pyddock 0.3.2__tar.gz → 0.3.3__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (85) hide show
  1. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/PKG-INFO +1 -1
  2. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  3. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_base.py +36 -17
  4. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_fs_enforcement.py +28 -5
  5. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/default_config.toml +2 -0
  6. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/shell_executor.py +22 -11
  7. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_jailbreak_regression.py +38 -3
  8. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/uv.lock +1 -1
  9. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.gitignore +0 -0
  10. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/.gitignore +0 -0
  11. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/106d94c8123c0256 +0 -0
  12. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/1685e03b3aa38c02 +0 -0
  13. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/1deca112ec6f2f3c +0 -0
  14. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/2488a3a95c48acfb +0 -0
  15. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/2a94d83a13979745 +0 -0
  16. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/499f1d5a639a382a +0 -0
  17. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/4ee6f24fa151b65d +0 -0
  18. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/5b1b2189b70f5ef2 +0 -0
  19. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/5d6f8b26b2137fe1 +0 -0
  20. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/61f9b905d7da14e0 +0 -0
  21. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/67a7f4ab2d372f23 +0 -0
  22. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/6c6f5083ece3f86b +0 -0
  23. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/827e18b40f235443 +0 -0
  24. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/8401e4039d635fbc +0 -0
  25. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/8490e7baefc8c8c3 +0 -0
  26. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/a7c132b836381d0d +0 -0
  27. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/b395547bc71e5c52 +0 -0
  28. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/constants/ca50661510a40488 +0 -0
  29. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpl8oe65gb +0 -0
  30. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpqwper0dp +0 -0
  31. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/charmap.json.gz +0 -0
  32. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/codec-utf-8.json.gz +0 -0
  33. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/LICENSE +0 -0
  34. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/README.md +0 -0
  35. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/publish-to-pypi.ps1 +0 -0
  36. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/__init__.py +0 -0
  37. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_audit_enforcement.py +0 -0
  38. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_enforcement.py +0 -0
  39. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_import_hook.py +0 -0
  40. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_prewarm.py +0 -0
  41. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_process_utils.py +0 -0
  42. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_proxies.py +0 -0
  43. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_runtime.py +0 -0
  44. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/_subprocess_patch.py +0 -0
  45. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/ast_validator.py +0 -0
  46. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/cli.py +0 -0
  47. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/config.py +0 -0
  48. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/executor.py +0 -0
  49. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/script_registry.py +0 -0
  50. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/server.py +0 -0
  51. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
  52. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_append.py +0 -0
  53. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_delete.py +0 -0
  54. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/read_file.py +0 -0
  55. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/stat_file.py +0 -0
  56. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/tools/str_replace.py +0 -0
  57. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/src/pyddock/venv_manager.py +0 -0
  58. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  59. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/_config_helpers.py +0 -0
  60. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_ast_properties.py +0 -0
  61. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_attr_reflection_hardening.py +0 -0
  62. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_audit_hook_backstop.py +0 -0
  63. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_chmod_integration.py +0 -0
  64. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_config.py +0 -0
  65. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_deny_always_wins.py +0 -0
  66. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_deny_messages.py +0 -0
  67. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_env_policy.py +0 -0
  68. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_executor.py +0 -0
  69. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_file_tools.py +0 -0
  70. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_filesystem_guards.py +0 -0
  71. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_proxy_properties.py +0 -0
  72. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_realistic.py +0 -0
  73. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_runtime.py +0 -0
  74. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_sandbox_escape_hardening.py +0 -0
  75. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_security_guards.py +0 -0
  76. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
  77. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_shell_arg_paths.py +0 -0
  78. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_shell_executor.py +0 -0
  79. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_shell_properties.py +0 -0
  80. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_subprocess_enforcement.py +0 -0
  81. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_subprocess_properties.py +0 -0
  82. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_subst_trusted_path.py +0 -0
  83. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_trusted_prefixes_uv_cache.py +0 -0
  84. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_venv_stamp.py +0 -0
  85. {pyddock-0.3.2 → pyddock-0.3.3}/tests/test_workspace_imports.py +0 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: pyddock
3
- Version: 0.3.2
3
+ Version: 0.3.3
4
4
  Summary: MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved Python, shell, and file I/O tools with declarative policy controls
5
5
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
6
6
  Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  [project]
2
2
  name = "pyddock"
3
- version = "0.3.2"
3
+ version = "0.3.3"
4
4
  description = "MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved Python, shell, and file I/O tools with declarative policy controls"
5
5
  requires-python = ">=3.11"
6
6
  license = "MIT"
@@ -36,33 +36,39 @@ del _os_for_path
36
36
  _ORIGINALS: dict[str, Any] = {}
37
37
 
38
38
 
39
- def has_ntfs_stream(path: Any) -> bool:
40
- """Detect an NTFS alternate-data-stream (ADS) reference in a path.
39
+ def ntfs_stream_base(path: Any) -> str | None:
40
+ """Return the base path of an NTFS alternate-data-stream (ADS) reference.
41
41
 
42
42
  On Windows, ``name:stream`` (and ``name::$DATA``, ``dir:stream``) addresses a
43
43
  *different* securable object than the path's lexical components imply: a write
44
44
  to ``.pyddock:pwned`` lands a data stream on the ``.pyddock`` directory, yet
45
45
  the lexical leaf ``.pyddock:pwned`` is not a child of ``.pyddock`` — so a
46
46
  ``relative_to('.pyddock')`` containment check decides "not protected" and the
47
- write slips through. ``realpath`` does not reliably normalize the stream away
48
- (a not-yet-existing stream resolves to the literal), so the only sound defense
49
- is to reject the syntax up front.
47
+ write slips through.
50
48
 
51
49
  A ``:`` is only legal as the drive designator at index 1 of the FIRST path
52
50
  component (``C:\\...`` or the drive-relative ``C:rest``). A ``:`` anywhere else
53
- is a stream reference. Returns False on non-Windows, where ``:`` is an
51
+ opens a named stream on the component to its left. When such a reference is
52
+ present this returns the lexical BASE — everything up to (but not including)
53
+ the stream ``:`` — i.e. the object the stream would attach to. Returns None
54
+ when no stream reference is present, and on non-Windows, where ``:`` is an
54
55
  ordinary, legal filename character.
55
56
 
56
- NOTE: this primitive is deliberately strict and makes NO exception for
57
- URL-looking strings (``https://...``). It guards real filesystem operations
58
- (``open``/``Path.write_*``), where the argument is always a local path and a
59
- ``scheme:`` prefix would still carry a stream-bearing ``:``. The one place a
60
- URL is a legitimate value — a shell CLI argument — filters URLs out *before*
61
- they reach this check (see ``_looks_like_path`` in shell_executor), so URLs
62
- never get here in the first place.
57
+ Callers existence-check the resolved base to decide whether the reference is
58
+ security-relevant: the ADS containment-evasion attack aliases a stream onto
59
+ an *existing* (and typically protected) object — ``.pyddock``, a workspace
60
+ module dir, the stdlib — all of which always exist on disk. A colon in a
61
+ string that merely looks path-like (e.g. a commit message) has a base that
62
+ does not exist, so it is not a real stream reference.
63
+
64
+ NOTE: this is purely lexical and makes NO exception for URL-looking strings
65
+ (``https://...``); a ``scheme:`` prefix still carries a stream-bearing ``:``.
66
+ The one place a URL is a legitimate value — a shell CLI argument — filters
67
+ URLs out *before* they reach this check (see ``_looks_like_path`` in
68
+ shell_executor), so URLs never get here in the first place.
63
69
  """
64
70
  if _os_name != "nt":
65
- return False
71
+ return None
66
72
  parts = str(path).replace("/", "\\").split("\\")
67
73
  for idx, comp in enumerate(parts):
68
74
  if not comp:
@@ -71,9 +77,22 @@ def has_ntfs_stream(path: Any) -> bool:
71
77
  # First component may carry a 'X:' drive designator (X: or X:rest).
72
78
  if idx == 0 and len(comp) >= 2 and comp[0].isalpha() and comp[1] == ":":
73
79
  start = 2
74
- if ":" in comp[start:]:
75
- return True
76
- return False
80
+ ci = comp.find(":", start)
81
+ if ci != -1:
82
+ base_parts = parts[:idx] + [comp[:ci]]
83
+ return "\\".join(base_parts)
84
+ return None
85
+
86
+
87
+ def has_ntfs_stream(path: Any) -> bool:
88
+ """Pure-syntactic NTFS ADS detector — True if *path* carries a stream ``:``.
89
+
90
+ See ``ntfs_stream_base`` for the parsing rules. This is the lexical primitive
91
+ (existence-agnostic). Enforcement layers DO NOT call this directly: they
92
+ existence-gate via ``ntfs_stream_base`` so a colon in a non-path string does
93
+ not raise a false positive. Returns False on non-Windows.
94
+ """
95
+ return ntfs_stream_base(path) is not None
77
96
 
78
97
 
79
98
  def canonical_path(path: Any) -> pathlib.Path:
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import tempfile as _tempfile_module
14
14
  import _io as _cio_module
15
15
  from typing import Any
16
16
 
17
- from pyddock._base import _ORIGINALS, _PYDDOCK_DIR, _find_deny_hint, canonical_path, has_ntfs_stream
17
+ from pyddock._base import _ORIGINALS, _PYDDOCK_DIR, _find_deny_hint, canonical_path, ntfs_stream_base
18
18
  from pyddock._import_hook import _caller_is_trusted
19
19
  from pyddock._audit_enforcement import install_audit_enforcement
20
20
  from pyddock._process_utils import make_child_env
@@ -54,16 +54,30 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
54
54
  """
55
55
  return canonical_path(p)
56
56
 
57
+ def _resolve_scope_path(p: str) -> pathlib.Path:
58
+ """Resolve a scope path entry to an absolute, canonicalized path.
59
+
60
+ Supports:
61
+ - "~" or "~/..." — expanded via os.path.expanduser
62
+ - Absolute paths (e.g. "C:\\Users\\...") — used as-is
63
+ - Relative paths (e.g. ".", "src") — joined with workspace_root
64
+ """
65
+ expanded = _real_os.path.expanduser(p)
66
+ path = pathlib.Path(expanded)
67
+ if path.is_absolute():
68
+ return _abspath(path)
69
+ return _abspath(workspace_root / expanded)
70
+
57
71
  # Canonicalize allowed paths (realpath: resolves symlinks/junctions/8.3
58
72
  # names) so they compare consistently with canonicalized candidate paths.
59
73
  resolved_writable = [
60
- _abspath(workspace_root / p) for p in writable_paths
74
+ _resolve_scope_path(p) for p in writable_paths
61
75
  ]
62
76
 
63
77
  # "*" means unrestricted reads
64
78
  unrestricted_reads = "*" in readable_paths
65
79
  resolved_readable = [
66
- _abspath(workspace_root / p) for p in readable_paths if p != "*"
80
+ _resolve_scope_path(p) for p in readable_paths if p != "*"
67
81
  ]
68
82
 
69
83
  # .pyddock/ is always excluded from writes (self-modification protection)
@@ -243,7 +257,12 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
243
257
  path = _real_os.fsdecode(path)
244
258
  if _is_null_device(path):
245
259
  return
246
- if has_ntfs_stream(path):
260
+ # NTFS alternate data stream whose base object EXISTS — aliasing a
261
+ # stream onto an existing (often protected) object evades containment
262
+ # checks. Gated on existence to avoid false positives on colon-bearing
263
+ # strings whose base does not exist.
264
+ _stream_base = ntfs_stream_base(path)
265
+ if _stream_base is not None and _real_os.path.exists(_stream_base):
247
266
  raise PermissionError(
248
267
  f"PermissionError: Cannot read '{path}' — NTFS alternate data "
249
268
  f"streams (':' in a path component) are not permitted. Use a "
@@ -271,7 +290,11 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
271
290
  path = _real_os.fsdecode(path)
272
291
  if _is_null_device(path):
273
292
  return
274
- if has_ntfs_stream(path):
293
+ # NTFS alternate data stream whose base object EXISTS (see _check_read).
294
+ # The base of '.pyddock:x' is '.pyddock' (always present) — caught; a
295
+ # colon in a non-existent-base string is not a real stream reference.
296
+ _stream_base = ntfs_stream_base(path)
297
+ if _stream_base is not None and _real_os.path.exists(_stream_base):
275
298
  raise PermissionError(
276
299
  f"PermissionError: Cannot write to '{path}' — NTFS alternate "
277
300
  f"data streams (':' in a path component) are not permitted. A "
@@ -69,7 +69,9 @@ P4 = "p4python" # Restricted to non-submit operations
69
69
  # Filesystem scoping for run_python.
70
70
  # Paths are relative to the workspace root (the --workspace directory or CWD).
71
71
  # "." = the workspace directory itself (and everything under it)
72
+ # "~" = user home directory (os.path.expanduser); "~/subdir" works too
72
73
  # "*" = unrestricted (entire host filesystem)
74
+ # Absolute paths (e.g. "C:\\Data") are also accepted and used as-is.
73
75
  # Writes are always denied to .pyddock/ (self-modification protection) and to
74
76
  # paths matching shell-executable script patterns (write-then-execute prevention).
75
77
  [filesystem]
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
15
15
  from typing import Any
16
16
 
17
17
  from pyddock.config import PyddockConfig, ShellPolicyConfig, find_deny_hint
18
- from pyddock._base import canonical_path, has_ntfs_stream
18
+ from pyddock._base import canonical_path, ntfs_stream_base
19
19
  from pyddock._process_utils import get_startupinfo, kill_and_drain, make_child_env, truncate_output
20
20
 
21
21
  import shutil
@@ -501,11 +501,18 @@ def evaluate_arg_paths(
501
501
  # NTFS alternate data streams alias a different object than their
502
502
  # lexical path implies (e.g. "--output=.pyddock:x" writes onto the
503
503
  # protected .pyddock dir while evading the relative_to() check).
504
- if has_ntfs_stream(candidate):
505
- return (
506
- f"Argument '{arg}' uses an NTFS alternate data stream "
507
- f"(':' in a path component), which is not permitted."
508
- )
504
+ # Gated on existence of the base object: protected targets always
505
+ # exist, so the attack is still caught, while a colon in a value
506
+ # whose base does not exist is not treated as a stream.
507
+ _stream_base = ntfs_stream_base(candidate)
508
+ if _stream_base is not None:
509
+ _base_p = Path(_stream_base)
510
+ _base_abs = _base_p if _base_p.is_absolute() else workspace_root / _base_p
511
+ if _base_abs.exists():
512
+ return (
513
+ f"Argument '{arg}' uses an NTFS alternate data stream "
514
+ f"(':' in a path component), which is not permitted."
515
+ )
509
516
  # Resolve relative to workspace root (same as command cwd)
510
517
  resolved = _abspath(workspace_root / candidate)
511
518
 
@@ -584,11 +591,15 @@ def evaluate_cwd(
584
591
  return None
585
592
 
586
593
  cwd_str = cwd.decode("utf-8", "surrogateescape") if isinstance(cwd, bytes) else str(cwd)
587
- if has_ntfs_stream(cwd_str):
588
- return (
589
- f"cwd '{cwd_str}' uses an NTFS alternate data stream (':' in a path "
590
- f"component), which is not permitted."
591
- )
594
+ _cwd_stream_base = ntfs_stream_base(cwd_str)
595
+ if _cwd_stream_base is not None:
596
+ _cwd_base_p = Path(_cwd_stream_base)
597
+ _cwd_base_abs = _cwd_base_p if _cwd_base_p.is_absolute() else workspace_root / _cwd_base_p
598
+ if _cwd_base_abs.exists():
599
+ return (
600
+ f"cwd '{cwd_str}' uses an NTFS alternate data stream (':' in a path "
601
+ f"component), which is not permitted."
602
+ )
592
603
  ws_root_abs = _abspath(workspace_root)
593
604
  pyddock_dir = _abspath(workspace_root / ".pyddock")
594
605
  resolved = _abspath(workspace_root / Path(cwd_str))
@@ -8,9 +8,13 @@
8
8
  2. NTFS alternate data streams — `open(".pyddock:pwned", "w")` writes a data
9
9
  stream onto the protected `.pyddock` directory while the lexical leaf
10
10
  `.pyddock:pwned` evades the `relative_to('.pyddock')` containment check.
11
- Fixed by rejecting any path component carrying a `:` stream reference
12
- (has_ntfs_stream), wired into the shared _check_read/_check_write closures
13
- and the shell arg-path / cwd scanners.
11
+ Fixed by detecting a `:` stream reference and rejecting it when the stream's
12
+ BASE object exists on disk (ntfs_stream_base + an existence check), wired
13
+ into the shared _check_read/_check_write closures and the shell arg-path /
14
+ cwd scanners. The existence gate is sound because every protected target
15
+ (.pyddock, workspace module dirs, the stdlib) always exists, so the attack is
16
+ still blocked — while a colon in a string that merely looks path-like (e.g. a
17
+ commit message) has a non-existent base and is no longer a false positive.
14
18
  """
15
19
 
16
20
  from __future__ import annotations
@@ -138,6 +142,18 @@ class TestHasNtfsStream:
138
142
  ]:
139
143
  assert has_ntfs_stream(bad) is True, bad
140
144
 
145
+ @pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform != "win32", reason="NTFS ADS is Windows-only")
146
+ def test_stream_base_extraction(self) -> None:
147
+ # ntfs_stream_base returns the object the stream attaches to (or None).
148
+ from pyddock._base import ntfs_stream_base
149
+
150
+ assert ntfs_stream_base(".pyddock:pwned") == ".pyddock"
151
+ assert ntfs_stream_base(".pyddock:pwned.txt") == ".pyddock"
152
+ assert ntfs_stream_base("C:/Git/pyddock/.pyddock:pwned") == "C:\\Git\\pyddock\\.pyddock"
153
+ assert ntfs_stream_base("dir/file.txt:s") == "dir\\file.txt"
154
+ assert ntfs_stream_base("file.txt") is None
155
+ assert ntfs_stream_base("C:\\abs\\file") is None
156
+
141
157
  @pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform != "win32", reason="NTFS ADS is Windows-only")
142
158
  def test_drive_relative_not_flagged(self) -> None:
143
159
  # 'C:rest' (drive-relative) and 'C:\\...' are the only legal colons.
@@ -199,6 +215,7 @@ class TestUrlArgsNotPathCandidates:
199
215
  def test_stream_in_flag_value_still_blocked(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
200
216
  # The URL exclusion must NOT weaken the output-flag stream attack: a
201
217
  # value that is a stream-bearing path (not a scheme://) is still scanned.
218
+ (tmp_path / ".pyddock").mkdir() # base object the stream targets
202
219
  reason = evaluate_arg_paths(
203
220
  ["-o=.pyddock:pwned"],
204
221
  arg_paths="protected",
@@ -220,6 +237,9 @@ class TestAdsWriteBlockedEndToEnd:
220
237
  ) -> None:
221
238
  """open('.pyddock:pwned', 'w') must be rejected — it would otherwise
222
239
  write a data stream onto the protected .pyddock directory."""
240
+ # The server always creates .pyddock at startup; mirror that here so the
241
+ # stream's base object exists (the existence gate keys off this).
242
+ (workspace / ".pyddock").mkdir(exist_ok=True)
223
243
  config = PyddockConfig(
224
244
  execution=ExecutionConfig(timeout=30.0),
225
245
  imports=ImportsConfig(allowed=["pathlib", "io"]),
@@ -471,6 +491,7 @@ class TestAdsArgPathScanBlocked:
471
491
  def test_shell_output_arg_with_stream_rejected(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
472
492
  """A shell arg like --output=.pyddock:x must be rejected by the arg
473
493
  scanner (same containment gap as the fs guard)."""
494
+ (tmp_path / ".pyddock").mkdir() # base object the stream targets
474
495
  reason = evaluate_arg_paths(
475
496
  ["--output=.pyddock:pwned"],
476
497
  arg_paths="workspace",
@@ -506,3 +527,17 @@ class TestAdsArgPathScanBlocked:
506
527
  shell_command_patterns=["^git$"],
507
528
  )
508
529
  assert reason is None
530
+
531
+ def test_stream_value_with_nonexistent_base_allowed(self, tmp_path: Path) -> None:
532
+ """Existence gate (false-positive fix): a colon-bearing, path-like value
533
+ whose base object does NOT exist is not treated as a stream. This is what
534
+ keeps colons in non-path strings (e.g. a 'feat: ...' commit message that
535
+ happens to contain a '/') from being rejected as ADS references."""
536
+ reason = evaluate_arg_paths(
537
+ ["-o=notes:draft/today.txt"],
538
+ arg_paths="workspace",
539
+ workspace_root=tmp_path,
540
+ workspace_module_dirs={},
541
+ shell_command_patterns=[],
542
+ )
543
+ assert reason is None, reason
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ wheels = [
480
480
 
481
481
  [[package]]
482
482
  name = "pyddock"
483
- version = "0.3.2"
483
+ version = "0.3.3"
484
484
  source = { editable = "." }
485
485
  dependencies = [
486
486
  { name = "mcp" },
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