a regular `http://` or `https://` page — not a browser internal page like `brave://newtab`.
 
 ```sh
@@ -366,7 +356,6 @@ browser-cli dom type "#search" "hello"       # type text into an input
 ```
 
 ### Extract
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli extract links                    # all <a href> links on the page
 browser-cli extract images                   # all <img> tags (src + alt)
@@ -378,7 +367,6 @@ browser-cli extract markdown --selector "article"   # specific DOM subtree as Ma
 ```
 
 ### Sessions
-
 A session is a snapshot of all open tab URLs, stored inside the extension via `chrome.storage.local`. Sessions survive browser restarts but are lost if the extension is uninstalled or extension data is cleared.
 
 ```sh
@@ -392,7 +380,6 @@ browser-cli session auto-save off
 ```
 
 ### Misc
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli clients                          # show connected browser info from the registry
 browser-cli clients rename --browser abcd1234 work  # rename one connected browser instance
@@ -403,7 +390,6 @@ browser-cli completion zsh --script          # output raw completion script
 ```
 
 ### Remote control, auth, and gateways
-
 ```sh
 # On the machine with the browser
 browser-cli auth keygen --output ~/.config/browser-cli/client.key
@@ -428,22 +414,24 @@ browser-cli serve-http --port 8766
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" http://127.0.0.1:8766/tabs
 ```
 
-Remote auth uses Ed25519 challenge/response. `--remote` domains default to port 443; explicit `host:port` endpoints are also supported. Saved remote endpoints participate in aggregate list/count commands, where output is grouped by endpoint.
+Remote auth uses Ed25519 challenge/response. `--remote` domains default to port 443; explicit `host:port` endpoints are also supported. Use `browser-cli remote trust ENDPOINT KEY` to remember a key for later calls. Saved remote endpoints participate in aggregate list/count commands, where output is grouped by endpoint.
 
-#### Security model
+#### n8n integration
+The n8n community node is published as [`n8n-nodes-browser-cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/n8n-nodes-browser-cli) on npm. It talks directly to a remote `browser-cli serve` endpoint over the same Ed25519-authenticated, ML-KEM-encrypted TCP protocol as the CLI remote client. Install it from n8n's Community Nodes UI, run `browser-cli serve` on the browser machine, paste the client key into the node credential, and drive tabs/DOM/extraction/raw commands from a workflow. See [`n8n-nodes-browser-cli/README.md`](n8n-nodes-browser-cli/README.md).
 
-- **`serve` (TCP)** authenticates every connection with an Ed25519 signature over a fresh server nonce and, for modern clients, wraps the transport in an ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum) AEAD channel. Commands are gated by a **safe-only policy by default** — even a trusted key can only run read-only status/listing commands until you open more with `--allow-read-page`, `--allow-control`, `--allow-dangerous`, or `--allow-all` (full control, including `dom.eval`/`storage.*`). `--no-auth` is rejected on non-loopback hosts.
-  - **Per-key authorization:** a key in `authorized_keys` can carry an optional `allow:` token (`<pubkey> <name> allow:read-page,control`) listing its categories (`all`, `safe`, `read-page`, `control`, `dangerous`). That key uses its own policy, overriding the server-wide `--allow-*` default; keys without a token fall back to the default. Set it with `auth trust <pubkey> --allow-control …` (works locally and over `--remote`); `auth keys` shows each key's policy.
+#### Security model
+- **`serve` (TCP)** authenticates every connection with an Ed25519 signature over a fresh server nonce and, for modern clients, wraps the transport in an ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum) AEAD channel. Commands are gated by a **safe-only policy by default** — even a trusted key can only run read-only status/listing commands until you open more with `--allow-read-page`, `--allow-control`, `--allow-dangerous`, `--allow-keys`, or `--allow-all` (full control, including `dom.eval`/`storage.*`). `--no-auth` is rejected on non-loopback hosts.
+  - **Per-key authorization:** a key in `authorized_keys` can carry an optional `allow:` token (`<pubkey> <name> allow:read-page,control`) listing its categories (`all`, `safe`, `read-page`, `control`, `dangerous`, `keys`). That key uses its own policy, overriding the server-wide `--allow-*` default; keys without a token fall back to the default. Set it with `auth trust <pubkey> --allow-control …` when adding a key, or change it later with `auth policy <pubkey|name> …` (interactive picker when run with no args; `--safe`/`--server-default`/`--allow-*` for scripting). Both work locally and over `--remote`; `auth keys` shows each key's policy.
+  - **Key-management is its own category:** listing/trusting/repolicing keys (`auth keys`/`auth trust`/`auth policy` over `--remote`) requires the `keys` category. A key trusted only for browsing — even with full `control`+`dangerous` — cannot manage the trust store unless granted `allow:keys` (or `allow:all`). This prevents a compromised browser key from escalating by trusting its own.
   - **Rate limiting:** `--rate-limit N` caps commands/second per client key (token bucket, default `100`, `0` disables) so a compromised key can't hammer the browser.
   - **Audit logging:** request logs include the acting key (its name from `authorized_keys` plus a short pubkey), not just the client address.
-- **`serve-http`** is a convenience gateway with the inverse trade-off: commands are gated by the same `--allow-*` policy (safe-only by default), but the bearer token travels in **clear text over plain HTTP**. It binds to loopback by default; `--no-auth` is only permitted there. If you must expose it beyond loopback, put it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy — never send the token over an untrusted network unencrypted.
+- **`serve-http`** is a convenience gateway with the inverse trade-off: commands are gated by the same `--allow-*` policy (safe-only by default) and requests are throttled per client address (`--rate-limit`, default `100`/s) with an 8 MB body cap, but the bearer token travels in **clear text over plain HTTP**. It binds to loopback by default; `--no-auth` is only permitted there, and binding beyond loopback prints a loud cleartext warning. If you must expose it, put it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy — never send the token over an untrusted network unencrypted, and prefer `serve` (encrypted) for real remote use.
 
 For low latency, an authenticated encrypted remote connection is kept open and reused for further commands in the same process — so SDK scripts and multi-browser fan-out avoid repeating the TCP/TLS/challenge handshake on every command. Aggregate commands also fan out to remote targets concurrently. Both degrade gracefully against older servers that handle one command per connection.
 
 ---
 
 ## Python SDK
-
 ```python
 from browser_cli import AsyncBrowserCLI, BrowserCLI
 
@@ -579,7 +567,6 @@ raw = b.command("tabs.count", {"pattern": "github"})  # escape hatch for raw com
 ```
 
 **Error handling**
-
 ```python
 from browser_cli import BrowserCLI, BrowserNotConnected
 
@@ -611,7 +598,6 @@ if isinstance(counts, BrowserCounts):
 ---
 
 ## Example scripts
-
 See `examples/demo.py` (Python) and `examples/demo.sh` (Bash) for full walkthroughs covering tabs, groups, DOM extraction, and session management.
 
 ```sh
@@ -622,7 +608,6 @@ bash examples/demo.sh
 ---
 
 ## Development
-
 ```sh
 npm ci
 npm run check:extension   # type-check, build extension bundles, syntax-check bundle
@@ -663,7 +648,6 @@ For Firefox temporary testing via `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, run `
 ---
 
 ## Limitations
-
 - **Browser internal pages** (`chrome://`, `brave://`, `edge://`, `about:`) cannot be scripted. DOM and extract commands only work on regular `http://` and `https://` pages.
 - **Multiple browser instances can be auto-distinguished, but generated aliases are temporary**. Unaliased browsers get UUID aliases from the native host, which avoids collisions but is less ergonomic than setting a stable alias with `browser-cli clients rename --browser <current-alias> <new-alias>`.
 - **Supported install targets are explicit, not “all Chromium browsers”**. The installer currently supports Chrome, Chromium, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, and Firefox. Other Chromium-based browsers may use different or shared native messaging manifest locations, so they need browser-specific verification before being added safely.
@@ -672,7 +656,6 @@ For Firefox temporary testing via `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, run `
 ---
 
 ## License
-
 PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).
 
 Commercial use is not permitted under this license. For commercial licensing, contact the project maintainer.

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/README.md

@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ terminal / python script / remote client
 No local server needs to be running beforehand. The browser manages the native host's lifecycle. For cross-machine control, `browser-cli serve` starts an explicit TCP listener protected by Ed25519 public-key authentication unless you opt out with `--no-auth`.
 
 **Message format**
-
 Every command is a JSON object:
 ```json
 { "id": "uuid", "command": "tabs.list", "args": {} }
@@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ Every response:
 ---
 
 ## Installation
-
 **Requirements:** Python 3.10+, [uv](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv), Chrome, Chromium, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, or Firefox
 
 browser-cli has two parts: the **CLI / native host** (a Python package) and the **browser extension** (published on the public stores).
@@ -109,7 +107,6 @@ Only the `browser-cli` command needs to be on your `PATH`. The browser launches
 ---
 
 ## Project structure
-
 ```text
 browser-cli/
 ├── browser_cli/
@@ -145,7 +142,6 @@ browser-cli/
 ---
 
 ## CLI reference
-
 During source development, commands are usually run as `uv run browser-cli [--browser ALIAS] <command>`. After tool installation, use `browser-cli ...` directly. Add `--remote HOST[:PORT]` and optionally `--key PATH` to target a browser exposed by `browser-cli serve`.
 
 If exactly one browser instance is connected, commands auto-target it. Use `--browser ALIAS` when multiple browser instances are connected. `tabs list`, `tabs count`, `groups list`, `groups count`, `windows list`, and `session list` aggregate across all active browsers when `--browser` is omitted; in that mode they show the source browser alias or UUID. When local and saved remote browsers are mixed, tables group rows by source (`local` or the remote endpoint) and indent the browser profile below that group. You can inspect active instances with `browser-cli clients` and assign a persistent profile alias from inside the target browser with `browser-cli clients rename --browser <current-alias> <new-alias>`. Closed browsers are removed from the client registry automatically.
@@ -153,7 +149,6 @@ If exactly one browser instance is connected, commands auto-target it. Use `--br
 Important: profile aliases are browser-instance aliases, not window aliases. Window aliases created with `windows rename` are only for targeting windows in commands like `nav open --window work`. If a browser instance has no explicit profile alias set, the native host gives it a generated UUID alias so multiple unaliased browsers stay distinct.
 
 ### Navigation (`nav`)
-
 ```sh
 # Open a URL (no focus stealing by default)
 browser-cli nav open https://example.com
@@ -175,7 +170,6 @@ browser-cli nav focus github            # focuses first tab whose URL contains "
 ```
 
 ### Search
-
 Each search command opens the search results in your browser using the same flags as `nav open`.
 
 ```sh
@@ -199,7 +193,6 @@ browser-cli search so click choices
 ```
 
 ### Tabs
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli tabs list                        # list all open tabs (all windows)
 browser-cli tabs count                       # count all tabs
@@ -227,7 +220,6 @@ browser-cli tabs merge-windows               # pull all tabs into the current wi
 ```
 
 ### Tab groups
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli groups list                      # list all tab groups
 browser-cli groups count                     # count groups
@@ -249,7 +241,6 @@ browser-cli groups move 42 -l                # short left alias
 ```
 
 ### Windows
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli windows list                     # list all windows
 browser-cli windows open                     # open a new window
@@ -259,7 +250,6 @@ browser-cli windows close 1                  # close a window
 ```
 
 ### DOM
-
 These commands run on the **active tab**. The tab must be on a regular `http://` or `https://` page — not a browser internal page like `brave://newtab`.
 
 ```sh
@@ -272,7 +262,6 @@ browser-cli dom type "#search" "hello"       # type text into an input
 ```
 
 ### Extract
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli extract links                    # all <a href> links on the page
 browser-cli extract images                   # all <img> tags (src + alt)
@@ -284,7 +273,6 @@ browser-cli extract markdown --selector "article"   # specific DOM subtree as Ma
 ```
 
 ### Sessions
-
 A session is a snapshot of all open tab URLs, stored inside the extension via `chrome.storage.local`. Sessions survive browser restarts but are lost if the extension is uninstalled or extension data is cleared.
 
 ```sh
@@ -298,7 +286,6 @@ browser-cli session auto-save off
 ```
 
 ### Misc
-
 ```sh
 browser-cli clients                          # show connected browser info from the registry
 browser-cli clients rename --browser abcd1234 work  # rename one connected browser instance
@@ -309,7 +296,6 @@ browser-cli completion zsh --script          # output raw completion script
 ```
 
 ### Remote control, auth, and gateways
-
 ```sh
 # On the machine with the browser
 browser-cli auth keygen --output ~/.config/browser-cli/client.key
@@ -334,22 +320,24 @@ browser-cli serve-http --port 8766
 curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" http://127.0.0.1:8766/tabs
 ```
 
-Remote auth uses Ed25519 challenge/response. `--remote` domains default to port 443; explicit `host:port` endpoints are also supported. Saved remote endpoints participate in aggregate list/count commands, where output is grouped by endpoint.
+Remote auth uses Ed25519 challenge/response. `--remote` domains default to port 443; explicit `host:port` endpoints are also supported. Use `browser-cli remote trust ENDPOINT KEY` to remember a key for later calls. Saved remote endpoints participate in aggregate list/count commands, where output is grouped by endpoint.
 
-#### Security model
+#### n8n integration
+The n8n community node is published as [`n8n-nodes-browser-cli`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/n8n-nodes-browser-cli) on npm. It talks directly to a remote `browser-cli serve` endpoint over the same Ed25519-authenticated, ML-KEM-encrypted TCP protocol as the CLI remote client. Install it from n8n's Community Nodes UI, run `browser-cli serve` on the browser machine, paste the client key into the node credential, and drive tabs/DOM/extraction/raw commands from a workflow. See [`n8n-nodes-browser-cli/README.md`](n8n-nodes-browser-cli/README.md).
 
-- **`serve` (TCP)** authenticates every connection with an Ed25519 signature over a fresh server nonce and, for modern clients, wraps the transport in an ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum) AEAD channel. Commands are gated by a **safe-only policy by default** — even a trusted key can only run read-only status/listing commands until you open more with `--allow-read-page`, `--allow-control`, `--allow-dangerous`, or `--allow-all` (full control, including `dom.eval`/`storage.*`). `--no-auth` is rejected on non-loopback hosts.
-  - **Per-key authorization:** a key in `authorized_keys` can carry an optional `allow:` token (`<pubkey> <name> allow:read-page,control`) listing its categories (`all`, `safe`, `read-page`, `control`, `dangerous`). That key uses its own policy, overriding the server-wide `--allow-*` default; keys without a token fall back to the default. Set it with `auth trust <pubkey> --allow-control …` (works locally and over `--remote`); `auth keys` shows each key's policy.
+#### Security model
+- **`serve` (TCP)** authenticates every connection with an Ed25519 signature over a fresh server nonce and, for modern clients, wraps the transport in an ML-KEM-768 (post-quantum) AEAD channel. Commands are gated by a **safe-only policy by default** — even a trusted key can only run read-only status/listing commands until you open more with `--allow-read-page`, `--allow-control`, `--allow-dangerous`, `--allow-keys`, or `--allow-all` (full control, including `dom.eval`/`storage.*`). `--no-auth` is rejected on non-loopback hosts.
+  - **Per-key authorization:** a key in `authorized_keys` can carry an optional `allow:` token (`<pubkey> <name> allow:read-page,control`) listing its categories (`all`, `safe`, `read-page`, `control`, `dangerous`, `keys`). That key uses its own policy, overriding the server-wide `--allow-*` default; keys without a token fall back to the default. Set it with `auth trust <pubkey> --allow-control …` when adding a key, or change it later with `auth policy <pubkey|name> …` (interactive picker when run with no args; `--safe`/`--server-default`/`--allow-*` for scripting). Both work locally and over `--remote`; `auth keys` shows each key's policy.
+  - **Key-management is its own category:** listing/trusting/repolicing keys (`auth keys`/`auth trust`/`auth policy` over `--remote`) requires the `keys` category. A key trusted only for browsing — even with full `control`+`dangerous` — cannot manage the trust store unless granted `allow:keys` (or `allow:all`). This prevents a compromised browser key from escalating by trusting its own.
   - **Rate limiting:** `--rate-limit N` caps commands/second per client key (token bucket, default `100`, `0` disables) so a compromised key can't hammer the browser.
   - **Audit logging:** request logs include the acting key (its name from `authorized_keys` plus a short pubkey), not just the client address.
-- **`serve-http`** is a convenience gateway with the inverse trade-off: commands are gated by the same `--allow-*` policy (safe-only by default), but the bearer token travels in **clear text over plain HTTP**. It binds to loopback by default; `--no-auth` is only permitted there. If you must expose it beyond loopback, put it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy — never send the token over an untrusted network unencrypted.
+- **`serve-http`** is a convenience gateway with the inverse trade-off: commands are gated by the same `--allow-*` policy (safe-only by default) and requests are throttled per client address (`--rate-limit`, default `100`/s) with an 8 MB body cap, but the bearer token travels in **clear text over plain HTTP**. It binds to loopback by default; `--no-auth` is only permitted there, and binding beyond loopback prints a loud cleartext warning. If you must expose it, put it behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy — never send the token over an untrusted network unencrypted, and prefer `serve` (encrypted) for real remote use.
 
 For low latency, an authenticated encrypted remote connection is kept open and reused for further commands in the same process — so SDK scripts and multi-browser fan-out avoid repeating the TCP/TLS/challenge handshake on every command. Aggregate commands also fan out to remote targets concurrently. Both degrade gracefully against older servers that handle one command per connection.
 
 ---
 
 ## Python SDK
-
 ```python
 from browser_cli import AsyncBrowserCLI, BrowserCLI
 
@@ -485,7 +473,6 @@ raw = b.command("tabs.count", {"pattern": "github"})  # escape hatch for raw com
 ```
 
 **Error handling**
-
 ```python
 from browser_cli import BrowserCLI, BrowserNotConnected
 
@@ -517,7 +504,6 @@ if isinstance(counts, BrowserCounts):
 ---
 
 ## Example scripts
-
 See `examples/demo.py` (Python) and `examples/demo.sh` (Bash) for full walkthroughs covering tabs, groups, DOM extraction, and session management.
 
 ```sh
@@ -528,7 +514,6 @@ bash examples/demo.sh
 ---
 
 ## Development
-
 ```sh
 npm ci
 npm run check:extension   # type-check, build extension bundles, syntax-check bundle
@@ -569,7 +554,6 @@ For Firefox temporary testing via `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, run `
 ---
 
 ## Limitations
-
 - **Browser internal pages** (`chrome://`, `brave://`, `edge://`, `about:`) cannot be scripted. DOM and extract commands only work on regular `http://` and `https://` pages.
 - **Multiple browser instances can be auto-distinguished, but generated aliases are temporary**. Unaliased browsers get UUID aliases from the native host, which avoids collisions but is less ergonomic than setting a stable alias with `browser-cli clients rename --browser <current-alias> <new-alias>`.
 - **Supported install targets are explicit, not “all Chromium browsers”**. The installer currently supports Chrome, Chromium, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, and Firefox. Other Chromium-based browsers may use different or shared native messaging manifest locations, so they need browser-specific verification before being added safely.
@@ -578,7 +562,6 @@ For Firefox temporary testing via `about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`, run `
 ---
 
 ## License
-
 PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).
 
 Commercial use is not permitted under this license. For commercial licensing, contact the project maintainer.

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/browser_cli/client/auth.py

@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ def add_remote_auth_fields(msg: dict, command: str, requested_profile: str | Non
   msg["accept_encoding"] = transport.client_accept_encoding()
   key_spec = key if key is not None else remote_registry.key_for_remote(remote_endpoint)
   private_key = load_private_key(key_spec)
-  if key is not None:
-    remote_registry.save_remote_key(remote_endpoint, str(key))
 
   route_profile = requested_profile
   if not route_profile and command not in NO_ROUTE_COMMANDS:
@@ -52,8 +50,6 @@ async def add_remote_auth_fields_async(msg: dict, command: str, requested_profil
   msg["accept_encoding"] = transport.client_accept_encoding()
   key_spec = key if key is not None else await asyncio.to_thread(remote_registry.key_for_remote, remote_endpoint)
   private_key = await asyncio.to_thread(load_private_key, key_spec)
-  if key is not None:
-    await asyncio.to_thread(remote_registry.save_remote_key, remote_endpoint, str(key))
 
   route_profile = requested_profile
   if not route_profile and command not in NO_ROUTE_COMMANDS:

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/browser_cli/commands/serve_http.py

@@ -11,9 +11,13 @@ from rich.console import Console
 from browser_cli import BrowserCLI
 from browser_cli.command_security import CommandPolicy, assert_command_allowed
 from browser_cli.commands import command_policy_from_options, command_policy_options
+from browser_cli.serve.security import RateLimiter
 
 console = Console()
 
+# Hard cap on request body size so a bogus Content-Length can't exhaust memory.
+MAX_BODY_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
+
 def _is_loopback(host: str) -> bool:
   return host in {"127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"}
 
@@ -21,6 +25,7 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
   client: BrowserCLI
   token: str | None = None
   policy: CommandPolicy = CommandPolicy()
+  rate_limiter: RateLimiter | None = None
 
   def _authorized(self) -> bool:
     if self.token is None:
@@ -37,6 +42,12 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
     self._send(401, {"error": "missing or invalid token"})
     return False
 
+  def _within_rate_limit(self) -> bool:
+    if self.rate_limiter is None or self.rate_limiter.allow(self.client_address[0]):
+      return True
+    self._send(429, {"error": "rate limit exceeded; slow down and retry"})
+    return False
+
   def _send(self, status: int, payload):
     raw = json.dumps(payload, default=str).encode("utf-8")
     self.send_response(status)
@@ -48,8 +59,11 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
   def do_GET(self):
     path = urlparse(self.path).path
     try:
-      if path != "/health" and not self._require_auth():
-        return
+      if path != "/health":
+        if not self._require_auth():
+          return
+        if not self._within_rate_limit():
+          return
       if path == "/tabs":
         self._send(200, [t.__dict__ for t in self.client.tabs.list()])
       elif path == "/clients":
@@ -64,16 +78,21 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
   def do_POST(self):
     path = urlparse(self.path).path
     try:
+      if path != "/command":
+        self._send(404, {"error": "not found"})
+        return
+      if not self._require_auth():
+        return
+      if not self._within_rate_limit():
+        return
       length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0"))
+      if length > MAX_BODY_BYTES:
+        self._send(413, {"error": f"request body too large (max {MAX_BODY_BYTES} bytes)"})
+        return
       body = json.loads(self.rfile.read(length) or b"{}")
-      if path == "/command":
-        if not self._require_auth():
-          return
-        command = body.get("command")
-        assert_command_allowed(command, self.policy)
-        self._send(200, {"result": self.client.command(command, body.get("args") or {})})
-      else:
-        self._send(404, {"error": "not found"})
+      command = body.get("command")
+      assert_command_allowed(command, self.policy)
+      self._send(200, {"result": self.client.command(command, body.get("args") or {})})
     except PermissionError as exc:
       self._send(403, {"error": str(exc)})
     except Exception as exc:
@@ -90,21 +109,32 @@ class _Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
 @click.option("--key", default=None, help="Remote auth key spec")
 @click.option("--token", default=None, help="Bearer token required for HTTP access (generated by default)")
 @click.option("--no-auth", is_flag=True, help="Disable HTTP auth (only allowed on loopback hosts)")
+@click.option("--rate-limit", default=100.0, show_default=True, type=float, help="Max requests/sec per client address (0 disables)")
 @command_policy_options
-def cmd_serve_http(host, port, browser, remote, key, token, no_auth, allow_read_page, allow_control, allow_dangerous, allow_keys, allow_all):
+def cmd_serve_http(host, port, browser, remote, key, token, no_auth, rate_limit, allow_read_page, allow_control, allow_dangerous, allow_keys, allow_all):
   """Expose a tiny local HTTP JSON gateway (/tabs, /clients, /command).
 
   Auth is enabled by default. Pass the printed token as either
   ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` or ``X-Browser-CLI-Token: <token>``.
+
+  This gateway speaks plain HTTP — the token is sent in clear text. Keep it on
+  loopback, or put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front before exposing it.
   """
   if no_auth and not _is_loopback(host):
     raise click.ClickException("--no-auth is only allowed on loopback hosts")
+  if not _is_loopback(host):
+    console.print(
+      "[yellow]Warning:[/yellow] binding beyond loopback — this gateway is plain HTTP and the "
+      "token travels in clear text. Put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front, or use "
+      "[bold]browser-cli serve[/bold] (encrypted) instead."
+    )
   auth_token = None if no_auth else (token or secrets.token_urlsafe(32))
   policy = command_policy_from_options(allow_read_page=allow_read_page, allow_control=allow_control, allow_dangerous=allow_dangerous, allow_keys=allow_keys, allow_all=allow_all)
+  rate_limiter = RateLimiter(rate_limit) if rate_limit and rate_limit > 0 else None
   handler = type(
     "BrowserCLIHTTPHandler",
     (_Handler,),
-    {"client": BrowserCLI(browser=browser, remote=remote, key=key), "token": auth_token, "policy": policy},
+    {"client": BrowserCLI(browser=browser, remote=remote, key=key), "token": auth_token, "policy": policy, "rate_limiter": rate_limiter},
   )
   server = ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), handler)
   console.print(f"[green]HTTP gateway listening on http://{host}:{port}[/green]")

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/browser_cli/markdown/html.py

@@ -11,6 +11,13 @@ class _HtmlNode:
     self.text = text
     self.children = []
 
+# Cap how deep the parsed tree may nest. Hostile page content (thousands of
+# nested elements) would otherwise blow Python's recursion limit in the
+# depth-first render walkers below. Bounding here protects every walker at once.
+# 200 levels is far beyond any real document; deeper content is flattened, not
+# dropped (its text still reaches the output).
+_MAX_TREE_DEPTH = 200
+
 class _HtmlTreeBuilder(HTMLParser):
   _VOID_TAGS = {"br", "hr", "img"}
 
@@ -22,7 +29,9 @@ class _HtmlTreeBuilder(HTMLParser):
   def handle_starttag(self, tag, attrs):
     node = _HtmlNode(tag=tag.lower(), attrs=dict(attrs))
     self._stack[-1].children.append(node)
-    if node.tag not in self._VOID_TAGS:
+    # Only descend while under the depth cap; beyond it, children of this node
+    # attach to the current (capped) parent — flattened but preserved.
+    if node.tag not in self._VOID_TAGS and len(self._stack) < _MAX_TREE_DEPTH:
       self._stack.append(node)
 
   def handle_startendtag(self, tag, attrs):
@@ -57,6 +66,14 @@ def _collapse_blank_lines(value):
 def _escape_markdown(text):
   return re.sub(r"([\\`[\]])", r"\\\1", text)
 
+# Schemes that are dangerous if the produced markdown is later rendered as HTML
+# by a downstream consumer. The output is plain text here, but neutralising them
+# keeps the converter from laundering an XSS payload through to such a consumer.
+_UNSAFE_URL_SCHEME = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:javascript|vbscript|data)\s*:", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+def _safe_url(url):
+  return "" if _UNSAFE_URL_SCHEME.match(url or "") else url
+
 def _escape_table_cell(text):
   return text.replace("|", r"\|").replace("\n", " ").strip()
 
@@ -86,14 +103,14 @@ def _inline_text(node):
   if tag == "br":
     return "\n"
   if tag == "img":
-    src = node.attrs.get("src") or ""
+    src = _safe_url(node.attrs.get("src") or "")
     alt = _normalize_text(node.attrs.get("alt") or "")
     if not src:
       return ""
     return f"![{_escape_markdown(alt)}]({src})" if alt else f"![]({src})"
   if tag == "a":
     text = _normalize_inline("".join(_inline_text(child) for child in node.children))
-    href = node.attrs.get("href") or ""
+    href = _safe_url(node.attrs.get("href") or "")
     return f"[{text or href}]({href})" if href else text
   if tag == "code":
     text = _normalize_inline("".join(_inline_text(child) for child in node.children))
@@ -235,5 +252,10 @@ def _block_to_markdown(node):
 def convert_html_to_markdown(html, clean_markdown_output):
   parser = _HtmlTreeBuilder()
   parser.feed(html or "")
-  markdown = _block_to_markdown(parser.root)
+  try:
+    markdown = _block_to_markdown(parser.root)
+  except RecursionError:
+    # The depth cap should prevent this, but never let hostile page content
+    # crash the caller: fall back to a flat, tag-stripped text extraction.
+    markdown = _normalize_inline(re.sub(r"<[^>]*>", " ", html or ""))
   return clean_markdown_output(markdown)

{real_browser_cli-0.16.2 → real_browser_cli-0.16.3}/extension/manifest.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "manifest_version": 3,
   "name": "browser-cli",
-  "version": "0.16.0",
+  "version": "0.16.3",
   "description": "Control your browser from the terminal or Python SDK",
   "browser_specific_settings": {
     "gecko": {

real_browser_cli-0.16.3/n8n-nodes-browser-cli/.claude/settings.local.json

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "allow": [
+      "Bash(npm whoami *)"
+    ]
+  }
+}

real_browser_cli-0.16.3/n8n-nodes-browser-cli/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+node_modules/
+dist/
+test-dist/
+*.tsbuildinfo