pyddock 0.3.0__tar.gz → 0.3.2__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/PKG-INFO +1 -1
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_audit_enforcement.py +9 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_base.py +41 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_enforcement.py +22 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_fs_enforcement.py +95 -28
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_proxies.py +99 -6
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_subprocess_patch.py +18 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/default_config.toml +53 -9
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/executor.py +10 -1
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/shell_executor.py +86 -29
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_env_policy.py +54 -2
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_executor.py +30 -0
- pyddock-0.3.2/tests/test_jailbreak_regression.py +508 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_security_guards.py +78 -0
- pyddock-0.3.2/tests/test_trusted_prefixes_uv_cache.py +166 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/uv.lock +1 -1
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.gitignore +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/.gitignore +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/106d94c8123c0256 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/1685e03b3aa38c02 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/1deca112ec6f2f3c +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/2488a3a95c48acfb +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/2a94d83a13979745 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/499f1d5a639a382a +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/4ee6f24fa151b65d +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/5b1b2189b70f5ef2 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/5d6f8b26b2137fe1 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/61f9b905d7da14e0 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/67a7f4ab2d372f23 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/6c6f5083ece3f86b +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/827e18b40f235443 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/8401e4039d635fbc +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/8490e7baefc8c8c3 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/a7c132b836381d0d +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/b395547bc71e5c52 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/constants/ca50661510a40488 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpl8oe65gb +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/tmp/tmpqwper0dp +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/charmap.json.gz +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/.hypothesis/unicode_data/15.1.0/codec-utf-8.json.gz +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/README.md +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/publish-to-pypi.ps1 +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/__init__.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_import_hook.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_prewarm.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_process_utils.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/_runtime.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/ast_validator.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/cli.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/config.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/script_registry.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/server.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_append.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/fs_delete.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/read_file.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/stat_file.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/tools/str_replace.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/src/pyddock/venv_manager.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/_config_helpers.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_ast_properties.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_attr_reflection_hardening.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_audit_hook_backstop.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_chmod_integration.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_config.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_deny_always_wins.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_deny_messages.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_file_tools.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_filesystem_guards.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_proxy_properties.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_realistic.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_runtime.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_sandbox_escape_hardening.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_shell_arg_paths.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_shell_executor.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_shell_properties.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_subprocess_enforcement.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_subprocess_properties.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_subst_trusted_path.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_venv_stamp.py +0 -0
- {pyddock-0.3.0 → pyddock-0.3.2}/tests/test_workspace_imports.py +0 -0
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
Metadata-Version: 2.4
|
|
2
2
|
Name: pyddock
|
|
3
|
-
Version: 0.3.
|
|
3
|
+
Version: 0.3.2
|
|
4
4
|
Summary: MCP server that gives AI agents pre-approved Python, shell, and file I/O tools with declarative policy controls
|
|
5
5
|
Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
|
|
6
6
|
Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/portablestew/pyddock
|
|
@@ -457,6 +457,15 @@ def install_audit_enforcement(
|
|
|
457
457
|
pass
|
|
458
458
|
|
|
459
459
|
def _enforce_fs(disp: str, event: str, args: tuple) -> None:
|
|
460
|
+
# NOTE on path-resolution TOCTOU: every fs audit event carries the path
|
|
461
|
+
# value the syscall actually uses — primitives resolve __fspath__ ONCE
|
|
462
|
+
# and raise the event with that resolved str (verified: builtins.open /
|
|
463
|
+
# io.open / os.open / os.mkdir / os.remove / os.scandir deliver a str;
|
|
464
|
+
# _io.FileIO raises 'open' first with its single resolved str, then a
|
|
465
|
+
# redundant event with the original object). So the check here always
|
|
466
|
+
# sees the true target — there is no second, independent resolution to
|
|
467
|
+
# exploit. The materialize-once name-patch layer closes the only real
|
|
468
|
+
# gap (its separate check/use resolutions). Hence no object-type guard.
|
|
460
469
|
if disp == "fs": # open
|
|
461
470
|
path = _extract_path(args[0] if args else None)
|
|
462
471
|
if path is None:
|
|
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ _PYDDOCK_DIR = _os_for_path.path.dirname(_os_for_path.path.abspath(__file__))
|
|
|
25
25
|
_normcase = _os_for_path.path.normcase
|
|
26
26
|
_realpath = _os_for_path.path.realpath
|
|
27
27
|
_abspath = _os_for_path.path.abspath
|
|
28
|
+
_os_name = _os_for_path.name
|
|
28
29
|
del _os_for_path
|
|
29
30
|
|
|
30
31
|
# Module-level dict for storing original (unpatched) function references.
|
|
@@ -35,6 +36,46 @@ del _os_for_path
|
|
|
35
36
|
_ORIGINALS: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
|
36
37
|
|
|
37
38
|
|
|
39
|
+
def has_ntfs_stream(path: Any) -> bool:
|
|
40
|
+
"""Detect an NTFS alternate-data-stream (ADS) reference in a path.
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
On Windows, ``name:stream`` (and ``name::$DATA``, ``dir:stream``) addresses a
|
|
43
|
+
*different* securable object than the path's lexical components imply: a write
|
|
44
|
+
to ``.pyddock:pwned`` lands a data stream on the ``.pyddock`` directory, yet
|
|
45
|
+
the lexical leaf ``.pyddock:pwned`` is not a child of ``.pyddock`` — so a
|
|
46
|
+
``relative_to('.pyddock')`` containment check decides "not protected" and the
|
|
47
|
+
write slips through. ``realpath`` does not reliably normalize the stream away
|
|
48
|
+
(a not-yet-existing stream resolves to the literal), so the only sound defense
|
|
49
|
+
is to reject the syntax up front.
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
A ``:`` is only legal as the drive designator at index 1 of the FIRST path
|
|
52
|
+
component (``C:\\...`` or the drive-relative ``C:rest``). A ``:`` anywhere else
|
|
53
|
+
is a stream reference. Returns False on non-Windows, where ``:`` is an
|
|
54
|
+
ordinary, legal filename character.
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
NOTE: this primitive is deliberately strict and makes NO exception for
|
|
57
|
+
URL-looking strings (``https://...``). It guards real filesystem operations
|
|
58
|
+
(``open``/``Path.write_*``), where the argument is always a local path and a
|
|
59
|
+
``scheme:`` prefix would still carry a stream-bearing ``:``. The one place a
|
|
60
|
+
URL is a legitimate value — a shell CLI argument — filters URLs out *before*
|
|
61
|
+
they reach this check (see ``_looks_like_path`` in shell_executor), so URLs
|
|
62
|
+
never get here in the first place.
|
|
63
|
+
"""
|
|
64
|
+
if _os_name != "nt":
|
|
65
|
+
return False
|
|
66
|
+
parts = str(path).replace("/", "\\").split("\\")
|
|
67
|
+
for idx, comp in enumerate(parts):
|
|
68
|
+
if not comp:
|
|
69
|
+
continue
|
|
70
|
+
start = 0
|
|
71
|
+
# First component may carry a 'X:' drive designator (X: or X:rest).
|
|
72
|
+
if idx == 0 and len(comp) >= 2 and comp[0].isalpha() and comp[1] == ":":
|
|
73
|
+
start = 2
|
|
74
|
+
if ":" in comp[start:]:
|
|
75
|
+
return True
|
|
76
|
+
return False
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
|
|
38
79
|
def canonical_path(path: Any) -> pathlib.Path:
|
|
39
80
|
"""Canonicalize a filesystem path for security containment checks.
|
|
40
81
|
|
|
@@ -264,6 +264,28 @@ class RuntimeEnforcement:
|
|
|
264
264
|
name, _trusted, _skip_proxy, _ws_module_names,
|
|
265
265
|
include_private=True,
|
|
266
266
|
)
|
|
267
|
+
# `from <pkg> import <submodule>` loads the submodule through
|
|
268
|
+
# importlib's _handle_fromlist -> _gcd_import, which BYPASSES this
|
|
269
|
+
# hook. So the submodule never reaches the "." in name path above,
|
|
270
|
+
# and the package name is never registered in _loading_names —
|
|
271
|
+
# which made a re-entrant `from <pkg> import <sub>` inside the
|
|
272
|
+
# package's own __init__.py look "outermost" and (before the
|
|
273
|
+
# _initializing guard in _proxy_module_universal) freeze a partial
|
|
274
|
+
# proxy. Proxy the fromlist submodules here, after the parent (and
|
|
275
|
+
# the submodule) have fully loaded, so `from cryptography import
|
|
276
|
+
# x509` yields the same full-API proxy as `import cryptography.x509`.
|
|
277
|
+
if is_outermost:
|
|
278
|
+
fromlist = args[2] if len(args) > 2 else kwargs.get("fromlist")
|
|
279
|
+
if fromlist:
|
|
280
|
+
for entry in fromlist:
|
|
281
|
+
if not isinstance(entry, str) or entry == "*":
|
|
282
|
+
continue
|
|
283
|
+
submod = name + "." + entry
|
|
284
|
+
if submod in sys.modules:
|
|
285
|
+
_proxy_module_universal(
|
|
286
|
+
submod, _trusted, _skip_proxy,
|
|
287
|
+
_ws_module_names, include_private=True,
|
|
288
|
+
)
|
|
267
289
|
return result
|
|
268
290
|
# If the module was explicitly pre-warmed as a stdlib internal
|
|
269
291
|
# (e.g. _strptime), allow re-import from cache. These are lazily
|
|
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import tempfile as _tempfile_module
|
|
|
14
14
|
import _io as _cio_module
|
|
15
15
|
from typing import Any
|
|
16
16
|
|
|
17
|
-
from pyddock._base import _ORIGINALS, _PYDDOCK_DIR, _find_deny_hint, canonical_path
|
|
17
|
+
from pyddock._base import _ORIGINALS, _PYDDOCK_DIR, _find_deny_hint, canonical_path, has_ntfs_stream
|
|
18
18
|
from pyddock._import_hook import _caller_is_trusted
|
|
19
19
|
from pyddock._audit_enforcement import install_audit_enforcement
|
|
20
20
|
from pyddock._process_utils import make_child_env
|
|
@@ -239,8 +239,16 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
239
239
|
|
|
240
240
|
def _check_read(path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
|
|
241
241
|
"""Raise PermissionError if path is outside readable scope."""
|
|
242
|
+
if isinstance(path, bytes):
|
|
243
|
+
path = _real_os.fsdecode(path)
|
|
242
244
|
if _is_null_device(path):
|
|
243
245
|
return
|
|
246
|
+
if has_ntfs_stream(path):
|
|
247
|
+
raise PermissionError(
|
|
248
|
+
f"PermissionError: Cannot read '{path}' — NTFS alternate data "
|
|
249
|
+
f"streams (':' in a path component) are not permitted. Use a "
|
|
250
|
+
f"standard file path."
|
|
251
|
+
)
|
|
244
252
|
resolved = _abspath(path)
|
|
245
253
|
# Check guards first (first match wins)
|
|
246
254
|
guard_result = _check_guard(resolved, "read")
|
|
@@ -259,8 +267,18 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
259
267
|
|
|
260
268
|
def _check_write(path: pathlib.Path) -> None:
|
|
261
269
|
"""Raise PermissionError if path is outside writable scope."""
|
|
270
|
+
if isinstance(path, bytes):
|
|
271
|
+
path = _real_os.fsdecode(path)
|
|
262
272
|
if _is_null_device(path):
|
|
263
273
|
return
|
|
274
|
+
if has_ntfs_stream(path):
|
|
275
|
+
raise PermissionError(
|
|
276
|
+
f"PermissionError: Cannot write to '{path}' — NTFS alternate "
|
|
277
|
+
f"data streams (':' in a path component) are not permitted. A "
|
|
278
|
+
f"stream reference can address a protected object (e.g. "
|
|
279
|
+
f"'.pyddock:x' writes onto the .pyddock directory). Use a "
|
|
280
|
+
f"standard file path."
|
|
281
|
+
)
|
|
264
282
|
resolved = _abspath(path)
|
|
265
283
|
# Check guards first (first match wins)
|
|
266
284
|
guard_result = _check_guard(resolved, "write")
|
|
@@ -338,18 +356,58 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
338
356
|
# Any mode containing w, a, x, or + (except bare r) is a write mode
|
|
339
357
|
return any(c in mode for c in "wax+")
|
|
340
358
|
|
|
359
|
+
def _materialize_pathlike(file: Any) -> Any:
|
|
360
|
+
"""Resolve a path argument to a frozen str/bytes exactly once (TOCTOU).
|
|
361
|
+
|
|
362
|
+
The patched open-family functions previously checked ``Path(file)`` and
|
|
363
|
+
then handed the ORIGINAL ``file`` object to the real primitive — two
|
|
364
|
+
independent resolutions. A path-like object with a call-counting
|
|
365
|
+
``__fspath__`` (or a mutable ``bytearray``/``memoryview`` buffer) can
|
|
366
|
+
return a benign value to the check and the protected value to the real
|
|
367
|
+
open. We close that by resolving ONCE here and forcing callers to pass
|
|
368
|
+
the returned value to BOTH the check and the real primitive, so the
|
|
369
|
+
kernel sees exactly what was validated.
|
|
370
|
+
|
|
371
|
+
- ``str``/``bytes`` (incl. subclasses): immutable content — returned as-is.
|
|
372
|
+
- ``bytearray``/``memoryview``: mutable buffer — rejected (a concurrent
|
|
373
|
+
thread could flip it between check and syscall).
|
|
374
|
+
- ``os.PathLike`` (incl. pathlib.Path and any subclass): ``os.fspath`` is
|
|
375
|
+
invoked exactly once; the result must be ``str``/``bytes``.
|
|
376
|
+
Non-path-like objects fall through to ``os.fspath`` which raises the same
|
|
377
|
+
``TypeError`` the real open would.
|
|
378
|
+
"""
|
|
379
|
+
if isinstance(file, (str, bytes)):
|
|
380
|
+
return file
|
|
381
|
+
if isinstance(file, (bytearray, memoryview)):
|
|
382
|
+
raise PermissionError(
|
|
383
|
+
"PermissionError: a mutable path buffer (bytearray/memoryview) "
|
|
384
|
+
"is not permitted as a file path — its contents can change "
|
|
385
|
+
"between the security check and the open (TOCTOU). Pass a str "
|
|
386
|
+
"or bytes path."
|
|
387
|
+
)
|
|
388
|
+
name = _real_os.fspath(file) # single __fspath__ call
|
|
389
|
+
if not isinstance(name, (str, bytes)) or isinstance(name, (bytearray, memoryview)):
|
|
390
|
+
raise PermissionError(
|
|
391
|
+
"PermissionError: __fspath__ must return a str or bytes path."
|
|
392
|
+
)
|
|
393
|
+
return name
|
|
394
|
+
|
|
341
395
|
# Patch builtins.open
|
|
342
396
|
_ORIGINALS["builtins.open"] = builtins.open
|
|
343
397
|
|
|
344
398
|
def _patched_open(
|
|
345
399
|
file: Any, mode: str = "r", *args: Any, **kwargs: Any
|
|
346
400
|
) -> Any:
|
|
347
|
-
|
|
401
|
+
# Integer file descriptors are already-open handles — no path to check.
|
|
402
|
+
if isinstance(file, int):
|
|
403
|
+
return _ORIGINALS["builtins.open"](file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
404
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(file) # resolve once
|
|
348
405
|
if _is_write_mode(mode):
|
|
349
|
-
_check_write(
|
|
406
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
350
407
|
else:
|
|
351
|
-
_check_read(
|
|
352
|
-
|
|
408
|
+
_check_read(name)
|
|
409
|
+
# Forward the FROZEN value, never the original object.
|
|
410
|
+
return _ORIGINALS["builtins.open"](name, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
353
411
|
|
|
354
412
|
builtins.open = _patched_open
|
|
355
413
|
|
|
@@ -513,12 +571,12 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
513
571
|
# Skip path checking for integer file descriptors (used internally by subprocess)
|
|
514
572
|
if isinstance(file, int):
|
|
515
573
|
return _ORIGINALS["io.open"](file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
516
|
-
|
|
574
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(file) # resolve once
|
|
517
575
|
if _is_write_mode(mode):
|
|
518
|
-
_check_write(
|
|
576
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
519
577
|
else:
|
|
520
|
-
_check_read(
|
|
521
|
-
return _ORIGINALS["io.open"](
|
|
578
|
+
_check_read(name)
|
|
579
|
+
return _ORIGINALS["io.open"](name, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
522
580
|
|
|
523
581
|
_io_module.open = _patched_io_open
|
|
524
582
|
|
|
@@ -536,12 +594,12 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
536
594
|
caller = sys._getframe(1)
|
|
537
595
|
if caller and caller.f_code.co_filename.startswith("<frozen"):
|
|
538
596
|
return _ORIGINALS["_io.open"](file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
539
|
-
|
|
597
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(file) # resolve once
|
|
540
598
|
if _is_write_mode(mode):
|
|
541
|
-
_check_write(
|
|
599
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
542
600
|
else:
|
|
543
|
-
_check_read(
|
|
544
|
-
return _ORIGINALS["_io.open"](
|
|
601
|
+
_check_read(name)
|
|
602
|
+
return _ORIGINALS["_io.open"](name, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
545
603
|
|
|
546
604
|
_cio_module.open = _patched_cio_open
|
|
547
605
|
|
|
@@ -554,13 +612,16 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
554
612
|
"""FileIO subclass that enforces filesystem scoping on construction."""
|
|
555
613
|
|
|
556
614
|
def __init__(self, file: Any, mode: str = "r", *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
|
|
557
|
-
if
|
|
558
|
-
|
|
559
|
-
|
|
560
|
-
|
|
561
|
-
|
|
562
|
-
|
|
563
|
-
|
|
615
|
+
if isinstance(file, int):
|
|
616
|
+
super().__init__(file, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
617
|
+
return
|
|
618
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(file) # resolve once
|
|
619
|
+
if _is_write_mode(mode):
|
|
620
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
621
|
+
else:
|
|
622
|
+
_check_read(name)
|
|
623
|
+
# Construct with the FROZEN value, never the original object.
|
|
624
|
+
super().__init__(name, mode, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
564
625
|
|
|
565
626
|
_io_module.FileIO = _PatchedFileIO
|
|
566
627
|
_cio_module.FileIO = _PatchedFileIO
|
|
@@ -606,14 +667,19 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
606
667
|
|
|
607
668
|
# Patch os.makedirs and os.mkdir on the safe os proxy to use _check_write.
|
|
608
669
|
# This ensures .pyddock/, workspace module dirs, and other protected paths
|
|
609
|
-
# are enforced (not just the workspace boundary check).
|
|
610
|
-
|
|
611
|
-
|
|
612
|
-
|
|
670
|
+
# are enforced (not just the workspace boundary check). Each resolves the
|
|
671
|
+
# path-like ONCE (_materialize_pathlike) and forwards that frozen value to
|
|
672
|
+
# the real call, so the check and the syscall can't see different paths
|
|
673
|
+
# (the same TOCTOU defense as the open family).
|
|
674
|
+
|
|
675
|
+
def _safe_makedirs(name: Any, mode: int = 0o777, exist_ok: bool = False) -> None:
|
|
676
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(name)
|
|
677
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
613
678
|
_real_os.makedirs(name, mode, exist_ok=exist_ok)
|
|
614
679
|
|
|
615
|
-
def _safe_mkdir(name:
|
|
616
|
-
|
|
680
|
+
def _safe_mkdir(name: Any, mode: int = 0o777) -> None:
|
|
681
|
+
name = _materialize_pathlike(name)
|
|
682
|
+
_check_write(name)
|
|
617
683
|
_real_os.mkdir(name, mode)
|
|
618
684
|
|
|
619
685
|
if "os" in sys.modules:
|
|
@@ -622,9 +688,10 @@ def apply_filesystem_scoping(
|
|
|
622
688
|
safe_os.mkdir = _safe_mkdir
|
|
623
689
|
|
|
624
690
|
# Expose os.chmod with the same validation as Path.chmod.
|
|
625
|
-
def _safe_chmod(path:
|
|
691
|
+
def _safe_chmod(path: Any, mode: int) -> None:
|
|
626
692
|
_validate_chmod(mode, "os.chmod()")
|
|
627
|
-
|
|
693
|
+
path = _materialize_pathlike(path)
|
|
694
|
+
_check_write(path)
|
|
628
695
|
_real_os.chmod(path, mode)
|
|
629
696
|
|
|
630
697
|
if "os" in sys.modules:
|
|
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ internal state via object.__getattribute__.
|
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
12
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
+
import logging
|
|
14
15
|
import pathlib
|
|
15
16
|
import re
|
|
16
17
|
import sys
|
|
@@ -20,6 +21,8 @@ from typing import Any
|
|
|
20
21
|
from pyddock._base import _find_deny_hint, _is_module_bound_builtin, _wrap_safe_callable
|
|
21
22
|
from pyddock._import_hook import _caller_is_trusted
|
|
22
23
|
|
|
24
|
+
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
23
26
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
24
27
|
# MethodFilterProxy
|
|
25
28
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
@@ -426,7 +429,16 @@ def _build_trusted_prefixes(
|
|
|
426
429
|
|
|
427
430
|
Returns normalized, resolved path prefixes for:
|
|
428
431
|
1. Workspace module directories (editable installs)
|
|
429
|
-
2. The venv
|
|
432
|
+
2. The .pyddock/venv site-packages — the single authoritative source of
|
|
433
|
+
third-party library code — plus the realpath targets of the venv's own
|
|
434
|
+
symlinked entries (so uv's symlink link-mode, where the venv's packages
|
|
435
|
+
physically live in a shared cache, still resolves as trusted). The venv
|
|
436
|
+
is deliberately the ONLY library location trusted: this keeps the trusted
|
|
437
|
+
set a closed, config-pinned unit so sandbox behavior is repeatable across
|
|
438
|
+
machines and install methods, and does not depend on how pyddock itself
|
|
439
|
+
was installed (e.g. a uvx tool cache on sys.path) or on shared-cache
|
|
440
|
+
contents. A package missing from the venv therefore fails loudly rather
|
|
441
|
+
than being silently trusted from elsewhere on sys.path.
|
|
430
442
|
3. The Python stdlib Lib directory
|
|
431
443
|
"""
|
|
432
444
|
_os = real_os if real_os is not None else __import__("os")
|
|
@@ -439,22 +451,92 @@ def _build_trusted_prefixes(
|
|
|
439
451
|
)
|
|
440
452
|
prefixes.append(abs_path)
|
|
441
453
|
|
|
442
|
-
# 2.
|
|
454
|
+
# 2. The .pyddock/venv site-packages (the authoritative library location).
|
|
455
|
+
#
|
|
456
|
+
# The trusted set must match where library code physically lives, because
|
|
457
|
+
# _caller_is_trusted compares each caller frame's realpath()-resolved
|
|
458
|
+
# filename against these prefixes. We trust the venv's site-packages and the
|
|
459
|
+
# realpath targets of ITS symlinked entries — nothing else on sys.path.
|
|
460
|
+
#
|
|
461
|
+
# We intentionally do NOT trust arbitrary site-packages/dist-packages dirs
|
|
462
|
+
# found on sys.path (e.g. a uvx tool cache that the bootstrap places on the
|
|
463
|
+
# path, or the per-user site). Trusting those would make the trusted set
|
|
464
|
+
# depend on install layout and shared-cache state, hurting repeatability and
|
|
465
|
+
# widening the attack surface. The companion fix in executor.py appends
|
|
466
|
+
# pyddock's install dir to sys.path (instead of prepending it) so allowed
|
|
467
|
+
# packages resolve from this venv, not from such a cache.
|
|
468
|
+
candidate_site_dirs: list[str] = []
|
|
443
469
|
if venv_path is not None and venv_path.is_dir():
|
|
444
470
|
# Find site-packages inside the venv (Windows: Lib/site-packages)
|
|
445
471
|
for root, dirs, _files in _os.walk(str(venv_path / "Lib")):
|
|
446
472
|
if "site-packages" in dirs:
|
|
447
|
-
|
|
448
|
-
prefixes.append(_os.path.normcase(_os.path.realpath(sp)))
|
|
473
|
+
candidate_site_dirs.append(_os.path.join(root, "site-packages"))
|
|
449
474
|
break
|
|
450
475
|
else:
|
|
451
476
|
# Unix-style layout: lib/pythonX.Y/site-packages
|
|
452
477
|
for root, dirs, _files in _os.walk(str(venv_path / "lib")):
|
|
453
478
|
if "site-packages" in dirs:
|
|
454
|
-
|
|
455
|
-
|
|
479
|
+
candidate_site_dirs.append(
|
|
480
|
+
_os.path.join(root, "site-packages")
|
|
481
|
+
)
|
|
456
482
|
break
|
|
457
483
|
|
|
484
|
+
# A site-packages dir INSIDE the workspace (other than the write-protected
|
|
485
|
+
# .pyddock/venv) is agent-writable (writable_paths defaults to ["."]), so
|
|
486
|
+
# trusting it would let agent code plant a shadowing module and have it run
|
|
487
|
+
# with full library privileges (free imports, deny-agent secret reads). Skip
|
|
488
|
+
# such dirs and warn — this fires only in the rare case one actually exists
|
|
489
|
+
# (e.g. a symlink target resolving back into the workspace), so it does not
|
|
490
|
+
# pollute normal snippet output.
|
|
491
|
+
_ws_real = _os.path.normcase(_os.path.realpath(str(workspace_root)))
|
|
492
|
+
_venv_real = (
|
|
493
|
+
_os.path.normcase(_os.path.realpath(str(venv_path)))
|
|
494
|
+
if venv_path is not None
|
|
495
|
+
else None
|
|
496
|
+
)
|
|
497
|
+
|
|
498
|
+
def _within(child: str, parent: str) -> bool:
|
|
499
|
+
return child == parent or child.startswith(parent + _os.sep)
|
|
500
|
+
|
|
501
|
+
def _is_agent_writable(resolved: str) -> bool:
|
|
502
|
+
if not _within(resolved, _ws_real):
|
|
503
|
+
return False # outside the workspace (shared cache, system site) — fine
|
|
504
|
+
if _venv_real is not None and _within(resolved, _venv_real):
|
|
505
|
+
return False # the managed, write-protected .pyddock/venv — fine
|
|
506
|
+
return True # inside workspace, outside the managed venv — agent-writable
|
|
507
|
+
|
|
508
|
+
def _add_trusted(resolved: str, *, origin: str) -> None:
|
|
509
|
+
if not _os.path.isdir(resolved):
|
|
510
|
+
return
|
|
511
|
+
if _is_agent_writable(resolved):
|
|
512
|
+
logger.warning(
|
|
513
|
+
"Refusing to trust site-packages directory inside the workspace "
|
|
514
|
+
"(agent-writable, import-shadowing risk): %s (via %s)",
|
|
515
|
+
resolved, origin,
|
|
516
|
+
)
|
|
517
|
+
return
|
|
518
|
+
prefixes.append(resolved)
|
|
519
|
+
|
|
520
|
+
# Trust the venv site-packages and, for uv symlink-mode venvs, the realpath
|
|
521
|
+
# targets of the venv's symlinked entries (the venv's own packages stored in
|
|
522
|
+
# a shared cache). This stays scoped to the venv's declared contents — we do
|
|
523
|
+
# not scan sys.path.
|
|
524
|
+
for _sp in candidate_site_dirs:
|
|
525
|
+
_add_trusted(
|
|
526
|
+
_os.path.normcase(_os.path.realpath(_sp)), origin="venv site-packages"
|
|
527
|
+
)
|
|
528
|
+
try:
|
|
529
|
+
_entries = _os.listdir(_sp)
|
|
530
|
+
except OSError:
|
|
531
|
+
continue
|
|
532
|
+
for _name in _entries:
|
|
533
|
+
_child = _os.path.join(_sp, _name)
|
|
534
|
+
if _os.path.islink(_child):
|
|
535
|
+
_target_dir = _os.path.dirname(
|
|
536
|
+
_os.path.normcase(_os.path.realpath(_child))
|
|
537
|
+
)
|
|
538
|
+
_add_trusted(_target_dir, origin="venv symlink target")
|
|
539
|
+
|
|
458
540
|
# 3. Python stdlib Lib directory
|
|
459
541
|
# Use sys.base_prefix to handle virtualenvs correctly — it points to
|
|
460
542
|
# the original Python installation, not the venv.
|
|
@@ -513,6 +595,17 @@ def _proxy_module_universal(
|
|
|
513
595
|
if name in skip_modules or top_level in skip_modules:
|
|
514
596
|
return
|
|
515
597
|
|
|
598
|
+
# Never proxy a partially-initialized module. A re-entrant import from inside
|
|
599
|
+
# a package's own __init__.py (e.g. `from cryptography.x509 import oid`,
|
|
600
|
+
# executed before x509 has bound its public classes) can reach here with the
|
|
601
|
+
# module still mid-init; proxying now would freeze an incomplete exported API
|
|
602
|
+
# (the original `from cryptography import x509` -> missing `x509.Name` bug).
|
|
603
|
+
# __spec__._initializing is True only while the module body is executing and
|
|
604
|
+
# flips to False once init completes; proxy only after the module is fully
|
|
605
|
+
# loaded. getattr fallback: a module without __spec__ is treated as complete.
|
|
606
|
+
if getattr(getattr(module, "__spec__", None), "_initializing", False):
|
|
607
|
+
return
|
|
608
|
+
|
|
516
609
|
# Compute the exported API — these attrs are always accessible to agent code.
|
|
517
610
|
# Workspace modules get stricter filtering: foreign classes are excluded
|
|
518
611
|
# to prevent leakage of network-capable factories (e.g. Jira, SSHClient),
|
|
@@ -161,13 +161,31 @@ def apply_subprocess_patch(
|
|
|
161
161
|
receives the known-good snapshot rather than inheriting the sandbox
|
|
162
162
|
process environment. Raises PermissionError if an override violates the
|
|
163
163
|
resolved [env] / [shell.<cmd>.env] policy.
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
The resolution bases (the spawn's effective cwd plus the workspace root)
|
|
166
|
+
let the inert-value filter reject a separator-less value that names a
|
|
167
|
+
real file/dir — a tool may resolve such a bare token as a path relative
|
|
168
|
+
to its cwd (e.g. p4 loading P4EDITOR/P4DIFF from a bare P4ENVIRO file).
|
|
164
169
|
"""
|
|
165
170
|
deny_patterns, env_default = resolve_env_policy(_env_base, policy)
|
|
171
|
+
resolve_bases: list[pathlib.Path] = [_ws_root]
|
|
172
|
+
cwd = kwargs.get("cwd")
|
|
173
|
+
if cwd is not None:
|
|
174
|
+
cwd_str = (
|
|
175
|
+
cwd.decode("utf-8", "surrogateescape")
|
|
176
|
+
if isinstance(cwd, (bytes, bytearray))
|
|
177
|
+
else str(cwd)
|
|
178
|
+
)
|
|
179
|
+
# `_ws_root / cwd_str` yields cwd_str unchanged when it is absolute,
|
|
180
|
+
# and resolves it against the workspace when relative — matching how
|
|
181
|
+
# the child process resolves its own cwd.
|
|
182
|
+
resolve_bases.append(_ws_root / cwd_str)
|
|
166
183
|
kwargs["env"] = filter_child_env(
|
|
167
184
|
kwargs.get("env"),
|
|
168
185
|
_env_snapshot,
|
|
169
186
|
deny_patterns=deny_patterns,
|
|
170
187
|
default=env_default,
|
|
188
|
+
resolve_bases=tuple(resolve_bases),
|
|
171
189
|
)
|
|
172
190
|
|
|
173
191
|
def _validated_run(cmd: Any, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
|
|
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ readable_paths = ["*"]
|
|
|
90
90
|
'/\.ssh/' = "deny-agent" # SSH keys — paramiko/GitPython may need access
|
|
91
91
|
'/\.aws/credentials$' = "deny-agent" # AWS credentials — boto3 needs access
|
|
92
92
|
'/\.aws/sso/cache/' = "deny-agent" # AWS SSO tokens — boto3 needs access
|
|
93
|
+
'/\.aws/login/cache/' = "deny-agent" # AWS SSO/OIDC login token cache — boto3 needs access
|
|
94
|
+
'/\.aws/cli/cache/' = "deny-agent" # AWS assume-role credential cache — boto3 needs access
|
|
93
95
|
'/\.docker/config\.json$' = "deny-agent" # Docker registry auth — docker SDK may need access
|
|
94
96
|
'/\.kube/config$' = "deny-agent" # Kubernetes credentials — k8s client may need access
|
|
95
97
|
'/\.gnupg/' = "deny-all" # GPG private keys — no library reader in sandbox
|
|
@@ -332,7 +334,19 @@ mode = "deny"
|
|
|
332
334
|
# upload/receive-pack hooks (local RCE), regardless of the allow-list below.
|
|
333
335
|
# Also blocks config/command-injection globals that, if injected before the
|
|
334
336
|
# subcommand, enable arbitrary code execution (-c core.sshCommand=..., etc.).
|
|
335
|
-
deny = [
|
|
337
|
+
deny = [
|
|
338
|
+
"ext::", "--upload-pack", "--receive-pack", "^-c(\\s|$)",
|
|
339
|
+
"--config-env", "--exec-path",
|
|
340
|
+
# rebase/push/fetch --exec: runs an arbitrary per-commit shell command
|
|
341
|
+
# (git rebase -x/--exec) and is also the documented synonym for
|
|
342
|
+
# --receive-pack (push) / --upload-pack (fetch). No legitimate sandbox use —
|
|
343
|
+
# safe to deny in every subcommand. Does NOT match --exec-path (above).
|
|
344
|
+
"--exec(\\s|=|$)",
|
|
345
|
+
# rebase short form: git rebase -x <cmd> (and "git pull --rebase ... -x").
|
|
346
|
+
# Scoped to the rebase token via re.search so it does NOT clobber the
|
|
347
|
+
# unrelated, legitimate "git clean -x" (remove ignored files).
|
|
348
|
+
"\\brebase\\b.*\\s-x(\\s|$)",
|
|
349
|
+
]
|
|
336
350
|
allow = [
|
|
337
351
|
# Read-only queries
|
|
338
352
|
"status(\\s|$)", "log(\\s|$)", "diff(\\s|$)", "show(\\s|$)", "rev-parse(\\s|$)",
|
|
@@ -396,7 +410,21 @@ allow = [
|
|
|
396
410
|
]
|
|
397
411
|
|
|
398
412
|
[shell.p4.env]
|
|
399
|
-
|
|
413
|
+
# p4 honors several vars that run an external program or load settings (which
|
|
414
|
+
# can themselves re-introduce an exec var) — the env-side equivalents of the
|
|
415
|
+
# command-execution denials. P4CONFIG and P4ENVIRO point to settings files that
|
|
416
|
+
# can define P4EDITOR/P4DIFF/etc., so locking only the exec vars without locking
|
|
417
|
+
# the loaders leaves a redirect (a bare `P4ENVIRO=z.txt` carries no separator,
|
|
418
|
+
# so the inert filter alone won't stop it — hence the hard-lock here).
|
|
419
|
+
deny = [
|
|
420
|
+
"P4PORT", "P4CONFIG", "P4ENVIRO", # connection target / settings-file loaders
|
|
421
|
+
"P4DIFF.*", # arbitrary command on diff (incl. P4DIFFUNICODE)
|
|
422
|
+
"P4MERGE.*", # arbitrary command on resolve/merge (incl. P4MERGEUNICODE)
|
|
423
|
+
"P4EDITOR", # arbitrary command on spec edit (p4 change, ...)
|
|
424
|
+
"P4PAGER", # arbitrary command on paged output
|
|
425
|
+
"P4LOGINSSO", # arbitrary command on SSO login
|
|
426
|
+
"P4ALIASES", # aliases file can rewrite an allowed verb into a denied one (allow-list bypass)
|
|
427
|
+
]
|
|
400
428
|
|
|
401
429
|
[shell.docker]
|
|
402
430
|
# Read-only / inspection ONLY. All container lifecycle (compose up/down/build/
|
|
@@ -463,15 +491,31 @@ deny = ["DOCKER_HOST", "DOCKER_CONFIG", "DOCKER_CONTEXT"]
|
|
|
463
491
|
# layer (captured-reference spawns like GitPython) enforces these locks only.
|
|
464
492
|
[env]
|
|
465
493
|
default = "inert"
|
|
494
|
+
# Patterns are re.fullmatch against the KEY name, matched CASE-INSENSITIVELY
|
|
495
|
+
# (see _env_key_locked) — Windows env names are case-insensitive, so a
|
|
496
|
+
# case-sensitive lock would be bypassable via `Path`/`home`. No (?i) needed here.
|
|
466
497
|
deny = [
|
|
467
|
-
|
|
468
|
-
"
|
|
469
|
-
|
|
470
|
-
"
|
|
471
|
-
"
|
|
498
|
+
# --- command / library resolution (PATH family + dynamic loaders) ---
|
|
499
|
+
".*PATH.*", # PATH, PATHEXT, PYTHONPATH, PSModulePath, GIT_EXEC_PATH,
|
|
500
|
+
# HOMEPATH, CLASSPATH, NODE_PATH, MANPATH, ... (resolution hijack)
|
|
501
|
+
"LD_.*", "DYLD_.*", # ELF / Mach-O loader injection (LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, ...)
|
|
502
|
+
"PYTHON.*", # python (.py) startup/home/path (PYTHONSTARTUP, PYTHONHOME, ...)
|
|
472
503
|
"COMSPEC", # cmd /c mapping (.bat)
|
|
473
|
-
|
|
474
|
-
"
|
|
504
|
+
# --- home / config discovery (redirect a tool to attacker-controlled config) ---
|
|
505
|
+
".*HOME.*", # HOME, HOMEDRIVE, HOMEPATH, GNUPGHOME, JAVA_HOME, XDG_*_HOME, ...
|
|
506
|
+
"USERPROFILE", # Windows home fallback — git global ~/.gitconfig discovery
|
|
507
|
+
"XDG_.*", # XDG_CONFIG_HOME/_DIRS, XDG_DATA_HOME/_DIRS, XDG_CACHE_HOME (config/data discovery)
|
|
508
|
+
# --- shell / interpreter startup & option injection ---
|
|
509
|
+
"BASH.*", "ENV", "PROMPT_COMMAND", # shell startup exec (BASH_ENV, BASH_FUNC_*, ...)
|
|
510
|
+
"PERL5.*", # PERL5OPT (-M<module> runs code), PERL5LIB
|
|
511
|
+
"_?JAVA.*", # JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS, _JAVA_OPTIONS (JVM arg injection); JAVA_HOME also via .*HOME.*
|
|
512
|
+
"NODE_OPTIONS", # node --require / --import code injection
|
|
513
|
+
"RUBY.*", # RUBYOPT (-r<lib> runs code), RUBYLIB
|
|
514
|
+
"LESS.*", # LESSOPEN / LESSCLOSE input-preprocessor command exec
|
|
515
|
+
# --- scratch-file redirection ---
|
|
516
|
+
"TMPDIR", "TEMP", "TMP",
|
|
517
|
+
# --- generic external-command hooks ---
|
|
518
|
+
"EDITOR", "VISUAL", "PAGER",
|
|
475
519
|
]
|
|
476
520
|
|
|
477
521
|
# Custom denial hints — appended to rejection messages when the pattern matches
|
|
@@ -173,7 +173,16 @@ class SubprocessExecutor:
|
|
|
173
173
|
"import sys",
|
|
174
174
|
"import ast as _ast",
|
|
175
175
|
"import types as _pyddock_types",
|
|
176
|
-
|
|
176
|
+
# APPEND (not insert at 0) so pyddock stays importable without letting
|
|
177
|
+
# pyddock's install location win the import-resolution race against the
|
|
178
|
+
# .pyddock/venv. When pyddock is provisioned by a tool like uv, its
|
|
179
|
+
# install dir is a shared cache that also contains pyddock's deps
|
|
180
|
+
# (e.g. cryptography). Prepending it shadowed the venv copy, so those
|
|
181
|
+
# packages loaded from the (untrusted) cache and their internal imports
|
|
182
|
+
# (`from __future__ import annotations`, `import warnings`, ...) were
|
|
183
|
+
# rejected. Appending lets the venv's site-packages take precedence;
|
|
184
|
+
# pyddock itself is only in this dir, so it is still found here.
|
|
185
|
+
f"sys.path.append({pyddock_src_path!r})",
|
|
177
186
|
f"sys.argv = [{SNIPPET_FILENAME!r}] + {args!r}",
|
|
178
187
|
"",
|
|
179
188
|
"# Apply runtime enforcement",
|