quart-security 2.0.6__tar.gz → 2.1.0__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/PKG-INFO +21 -2
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/README.md +20 -1
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/core.py +38 -1
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/datastore.py +6 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/forms.py +19 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/confirm_email.html +8 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/email/confirmation_instructions.txt +5 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/email/register_conflict.txt +6 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/email/reset_instructions.txt +5 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/email/reset_notice.txt +3 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/forgot_password.html +10 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/login_user.html +6 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/reset_password.html +10 -0
- quart_security-2.1.0/quart_security/templates/security/send_confirmation.html +10 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/views.py +374 -44
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/__init__.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/breach.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/decorators.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/email.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/models.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/password.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/proxies.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/py.typed +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/signals.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/state.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/_macros.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/change_password.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery_codes.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/register_user.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_select.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_setup.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/two_factor_verify_code.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_register.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_signin.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_verify.html +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/totp.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/utils.py +0 -0
- {quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/webauthn.py +0 -0
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: quart-security
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Version: 2.0
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Version: 2.1.0
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Summary: Native async auth for Quart
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Author: quart-security maintainers
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Requires-Python: >=3.11
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@@ -167,6 +167,13 @@ Core:
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- `SECURITY_COOKIE_SECURE` (default: `True`; sets `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE`)
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- `SECURITY_FRESHNESS` (default: `60` minutes)
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Password reset and email confirmation:
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- `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE` (default: `False`) - password reset by email at `/reset`
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` (default: `False`) - self-registered accounts sign in only after confirming their email; needs a `confirmed_at` column
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- `SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL` (default: unset) - origin for links in email, e.g. `https://app.example.com`; required when either flow sends mail, and never taken from the request's Host header
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- `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN` (default: 1 hour)
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN` (default: 1 day)
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Until then, a failed login for an account with a legacy hash takes a different time than one for an unknown email, which is checked against an argon2id dummy, so timing can reveal that the account exists. Apps that import hashes from another system should require a password reset rather than leave them in place.
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account. For an existing email nothing is created and `user_register_conflict` fires with the existing user. On its own that is not enough: someone can register an email and try to sign in with the password they chose, which works only if the account is new. Turn on `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` to close that gap.
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## Password reset and email confirmation
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With `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE`, `/reset` asks for an email and always gives the same answer. The link goes to the address stored on the account, works once, expires after `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN`, and stops working if the account's email or password changes first. Opening it only shows the form, so mail scanners cannot spend it. A reset rotates `fs_uniquifier`, which signs out every session, clears a lockout, confirms the email, fires `password_changed` and sends a notice.
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With `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` (and `SECURITY_REGISTERABLE`), a new account stores `confirmed_at = NULL` and cannot sign in until its owner opens the emailed link and presses the button on that page. The button is there because mail scanners open links: confirming on GET would let a scanner activate an account someone else registered with that address, with that person's password. Until then a login fails with the same message as a wrong password or a locked account, and `/confirm` sends a fresh link. Registering an existing email sends the owner a notice instead. Accounts created any other way should set `confirmed_at`; a column default does not work, because SQLAlchemy fills it in even when registration sets `None`.
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Only token hashes are stored. Lookups, token writes, account creation and mail for these flows run after the response through `app.add_background_task`, so response time does not depend on whether an email has an account. The same goes for counting failed logins. As a result, `user_registered` and `user_register_conflict` fire after the response when confirmation is on, in an app context with no request.
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Mail goes through `send_email` and the `MAIL_*` settings by default. Pass `Security(app, datastore, send_mail=fn)`, where `fn` is `async (subject, recipient, body)`, to use something else. Bodies come from `security/email/*.txt` templates, which the app can override.
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## Route Map
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- `/register`
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- `/logout` (POST only)
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- `/change`
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- `/reset`, `/reset/<token>` (with `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE`)
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- `/confirm`, `/confirm/<token>` (with `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` and `SECURITY_REGISTERABLE`)
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2FA:
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- `/tf-setup`
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- `SECURITY_COOKIE_SECURE` (default: `True`; sets `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE`)
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- `SECURITY_FRESHNESS` (default: `60` minutes)
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Password reset and email confirmation:
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- `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE` (default: `False`) - password reset by email at `/reset`
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` (default: `False`) - self-registered accounts sign in only after confirming their email; needs a `confirmed_at` column
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- `SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL` (default: unset) - origin for links in email, e.g. `https://app.example.com`; required when either flow sends mail, and never taken from the request's Host header
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- `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN` (default: 1 hour)
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- `SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN` (default: 1 day)
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Existing pbkdf2_sha512 and bcrypt hashes continue to verify after the argon2 default change. They are transparently rehashed to argon2id on the user's next successful login.
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Until then, a failed login for an account with a legacy hash takes a different time than one for an unknown email, which is checked against an argon2id dummy, so timing can reveal that the account exists. Apps that import hashes from another system should require a password reset rather than leave them in place.
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A visit to `/login?next=/path` sends the user to `/path` after they sign in, through 2FA and passkey sign-in too. Only same-site paths are honored, the next visit to `/login` replaces the target, and a sign-in finishing more than 10 minutes after the form was shown ignores it.
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account
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Registration answers the same way whether or not the email already has an account. For an existing email nothing is created and `user_register_conflict` fires with the existing user. On its own that is not enough: someone can register an email and try to sign in with the password they chose, which works only if the account is new. Turn on `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` to close that gap.
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## Password reset and email confirmation
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With `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE`, `/reset` asks for an email and always gives the same answer. The link goes to the address stored on the account, works once, expires after `SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN`, and stops working if the account's email or password changes first. Opening it only shows the form, so mail scanners cannot spend it. A reset rotates `fs_uniquifier`, which signs out every session, clears a lockout, confirms the email, fires `password_changed` and sends a notice.
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With `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` (and `SECURITY_REGISTERABLE`), a new account stores `confirmed_at = NULL` and cannot sign in until its owner opens the emailed link and presses the button on that page. The button is there because mail scanners open links: confirming on GET would let a scanner activate an account someone else registered with that address, with that person's password. Until then a login fails with the same message as a wrong password or a locked account, and `/confirm` sends a fresh link. Registering an existing email sends the owner a notice instead. Accounts created any other way should set `confirmed_at`; a column default does not work, because SQLAlchemy fills it in even when registration sets `None`.
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Only token hashes are stored. Lookups, token writes, account creation and mail for these flows run after the response through `app.add_background_task`, so response time does not depend on whether an email has an account. The same goes for counting failed logins. As a result, `user_registered` and `user_register_conflict` fire after the response when confirmation is on, in an app context with no request.
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Mail goes through `send_email` and the `MAIL_*` settings by default. Pass `Security(app, datastore, send_mail=fn)`, where `fn` is `async (subject, recipient, body)`, to use something else. Bodies come from `security/email/*.txt` templates, which the app can override.
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## Route Map
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- `/register`
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- `/logout` (POST only)
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- `/change`
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- `/reset`, `/reset/<token>` (with `SECURITY_RECOVERABLE`)
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- `/confirm`, `/confirm/<token>` (with `SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE` and `SECURITY_REGISTERABLE`)
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2FA:
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- `/tf-setup`
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from quart import abort, current_app, g, request, session
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from .datastore import SQLAlchemyUserDatastore
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from .
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from .email import send_email
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from .forms import (
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ChangePasswordForm,
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EmailForm,
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LoginForm,
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RegisterForm,
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ResetPasswordForm,
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)
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from .password import init_password_context
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from .proxies import AnonymousUser, current_user
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from .signals import user_authenticated, user_logged_out
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self.change_password_form_cls = kwargs.get(
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self.forgot_password_form_cls = kwargs.get("forgot_password_form", EmailForm)
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self.reset_password_form_cls = kwargs.get(
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"reset_password_form", ResetPasswordForm
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)
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self.send_confirmation_form_cls = kwargs.get(
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"send_confirmation_form", EmailForm
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)
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# async (subject, recipient, body); runs as a background task.
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self.send_mail = kwargs.get("send_mail", send_email)
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self.mail_util_cls = kwargs.get("mail_util_cls")
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self.change_password_form_cls = kwargs.get(
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for name in ("forgot_password", "reset_password", "send_confirmation"):
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attr = f"{name}_form_cls"
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setattr(self, attr, kwargs.get(f"{name}_form", getattr(self, attr)))
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self.send_mail = kwargs.get("send_mail", self.send_mail)
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self.mail_util_cls = kwargs.get("mail_util_cls", self.mail_util_cls)
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self.state_store = kwargs.get("state_store", self.state_store)
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required_fields.append("mf_recovery_codes")
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if app.config["SECURITY_WEBAUTHN"]:
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required_fields.append("fs_webauthn_user_handle")
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if app.config["SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE"]:
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required_fields.append("confirmed_at")
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missing = [
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name
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for name in required_fields
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if not app.secret_key:
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raise RuntimeError("Security requires SECRET_KEY")
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sends_links = app.config["SECURITY_RECOVERABLE"] or (
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app.config["SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE"] and app.config["SECURITY_REGISTERABLE"]
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)
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if sends_links and not app.config["SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL"]:
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# Links in email must not come from the request's Host header, which
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# the sender of a reset request controls.
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raise RuntimeError(
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"SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL is required for password reset and email"
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" confirmation links"
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)
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app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE"] = app.config["SECURITY_COOKIE_SECURE"]
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app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY"] = True
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app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE"] = (
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"SECURITY_PASSWORD_LENGTH_MIN": 12,
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"SECURITY_CHANGEABLE": True,
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"SECURITY_RECOVERABLE": False,
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"SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE": False,
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"SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN": timedelta(hours=1),
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"SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN": timedelta(days=1),
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"SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL": None,
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"SECURITY_TRACKABLE": True,
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"SECURITY_TWO_FACTOR": True,
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async def rollback(self):
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await self.session.rollback()
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async def refresh(self, obj):
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await self.session.refresh(obj)
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def begin_request(self):
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class EmailForm(QuartForm):
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"""One email field: asks for a password reset or a new confirmation link."""
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email = StringField(
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"Email", filters=[_strip_email], validators=[DataRequired(), Email()]
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)
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class ResetPasswordForm(QuartForm):
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password = PasswordField("New Password", validators=[DataRequired()])
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password_confirm = PasswordField(
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"Confirm Password",
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|
+
validators=[
|
|
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|
+
DataRequired(),
|
|
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|
+
EqualTo("password", message="Passwords must match"),
|
|
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|
+
],
|
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|
+
)
|
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|
+
|
|
110
|
+
|
|
92
111
|
class TwoFactorSetupForm(QuartForm):
|
|
93
112
|
token = StringField("Code", validators=[DataRequired()])
|
|
94
113
|
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
<!doctype html>
|
|
2
|
+
<title>Confirm email</title>
|
|
3
|
+
<h1>Confirm your email</h1>
|
|
4
|
+
<p>Confirm only if you created this account. If you did not, close this page.</p>
|
|
5
|
+
<form method="post" action="{{ url_for_security('confirm_email', token=confirm_email_token) }}">
|
|
6
|
+
{{ confirm_email_form.hidden_tag() }}
|
|
7
|
+
<button type="submit">Confirm my email</button>
|
|
8
|
+
</form>
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{% from 'security/_macros.html' import render_input %}
|
|
2
|
+
<!doctype html>
|
|
3
|
+
<title>Reset password</title>
|
|
4
|
+
<h1>Reset password</h1>
|
|
5
|
+
<form method="post" action="{{ url_for_security('forgot_password') }}">
|
|
6
|
+
{{ forgot_password_form.hidden_tag() }}
|
|
7
|
+
{{ render_input(forgot_password_form.email, 'email') }}
|
|
8
|
+
<button type="submit">Send reset link</button>
|
|
9
|
+
</form>
|
|
10
|
+
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('login') }}">Back to sign in</a></p>
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/login_user.html
RENAMED
|
@@ -11,4 +11,10 @@
|
|
|
11
11
|
{% if security.webauthn and security.wan_allow_as_first_factor %}
|
|
12
12
|
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('wan_signin') }}">Sign in with passkey</a></p>
|
|
13
13
|
{% endif %}
|
|
14
|
+
{% if security.recoverable %}
|
|
15
|
+
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('forgot_password') }}">Forgot password?</a></p>
|
|
16
|
+
{% endif %}
|
|
14
17
|
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('register') }}">Create account</a></p>
|
|
18
|
+
{% if security.registerable and security.confirmable %}
|
|
19
|
+
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('send_confirmation') }}">Resend confirmation link</a></p>
|
|
20
|
+
{% endif %}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{% from 'security/_macros.html' import render_input %}
|
|
2
|
+
<!doctype html>
|
|
3
|
+
<title>Choose a new password</title>
|
|
4
|
+
<h1>Choose a new password</h1>
|
|
5
|
+
<form method="post" action="{{ url_for_security('reset_password', token=reset_password_token) }}">
|
|
6
|
+
{{ reset_password_form.hidden_tag() }}
|
|
7
|
+
{{ render_input(reset_password_form.password, 'password') }}
|
|
8
|
+
{{ render_input(reset_password_form.password_confirm, 'password') }}
|
|
9
|
+
<button type="submit">Reset password</button>
|
|
10
|
+
</form>
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{% from 'security/_macros.html' import render_input %}
|
|
2
|
+
<!doctype html>
|
|
3
|
+
<title>Resend confirmation</title>
|
|
4
|
+
<h1>Resend confirmation link</h1>
|
|
5
|
+
<form method="post" action="{{ url_for_security('send_confirmation') }}">
|
|
6
|
+
{{ send_confirmation_form.hidden_tag() }}
|
|
7
|
+
{{ render_input(send_confirmation_form.email, 'email') }}
|
|
8
|
+
<button type="submit">Send link</button>
|
|
9
|
+
</form>
|
|
10
|
+
<p><a href="{{ url_for_security('login') }}">Back to sign in</a></p>
|
|
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import hmac
|
|
|
9
9
|
import json
|
|
10
10
|
import secrets
|
|
11
11
|
import time
|
|
12
|
+
import uuid
|
|
12
13
|
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
|
|
13
14
|
|
|
14
15
|
from quart import (
|
|
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ from quart import (
|
|
|
21
22
|
request,
|
|
22
23
|
session,
|
|
23
24
|
)
|
|
25
|
+
from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
|
|
24
26
|
from werkzeug.routing import BuildError
|
|
25
27
|
|
|
26
28
|
from . import webauthn as wan
|
|
@@ -103,6 +105,12 @@ async def _record_auth_failure(user):
|
|
|
103
105
|
)
|
|
104
106
|
|
|
105
107
|
|
|
108
|
+
async def _record_failure_job(user_id):
|
|
109
|
+
user = await _find_user(fs_uniquifier=user_id)
|
|
110
|
+
if user is not None:
|
|
111
|
+
await _record_auth_failure(user)
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
106
114
|
async def _reset_auth_failures(user):
|
|
107
115
|
if hasattr(user, "failed_login_count"):
|
|
108
116
|
user.failed_login_count = 0
|
|
@@ -168,6 +176,112 @@ async def _complete_login(user):
|
|
|
168
176
|
return redirect(_safe_redirect_target(target, fallback=fallback))
|
|
169
177
|
|
|
170
178
|
|
|
179
|
+
RESET_SUBJECT = "Reset your password"
|
|
180
|
+
RESET_NOTICE_SUBJECT = "Your password was reset"
|
|
181
|
+
CONFIRM_SUBJECT = "Confirm your email address"
|
|
182
|
+
REGISTER_CONFLICT_SUBJECT = "Sign-up attempt with your email"
|
|
183
|
+
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
def _public_url(endpoint: str, **values) -> str:
|
|
186
|
+
"""An absolute link for email, from SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL and never the Host
|
|
187
|
+
header, which whoever triggers the mail controls."""
|
|
188
|
+
base = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL")
|
|
189
|
+
if not base:
|
|
190
|
+
raise RuntimeError("SECURITY_PUBLIC_URL is required to build email links")
|
|
191
|
+
return base.rstrip("/") + url_for_security(endpoint, **values)
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
def _token_key(raw: str) -> str:
|
|
195
|
+
# Only the hash is stored, so a copy of the state table cannot replay links.
|
|
196
|
+
return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest()
|
|
197
|
+
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
def _password_fingerprint(user) -> str:
|
|
200
|
+
# Ties a reset link to the password it replaces: any change voids the link.
|
|
201
|
+
return hashlib.sha256((user.password or "").encode()).hexdigest()
|
|
202
|
+
|
|
203
|
+
|
|
204
|
+
def _new_link(endpoint: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
|
|
205
|
+
"""A fresh single-use token and the emailed link that carries it. Built in
|
|
206
|
+
the request, where url_for works; stored later, only if an account needs it,
|
|
207
|
+
so making one costs the same whether or not the email has an account."""
|
|
208
|
+
raw = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
|
|
209
|
+
return raw, _public_url(endpoint, token=raw)
|
|
210
|
+
|
|
211
|
+
|
|
212
|
+
async def _store_link(raw: str, payload: dict, within: str):
|
|
213
|
+
ttl = int(current_app.config[within].total_seconds())
|
|
214
|
+
await _security.state_store.put(payload, ttl=ttl, token=_token_key(raw))
|
|
215
|
+
|
|
216
|
+
|
|
217
|
+
def _defer(job, *args):
|
|
218
|
+
"""Run `job(*args)` after the response, on its own datastore session. Work
|
|
219
|
+
that depends on whether an email has an account (lookups, token writes,
|
|
220
|
+
mail) happens here, so the response takes the same time either way."""
|
|
221
|
+
datastore = _security.datastore
|
|
222
|
+
|
|
223
|
+
async def run():
|
|
224
|
+
# The task inherits the request's context; give it its own session.
|
|
225
|
+
begin = getattr(datastore, "begin_request", None)
|
|
226
|
+
if begin:
|
|
227
|
+
begin()
|
|
228
|
+
try:
|
|
229
|
+
await job(*args)
|
|
230
|
+
finally:
|
|
231
|
+
close = getattr(datastore, "close", None)
|
|
232
|
+
if close:
|
|
233
|
+
await maybe_await(close())
|
|
234
|
+
|
|
235
|
+
current_app.add_background_task(run)
|
|
236
|
+
|
|
237
|
+
|
|
238
|
+
async def _mail(template: str, subject: str, user, **context):
|
|
239
|
+
"""Render security/email/<template>.txt and send it. Runs in a deferred job,
|
|
240
|
+
outside any request, so links arrive already built in `context`."""
|
|
241
|
+
found = current_app.jinja_env.get_template(f"security/email/{template}.txt")
|
|
242
|
+
body = await found.render_async(user=user, **context)
|
|
243
|
+
await _security.send_mail(subject, user.email, body)
|
|
244
|
+
|
|
245
|
+
|
|
246
|
+
async def _send_confirmation_job(email: str, raw: str, link: str):
|
|
247
|
+
user = await _find_user(email=email)
|
|
248
|
+
if user is None or not getattr(user, "active", True):
|
|
249
|
+
return
|
|
250
|
+
if not _awaiting_confirmation(user):
|
|
251
|
+
return
|
|
252
|
+
await _store_confirmation(user, raw)
|
|
253
|
+
await _mail(
|
|
254
|
+
"confirmation_instructions", CONFIRM_SUBJECT, user, confirmation_link=link
|
|
255
|
+
)
|
|
256
|
+
|
|
257
|
+
|
|
258
|
+
async def _store_confirmation(user, raw: str):
|
|
259
|
+
await _store_link(
|
|
260
|
+
raw,
|
|
261
|
+
{"confirm_user_id": user.get_id(), "email": user.email},
|
|
262
|
+
"SECURITY_CONFIRM_EMAIL_WITHIN",
|
|
263
|
+
)
|
|
264
|
+
|
|
265
|
+
|
|
266
|
+
async def _password_errors(password: str) -> list[str]:
|
|
267
|
+
errors = validate_password(
|
|
268
|
+
password,
|
|
269
|
+
min_length=current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_LENGTH_MIN", 12),
|
|
270
|
+
)
|
|
271
|
+
if not errors and current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK", True):
|
|
272
|
+
count_min = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_BREACH_COUNT_MIN", 1)
|
|
273
|
+
if await password_is_breached(password, count_min=count_min):
|
|
274
|
+
errors = ["This password has appeared in a data breach. Choose another."]
|
|
275
|
+
return errors
|
|
276
|
+
|
|
277
|
+
|
|
278
|
+
def _awaiting_confirmation(user) -> bool:
|
|
279
|
+
return bool(
|
|
280
|
+
current_app.config.get("SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE")
|
|
281
|
+
and getattr(user, "confirmed_at", None) is None
|
|
282
|
+
)
|
|
283
|
+
|
|
284
|
+
|
|
171
285
|
def _webauthn_rp_id() -> str:
|
|
172
286
|
configured = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_WAN_RP_ID")
|
|
173
287
|
if configured:
|
|
@@ -382,21 +496,25 @@ async def login():
|
|
|
382
496
|
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
383
497
|
user = await _find_user(email=_normalize_email(form.email.data))
|
|
384
498
|
|
|
385
|
-
#
|
|
386
|
-
|
|
387
|
-
|
|
388
|
-
|
|
389
|
-
return await render_template(
|
|
390
|
-
"security/login_user.html", login_user_form=form
|
|
391
|
-
)
|
|
499
|
+
# A locked account fails like a wrong password, after the same work: a
|
|
500
|
+
# distinct "locked" answer would only ever appear for real accounts.
|
|
501
|
+
locked = user is not None and _account_is_locked(user)
|
|
502
|
+
if user and not locked and getattr(user, "locked_until", None):
|
|
392
503
|
# Lock expired, reset
|
|
393
504
|
user.failed_login_count = 0
|
|
394
505
|
user.locked_until = None
|
|
395
506
|
await _commit()
|
|
396
507
|
|
|
397
508
|
# Always run one verify, so response time does not reveal which emails
|
|
398
|
-
# have an active account.
|
|
399
|
-
|
|
509
|
+
# have an active account. An unconfirmed account fails like an unknown
|
|
510
|
+
# one: otherwise registering an email and trying its password would
|
|
511
|
+
# tell whether the email already had an account.
|
|
512
|
+
known = (
|
|
513
|
+
user is not None
|
|
514
|
+
and getattr(user, "active", True)
|
|
515
|
+
and not _awaiting_confirmation(user)
|
|
516
|
+
and not locked
|
|
517
|
+
)
|
|
400
518
|
password_ok = await verify_password_async(
|
|
401
519
|
form.password.data,
|
|
402
520
|
user.password if known else await unknown_user_hash_async(),
|
|
@@ -418,11 +536,19 @@ async def login():
|
|
|
418
536
|
await _reset_auth_failures(user)
|
|
419
537
|
return await _complete_login(user)
|
|
420
538
|
|
|
421
|
-
# Track failed login
|
|
422
|
-
|
|
423
|
-
|
|
539
|
+
# Track failed login after the response: the write happens only for real
|
|
540
|
+
# accounts, and its time must not tell them apart.
|
|
541
|
+
if user and not locked:
|
|
542
|
+
_defer(_record_failure_job, user.get_id())
|
|
424
543
|
|
|
425
|
-
|
|
544
|
+
if current_app.config.get("SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE"):
|
|
545
|
+
# One message for every failure, so it never says which case applied.
|
|
546
|
+
await flash(
|
|
547
|
+
"Invalid email or password, or the email is not confirmed yet",
|
|
548
|
+
"error",
|
|
549
|
+
)
|
|
550
|
+
else:
|
|
551
|
+
await flash("Invalid email or password", "error")
|
|
426
552
|
|
|
427
553
|
return await render_template("security/login_user.html", login_user_form=form)
|
|
428
554
|
|
|
@@ -440,10 +566,7 @@ async def register():
|
|
|
440
566
|
# Password checks come first and an existing email gets the same answer as
|
|
441
567
|
# a new one, after the same hashing work, so the form never reveals which
|
|
442
568
|
# emails have an account.
|
|
443
|
-
errors =
|
|
444
|
-
form.password.data,
|
|
445
|
-
min_length=current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_LENGTH_MIN", 12),
|
|
446
|
-
)
|
|
569
|
+
errors = await _password_errors(form.password.data)
|
|
447
570
|
if errors:
|
|
448
571
|
for error in errors:
|
|
449
572
|
await flash(error, "error")
|
|
@@ -451,42 +574,249 @@ async def register():
|
|
|
451
574
|
"security/register_user.html", register_user_form=form
|
|
452
575
|
)
|
|
453
576
|
|
|
454
|
-
if current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_BREACH_CHECK", True):
|
|
455
|
-
count_min = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_PASSWORD_BREACH_COUNT_MIN", 1)
|
|
456
|
-
breached = await password_is_breached(
|
|
457
|
-
form.password.data, count_min=count_min
|
|
458
|
-
)
|
|
459
|
-
if breached:
|
|
460
|
-
await flash(
|
|
461
|
-
"This password has appeared in a data breach."
|
|
462
|
-
" Choose a different one.",
|
|
463
|
-
"error",
|
|
464
|
-
)
|
|
465
|
-
return await render_template(
|
|
466
|
-
"security/register_user.html", register_user_form=form
|
|
467
|
-
)
|
|
468
|
-
|
|
469
577
|
password = await hash_password_async(form.password.data)
|
|
578
|
+
name = (form.name.data or "").strip() if hasattr(form, "name") else ""
|
|
470
579
|
app = current_app._get_current_object()
|
|
471
|
-
|
|
472
|
-
if
|
|
473
|
-
|
|
580
|
+
confirmable = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE")
|
|
581
|
+
if confirmable:
|
|
582
|
+
raw, confirm_link = _new_link("confirm_email")
|
|
583
|
+
recoverable = current_app.config.get("SECURITY_RECOVERABLE")
|
|
584
|
+
links = {
|
|
585
|
+
"confirm": confirm_link,
|
|
586
|
+
"login": _public_url("login"),
|
|
587
|
+
"reset": _public_url("forgot_password") if recoverable else None,
|
|
588
|
+
}
|
|
589
|
+
_defer(_register_job, app, email, password, name, raw, links)
|
|
474
590
|
else:
|
|
475
|
-
|
|
476
|
-
|
|
477
|
-
|
|
591
|
+
# Without confirmation the new account signs in at once, which
|
|
592
|
+
# reveals it anyway; create it before answering.
|
|
593
|
+
await _register_job(app, email, password, name, None, {})
|
|
478
594
|
|
|
479
|
-
|
|
480
|
-
|
|
481
|
-
|
|
595
|
+
if confirmable:
|
|
596
|
+
await flash("Check your email to confirm your account.", "success")
|
|
597
|
+
else:
|
|
598
|
+
await flash("Registration successful. Please log in.", "success")
|
|
599
|
+
return redirect(_resolve_redirect("SECURITY_POST_REGISTER_VIEW", "login"))
|
|
600
|
+
|
|
601
|
+
return await render_template("security/register_user.html", register_user_form=form)
|
|
482
602
|
|
|
603
|
+
|
|
604
|
+
async def _register_job(app, email, password, name, confirm_raw, links):
|
|
605
|
+
"""Create the account, or tell the owner of the existing one. With
|
|
606
|
+
confirmation on this runs after the response, so neither case is slower."""
|
|
607
|
+
confirmable = confirm_raw is not None
|
|
608
|
+
existing = await _find_user(email=email)
|
|
609
|
+
if existing is None:
|
|
610
|
+
user_kwargs = {"email": email, "password": password, "active": True}
|
|
611
|
+
if name:
|
|
612
|
+
user_kwargs["name"] = name
|
|
613
|
+
user = await _create_user(**user_kwargs)
|
|
614
|
+
if hasattr(user, "confirmed_at"):
|
|
615
|
+
# Set either way: a model default must not confirm a sign-up.
|
|
616
|
+
user.confirmed_at = None if confirmable else naive_utcnow()
|
|
617
|
+
try:
|
|
483
618
|
await _commit()
|
|
619
|
+
except IntegrityError:
|
|
620
|
+
# Another request registered this email after the lookup above.
|
|
621
|
+
await maybe_await(_security.datastore.rollback())
|
|
622
|
+
existing = await _find_user(email=email)
|
|
623
|
+
if existing is None:
|
|
624
|
+
raise
|
|
625
|
+
else:
|
|
626
|
+
# Receivers run before the mail, so a mail failure cannot skip them;
|
|
627
|
+
# the owner can ask for a new link at /confirm.
|
|
484
628
|
await user_registered.send_async(app, user=user)
|
|
629
|
+
if confirmable:
|
|
630
|
+
await _store_confirmation(user, confirm_raw)
|
|
631
|
+
await _mail(
|
|
632
|
+
"confirmation_instructions",
|
|
633
|
+
CONFIRM_SUBJECT,
|
|
634
|
+
user,
|
|
635
|
+
confirmation_link=links["confirm"],
|
|
636
|
+
)
|
|
637
|
+
if existing is not None:
|
|
638
|
+
await user_register_conflict.send_async(app, user=existing)
|
|
639
|
+
if confirmable:
|
|
640
|
+
await _mail(
|
|
641
|
+
"register_conflict",
|
|
642
|
+
REGISTER_CONFLICT_SUBJECT,
|
|
643
|
+
existing,
|
|
644
|
+
login_link=links["login"],
|
|
645
|
+
reset_link=links["reset"],
|
|
646
|
+
)
|
|
485
647
|
|
|
486
|
-
await flash("Registration successful. Please log in.", "success")
|
|
487
|
-
return redirect(_resolve_redirect("SECURITY_POST_REGISTER_VIEW", "login"))
|
|
488
648
|
|
|
489
|
-
|
|
649
|
+
@security_bp.route("/reset", methods=["GET", "POST"])
|
|
650
|
+
async def forgot_password():
|
|
651
|
+
if not current_app.config.get("SECURITY_RECOVERABLE"):
|
|
652
|
+
abort(404)
|
|
653
|
+
form = await _security.forgot_password_form_cls.from_formdata()
|
|
654
|
+
await _enforce_csrf(getattr(form, "_submitted_csrf", None))
|
|
655
|
+
|
|
656
|
+
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
657
|
+
raw, link = _new_link("reset_password")
|
|
658
|
+
_defer(_reset_job, _normalize_email(form.email.data), raw, link)
|
|
659
|
+
await flash(
|
|
660
|
+
"If an account uses that email, a link to reset its password is on"
|
|
661
|
+
" its way.",
|
|
662
|
+
"info",
|
|
663
|
+
)
|
|
664
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("login"))
|
|
665
|
+
|
|
666
|
+
return await render_template(
|
|
667
|
+
"security/forgot_password.html", forgot_password_form=form
|
|
668
|
+
)
|
|
669
|
+
|
|
670
|
+
|
|
671
|
+
async def _reset_job(email: str, raw: str, link: str):
|
|
672
|
+
user = await _find_user(email=email)
|
|
673
|
+
if user is None or not getattr(user, "active", True):
|
|
674
|
+
return
|
|
675
|
+
await _store_link(
|
|
676
|
+
raw,
|
|
677
|
+
{
|
|
678
|
+
"reset_user_id": user.get_id(),
|
|
679
|
+
"email": user.email,
|
|
680
|
+
"password": _password_fingerprint(user),
|
|
681
|
+
},
|
|
682
|
+
"SECURITY_RESET_PASSWORD_WITHIN",
|
|
683
|
+
)
|
|
684
|
+
# To the stored address, never the one typed into the form.
|
|
685
|
+
await _mail("reset_instructions", RESET_SUBJECT, user, reset_link=link)
|
|
686
|
+
|
|
687
|
+
|
|
688
|
+
async def _reset_link_user(state):
|
|
689
|
+
if not state or "reset_user_id" not in state:
|
|
690
|
+
return None
|
|
691
|
+
user = await _find_user(fs_uniquifier=state["reset_user_id"])
|
|
692
|
+
if user is None:
|
|
693
|
+
return None
|
|
694
|
+
# The identity map may hold the copy loaded earlier in this request; read
|
|
695
|
+
# the row again so an email or password changed meanwhile is seen.
|
|
696
|
+
refresh = getattr(_security.datastore, "refresh", None)
|
|
697
|
+
if refresh:
|
|
698
|
+
await maybe_await(refresh(user))
|
|
699
|
+
if not getattr(user, "active", True):
|
|
700
|
+
return None
|
|
701
|
+
# A changed email or password voids the link: it was sent to the old inbox.
|
|
702
|
+
if user.email != state["email"]:
|
|
703
|
+
return None
|
|
704
|
+
if not hmac.compare_digest(state["password"], _password_fingerprint(user)):
|
|
705
|
+
return None
|
|
706
|
+
return user
|
|
707
|
+
|
|
708
|
+
|
|
709
|
+
@security_bp.route("/reset/<token>", methods=["GET", "POST"])
|
|
710
|
+
async def reset_password(token):
|
|
711
|
+
if not current_app.config.get("SECURITY_RECOVERABLE"):
|
|
712
|
+
abort(404)
|
|
713
|
+
key = _token_key(token)
|
|
714
|
+
# A GET only looks: mail scanners open links, and must not spend the token.
|
|
715
|
+
user = await _reset_link_user(await _security.state_store.get(key))
|
|
716
|
+
if user is None:
|
|
717
|
+
await flash("This reset link is invalid or has expired.", "error")
|
|
718
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("forgot_password"))
|
|
719
|
+
|
|
720
|
+
form = await _security.reset_password_form_cls.from_formdata()
|
|
721
|
+
await _enforce_csrf(getattr(form, "_submitted_csrf", None))
|
|
722
|
+
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
723
|
+
errors = await _password_errors(form.password.data)
|
|
724
|
+
for error in errors:
|
|
725
|
+
await flash(error, "error")
|
|
726
|
+
if not errors:
|
|
727
|
+
# Hash first: the slow step must not sit between the final check of
|
|
728
|
+
# the account and the update that rotates it.
|
|
729
|
+
password = await hash_password_async(form.password.data)
|
|
730
|
+
if await _reset_link_user(await _security.state_store.pop(key)) is None:
|
|
731
|
+
await flash("This reset link is invalid or has expired.", "error")
|
|
732
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("forgot_password"))
|
|
733
|
+
user.password = password
|
|
734
|
+
# The link reached the inbox, which is what confirmation proves.
|
|
735
|
+
if hasattr(user, "confirmed_at") and user.confirmed_at is None:
|
|
736
|
+
user.confirmed_at = naive_utcnow()
|
|
737
|
+
if hasattr(user, "failed_login_count"):
|
|
738
|
+
user.failed_login_count = 0
|
|
739
|
+
user.locked_until = None
|
|
740
|
+
# Signs out every session, including whoever knew the old password.
|
|
741
|
+
rotated = await maybe_await(
|
|
742
|
+
_security.datastore.rotate_uniquifier(
|
|
743
|
+
user, user.get_id(), uuid.uuid4().hex
|
|
744
|
+
)
|
|
745
|
+
)
|
|
746
|
+
if not rotated:
|
|
747
|
+
abort(409)
|
|
748
|
+
app = current_app._get_current_object()
|
|
749
|
+
await password_changed.send_async(app, user=user)
|
|
750
|
+
_defer(_mail, "reset_notice", RESET_NOTICE_SUBJECT, user)
|
|
751
|
+
await flash("Your password was reset. Sign in with the new one.", "success")
|
|
752
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("login"))
|
|
753
|
+
|
|
754
|
+
return await render_template(
|
|
755
|
+
"security/reset_password.html",
|
|
756
|
+
reset_password_form=form,
|
|
757
|
+
reset_password_token=token,
|
|
758
|
+
)
|
|
759
|
+
|
|
760
|
+
|
|
761
|
+
def _confirmation_routes_enabled() -> bool:
|
|
762
|
+
# Only sign-ups wait for confirmation, so the routes exist only with sign-up.
|
|
763
|
+
config = current_app.config
|
|
764
|
+
return bool(
|
|
765
|
+
config.get("SECURITY_CONFIRMABLE") and config.get("SECURITY_REGISTERABLE")
|
|
766
|
+
)
|
|
767
|
+
|
|
768
|
+
|
|
769
|
+
@security_bp.route("/confirm", methods=["GET", "POST"])
|
|
770
|
+
async def send_confirmation():
|
|
771
|
+
if not _confirmation_routes_enabled():
|
|
772
|
+
abort(404)
|
|
773
|
+
form = await _security.send_confirmation_form_cls.from_formdata()
|
|
774
|
+
await _enforce_csrf(getattr(form, "_submitted_csrf", None))
|
|
775
|
+
|
|
776
|
+
if _is_post() and form.validate():
|
|
777
|
+
raw, link = _new_link("confirm_email")
|
|
778
|
+
_defer(_send_confirmation_job, _normalize_email(form.email.data), raw, link)
|
|
779
|
+
await flash(
|
|
780
|
+
"If that email is waiting to be confirmed, a new link is on its way.",
|
|
781
|
+
"info",
|
|
782
|
+
)
|
|
783
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("login"))
|
|
784
|
+
|
|
785
|
+
return await render_template(
|
|
786
|
+
"security/send_confirmation.html", send_confirmation_form=form
|
|
787
|
+
)
|
|
788
|
+
|
|
789
|
+
|
|
790
|
+
@security_bp.route("/confirm/<token>", methods=["GET", "POST"])
|
|
791
|
+
async def confirm_email(token):
|
|
792
|
+
if not _confirmation_routes_enabled():
|
|
793
|
+
abort(404)
|
|
794
|
+
form = await QuartForm.from_formdata()
|
|
795
|
+
await _enforce_csrf(getattr(form, "_submitted_csrf", None))
|
|
796
|
+
# A GET only shows a button. Mail scanners open every link, and confirming
|
|
797
|
+
# on GET would let one confirm an account someone else registered with this
|
|
798
|
+
# address, keeping that person's password.
|
|
799
|
+
key = _token_key(token)
|
|
800
|
+
store = _security.state_store
|
|
801
|
+
state = await (store.pop(key) if _is_post() else store.get(key))
|
|
802
|
+
user = None
|
|
803
|
+
if state and "confirm_user_id" in state:
|
|
804
|
+
user = await _find_user(fs_uniquifier=state["confirm_user_id"])
|
|
805
|
+
# A link sent before an email change does not confirm the new address.
|
|
806
|
+
if user is None or user.email != state.get("email"):
|
|
807
|
+
await flash("This confirmation link is invalid or has expired.", "error")
|
|
808
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("send_confirmation"))
|
|
809
|
+
if not _is_post():
|
|
810
|
+
return await render_template(
|
|
811
|
+
"security/confirm_email.html",
|
|
812
|
+
confirm_email_form=form,
|
|
813
|
+
confirm_email_token=token,
|
|
814
|
+
)
|
|
815
|
+
if user.confirmed_at is None:
|
|
816
|
+
user.confirmed_at = naive_utcnow()
|
|
817
|
+
await _commit()
|
|
818
|
+
await flash("Your email is confirmed. You can sign in now.", "success")
|
|
819
|
+
return redirect(url_for_security("login"))
|
|
490
820
|
|
|
491
821
|
|
|
492
822
|
@security_bp.route("/logout", methods=["POST"])
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/_macros.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/change_password.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/mf_recovery.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/register_user.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_register.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_signin.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
{quart_security-2.0.6 → quart_security-2.1.0}/quart_security/templates/security/wan_verify.html
RENAMED
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|
|
File without changes
|