pyddock 0.3.7__tar.gz → 0.4.1__tar.gz

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Files changed (129) hide show
  1. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/004ea90a2254fd73 +4 -0
  2. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/329a7eef502f7936 +4 -0
  3. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/38dc47fb9773e379 +4 -0
  4. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/391884b94a7115c7 +4 -0
  5. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/3bb4e9ec203536d4 +4 -0
  6. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/40349f5d8c70a617 +4 -0
  7. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/5483fac6aa469e79 +4 -0
  8. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/660384f7453fa1c6 +4 -0
  9. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/710dd4cbc0f8f2b9 +4 -0
  10. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/a5ac1ac916f50c87 +4 -0
  11. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/b1a15c14c1b1e1a5 +4 -0
  12. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/constants/e6bd84b4fb5294e0 +4 -0
  13. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmp2j0w5x7e +0 -0
  14. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpa_l48ktk +0 -0
  15. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpfopee85f +0 -0
  16. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpgt8q202z +0 -0
  17. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpuczeruwd +0 -0
  18. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpvztf8hes +0 -0
  19. pyddock-0.4.1/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpzz05pj63 +0 -0
  20. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/PKG-INFO +50 -5
  21. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/README.md +48 -3
  22. pyddock-0.4.1/docs/mcp-tool-access.md +274 -0
  23. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/pyproject.toml +2 -2
  24. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_audit_enforcement.py +82 -0
  25. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_enforcement.py +15 -0
  26. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_fs_enforcement.py +25 -0
  27. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_subprocess_patch.py +21 -14
  28. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/config.py +161 -1
  29. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/default_config.toml +37 -0
  30. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/executor.py +79 -1
  31. pyddock-0.4.1/src/pyddock/mcp_definitions.py +384 -0
  32. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/server.py +135 -6
  33. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/shell_executor.py +208 -78
  34. pyddock-0.4.1/src/pyddock/shim/__init__.py +7 -0
  35. pyddock-0.4.1/src/pyddock/shim/pyddock_mcp.py +388 -0
  36. pyddock-0.4.1/src/pyddock/tools/mcp_call.py +77 -0
  37. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/venv_manager.py +89 -0
  38. pyddock-0.4.1/tests/test_mcp.py +928 -0
  39. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_shell_executor.py +149 -9
  40. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_subst_trusted_path.py +7 -0
  41. pyddock-0.4.1/uv.lock +657 -0
  42. pyddock-0.3.7/uv.lock +0 -582
  43. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.gitignore +0 -0
  44. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/.gitignore +0 -0
  45. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/0527dc28646c9360 +0 -0
  46. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/106d94c8123c0256 +0 -0
  47. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/1685e03b3aa38c02 +0 -0
  48. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/1deca112ec6f2f3c +0 -0
  49. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/2488a3a95c48acfb +0 -0
  50. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/2a94d83a13979745 +0 -0
  51. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/30ee1be194c33a1d +0 -0
  52. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/453881856851f311 +0 -0
  53. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/499f1d5a639a382a +0 -0
  54. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/4ee6f24fa151b65d +0 -0
  55. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/5b1b2189b70f5ef2 +0 -0
  56. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/5d6f8b26b2137fe1 +0 -0
  57. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/5f020be48d90847d +0 -0
  58. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/61f9b905d7da14e0 +0 -0
  59. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/6627988645b1286c +0 -0
  60. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/671fefe2f5d9935c +0 -0
  61. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/67a7f4ab2d372f23 +0 -0
  62. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/6c6f5083ece3f86b +0 -0
  63. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/805cbcbb07e3332d +0 -0
  64. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/827e18b40f235443 +0 -0
  65. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/8401e4039d635fbc +0 -0
  66. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/8490e7baefc8c8c3 +0 -0
  67. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/93108f7a5abfd484 +0 -0
  68. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/a7c132b836381d0d +0 -0
  69. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/b395547bc71e5c52 +0 -0
  70. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/ca50661510a40488 +0 -0
  71. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/d115f833e13f93f9 +0 -0
  72. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/df249c25d70870dc +0 -0
  73. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/e2c54b7949469c07 +0 -0
  74. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/e78de40070f52f91 +0 -0
  75. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/constants/e8cd7befaa4dd723 +0 -0
  76. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpl8oe65gb +0 -0
  77. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpqwper0dp +0 -0
  78. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/charmap.json.gz +0 -0
  79. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/codec-utf-8.json.gz +0 -0
  80. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/16.0.0/charmap.json.gz +0 -0
  81. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/16.0.0/codec-utf-8.json.gz +0 -0
  82. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/LICENSE +0 -0
  83. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/publish-to-pypi.ps1 +0 -0
  84. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/__init__.py +0 -0
  85. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_base.py +0 -0
  86. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_import_hook.py +0 -0
  87. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_prewarm.py +0 -0
  88. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_process_utils.py +0 -0
  89. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_proxies.py +0 -0
  90. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/_runtime.py +0 -0
  91. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/ast_validator.py +0 -0
  92. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/cli.py +0 -0
  93. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/script_registry.py +0 -0
  94. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
  95. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_append.py +0 -0
  96. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_delete.py +0 -0
  97. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_find.py +0 -0
  98. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_grep.py +0 -0
  99. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/read_file.py +0 -0
  100. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/stat_file.py +0 -0
  101. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/src/pyddock/tools/str_replace.py +0 -0
  102. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  103. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/_config_helpers.py +0 -0
  104. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_ast_properties.py +0 -0
  105. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_attr_reflection_hardening.py +0 -0
  106. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_audit_hook_backstop.py +0 -0
  107. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_chmod_integration.py +0 -0
  108. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_config.py +0 -0
  109. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_deny_always_wins.py +0 -0
  110. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_deny_messages.py +0 -0
  111. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_env_policy.py +0 -0
  112. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_executor.py +0 -0
  113. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_file_tools.py +0 -0
  114. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_filesystem_guards.py +0 -0
  115. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_jailbreak_regression.py +0 -0
  116. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_proxy_properties.py +0 -0
  117. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_realistic.py +0 -0
  118. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_runtime.py +0 -0
  119. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_sandbox_escape_hardening.py +0 -0
  120. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_security_guards.py +0 -0
  121. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
  122. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_shell_arg_paths.py +0 -0
  123. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_shell_properties.py +0 -0
  124. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_subprocess_enforcement.py +0 -0
  125. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_subprocess_properties.py +0 -0
  126. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_trusted_prefixes_uv_cache.py +0 -0
  127. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_venv_recreation.py +0 -0
  128. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_venv_stamp.py +0 -0
  129. {pyddock-0.3.7 → pyddock-0.4.1}/tests/test_workspace_imports.py +0 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\_enforcement.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
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+
4
+ ['*', ', ', '.', '.pyddock', '<frozen', 'PathLike', '_', '__doc__', '__loader__', '__name__', '__package__', '__path__', '__spec__', '_current_frames', '_getframe', '_pyddock_format_tb', 'allow', 'allowed', 'altsep', 'argv', 'ast', 'attrgetter', 'block_attributes', 'byteorder', 'class_allow', 'class_deny', 'cpu_count', 'curdir', 'deny', 'deny_messages', 'devnull', 'exc_info', 'exec_prefix', 'executable', 'exit', 'extsep', 'float_info', 'fromlist', 'fspath', 'fstat', 'getattr', 'getcwd', 'getdefaultencoding', 'getenv', 'getlogin', 'getpid', 'getrecursionlimit', 'hash_info', 'import', 'imports', 'int_info', 'level', 'linesep', 'listdir', 'lstat', 'maxsize', 'message', 'meta_path', 'mode', 'module_allow', 'module_deny', 'name', 'os', 'os.path', 'pardir', 'path', 'path_hooks', 'path_importer_cache', 'pathsep', 'pattern', 'platform', 'prefix', 'restrictions', 'scandir', 'sep', 'stat', 'stderr', 'stdin', 'stdout', 'sys', 'threading', 'urandom', 'venv', 'version', 'version_info', 'walk', 'workspace']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\executor.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
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+
4
+ [' )', ' del _pyddock_mcp', ' print(', '#', '.py', '__PYDDOCK_RESULT__', '_last_expr = None', '_pyddock_bootstrap_', 'allow', 'allowed', 'arg_paths', 'args', 'ast', 'audit', 'block_attributes', 'block_calls', 'class_allow', 'class_deny', 'command', 'default', 'deny', 'deny_messages', 'description', 'disposition', 'env', 'exec(_code, _ns)', 'execution', 'filesystem', 'guards', 'import ast as _ast', 'import sys', 'imports', 'mcp', 'message', 'mode', 'module_allow', 'module_deny', 'nt', 'output', 'pattern', 'readable_paths', 'replace', 'restrictions', 'servers', 'shell', 'shim_path', 'spawn_argvs', 'stderr', 'timeout', 'tools', 'try:', 'utf-8', 'w', 'workspace', 'writable_paths']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\_fs_enforcement.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
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+
4
+ [511, 3584, '$', '*', ', ', '.', '.pyddock', '/', '<frozen', 'Lib', 'Path.chmod', 'Path.chmod()', 'Path.lchmod', 'Path.lchmod()', 'Path.mkdir', 'Path.open', 'Path.read_bytes', 'Path.read_text', 'Path.rename', 'Path.replace', 'Path.rmdir', 'Path.touch', 'Path.unlink', 'Path.write_bytes', 'Path.write_text', '\\', '\\.', '\\/', '\\\\', '^', '_io.FileIO', '_io.open', 'a', 'a+', 'a+b', 'a+t', 'ab', 'ab+', 'allow', 'at', 'at+', 'audit', 'audit.jsonl', 'builtins.open', 'command', 'deny', 'deny-agent', 'deny-all', 'disposition', 'env', 'filesystem', 'guards', 'imports', 'io.FileIO', 'io.open', 'lchmod', 'lib', 'link_to', 'mcp', 'mkdtemp', 'mkstemp', 'nt', 'nul', 'nul.', 'os', 'os.chmod()', 'pattern', 'r', 'r+', 'r+b', 'r+t', 'rb+', 'read', 'read-only', 'readable_paths', 'rt+', 'servers', 'shell', 'tempdir', 'tempfile', 'tmp', 'w', 'w+', 'w+b', 'w+t', 'wax+', 'wb', 'wb+', 'workspace', 'writable_paths', 'write', 'wt', 'wt+', 'x', 'x+', 'x+b', 'x+t', 'xb', 'xb+', 'xt', 'xt+']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\venv_manager.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ [300, '-c', '-e', '-m', '.pyddock', 'Lib', 'Scripts', '_is_gil_enabled', '_workspace_hashes', 'allowlist_hash', 'bin', 'freethreaded', 'gil', 'install', 'installed.json', 'interpreter_id', 'lib', 'mcp', 'mcp>=2,<3', 'pip', 'pyddock', 'pyddock_mcp.py', 'pyproject.toml', 'python', 'python.exe', 'pyvenv.cfg', 'setup.cfg', 'setup.py', 'shim', 'site-packages', 'utf-8', 'venv', 'venv_created', 'win32', 'workspace', '||']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\_fs_enforcement.py
2
+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ [511, 3584, '$', '*', ', ', '.', '.pyddock', '/', '<frozen', 'Lib', 'Path.chmod', 'Path.chmod()', 'Path.lchmod', 'Path.lchmod()', 'Path.mkdir', 'Path.open', 'Path.read_bytes', 'Path.read_text', 'Path.rename', 'Path.replace', 'Path.rmdir', 'Path.touch', 'Path.unlink', 'Path.write_bytes', 'Path.write_text', '\\', '\\.', '\\/', '\\\\', '^', '_io.FileIO', '_io.open', 'a', 'a+', 'a+b', 'a+t', 'ab', 'ab+', 'allow', 'at', 'at+', 'audit', 'audit.jsonl', 'builtins.open', 'command', 'deny', 'deny-agent', 'deny-all', 'disposition', 'env', 'filesystem', 'guards', 'imports', 'io.FileIO', 'io.open', 'lchmod', 'lib', 'link_to', 'mcp', 'mkdtemp', 'mkstemp', 'nt', 'nul', 'nul.', 'os', 'os.chmod()', 'pattern', 'r', 'r+', 'r+b', 'r+t', 'rb+', 'read', 'read-only', 'readable_paths', 'rt+', 'servers', 'shell', 'tempdir', 'tempfile', 'tmp', 'w', 'w+', 'w+b', 'w+t', 'wax+', 'wb', 'wb+', 'workspace', 'writable_paths', 'write', 'wt', 'wt+', 'x', 'x+', 'x+b', 'x+t', 'xb', 'xb+', 'xt', 'xt+']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\mcp_definitions.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ ['*', '.bat', '.cmd', '.cursor', '.exe', '.kiro', '.mcp.json', '.ps1', '.pyddock', '.vscode', '/', 'Lib', '\\', 'allow', 'args', 'command', 'deny-agent', 'deny-all', 'env', 'lib', 'mcp.json', 'mcpServers', 'read-only', 'servers', 'settings', 'tmp', 'url', 'utf-8', 'win32', 'workspace']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\server.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ ['(none)', ', ', '--debug', '--workspace', '.py', '.pyddock', 'Configured commands:', 'Configured servers:', 'Modes:', 'Restrictions:', '_', '__main__', 'allow', 'arguments', 'content', 'context_lines', 'deny', 'end', 'end_line', 'exclude_regex', 'file_glob', 'file_regex', 'fs_append', 'fs_delete', 'fs_find', 'fs_grep', 'fs_readfile', 'fs_stat', 'fs_str_replace', 'grep_regex', 'max_results', 'max_results_per_file', 'mcp_call', 'newStr', 'oldStr', 'path', 'pyddock', 'pyddock serve', 'pyddock_mcp', 'read_file', 'run_mcp', 'run_python', 'run_shell', 'server', 'start', 'start_line', 'stat_file', 'stdio', 'store_true', 'str_replace', 'tmp', 'tool', 'utf-8', 'venv']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\mcp_definitions.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ ['*', '.bat', '.cmd', '.cursor', '.exe', '.kiro', '.mcp.json', '.ps1', '.pyddock', '.vscode', '/', 'Lib', '\\', 'allow', 'args', 'command', 'deny-agent', 'deny-all', 'env', 'lib', 'mcp.json', 'mcpServers', 'read-only', 'servers', 'settings', 'tmp', 'url', 'utf-8', 'win32', 'workspace']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\shell_executor.py
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+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
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+
4
+ ['$', ', ', '-', '-ExecutionPolicy', '-File', '-NoProfile', '.', '.bat', '.ps1', '.py', '.pyddock', '.sh', '.~', '/', '//', '/c', ':', '=', 'Bypass', '\\', '\\.', '\\/', '\\\\', '^', 'bash', 'cmd', 'command', 'default', 'deny', 'deny pattern', 'does not exist', 'env', 'inert', 'is not a directory', 'items', 'no argument patterns', 'none', 'nt', 'output', 'powershell', 'pwsh', 'python', 'replace', 'snapshot', 'stderr', 'surrogateescape', 'tmp', 'utf-8', 'workspace']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
1
+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\config.py
2
+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ [30.0, 3600.0, '%s', ', ', '.', '.pyddock', '/', '[env]', '\\', 'agent-deny', 'allow', 'arg_paths', 'ast', 'audit', 'block_attributes', 'block_calls', 'class_allow', 'class_deny', 'command', 'default', 'default_config.toml', 'deny', 'deny-agent', 'deny-all', 'deny_messages', 'description', 'env', 'execution', 'filesystem', 'fs', 'fs-write', 'fs-write-pair', 'guards', 'imports', 'inert', 'max_timeout', 'mcp', 'mode', 'module_allow', 'module_deny', 'network', 'none', 'observe', 'protected', 'pyddock', 'pyddock.toml', 'read-only', 'readable_paths', 'restrictions', 'shell', 'snapshot', 'timeout', 'tools', 'utf-8', 'workspace', 'writable_paths']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
1
+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\_audit_enforcement.py
2
+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ [200, 300, 384, ' | ', '"', '*', '/', '<frozen', '<frozen importlib', '<unsummarizable>', 'AGENT', 'IMPORT', 'OTHER', 'O_APPEND', 'O_CREAT', 'O_RDWR', 'O_TRUNC', 'O_WRONLY', 'TRUSTED', '\\', 'agent-deny', 'allow', 'arg_paths', 'caller', 'command', 'decision', 'deny', 'detail', 'errors', 'event', 'fs', 'fs-write', 'fs-write-pair', 'fspath', 'import-exempt', 'mode', 'network', 'observe', 'open', 'os.system', 'pid', 'reentry', 'replace', 'shell', 'shim_path', 'socket.', 'spawn_argvs', 'subprocess.Popen', 'surrogateescape', 't', 'utf-8', 'workspace']
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
1
+ # file: C:\Dev\github\pyddock\src\pyddock\_subprocess_patch.py
2
+ # hypothesis_version: 6.163.0
3
+
4
+ ['$', '(none configured)', ', ', 'Popen', '^', '_SafePopen', 'allow', 'arg_paths', 'command', 'cwd', 'deny', 'deny pattern', 'env', 'imports', 'mode', 'no argument patterns', 'os', 'shell', 'subprocess', 'subprocess.Popen', 'subprocess.run', 'workspace']
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: pyddock
3
- Version: 0.3.7
3
+ Version: 0.4.1
4
4
  Summary: MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved Python, shell, and file I/O tools with declarative policy controls
5
5
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
6
6
  Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
17
17
  Classifier: Topic :: Security
18
18
  Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries
19
19
  Requires-Python: >=3.14
20
- Requires-Dist: mcp>=1.0
20
+ Requires-Dist: mcp<3,>=2
21
21
  Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
22
22
 
23
23
  # pyddock
24
24
 
25
25
  *py + paddock — an enclosed space where code can run freely within bounds. ([Worked great in Jurassic Park.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jurassic_Park))*
26
26
 
27
- MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved `run_python`, `run_shell`, and file i/o tools. Safely replaces shell scripting for data processing, file analysis, computation, and external command execution — no user confirmation needed.
27
+ MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved `run_python`, `run_shell`, `run_mcp`, and file i/o tools. Safely replaces shell scripting for data processing, file analysis, computation, and external command execution — no user confirmation needed.
28
28
 
29
29
  ## Why
30
30
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ pyddock provides Python execution and shell command access with declarative poli
53
53
  "pyddock": {
54
54
  "command": "uvx",
55
55
  "args": ["pyddock", "serve", "--workspace", "<path-to-workspace>"],
56
- "autoApprove": ["run_python","run_shell","fs_readfile","fs_stat","fs_find","fs_grep","fs_append","fs_delete","fs_str_replace"]
56
+ "autoApprove": ["run_python","run_shell","run_mcp","fs_readfile","fs_stat","fs_find","fs_grep","fs_append","fs_delete","fs_str_replace"]
57
57
  }
58
58
  }
59
59
  }
@@ -77,10 +77,28 @@ The last expression in your snippet is captured as RESULT (like a Jupyter cell)
77
77
  | `command` | string | Executable name or script path (must match a shell policy) |
78
78
  | `args` | string[] | Arguments passed directly to the command (no shell interpretation) |
79
79
  | `timeout` | number | Seconds (default: 30) |
80
+ | `cwd` | string | Working directory, relative to the workspace root (default: the workspace root) |
80
81
 
81
82
  Commands are executed directly — no shell interpretation, pipes, redirects, chaining, or variable expansion. Only commands matching a `[shell.*]` policy in your config are permitted. The tool is only registered when at least one `[shell.*]` section exists in the config.
82
83
 
83
- Script files get automatic interpreter mapping: `.ps1` → powershell, `.py` → python, `.sh` → bash, `.bat` → cmd /c.
84
+ Script files get automatic interpreter mapping: `.ps1` → powershell, `.py` → python, `.sh` → bash, `.bat` → cmd /c. A script or path-like command is resolved relative to the workspace root, never to `cwd`, so `cwd` cannot change which file executes.
85
+
86
+ `cwd` is subject to the command's `arg_paths` policy — normally it must be an existing directory inside the workspace and outside protected directories. Relative path arguments are resolved by the command against `cwd`, and are path-checked against both `cwd` and the workspace root.
87
+
88
+ ## Tool: `run_mcp`
89
+
90
+ | Parameter | Type | Description |
91
+ |-----------|------|-------------|
92
+ | `server` | string | Configured server name. Omit to list servers and their tool policy |
93
+ | `tool` | string | Tool name. Omit to list that server's permitted tools with input schemas |
94
+ | `arguments` | object \| string | Tool arguments (a JSON string is also accepted) |
95
+ | `timeout` | number | Seconds (default: 30) |
96
+
97
+ Calls a pre-approved tool on another MCP server. Only registered when at least one `[mcp.*]` section resolves to a real server definition. The same capability is available inside `run_python` as `pyddock_mcp.call(server, tool, arguments)`, which is the preferred form for anything beyond a single lookup: a 60KB tool result parsed down to three numbers in a snippet never enters the agent's context at all.
98
+
99
+ This is one dispatcher, not a gateway — other servers' tools are never registered as individual pyddock tools, so your agent's tool list and the host's tool budget stay untouched. Intended for MCP servers you cannot replace with a library: host-provided tools with no API behind them, org-internal servers, and local dev tooling. For anything with a decent Python SDK, call the API directly instead.
100
+
101
+ See [docs/mcp-tool-access.md](docs/mcp-tool-access.md) for the design and threat model.
84
102
 
85
103
  ## Output format
86
104
 
@@ -295,6 +313,33 @@ Args are space-joined before matching: `["filelog", "//depot/..."]` becomes `"fi
295
313
 
296
314
  When `subprocess` is enabled in `[imports]`, `run_python` code can call `subprocess.run([...])` with the same policy enforcement and interpreter mapping. This is useful for composing multiple commands, processing output between calls, or passing environment variables dynamically.
297
315
 
316
+ ## MCP Policies
317
+
318
+ JSON says what can be launched; TOML says what may be called. Nothing in a JSON file ever grants anything.
319
+
320
+ **What may be called** comes only from `[mcp.<name>]` sections in your config:
321
+
322
+ ```toml
323
+ [mcp.github]
324
+ description = "Read-only GitHub queries. Tools include get_issue, get_pull_request, list_commits."
325
+ tools = { "get_.*" = true, "list_.*" = true, "search_.*" = true }
326
+ ```
327
+
328
+ - **tools**: pattern → bool, full-match anchored. Deny always wins (every `false` is checked before any `true`), and an unmatched tool is denied. Keep these read-only-shaped: nothing structurally prevents this policy from exceeding what your host permits.
329
+ - **description**: surfaced in the tool description. Descriptions are policy-only and never fetched from the server, so this is where you tell the agent what the patterns cover — saving it a discovery call, and keeping third-party tool descriptions out of your agent's always-present context.
330
+
331
+ Presence of the section is the only switch. Omitting `[mcp]` entirely disables the feature and `run_mcp` is not registered.
332
+
333
+ **What gets launched** comes from JSON definition files, scanned in this order (later wins): `~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json`, `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, `<workspace>/.kiro/settings/mcp.json`, `.vscode/mcp.json`, `.cursor/mcp.json`, `.mcp.json`, `.pyddock/mcp.json`.
334
+
335
+ Only `command`, `args`, and `env` are read. Host settings such as `disabled` and `autoApprove` are ignored — pyddock does not inherit another agent's trust decisions. A server disabled in your host config is still reachable via `run_mcp` if a `[mcp.*]` section enables it, which is deliberate: disabling a chatty MCP for direct agent use while keeping it available from Python is the point.
336
+
337
+ A definition file that agent code could write is refused with a warning, because it would let a snippet redirect an already-permitted server. This is checked against your *actual* filesystem policy, so widening `writable_paths` deactivates a location on its own. `.pyddock/mcp.json` always qualifies; `.kiro/settings` and `.claude/settings` qualify via their default `read-only` guards. Add a `read-only` guard to load definitions from anywhere else.
338
+
339
+ Servers are launched inside the sandbox as descendants of the snippet process, and the spawn allowlist is *derived* from (TOML-enabled servers ∩ scanned definitions) — never written by hand as `[shell.*]` sections. Commands are resolved to an absolute path at load time, so the directory the executable lives in becomes write-protected, same as a path-like shell policy. An MCP server is otherwise an ordinary unconstrained process, and `npx -y @foo/server` fetches and executes registry code, so pinned versions in definitions are worth having.
340
+
341
+ Current limits: stdio servers only (no `url`), tool-name gating only (no argument-level policy), no `${VAR}` interpolation in definition `env`, and the snippet timeout is the outer bound. Connections are request-scoped — one invocation, then torn down.
342
+
298
343
  ## CLI
299
344
 
300
345
  ```sh
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
 
3
3
  *py + paddock — an enclosed space where code can run freely within bounds. ([Worked great in Jurassic Park.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jurassic_Park))*
4
4
 
5
- MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved `run_python`, `run_shell`, and file i/o tools. Safely replaces shell scripting for data processing, file analysis, computation, and external command execution — no user confirmation needed.
5
+ MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved `run_python`, `run_shell`, `run_mcp`, and file i/o tools. Safely replaces shell scripting for data processing, file analysis, computation, and external command execution — no user confirmation needed.
6
6
 
7
7
  ## Why
8
8
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ pyddock provides Python execution and shell command access with declarative poli
31
31
  "pyddock": {
32
32
  "command": "uvx",
33
33
  "args": ["pyddock", "serve", "--workspace", "<path-to-workspace>"],
34
- "autoApprove": ["run_python","run_shell","fs_readfile","fs_stat","fs_find","fs_grep","fs_append","fs_delete","fs_str_replace"]
34
+ "autoApprove": ["run_python","run_shell","run_mcp","fs_readfile","fs_stat","fs_find","fs_grep","fs_append","fs_delete","fs_str_replace"]
35
35
  }
36
36
  }
37
37
  }
@@ -55,10 +55,28 @@ The last expression in your snippet is captured as RESULT (like a Jupyter cell)
55
55
  | `command` | string | Executable name or script path (must match a shell policy) |
56
56
  | `args` | string[] | Arguments passed directly to the command (no shell interpretation) |
57
57
  | `timeout` | number | Seconds (default: 30) |
58
+ | `cwd` | string | Working directory, relative to the workspace root (default: the workspace root) |
58
59
 
59
60
  Commands are executed directly — no shell interpretation, pipes, redirects, chaining, or variable expansion. Only commands matching a `[shell.*]` policy in your config are permitted. The tool is only registered when at least one `[shell.*]` section exists in the config.
60
61
 
61
- Script files get automatic interpreter mapping: `.ps1` → powershell, `.py` → python, `.sh` → bash, `.bat` → cmd /c.
62
+ Script files get automatic interpreter mapping: `.ps1` → powershell, `.py` → python, `.sh` → bash, `.bat` → cmd /c. A script or path-like command is resolved relative to the workspace root, never to `cwd`, so `cwd` cannot change which file executes.
63
+
64
+ `cwd` is subject to the command's `arg_paths` policy — normally it must be an existing directory inside the workspace and outside protected directories. Relative path arguments are resolved by the command against `cwd`, and are path-checked against both `cwd` and the workspace root.
65
+
66
+ ## Tool: `run_mcp`
67
+
68
+ | Parameter | Type | Description |
69
+ |-----------|------|-------------|
70
+ | `server` | string | Configured server name. Omit to list servers and their tool policy |
71
+ | `tool` | string | Tool name. Omit to list that server's permitted tools with input schemas |
72
+ | `arguments` | object \| string | Tool arguments (a JSON string is also accepted) |
73
+ | `timeout` | number | Seconds (default: 30) |
74
+
75
+ Calls a pre-approved tool on another MCP server. Only registered when at least one `[mcp.*]` section resolves to a real server definition. The same capability is available inside `run_python` as `pyddock_mcp.call(server, tool, arguments)`, which is the preferred form for anything beyond a single lookup: a 60KB tool result parsed down to three numbers in a snippet never enters the agent's context at all.
76
+
77
+ This is one dispatcher, not a gateway — other servers' tools are never registered as individual pyddock tools, so your agent's tool list and the host's tool budget stay untouched. Intended for MCP servers you cannot replace with a library: host-provided tools with no API behind them, org-internal servers, and local dev tooling. For anything with a decent Python SDK, call the API directly instead.
78
+
79
+ See [docs/mcp-tool-access.md](docs/mcp-tool-access.md) for the design and threat model.
62
80
 
63
81
  ## Output format
64
82
 
@@ -273,6 +291,33 @@ Args are space-joined before matching: `["filelog", "//depot/..."]` becomes `"fi
273
291
 
274
292
  When `subprocess` is enabled in `[imports]`, `run_python` code can call `subprocess.run([...])` with the same policy enforcement and interpreter mapping. This is useful for composing multiple commands, processing output between calls, or passing environment variables dynamically.
275
293
 
294
+ ## MCP Policies
295
+
296
+ JSON says what can be launched; TOML says what may be called. Nothing in a JSON file ever grants anything.
297
+
298
+ **What may be called** comes only from `[mcp.<name>]` sections in your config:
299
+
300
+ ```toml
301
+ [mcp.github]
302
+ description = "Read-only GitHub queries. Tools include get_issue, get_pull_request, list_commits."
303
+ tools = { "get_.*" = true, "list_.*" = true, "search_.*" = true }
304
+ ```
305
+
306
+ - **tools**: pattern → bool, full-match anchored. Deny always wins (every `false` is checked before any `true`), and an unmatched tool is denied. Keep these read-only-shaped: nothing structurally prevents this policy from exceeding what your host permits.
307
+ - **description**: surfaced in the tool description. Descriptions are policy-only and never fetched from the server, so this is where you tell the agent what the patterns cover — saving it a discovery call, and keeping third-party tool descriptions out of your agent's always-present context.
308
+
309
+ Presence of the section is the only switch. Omitting `[mcp]` entirely disables the feature and `run_mcp` is not registered.
310
+
311
+ **What gets launched** comes from JSON definition files, scanned in this order (later wins): `~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json`, `~/.cursor/mcp.json`, `<workspace>/.kiro/settings/mcp.json`, `.vscode/mcp.json`, `.cursor/mcp.json`, `.mcp.json`, `.pyddock/mcp.json`.
312
+
313
+ Only `command`, `args`, and `env` are read. Host settings such as `disabled` and `autoApprove` are ignored — pyddock does not inherit another agent's trust decisions. A server disabled in your host config is still reachable via `run_mcp` if a `[mcp.*]` section enables it, which is deliberate: disabling a chatty MCP for direct agent use while keeping it available from Python is the point.
314
+
315
+ A definition file that agent code could write is refused with a warning, because it would let a snippet redirect an already-permitted server. This is checked against your *actual* filesystem policy, so widening `writable_paths` deactivates a location on its own. `.pyddock/mcp.json` always qualifies; `.kiro/settings` and `.claude/settings` qualify via their default `read-only` guards. Add a `read-only` guard to load definitions from anywhere else.
316
+
317
+ Servers are launched inside the sandbox as descendants of the snippet process, and the spawn allowlist is *derived* from (TOML-enabled servers ∩ scanned definitions) — never written by hand as `[shell.*]` sections. Commands are resolved to an absolute path at load time, so the directory the executable lives in becomes write-protected, same as a path-like shell policy. An MCP server is otherwise an ordinary unconstrained process, and `npx -y @foo/server` fetches and executes registry code, so pinned versions in definitions are worth having.
318
+
319
+ Current limits: stdio servers only (no `url`), tool-name gating only (no argument-level policy), no `${VAR}` interpolation in definition `env`, and the snippet timeout is the outer bound. Connections are request-scoped — one invocation, then torn down.
320
+
276
321
  ## CLI
277
322
 
278
323
  ```sh
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
1
+ # MCP tool access from Python
2
+
3
+ ## Problem
4
+
5
+ Agents can gather information in `run_python` snippets and parse it structurally. They
6
+ cannot do that with information that only exists behind another MCP tool. Today the only
7
+ path is: call the tool, read a wall of text into context, retype the interesting parts
8
+ into a snippet.
9
+
10
+ This matters most for capabilities pyddock's usual answer ("just call the API with
11
+ boto3/p4python") does not cover:
12
+
13
+ - host-provided tools with no API behind them (browser automation, LSP, indexing)
14
+ - org-internal MCP servers where the MCP *is* the only interface
15
+ - MCPs wrapping local dev tooling not worth reimplementing
16
+
17
+ The payoff is not only composition. `run_python` truncates at 64KB and the RESULT
18
+ sentinel encourages small returns, so `mcp.call(...)` → parse → return three numbers
19
+ means a 60KB tool result never enters the agent's context at all.
20
+
21
+ Scope: **for MCP servers you cannot replace with a library.**
22
+
23
+ ## Shape
24
+
25
+ Two entry points, one implementation:
26
+
27
+ - **`run_mcp`** — single dispatcher (`server`, `tool`, `arguments`, `timeout`). One call,
28
+ raw result. Ergonomics and discovery. Implemented as a bundled script in `tools/`,
29
+ dispatched through `ScriptToolRegistry` exactly like the seven `fs_*` tools, so it runs
30
+ in the sandbox under identical enforcement and shares one code path with the shim.
31
+ - **`pyddock_mcp.call(...)`** inside `run_python` — composition across servers and
32
+ parse-down-before-returning.
33
+
34
+ Tool descriptions cross-reference each other, mirroring the existing `run_shell` ↔
35
+ `run_python` wording.
36
+
37
+ **Explicitly not a gateway.** MCP tools are never registered as individual pyddock MCP
38
+ tools. One dispatcher, never N proxied tools — that keeps the agent's tool list and the
39
+ host's tool budget untouched.
40
+
41
+ ## Configuration: JSON defines, TOML permits
42
+
43
+ > JSON says what can be launched. TOML says what may be called. Nothing in a JSON ever
44
+ > grants anything.
45
+
46
+ **Definitions** come from scanned JSON files: `.pyddock/mcp.json` plus standard platform
47
+ locations. Only `command`/`args`/`env`/`url` are read. `disabled`, `autoApprove`, and
48
+ every other host setting is **ignored** — pyddock does not inherit trust decisions.
49
+
50
+ **Policy** is always `[mcp.<name>]` in `pyddock.toml`:
51
+
52
+ ```toml
53
+ [mcp.github]
54
+ description = "Read-only GitHub queries. Tools are get_issue, get_pr, list_repos."
55
+ tools = { "get_.*" = true, "list_.*" = true }
56
+ ```
57
+
58
+ Presence in the TOML is the only switch. A host-`disabled` server becomes reachable if
59
+ the TOML enables it — which is a legitimate use case: disable a chatty MCP for the
60
+ agent's direct use precisely because it floods context, and reach it only from Python
61
+ where results get parsed down.
62
+
63
+ `tools` is a table rather than a list so argument-level policy can grow a value side
64
+ later without a breaking change (the same trick `[imports]` uses).
65
+
66
+ `[mcp]` is optional and not in `_REQUIRED_SECTIONS`, matching `[shell]`: absent means the
67
+ feature is off and `run_mcp` is not registered.
68
+
69
+ ### Definition locations must not be agent-writable
70
+
71
+ If an agent can write a scanned location, it can redirect a server the user already
72
+ permitted:
73
+
74
+ ```json
75
+ { "mcpServers": { "github": { "command": "./notes/setup.sh" } } }
76
+ ```
77
+
78
+ Policy-in-TOML does not help — the agent isn't granting itself a tool, it's redirecting
79
+ one. So at boot, each candidate location is checked against the *actual* filesystem
80
+ policy, and definitions are refused from any path agent code could write:
81
+
82
+ ```
83
+ mcp: ignoring .vscode/mcp.json — agent-writable under current filesystem policy
84
+ (add a "read-only" guard to load definitions from it)
85
+ ```
86
+
87
+ This is self-enforcing rather than a hand-maintained guard list: adding a scan location
88
+ cannot silently open a hole, and widening `writable_paths` deactivates the location on its
89
+ own. `.pyddock/mcp.json` passes via the blanket `.pyddock/` write exclusion;
90
+ `.kiro/settings`, `.kiro/agent`, and `.claude/settings` already have `read-only` guards.
91
+
92
+ Duplicate server names with differing commands are warned about — that is the signature
93
+ definition injection would leave. A TOML server with no definition warns at boot.
94
+
95
+ ## Launch happens in the sandbox
96
+
97
+ The shim (`pyddock_mcp`) is installed into `.pyddock/venv`, so it sits under a trusted
98
+ prefix, and spawns stdio MCP servers itself.
99
+
100
+ **Installed, not importable.** The `mcp` SDK lands in the venv but is *not* added to the
101
+ `[imports]` allowlist. The shim imports it via `_caller_is_trusted`; agent code cannot
102
+ `import mcp` or `import httpx`. If `httpx` were agent-importable it would mean
103
+ unrestricted egress for any snippet via the `network` disposition's TRUSTED bypass.
104
+
105
+ ### Why not launch from the parent
106
+
107
+ Considered and rejected. The parent-side design needs a launcher, an IPC channel, a
108
+ connection registry, per-server process groups, and teardown wired into the timeout path
109
+ — because parent-spawned MCP children are *siblings* of the sandbox process and survive
110
+ `kill_and_drain`. In-sandbox children are **descendants**, so the existing
111
+ `os.killpg` / `taskkill /F /T` tree-kill reaps them for free.
112
+
113
+ ### The subprocess gate
114
+
115
+ `_validate_command` is caller-blind by design, and that is load-bearing: any spawn right
116
+ the shim has, a snippet would have identically, and it could then speak JSON-RPC directly
117
+ to the server and invoke any tool — making the `[mcp.*]` allowlist decorative.
118
+
119
+ So the gate is caller-scoped:
120
+
121
+ - the spawn allowlist is **derived** from (TOML-enabled servers ∩ scanned definitions),
122
+ never hand-written as `[shell.*]` sections
123
+ - permitted only when the **immediate calling frame** is inside the shim's install
124
+ directory — immediate-frame semantics, not `_caller_is_trusted`'s any-frame walk, which
125
+ closes callback re-entry without needing to reason about it
126
+ - `shell_protected_dirs` derivation extends to MCP commands, for the same
127
+ write-then-execute prevention the shell policies get. Because commands are resolved
128
+ (below), this protects the directory the executable actually lives in. A command
129
+ resolving to the workspace root is skipped: protecting the whole workspace costs more
130
+ than the exposure it removes, and the path-like heuristic already skips the same case
131
+ for `[shell.*]` patterns.
132
+
133
+ ### Commands are resolved in the parent
134
+
135
+ The exact-argv match only works if both sides agree on what argv is. They do not agree by
136
+ default, because the SDK resolves the command in *userspace* before spawning:
137
+ `_get_executable_command` → `get_windows_executable_command` → `shutil.which`. So a
138
+ definition saying `uvx` reaches `subprocess.Popen` as `C:\...\uvx.EXE`, the allowlist
139
+ entry built from the definition never matches, and the spawn falls through to `[shell.*]`
140
+ and is denied. Every bare-name command — `uvx`, `npx`, `node` — was affected on Windows;
141
+ POSIX was unaffected because the SDK passes the command through untouched there.
142
+
143
+ `_normalize_spawn_args` states the assumption this violates: `tokens[0]` is "the command
144
+ name as written — NOT the resolved binary … the OS performs PATH resolution only *after*
145
+ this event". True of an ordinary spawn; false of a caller that resolves first.
146
+
147
+ So `mcp_definitions.resolve_launch_command` resolves once, in the parent, and the resolved form
148
+ becomes the single canonical value — it is both what the allowlist holds and what the shim
149
+ hands the SDK. Two properties keep that sound, and both have tests:
150
+
151
+ - **The result is a fixed point of the SDK's resolver.** `shutil.which` returns an
152
+ already-resolved path unchanged, so the SDK's second pass inside the sandbox is a no-op.
153
+ A test asserts this against the SDK's own function rather than against a copy of its
154
+ logic, since the copy is what would drift.
155
+ - **No path is ever fabricated.** An unresolvable command is kept as written and warned
156
+ about, so the failure surfaces as the SDK's own "cannot spawn" instead of a denial
157
+ naming an unrelated shell policy.
158
+
159
+ Resolving on POSIX too is not needed for the match, but it keeps one canonical form on
160
+ both platforms and gives the protected-dirs derivation a real directory. The extension
161
+ probe (`.cmd`/`.bat`/`.exe`/`.ps1`) stays Windows-only so the result remains a fixed point
162
+ of what the SDK itself would compute.
163
+
164
+ One deliberate side effect: the "defined differently" collision warning now compares
165
+ resolved commands, so two definitions naming the same executable different ways no longer
166
+ warn. They describe the same launch, so that is the right answer.
167
+
168
+ ### Why the gate holds
169
+
170
+ The check is backed by capability removal, not by the check alone. To spawn without going
171
+ through the shim, a snippet must make its call appear to originate from the shim's path,
172
+ which requires one of:
173
+
174
+ | Vector | Status |
175
+ |---|---|
176
+ | `compile`/`exec`/`eval` with a forged filename | AST-blocked in the parent, pre-execution |
177
+ | Planting a `.py` in a trusted directory | Every trusted prefix is write-protected; `_build_trusted_prefixes` separately *refuses* to trust any agent-writable site-packages dir |
178
+ | `sys._getframe`, frame attributes | Blocked for everyone, trusted code included |
179
+ | `sys.modules`, `sys.meta_path` | Trusted-only and never-exposed respectively |
180
+
181
+ Forging provenance is therefore as hard as any other pyddock escape, which is the standard
182
+ the rest of the sandbox is held to.
183
+
184
+ ### Residual risk is three shim invariants
185
+
186
+ 1. **Return only plain data** — `dict`/`list`/`str`/`int`/`bool`/`None`. Never an object
187
+ holding `_proc` or a stream. A leaked pipe to something like `server-filesystem` is
188
+ arbitrary FS access, and reference leakage through proxied objects is this codebase's
189
+ recurring bug class (`os.path.os`, `func.__self__`).
190
+ 2. **Never build argv from snippet input** — server name is an exact key lookup against
191
+ parsed config. No path joining, no interpolation.
192
+ 3. **Never forward snippet kwargs to `Popen`** — notably `close_fds=False`/`pass_fds`.
193
+
194
+ Unchanged either way: an MCP server is an ordinary unconstrained process, and
195
+ `npx -y @foo/server` fetches and executes registry code. Pinned versions in definitions
196
+ are worth having.
197
+
198
+ ## Lifecycle
199
+
200
+ Request-scoped. Connections live for one invocation and are torn down when it ends. A
201
+ snippet looping 20 calls against one server spawns once; separate snippets re-spawn, which
202
+ is the case where the agent should be batching anyway — and pyddock already accepts
203
+ fresh-process startup per call as the price of isolation.
204
+
205
+ No LRU, no idle TTL, no persistence. If spawn latency shows up in practice, the shape to
206
+ grow into is idle-TTL-primary with max-concurrent as a cap and LRU only as the backstop,
207
+ plus per-server opt-in — not LRU as the primary mechanism, since MCP usage is bursty and
208
+ LRU would keep long-idle servers resident.
209
+
210
+ `Client` cannot be reused after its `async with` block exits, so naive `asyncio.run()` per
211
+ call would respawn the server every call. The shim runs one loop on a background thread
212
+ with an `AsyncExitStack` holding entered clients for the snippet's lifetime.
213
+
214
+ ## Descriptions are lazy and policy-only
215
+
216
+ The `run_mcp` description lists server names, the TOML tool patterns, and the author's
217
+ `description` line. It does **not** connect to servers at boot and does not list live
218
+ tools — which removes the entire boot-connection, tool-cache, and staleness subsystem.
219
+
220
+ Full schemas come from `run_mcp(server=...)` on demand. Errors list the allowed tools,
221
+ following the existing idiom where a blocked import raises listing the whole allowlist.
222
+
223
+ Keeping upstream tool descriptions out of the always-present context is also deliberate:
224
+ third-party descriptions are an injection surface, and they now only reach the agent when
225
+ it explicitly asks.
226
+
227
+ ## Two enforcement changes the SDK required
228
+
229
+ Both were found by running a real server in the sandbox, and both are shared
230
+ enforcement code rather than MCP-specific, so they deserve to be visible.
231
+
232
+ **1. The SDK must be imported before enforcement is applied.** pydantic calls
233
+ `sys._getframe` at *class-definition* time (`parent_frame_namespace`) while
234
+ `mcp_types` is imported, and `sys._getframe` is blocked for everyone — trusted
235
+ callers included — because frame access leads to globals access. So importing the
236
+ SDK after `apply_all()` fails with `module 'sys' has no attribute '_getframe'`.
237
+ The shim's `_sdk()` is therefore cached and primed from `_install()` during the
238
+ prologue, the same approach `_prewarm.py` already takes for lazily-imported
239
+ stdlib internals. Frame protections are unchanged.
240
+
241
+ **2. `getattr(obj, blocked, default)` now returns the default instead of
242
+ raising.** anyio probes `getattr(factory, "__closure__", None)` to detect an
243
+ eager task factory and falls back to `loop.create_task()` otherwise; raising
244
+ there broke every anyio-based library in the sandbox. A three-argument `getattr`
245
+ is a *probe* — the caller has already declared what to do when the attribute is
246
+ unavailable — so answering "unavailable" serves the guard's purpose exactly. This
247
+ grants no new access: the blocked attribute is still never returned, and a caller
248
+ cannot even distinguish "blocked" from "absent" because the default is always
249
+ what comes back. The two-argument form still raises, and `operator.attrgetter`
250
+ (which has no default) is untouched.
251
+
252
+ ## Known constraint
253
+
254
+ `readable_paths` must include the venv's site-packages, which the shipped default
255
+ (`["*"]`) satisfies. The SDK validates tool results against JSON Schema, and
256
+ `jsonschema_specifications` reads metaschema files from its own package
257
+ directory; a workspace narrowing reads to `["."]` will see MCP calls fail on that
258
+ read. Tool *listing* is unaffected — only `call` validates.
259
+
260
+ ## Deferred
261
+
262
+ - **Argument-level policy.** Tool-name gating only. The existing policy vocabulary is
263
+ regex-over-strings and MCP arguments are structured JSON, so there is no pattern to
264
+ copy; `tools` being a table leaves room.
265
+ - **HTTP / remote servers.** stdio only. The 2026-07-28 revision makes remote servers
266
+ stateless, so this is additive later.
267
+ - **Env handling.** Definition `env` passes through the existing `_apply_env_policy`
268
+ unchanged, so `[env]` deny locks still apply (a server needing `PYTHONPATH` will not
269
+ work) and `${VAR}` is not interpolated.
270
+ - **Per-server timeouts.** The snippet timeout is the outer bound.
271
+ - **Host `autoApprove` inheritance.** Rejected: policy comes only from the TOML. The
272
+ consequence is that nothing structurally prevents the TOML from exceeding host policy,
273
+ so the shipped default should stay read-only-shaped (`get_.*`, `list_.*`, `search_.*`),
274
+ matching the commented-out `boto3` posture.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  [project]
2
2
  name = "pyddock"
3
- version = "0.3.7"
3
+ version = "0.4.1"
4
4
  description = "MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved Python, shell, and file I/O tools with declarative policy controls"
5
5
  requires-python = ">=3.14"
6
6
  license = "MIT"
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ classifiers = [
19
19
  "Topic :: Security",
20
20
  ]
21
21
  dependencies = [
22
- "mcp>=1.0",
22
+ "mcp>=2,<3",
23
23
  ]
24
24
 
25
25
  [project.urls]