quart-security 2.1.1__tar.gz → 2.2.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/PKG-INFO +8 -3
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/README.md +7 -2
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/__init__.py +2 -1
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/breach.py +4 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/decorators.py +7 -1
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/password.py +32 -7
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/utils.py +15 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/views.py +37 -17
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/core.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/datastore.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/email.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/forms.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/models.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/proxies.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/py.typed +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/signals.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/state.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/_macros.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/change_password.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/confirm_email.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/email/confirmation_instructions.txt +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/email/register_conflict.txt +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/email/reset_instructions.txt +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/email/reset_notice.txt +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/forgot_password.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/login_user.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery_codes.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/register_user.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/reset_password.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/send_confirmation.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_select.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_setup.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_verify_code.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_register.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_signin.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_verify.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/totp.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/webauthn.py +0 -0
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: quart-security
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Version: 2.
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Version: 2.2.0
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Summary: Native async auth for Quart
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Author: quart-security maintainers
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Requires-Python: >=3.11
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@@ -143,6 +143,11 @@ These fields are required when login or MFA lockout is enabled. The built-in
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counter limits account-level guesses. Deploy an application or edge rate limiter
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for source IP and distributed abuse controls.
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Emails are normalized with `normalize_email` (Unicode NFC, internationalized
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domains decoded, lowercased) before every lookup and on registration; store
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them the same way. Passwords are NFKD-normalized before hashing, so the same
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password typed in composed or decomposed Unicode is one secret.
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The database must enforce unique normalized emails, `fs_uniquifier` values,
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WebAuthn user handles, and credential IDs. Use a stable primary key separate from
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`fs_uniquifier`: this value changes when security settings change.
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- `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN` (default: 1 hour)
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN` (default: 1 day)
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. bcrypt hashes are checked against the first 72 bytes of the password, as bcrypt always did. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Until then, a failed login for an account with a legacy hash takes a different time than one for an unknown email, which is checked against an argon2id dummy, so timing can reveal that the account exists. Apps that import hashes from another system should require a password reset rather than leave them in place.
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@@ -205,7 +210,7 @@ Routing:
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- `SECURITY_POST_LOGIN_VIEW`
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- `SECURITY_POST_REGISTER_VIEW`
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. `auth_required` sends the page that was asked for. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account. For an existing email nothing is created and `user_register_conflict` fires with the existing user. On its own that is not enough: someone can register an email and try to sign in with the password they chose, which works only if the account is new. Turn on `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` to close that gap.
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@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ These fields are required when login or MFA lockout is enabled. The built-in
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counter limits account-level guesses. Deploy an application or edge rate limiter
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for source IP and distributed abuse controls.
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Emails are normalized with `normalize_email` (Unicode NFC, internationalized
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domains decoded, lowercased) before every lookup and on registration; store
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them the same way. Passwords are NFKD-normalized before hashing, so the same
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password typed in composed or decomposed Unicode is one secret.
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The database must enforce unique normalized emails, `fs_uniquifier` values,
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WebAuthn user handles, and credential IDs. Use a stable primary key separate from
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`fs_uniquifier`: this value changes when security settings change.
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@@ -144,7 +149,7 @@ Password reset and email confirmation:
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- `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN` (default: 1 hour)
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN` (default: 1 day)
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. bcrypt hashes are checked against the first 72 bytes of the password, as bcrypt always did. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Until then, a failed login for an account with a legacy hash takes a different time than one for an unknown email, which is checked against an argon2id dummy, so timing can reveal that the account exists. Apps that import hashes from another system should require a password reset rather than leave them in place.
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@@ -175,7 +180,7 @@ Routing:
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- `SECURITY_POST_LOGIN_VIEW`
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- `SECURITY_POST_REGISTER_VIEW`
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. `auth_required` sends the page that was asked for. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account. For an existing email nothing is created and `user_register_conflict` fires with the existing user. On its own that is not enough: someone can register an email and try to sign in with the password they chose, which works only if the account is new. Turn on `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` to close that gap.
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ from .signals import (
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user_registered,
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)
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from .state import SecurityState, SQLAlchemyStateStore
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from .utils import url_for_security
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from .utils import normalize_email, url_for_security
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__all__ = [
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"Security",
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"user_registered",
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"user_register_conflict",
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"url_for_security",
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"normalize_email",
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]
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import httpx2
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from .password import normalize_password
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_HIBP_URL = "https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/{prefix}"
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False - password not found in response.
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None - network/HTTP error; caller should fail-open (allow the password).
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"""
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# Check the secret that gets hashed, not the typed form of it.
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password = normalize_password(password)
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sha1 = (
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hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8"), usedforsecurity=False)
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.hexdigest()
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import datetime
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from functools import wraps
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from urllib.parse import quote
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from quart import abort, current_app, redirect, request, session
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# A path, not request.url: login only follows same-site paths.
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target = quote(request.script_root + request.path)
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if request.query_string:
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target += "?" + request.query_string.decode()
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return redirect(url_for_security("login", next=target))
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if fresh:
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freshness = current_app.config.get(
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import secrets
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from passlib.context import CryptContext
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from passlib.exc import PasswordSizeError
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from quart import current_app
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# OWASP 2025 minimum argon2id parameters
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def normalize_password(password: str) -> str:
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def _secret(password: str, scheme: str | None) -> str | bytes:
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def hash_password(password: str, *, app=None) -> str:
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def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str, *, app=None) -> bool:
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return any(
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)
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def _verifies(context, secret, password_hash) -> bool:
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return context.verify(secret, password_hash)
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except PasswordSizeError:
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def password_needs_rehash(password_hash: str, *, app=None) -> bool:
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from email_validator import EmailNotValidError, validate_email
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def normalize_email(value: str | None) -> str:
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"""One form per mailbox: lowercased, Unicode NFC, IDNA domains decoded.
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Lowercasing first keeps it idempotent: lowering an NFC string can leave one
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"""
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from .utils import maybe_await, naive_utcnow, url_for_security
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from .utils import maybe_await, naive_utcnow, normalize_email, url_for_security
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60
|
|
|
61
61
|
|
|
62
|
-
def _normalize_email(value: str | None) -> str:
|
|
63
|
-
return (value or "").strip().lower()
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
|
|
66
62
|
def _resolve_redirect(config_key: str, fallback_endpoint: str) -> str:
|
|
67
63
|
value = current_app.config.get(config_key)
|
|
68
64
|
if isinstance(value, str) and value:
|
|
@@ -275,6 +271,20 @@ async def _password_errors(password: str) -> list[str]:
|
|
|
275
271
|
return errors
|
|
276
272
|
|
|
277
273
|
|
|
274
|
+
def _needs_second_factor(user) -> bool:
|
|
275
|
+
return bool(
|
|
276
|
+
current_app.config.get("SECURITY_TWO_FACTOR")
|
|
277
|
+
and getattr(user, "tf_primary_method", None)
|
|
278
|
+
)
|
|
279
|
+
|
|
280
|
+
|
|
281
|
+
async def _start_second_factor(user):
|
|
282
|
+
session["tf_user_id"] = await _security.state_store.put(
|
|
283
|
+
{"user_id": user.get_id()}, ttl=300
|
|
284
|
+
)
|
|
285
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("two_factor_token_validation"))
|
|
286
|
+
|
|
287
|
+
|
|
278
288
|
def _awaiting_confirmation(user) -> bool:
|
|
279
289
|
return bool(
|
|
280
290
|
current_app.config.get("SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE")
|
|
@@ -494,7 +504,7 @@ async def login():
|
|
|
494
504
|
session.pop("security_next", None)
|
|
495
505
|
|
|
496
506
|
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
497
|
-
user = await _find_user(email=
|
|
507
|
+
user = await _find_user(email=normalize_email(form.email.data))
|
|
498
508
|
|
|
499
509
|
# A locked account fails like a wrong password, after the same work: a
|
|
500
510
|
# distinct "locked" answer would only ever appear for real accounts.
|
|
@@ -525,13 +535,8 @@ async def login():
|
|
|
525
535
|
user.password = await hash_password_async(form.password.data)
|
|
526
536
|
await _commit()
|
|
527
537
|
|
|
528
|
-
if
|
|
529
|
-
|
|
530
|
-
):
|
|
531
|
-
session["tf_user_id"] = await _security.state_store.put(
|
|
532
|
-
{"user_id": user.get_id()}, ttl=300
|
|
533
|
-
)
|
|
534
|
-
return redirect(url_for_security("two_factor_token_validation"))
|
|
538
|
+
if _needs_second_factor(user):
|
|
539
|
+
return await _start_second_factor(user)
|
|
535
540
|
|
|
536
541
|
await _reset_auth_failures(user)
|
|
537
542
|
return await _complete_login(user)
|
|
@@ -562,7 +567,7 @@ async def register():
|
|
|
562
567
|
await _enforce_csrf(getattr(form, "_submitted_csrf", None))
|
|
563
568
|
|
|
564
569
|
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
565
|
-
email =
|
|
570
|
+
email = normalize_email(form.email.data)
|
|
566
571
|
# Password checks come first and an existing email gets the same answer as
|
|
567
572
|
# a new one, after the same hashing work, so the form never reveals which
|
|
568
573
|
# emails have an account.
|
|
@@ -655,7 +660,7 @@ async def forgot_password():
|
|
|
655
660
|
|
|
656
661
|
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
657
662
|
raw, link = _new_link("reset_password")
|
|
658
|
-
_defer(_reset_job,
|
|
663
|
+
_defer(_reset_job, normalize_email(form.email.data), raw, link)
|
|
659
664
|
await flash(
|
|
660
665
|
"If an account uses that email, a link to reset its password is on"
|
|
661
666
|
" its way.",
|
|
@@ -775,7 +780,7 @@ async def send_confirmation():
|
|
|
775
780
|
|
|
776
781
|
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
777
782
|
raw, link = _new_link("confirm_email")
|
|
778
|
-
_defer(_send_confirmation_job,
|
|
783
|
+
_defer(_send_confirmation_job, normalize_email(form.email.data), raw, link)
|
|
779
784
|
await flash(
|
|
780
785
|
"If that email is waiting to be confirmed, a new link is on its way.",
|
|
781
786
|
"info",
|
|
@@ -1384,7 +1389,12 @@ async def wan_signin_response():
|
|
|
1384
1389
|
await flash("Unable to identify user from passkey.", "error")
|
|
1385
1390
|
return redirect(url_for_security("wan_signin"))
|
|
1386
1391
|
|
|
1387
|
-
|
|
1392
|
+
# Same gates as a password login; one message, as there.
|
|
1393
|
+
if (
|
|
1394
|
+
not getattr(user, "active", True)
|
|
1395
|
+
or _account_is_locked(user)
|
|
1396
|
+
or _awaiting_confirmation(user)
|
|
1397
|
+
):
|
|
1388
1398
|
await flash("Unable to find user for passkey sign-in.", "error")
|
|
1389
1399
|
return redirect(url_for_security("wan_signin"))
|
|
1390
1400
|
if user_handle and user_handle != user.fs_webauthn_user_handle:
|
|
@@ -1417,6 +1427,16 @@ async def wan_signin_response():
|
|
|
1417
1427
|
if hasattr(stored_credential, "lastuse_datetime"):
|
|
1418
1428
|
stored_credential.lastuse_datetime = naive_utcnow()
|
|
1419
1429
|
|
|
1430
|
+
# A passkey replaces the second factor only when it proved the user too
|
|
1431
|
+
# (user verification) and the app allows that.
|
|
1432
|
+
config = current_app.config
|
|
1433
|
+
if _needs_second_factor(user) and not (
|
|
1434
|
+
config.get("SECURITY_WAN_REQUIRE_USER_VERIFICATION", True)
|
|
1435
|
+
and config.get("SECURITY_WAN_ALLOW_AS_MULTI_FACTOR", True)
|
|
1436
|
+
):
|
|
1437
|
+
await _commit()
|
|
1438
|
+
return await _start_second_factor(user)
|
|
1439
|
+
|
|
1420
1440
|
return await _complete_login(user)
|
|
1421
1441
|
|
|
1422
1442
|
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/_macros.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/change_password.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/confirm_email.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/forgot_password.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/login_user.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/register_user.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/reset_password.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_register.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_signin.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.1.1 → quart_security-2.2.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_verify.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|