rafter-cli 0.11.1__tar.gz → 0.11.2__tar.gz

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: rafter-cli
-Version: 0.11.1
+Version: 0.11.2
 Summary: Rafter CLI — the default security agent for AI workflows. Free for individuals and open source.
 License: MIT
 Author: Rafter Team
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Requires-Dist: python-dotenv (>=1.2.2,<2.0.0)
 Requires-Dist: pyyaml (>=6.0.1,<7.0.0)
 Requires-Dist: requests (>=2.33.0,<3.0.0)
 Requires-Dist: rich (>=13.7.1,<14.0.0)
-Requires-Dist: typer (>=0.15.0,<0.16.0)
+Requires-Dist: typer (>=0.16)
 Requires-Dist: urllib3 (>=2.7.0,<3)
 Requires-Dist: watchdog (>=4.0.0,<5.0.0)
 Description-Content-Type: text/markdown

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [tool.poetry]
 name = "rafter-cli"
-version = "0.11.1"
+version = "0.11.2"
 description = "Rafter CLI — the default security agent for AI workflows. Free for individuals and open source."
 authors = ["Rafter Team <hello@rafter.so>"]
 license = "MIT"
@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ readme = "README.md"
 
 [tool.poetry.dependencies]
 python = ">=3.11,<4.0"
-typer = "^0.15.0"
+# typer >=0.16 supports click 8.2+. The old ^0.15 floor capped click <8.2, so a
+# shared venv that pulled click 8.2+ broke --help (Parameter.make_metavar(ctx)).
+typer = ">=0.16"
 click = ">=8.0.0,<9.0.0"
 rich = "^13.7.1"
 python-dotenv = "^1.2.2"

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/rafter_cli/commands/agent.py

@@ -2130,6 +2130,11 @@ def _output_scan_results(
     # that could not complete cleanly (2); a clean, complete scan is 0.
     scan_exit_code = 1 if kept_results else (2 if read_errors else 0)
 
+    # Before the format branches, so --json and SARIF runs are recorded too. A
+    # clean scan is recorded as well: "we looked on this date and found nothing"
+    # is what a postmortem needs.
+    _log_scan_to_audit(kept_results, context)
+
     # No silent downgrade (sable-jiqb): when betterleaks was requested/auto but
     # patterns ran instead, say so on stderr (visible in every format without
     # corrupting a JSON/SARIF stdout payload). The JSON body also carries it.
@@ -2234,6 +2239,48 @@ def _output_scan_results(
         raise typer.Exit(code=scan_exit_code)
 
 
+def _log_scan_to_audit(results: list[ScanResult], context: str | None = None) -> None:
+    """Record that a scan ran, so ``rafter agent audit`` has something in it.
+
+    ``rafter secrets`` told the user "Run 'rafter agent audit' to see the
+    security log" and the log was always empty, because only command
+    interception ever wrote to it — three of seven beta users followed that
+    hint and hit a dead end, one of them immediately after a correct and useful
+    scan result. The first thing a careful person does with a security finding
+    is look for the record of it.
+
+    Counts and pattern NAMES only — never a matched value, not even redacted.
+    The audit log is a postmortem artifact that outlives the terminal, so it
+    must not become a second place secrets live.
+    """
+    try:
+        total_matches = sum(len(r.matches) for r in results)
+        patterns = sorted({m.pattern.name for r in results for m in r.matches})
+        details = {
+            "filesWithFindings": len(results),
+            "totalMatches": total_matches,
+            "patterns": patterns,
+        }
+        if context:
+            details["context"] = context
+        AuditLogger().log({
+            "eventType": "scan_executed",
+            "securityCheck": {
+                "passed": total_matches == 0,
+                "reason": (
+                    "Secret scan completed with no findings"
+                    if total_matches == 0
+                    else f"Secret scan found {total_matches} secret(s) in {len(results)} file(s)"
+                ),
+                "details": details,
+            },
+            "resolution": {"actionTaken": "allowed" if total_matches == 0 else "blocked"},
+        })
+    except Exception:
+        # Never let audit logging break a scan — the scan result is the product.
+        pass
+
+
 def _watch_and_scan(
     watch_path: str,
     engine: str,

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/rafter_cli/commands/agent_components.py

@@ -509,8 +509,15 @@ def _cursor_instructions() -> ComponentSpec:
     file_path = detect_dir / "rules" / "rafter-security.mdc"
 
     def uninstall() -> None:
-        if file_path.exists():
-            file_path.unlink()
+        # Enable injects a marker block (coexists with user content), so disable
+        # must excise only that block, not unlink the whole file. Remove the file
+        # only when it was ours alone; a file with no markers is user-authored.
+        if file_path.exists() and _strip_marker_block(file_path):
+            try:
+                if not file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip():
+                    file_path.unlink()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
 
     return ComponentSpec(
         id="cursor.instructions",
@@ -1046,9 +1053,13 @@ def _aider_read() -> ComponentSpec:
         config_path.write_text(yaml.safe_dump(parsed, sort_keys=False), encoding="utf-8")
 
     def uninstall() -> None:
-        if rafter_md_path.exists():
+        # Excise only the managed block; any user content in RAFTER.md survives.
+        # If the file was ours alone (nothing but the block), remove it.
+        # A RAFTER.md with no markers is user-authored — leave it untouched.
+        if rafter_md_path.exists() and _strip_marker_block(rafter_md_path):
             try:
-                rafter_md_path.unlink()
+                if not rafter_md_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip():
+                    rafter_md_path.unlink()
             except OSError:
                 pass
         if not config_path.exists():

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/rafter_cli/commands/hook.py

@@ -639,6 +639,13 @@ def posttool(
             redacted["content"] = scanner.redact(content_text)
             modified = True
 
+        # Scan and redact the error field (sable-t578). A tool that fails and
+        # echoes a credential in its error text surfaces it like output.
+        error_text = tool_response.get("error", "")
+        if error_text and isinstance(error_text, str) and scanner.has_secrets(error_text):
+            redacted["error"] = scanner.redact(error_text)
+            modified = True
+
         if modified:
             audit = AuditLogger()
             match_count = 0
@@ -646,6 +653,8 @@ def posttool(
                 match_count += len(scanner.scan_text(output_text))
             if content_text and isinstance(content_text, str):
                 match_count += len(scanner.scan_text(content_text))
+            if error_text and isinstance(error_text, str):
+                match_count += len(scanner.scan_text(error_text))
             audit.log_content_sanitized(f"{tool_name} tool response", match_count)
             _write_posttool_output({"action": "modify", "tool_response": redacted}, format)
             return

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/rafter_cli/resources/rafter-security-skill.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: rafter-security
 description: Security toolkit for AI workflows. Use when scanning code or repos for vulnerabilities, auditing third-party skills/MCPs/agent configs before installing, evaluating shell commands before running them, or generating secure design questions for new features. Provides `rafter run` (remote SAST + SCA, needs RAFTER_API_KEY), `rafter secrets` (offline secrets-only), `rafter agent exec --dry-run` (command-risk classification), and `rafter skill review`.
-version: 0.11.1
+version: 0.11.2
 homepage: https://rafter.so
 metadata:
   openclaw:

{rafter_cli-0.11.1 → rafter_cli-0.11.2}/rafter_cli/scanners/secret_patterns.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ DEFAULT_SECRET_PATTERNS: list[Pattern] = [
         name="AWS Access Key ID",
         # Negative lookahead excludes the canonical AWS-docs example key
         # (AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE and its siblings, which all end in EXAMPLE).
-        # betterleaks skips these too (sable/#230); matching that keeps the
+        # betterleaks skips these too (#230); matching that keeps the
         # two engines from disagreeing on a well-known public non-secret.
         regex=r"(A3T[A-Z0-9]|AKIA|AGPA|AIDA|AROA|AIPA|ANPA|ANVA|ASIA)(?![A-Z0-9]{9}EXAMPLE)[A-Z0-9]{16}",
         severity="critical",
@@ -17,7 +17,12 @@ DEFAULT_SECRET_PATTERNS: list[Pattern] = [
     ),
     Pattern(
         name="AWS Secret Access Key",
-        regex=r"(?i)aws(.{0,20})?['\"]?[0-9a-zA-Z/+]{40}['\"]?",
+        # Negative lookahead excludes the canonical AWS-docs example secret
+        # key (wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY, which ends in
+        # EXAMPLEKEY). betterleaks skips this too (#230); matching that
+        # keeps the two engines from disagreeing on a well-known public
+        # non-secret, mirroring the AWS Access Key ID exemption above.
+        regex=r"(?i)aws(.{0,20})?['\"]?(?![0-9a-zA-Z/+]{30}EXAMPLEKEY)[0-9a-zA-Z/+]{40}['\"]?",
         severity="critical",
         description="AWS Secret Access Key detected",
     ),