push-guard 0.1.0__tar.gz

push_guard-0.1.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
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push_guard-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: push-guard
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Local pre-push guard for likely secret leaks.
+Author: Dragon Lady
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard/issues
+Keywords: git,pre-push,secrets,security,credentials,developer-tools
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Version Control :: Git
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# Push Guard
+
+Push Guard is a local Git `pre-push` guard for likely secret leaks.
+
+It scans the content being pushed, reports likely secret patterns, redacts all
+matched values, and exits nonzero so Git blocks the push.
+
+> Built and maintained by Dragon Lady - [github.com/Dragon-Lady](https://github.com/Dragon-Lady) - X: [@answerislove2](https://x.com/answerislove2)
+
+## Posture
+
+- Local only.
+- No network calls.
+- No package installs.
+- No target file mutation.
+- No secret values printed.
+- No tokens, keys, secrets, credentials, file contents, repository contents, or
+  user data are saved by Push Guard.
+- Findings store only rule IDs, file paths, line numbers, reasons, and the
+  literal placeholder `<redacted>`.
+- Uses the `git` subprocess only to read commit diffs.
+- No mutation through Git and no other subprocess execution.
+- No claim that a repository is clean.
+
+Blocking a push is Git's response to the advisory. Push Guard remains read-only
+and does not mutate files. Override is available with `git push --no-verify`
+when the matched value is known not to be a secret.
+
+Push Guard does not send data to any service. It does not phone home, collect
+telemetry, upload reports, write scan results by default, or retain copies of
+matched values.
+
+## Current Signals
+
+- GitHub classic token prefixes: `ghp_`, `gho_`, `ghu_`, `ghs_`, `ghr_`
+- GitHub fine-grained token prefix: `github_pat_`
+- OpenAI-style `sk-...` tokens
+- AWS access key IDs: `AKIA...` / `ASIA...`
+- private key block markers
+- generic long `api_key`, `token`, `secret`, or `password` assignments,
+  including underscore/dash-delimited names such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
+
+All evidence is redacted as `<redacted>`.
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pip install push-guard
+```
+
+## Install A Repo Hook
+
+Install per repository. Do not install globally.
+
+From the repository you want to protect:
+
+```sh
+push-guard install
+```
+
+If a `pre-push` hook already exists, Push Guard refuses to overwrite it. Preserve
+and chain existing hooks intentionally, or rerun with `--force` only when you are
+refreshing a Push Guard-managed hook.
+
+Manual hook body, for teams that prefer to wire hooks themselves:
+
+```sh
+#!/bin/sh
+exec python -m push_guard --repo "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+```
+
+## Run Manually
+
+The CLI expects Git `pre-push` input on stdin. Manual dry runs are best done from
+an actual hook or a test fixture.
+
+```sh
+python -m push_guard --repo /path/to/repo
+```
+
+## Known Limits
+
+- Pattern-based detection can miss secrets or flag non-secrets.
+- Long non-secret identifiers in assignments such as
+  `secret = mySuperLongFunctionCallHereWithNoSpaces` can match the generic
+  assignment rule.
+- If a hook is installed from a Git subdirectory, Git may resolve `--repo` to a
+  parent repository root. This is acceptable for current diff-only scanning, but
+  future path-relative features such as allowlists or report output must resolve
+  and document the canonical Git root first.
+- It blocks likely matches; it does not rotate exposed credentials.
+- If a real secret was committed, rotate from a clean context after removing it.
+- It should be treated as a seatbelt, not a guarantee.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.

push_guard-0.1.0/README.md

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+# Push Guard
+
+Push Guard is a local Git `pre-push` guard for likely secret leaks.
+
+It scans the content being pushed, reports likely secret patterns, redacts all
+matched values, and exits nonzero so Git blocks the push.
+
+> Built and maintained by Dragon Lady - [github.com/Dragon-Lady](https://github.com/Dragon-Lady) - X: [@answerislove2](https://x.com/answerislove2)
+
+## Posture
+
+- Local only.
+- No network calls.
+- No package installs.
+- No target file mutation.
+- No secret values printed.
+- No tokens, keys, secrets, credentials, file contents, repository contents, or
+  user data are saved by Push Guard.
+- Findings store only rule IDs, file paths, line numbers, reasons, and the
+  literal placeholder `<redacted>`.
+- Uses the `git` subprocess only to read commit diffs.
+- No mutation through Git and no other subprocess execution.
+- No claim that a repository is clean.
+
+Blocking a push is Git's response to the advisory. Push Guard remains read-only
+and does not mutate files. Override is available with `git push --no-verify`
+when the matched value is known not to be a secret.
+
+Push Guard does not send data to any service. It does not phone home, collect
+telemetry, upload reports, write scan results by default, or retain copies of
+matched values.
+
+## Current Signals
+
+- GitHub classic token prefixes: `ghp_`, `gho_`, `ghu_`, `ghs_`, `ghr_`
+- GitHub fine-grained token prefix: `github_pat_`
+- OpenAI-style `sk-...` tokens
+- AWS access key IDs: `AKIA...` / `ASIA...`
+- private key block markers
+- generic long `api_key`, `token`, `secret`, or `password` assignments,
+  including underscore/dash-delimited names such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
+
+All evidence is redacted as `<redacted>`.
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pip install push-guard
+```
+
+## Install A Repo Hook
+
+Install per repository. Do not install globally.
+
+From the repository you want to protect:
+
+```sh
+push-guard install
+```
+
+If a `pre-push` hook already exists, Push Guard refuses to overwrite it. Preserve
+and chain existing hooks intentionally, or rerun with `--force` only when you are
+refreshing a Push Guard-managed hook.
+
+Manual hook body, for teams that prefer to wire hooks themselves:
+
+```sh
+#!/bin/sh
+exec python -m push_guard --repo "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+```
+
+## Run Manually
+
+The CLI expects Git `pre-push` input on stdin. Manual dry runs are best done from
+an actual hook or a test fixture.
+
+```sh
+python -m push_guard --repo /path/to/repo
+```
+
+## Known Limits
+
+- Pattern-based detection can miss secrets or flag non-secrets.
+- Long non-secret identifiers in assignments such as
+  `secret = mySuperLongFunctionCallHereWithNoSpaces` can match the generic
+  assignment rule.
+- If a hook is installed from a Git subdirectory, Git may resolve `--repo` to a
+  parent repository root. This is acceptable for current diff-only scanning, but
+  future path-relative features such as allowlists or report output must resolve
+  and document the canonical Git root first.
+- It blocks likely matches; it does not rotate exposed credentials.
+- If a real secret was committed, rotate from a clean context after removing it.
+- It should be treated as a seatbelt, not a guarantee.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.

push_guard-0.1.0/pyproject.toml

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+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "push-guard"
+version = "0.1.0"
+description = "Local pre-push guard for likely secret leaks."
+readme = "README.md"
+requires-python = ">=3.11"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
+authors = [{ name = "Dragon Lady" }]
+keywords = ["git", "pre-push", "secrets", "security", "credentials", "developer-tools"]
+classifiers = [
+    "Development Status :: 3 - Alpha",
+    "Environment :: Console",
+    "Intended Audience :: Developers",
+    "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
+    "Topic :: Security",
+    "Topic :: Software Development :: Version Control :: Git",
+]
+
+[project.urls]
+Homepage = "https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard"
+Repository = "https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard"
+Issues = "https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard/issues"
+
+[project.scripts]
+push-guard = "push_guard.guard:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["src"]

push_guard-0.1.0/setup.cfg

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+[egg_info]
+tag_build = 
+tag_date = 0
+

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard/__init__.py

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+"""Push Guard public API."""
+
+from .guard import SecretFinding, scan_git_push, scan_text_for_secrets
+
+__all__ = ["SecretFinding", "scan_git_push", "scan_text_for_secrets"]

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard/__main__.py

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+from .guard import main
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard/guard.py

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+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+ZERO_SHA = "0" * 40
+
+PLACEHOLDER_WORDS = {
+    "changeme",
+    "example",
+    "placeholder",
+    "replace",
+    "sample",
+    "test",
+    "your",
+}
+
+# Each entry: (rule_id, pattern, reason, high_confidence)
+# high_confidence == True means the match is a provider-specific token *shape*
+# (ghp_, github_pat_, sk-, AKIA/ASIA). A value matching one of these is a real
+# secret even if it happens to contain a word like "test" or "your", so the
+# placeholder filter MUST NOT suppress it. Only low-confidence/structural
+# markers honor the placeholder filter.
+SECRET_PATTERNS = [
+    (
+        "secret.github_fine_grained_token",
+        re.compile(r"github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}"),
+        "GitHub fine-grained token pattern",
+        True,
+    ),
+    (
+        "secret.github_token",
+        re.compile(r"gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}"),
+        "GitHub token pattern",
+        True,
+    ),
+    (
+        "secret.openai_token",
+        re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
+        "OpenAI-style token pattern",
+        True,
+    ),
+    (
+        "secret.aws_access_key",
+        re.compile(r"\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b"),
+        "AWS access key pattern",
+        True,
+    ),
+    (
+        "secret.private_key",
+        re.compile(r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]*PRIVATE KEY-----"),
+        "Private key block marker",
+        False,
+    ),
+]
+
+# Keyword may be embedded in an underscore/dash-delimited identifier so that
+# names like AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY or CLIENT_SECRET_TOKEN are matched, not just
+# bare `secret=`. The negative lookbehind keeps the keyword on a real boundary
+# (start, space, `_`, `-`) instead of matching inside an unrelated word.
+GENERIC_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
+    r"(?i)(?<![A-Za-z0-9])"
+    r"(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|secret|password|passwd|pwd)"
+    r"(?:[_-][A-Za-z0-9]+)*"
+    r"\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?([^'\"\s]{20,})"
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SecretFinding:
+    rule_id: str
+    path: str
+    line: int
+    reason: str
+    evidence: str
+
+
+class PushGuardInspectionError(RuntimeError):
+    """Raised when Push Guard cannot inspect Git push content cleanly."""
+
+
+def scan_text_for_secrets(text: str, path: str = "<text>") -> list[SecretFinding]:
+    findings: list[SecretFinding] = []
+    for line_number, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
+        findings.extend(_scan_line(line, path, line_number))
+    return findings
+
+
+def scan_git_push(repo: str | Path, stdin_text: str) -> list[SecretFinding]:
+    repo_path = _resolve_git_root(Path(repo))
+    findings: list[SecretFinding] = []
+    for _local_ref, local_sha, _remote_ref, remote_sha in _parse_pre_push(stdin_text):
+        if local_sha == ZERO_SHA:
+            continue
+        diffs = _diffs_for_push_ref(repo_path, local_sha, remote_sha)
+        for diff_text in diffs:
+            findings.extend(_scan_diff(diff_text))
+    return findings
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    argv = sys.argv[1:] if argv is None else argv
+    if argv and argv[0] == "install":
+        return _install_main(argv[1:])
+    if argv and argv[0] in {"-h", "--help"}:
+        _print_help()
+        return 0
+
+    # Backward-compatible pre-push mode. Existing hooks call:
+    #   python -m push_guard --repo "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+    return _pre_push_main(argv)
+
+
+def _pre_push_main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog="push-guard",
+        description="Local pre-push secret guard. Blocks likely secret pushes.",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--repo",
+        default=".",
+        help="Repository path. Defaults to current directory.",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    stdin_text = sys.stdin.read()
+    try:
+        findings = scan_git_push(args.repo, stdin_text)
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        print("Push Guard could not inspect this push.", file=sys.stderr)
+        print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
+        print("Blocking push because inspection failed.", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    if not findings:
+        return 0
+
+    print("Push Guard blocked this push.", file=sys.stderr)
+    print("Likely secret material matched. Values are redacted.", file=sys.stderr)
+    for finding in findings:
+        print(
+            f"- {finding.rule_id} at {finding.path}:{finding.line} "
+            f"({finding.reason}; {finding.evidence})",
+            file=sys.stderr,
+        )
+    print("Review locally, remove or rotate the secret, then retry.", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 1
+
+
+def _install_main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog="push-guard install",
+        description="Install Push Guard as this repository's local pre-push hook.",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--repo",
+        default=".",
+        help="Repository path. Defaults to current directory.",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--force",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Replace an existing Push Guard-managed pre-push hook.",
+    )
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    try:
+        hook_path = install_pre_push_hook(args.repo, force=args.force)
+    except RuntimeError as exc:
+        print(f"Push Guard install failed: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    print(f"Push Guard installed: {hook_path}")
+    return 0
+
+
+def install_pre_push_hook(repo: str | Path = ".", *, force: bool = False) -> Path:
+    repo_path = _resolve_git_root(Path(repo))
+    hook_dir = repo_path / ".git" / "hooks"
+    hook_path = hook_dir / "pre-push"
+    hook_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
+    hook_body = _hook_body()
+    if hook_path.exists():
+        existing = hook_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace")
+        if existing == hook_body:
+            return hook_path
+        if "push_guard" not in existing and "push-guard" not in existing:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"{hook_path} already exists. Chain it manually or rerun with --force."
+            )
+        if not force:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"{hook_path} already exists. Rerun with --force to refresh it."
+            )
+
+    hook_path.write_text(hook_body, encoding="utf-8", newline="\n")
+    if os.name != "nt":
+        hook_path.chmod(0o755)
+    return hook_path
+
+
+def _hook_body() -> str:
+    return (
+        "#!/bin/sh\n"
+        "# Installed by Push Guard. Local only; no network calls.\n"
+        'exec python -m push_guard --repo "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"\n'
+    )
+
+
+def _print_help() -> None:
+    print(
+        "usage: push-guard [--repo REPO]\n"
+        "       push-guard install [--repo REPO] [--force]\n\n"
+        "Local pre-push secret guard. Run from a Git pre-push hook, or install\n"
+        "the hook with `push-guard install`."
+    )
+
+
+def _scan_line(line: str, path: str, line_number: int) -> list[SecretFinding]:
+    findings: list[SecretFinding] = []
+
+    for rule_id, pattern, reason, high_confidence in SECRET_PATTERNS:
+        for match in pattern.finditer(line):
+            # High-confidence provider token shapes are never suppressed by a
+            # placeholder word — a real ghp_/sk-/AKIA value that merely contains
+            # "test" or "your" is still a real secret and must be caught.
+            if not high_confidence and _looks_like_placeholder(match.group(0)):
+                continue
+            findings.append(
+                SecretFinding(
+                    rule_id=rule_id,
+                    path=path,
+                    line=line_number,
+                    reason=reason,
+                    evidence="<redacted>",
+                )
+            )
+
+    # Only consider the lower-confidence generic-assignment rule when no
+    # specific token already matched this line. This avoids double-reporting a
+    # single leak (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...) while still catching secrets that
+    # only the generic rule can see (e.g. a 40-char AWS *secret* in
+    # AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=..., which has no provider prefix).
+    if not findings:
+        match = GENERIC_ASSIGNMENT.search(line)
+        if match and not _value_is_placeholder(match.group(1)):
+            findings.append(
+                SecretFinding(
+                    rule_id="secret.generic_assignment",
+                    path=path,
+                    line=line_number,
+                    reason="High-entropy-looking secret assignment",
+                    evidence="<redacted>",
+                )
+            )
+
+    return findings
+
+
+def _looks_like_placeholder(value: str) -> bool:
+    """Substring check, used only for low-confidence/structural markers."""
+    lowered = value.lower()
+    return any(word in lowered for word in PLACEHOLDER_WORDS)
+
+
+def _value_is_placeholder(value: str) -> bool:
+    """True only when an assigned value is *dominated* by placeholder text.
+
+    The earlier behaviour skipped any value that merely *contained* a
+    placeholder word (e.g. a real secret embedding "test"), which silently let
+    secrets through. Now a value counts as a placeholder only when it is an
+    obvious dummy shape, stacks two or more placeholder words, or is left with
+    almost nothing real after the placeholder words are removed. This biases a
+    pre-push seatbelt toward blocking — a verbose dummy may be flagged for
+    review, but a real secret with an embedded common word is no longer missed.
+    """
+    lowered = value.lower()
+    # Bracketed dummies (<your-token>, [REDACTED]) or filler runs (xxxxxxxx).
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[<\[{(].*[>\]})]", value):
+        return True
+    if re.fullmatch(r"[x*._\-]{8,}", lowered):
+        return True
+    present = [word for word in PLACEHOLDER_WORDS if word in lowered]
+    if len(present) >= 2:
+        return True
+    residue = lowered
+    for word in present:
+        residue = residue.replace(word, "")
+    residue = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]", "", residue)
+    return len(residue) < 8
+
+
+def _parse_pre_push(stdin_text: str) -> list[tuple[str, str, str, str]]:
+    refs: list[tuple[str, str, str, str]] = []
+    for line in stdin_text.splitlines():
+        parts = line.split()
+        if len(parts) != 4:
+            continue
+        refs.append((parts[0], parts[1], parts[2], parts[3]))
+    return refs
+
+
+def _diffs_for_push_ref(repo: Path, local_sha: str, remote_sha: str) -> list[str]:
+    if remote_sha == ZERO_SHA:
+        commits = _run_git(
+            repo,
+            ["rev-list", "--reverse", local_sha, "--not", "--remotes"],
+        ).splitlines()
+        if not commits:
+            commits = [local_sha]
+        return [
+            _run_git(repo, ["show", "--format=", "--unified=0", "--no-ext-diff", commit])
+            for commit in commits
+        ]
+
+    return [
+        _run_git(
+            repo,
+            [
+                "diff",
+                "--unified=0",
+                "--no-ext-diff",
+                "--diff-filter=ACMRT",
+                remote_sha,
+                local_sha,
+            ],
+        )
+    ]
+
+
+def _scan_diff(diff_text: str) -> list[SecretFinding]:
+    findings: list[SecretFinding] = []
+    current_path = "<diff>"
+    new_line = 0
+    in_hunk = False
+    for line in diff_text.splitlines():
+        if line.startswith("+++ b/"):
+            current_path = line[6:]
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("@@"):
+            new_line = _parse_hunk_new_line(line)
+            in_hunk = True
+            continue
+        if not in_hunk:
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("+") and not line.startswith("+++"):
+            findings.extend(_scan_line(line[1:], current_path, max(new_line, 1)))
+            new_line += 1
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("-") and not line.startswith("---"):
+            continue
+        if line.startswith("\\ No newline"):
+            continue
+        new_line += 1
+    return findings
+
+
+def _parse_hunk_new_line(line: str) -> int:
+    match = re.search(r"\+(\d+)", line)
+    if not match:
+        return 0
+    return int(match.group(1))
+
+
+def _resolve_git_root(repo: Path) -> Path:
+    try:
+        completed = _run_rev_parse_show_toplevel(repo, repo)
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
+        dubious_root = _parse_dubious_ownership_root(exc.stderr)
+        if dubious_root:
+            try:
+                completed = _run_rev_parse_show_toplevel(repo, dubious_root)
+            except subprocess.CalledProcessError as retry_exc:
+                raise _git_inspection_error(
+                    "git rev-parse --show-toplevel", retry_exc
+                ) from retry_exc
+        else:
+            raise _git_inspection_error("git rev-parse --show-toplevel", exc) from exc
+
+    root = completed.stdout.strip()
+    if not root:
+        raise PushGuardInspectionError("git rev-parse --show-toplevel returned no path")
+    return Path(root)
+
+
+def _run_rev_parse_show_toplevel(
+    repo: Path, safe_directory: Path
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
+    return subprocess.run(
+        _git_command(repo, ["rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"], safe_directory),
+        check=True,
+        text=True,
+        encoding="utf-8",
+        errors="replace",
+        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+    )
+
+
+def _git_inspection_error(
+    command: str, exc: subprocess.CalledProcessError
+) -> PushGuardInspectionError:
+    stderr = _first_stderr_line(exc.stderr)
+    detail = f": {stderr}" if stderr else ""
+    return PushGuardInspectionError(
+        f"{command} failed with exit {exc.returncode}{detail}"
+    )
+
+
+def _parse_dubious_ownership_root(stderr: str | None) -> Path | None:
+    if not stderr or "dubious ownership" not in stderr:
+        return None
+    match = re.search(r"repository at '([^']+)'", stderr)
+    if not match:
+        return None
+    return Path(match.group(1))
+
+
+def _run_git(repo: Path, args: list[str]) -> str:
+    try:
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            _git_command(repo, args, repo),
+            check=True,
+            text=True,
+            encoding="utf-8",
+            errors="replace",
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
+            stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
+        )
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
+        stderr = _first_stderr_line(exc.stderr)
+        detail = f": {stderr}" if stderr else ""
+        raise PushGuardInspectionError(
+            f"git {' '.join(args)} failed with exit {exc.returncode}{detail}"
+        ) from exc
+    return completed.stdout
+
+
+def _git_command(repo: Path, args: list[str], safe_directory: Path) -> list[str]:
+    return [
+        "git",
+        "-c",
+        f"safe.directory={safe_directory}",
+        "-C",
+        str(repo),
+        *args,
+    ]
+
+
+def _first_stderr_line(stderr: str | None) -> str:
+    if not stderr:
+        return ""
+    for line in stderr.splitlines():
+        stripped = line.strip()
+        if stripped:
+            return stripped
+    return ""

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: push-guard
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Local pre-push guard for likely secret leaks.
+Author: Dragon Lady
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/Dragon-Lady/push-guard/issues
+Keywords: git,pre-push,secrets,security,credentials,developer-tools
+Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Version Control :: Git
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# Push Guard
+
+Push Guard is a local Git `pre-push` guard for likely secret leaks.
+
+It scans the content being pushed, reports likely secret patterns, redacts all
+matched values, and exits nonzero so Git blocks the push.
+
+> Built and maintained by Dragon Lady - [github.com/Dragon-Lady](https://github.com/Dragon-Lady) - X: [@answerislove2](https://x.com/answerislove2)
+
+## Posture
+
+- Local only.
+- No network calls.
+- No package installs.
+- No target file mutation.
+- No secret values printed.
+- No tokens, keys, secrets, credentials, file contents, repository contents, or
+  user data are saved by Push Guard.
+- Findings store only rule IDs, file paths, line numbers, reasons, and the
+  literal placeholder `<redacted>`.
+- Uses the `git` subprocess only to read commit diffs.
+- No mutation through Git and no other subprocess execution.
+- No claim that a repository is clean.
+
+Blocking a push is Git's response to the advisory. Push Guard remains read-only
+and does not mutate files. Override is available with `git push --no-verify`
+when the matched value is known not to be a secret.
+
+Push Guard does not send data to any service. It does not phone home, collect
+telemetry, upload reports, write scan results by default, or retain copies of
+matched values.
+
+## Current Signals
+
+- GitHub classic token prefixes: `ghp_`, `gho_`, `ghu_`, `ghs_`, `ghr_`
+- GitHub fine-grained token prefix: `github_pat_`
+- OpenAI-style `sk-...` tokens
+- AWS access key IDs: `AKIA...` / `ASIA...`
+- private key block markers
+- generic long `api_key`, `token`, `secret`, or `password` assignments,
+  including underscore/dash-delimited names such as `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`
+
+All evidence is redacted as `<redacted>`.
+
+## Install
+
+```sh
+pip install push-guard
+```
+
+## Install A Repo Hook
+
+Install per repository. Do not install globally.
+
+From the repository you want to protect:
+
+```sh
+push-guard install
+```
+
+If a `pre-push` hook already exists, Push Guard refuses to overwrite it. Preserve
+and chain existing hooks intentionally, or rerun with `--force` only when you are
+refreshing a Push Guard-managed hook.
+
+Manual hook body, for teams that prefer to wire hooks themselves:
+
+```sh
+#!/bin/sh
+exec python -m push_guard --repo "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)"
+```
+
+## Run Manually
+
+The CLI expects Git `pre-push` input on stdin. Manual dry runs are best done from
+an actual hook or a test fixture.
+
+```sh
+python -m push_guard --repo /path/to/repo
+```
+
+## Known Limits
+
+- Pattern-based detection can miss secrets or flag non-secrets.
+- Long non-secret identifiers in assignments such as
+  `secret = mySuperLongFunctionCallHereWithNoSpaces` can match the generic
+  assignment rule.
+- If a hook is installed from a Git subdirectory, Git may resolve `--repo` to a
+  parent repository root. This is acceptable for current diff-only scanning, but
+  future path-relative features such as allowlists or report output must resolve
+  and document the canonical Git root first.
+- It blocks likely matches; it does not rotate exposed credentials.
+- If a real secret was committed, rotate from a clean context after removing it.
+- It should be treated as a seatbelt, not a guarantee.
+
+## License
+
+Apache-2.0.

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+LICENSE
+README.md
+pyproject.toml
+src/push_guard/__init__.py
+src/push_guard/__main__.py
+src/push_guard/guard.py
+src/push_guard.egg-info/PKG-INFO
+src/push_guard.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
+src/push_guard.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
+src/push_guard.egg-info/entry_points.txt
+src/push_guard.egg-info/top_level.txt
+tests/test_guard.py

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard.egg-info/dependency_links.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard.egg-info/entry_points.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[console_scripts]
+push-guard = push_guard.guard:main

push_guard-0.1.0/src/push_guard.egg-info/top_level.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+push_guard

push_guard-0.1.0/tests/test_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+import unittest
+from io import StringIO
+from pathlib import Path
+from subprocess import CalledProcessError, CompletedProcess
+from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+from push_guard.guard import (
+    _resolve_git_root,
+    _scan_diff,
+    install_pre_push_hook,
+    main,
+    scan_text_for_secrets,
+)
+
+
+class PushGuardTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_detects_github_tokens_without_returning_secret_value(self):
+        secret = "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(f"token={secret}", path="example.env")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.github_token", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertEqual("example.env", findings[0].path)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+        self.assertIn("redacted", findings[0].evidence.lower())
+
+    def test_detects_github_fine_grained_token_without_returning_secret_value(self):
+        secret = "github_pat_11AAAAAAA0abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHI"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(secret, path="notes.txt")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.github_fine_grained_token", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_detects_private_key_block_without_returning_body(self):
+        text = (
+            "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+            "abc123abc123abc123abc123\n"
+            "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+        )
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(text, path="id_key")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.private_key", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn("abc123abc123abc123abc123", findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_detects_openai_style_token_without_returning_secret_value(self):
+        secret = "sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEF"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(f"OPENAI_API_KEY={secret}", path=".env")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.openai_token", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_detects_aws_access_key_without_returning_secret_value(self):
+        secret = "AKIAABCDEFGHIJKLMNOP"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(f"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID={secret}", path=".env")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.aws_access_key", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_detects_generic_secret_assignment_without_returning_secret_value(self):
+        secret = "superlongsecretvalue1234567890"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(f"api_key = '{secret}'", path="config.py")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.generic_assignment", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_ignores_obvious_placeholders(self):
+        text = "\n".join(
+            [
+                "api_key=YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
+                "token=example-token-placeholder",
+                "password=changeme",
+            ]
+        )
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(text, path="README.md")
+
+        self.assertEqual([], findings)
+
+    def test_specific_token_is_not_hidden_by_placeholder_comment(self):
+        secret = "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(
+            f'token = "{secret}"  # test this config',
+            path="config.py",
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.github_token", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_token_shape_with_embedded_placeholder_word_is_detected(self):
+        # A real ghp_ token whose own characters contain "test" must NOT be
+        # suppressed by the placeholder filter (the original false-negative).
+        secret = "ghp_test" + "a" * 30
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(secret, path="config.py")
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.github_token", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_detects_underscored_secret_assignment(self):
+        # AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY holds a 40-ish char secret with no provider
+        # prefix; only the generic rule can see it, and the underscores must not
+        # hide the `secret` keyword.
+        secret = "abcdEFGH1234ijklMNOP5678qrstUVWX"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(
+            f"AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY={secret}", path=".env"
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.generic_assignment", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_generic_secret_with_embedded_common_word_is_not_skipped(self):
+        secret = "mytestpasswordABCDEF1234567890"
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(
+            f"password = '{secret}'", path="config.py"
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("secret.generic_assignment", findings[0].rule_id)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, findings[0].evidence)
+
+    def test_verbose_dummy_placeholder_value_is_still_ignored(self):
+        findings = scan_text_for_secrets(
+            "api_key = 'your-api-key-here-please-replace'", path="README.md"
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual([], findings)
+
+    def test_scan_diff_reports_added_secret_path_and_line(self):
+        secret = "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ"
+        diff_text = "\n".join(
+            [
+                "diff --git a/config.py b/config.py",
+                "index 1111111..2222222 100644",
+                "--- a/config.py",
+                "+++ b/config.py",
+                "@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@",
+                " context line one",
+                " context line two",
+                f"+token = '{secret}'",
+            ]
+        )
+
+        findings = _scan_diff(diff_text)
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(findings))
+        self.assertEqual("config.py", findings[0].path)
+        self.assertEqual(12, findings[0].line)
+
+    def test_resolve_git_root_canonicalizes_nested_repo_path(self):
+        nested = Path("C:/Users/tanya/dragoneye")
+        root = "C:/Users/tanya"
+
+        with patch(
+            "push_guard.guard.subprocess.run",
+            return_value=CompletedProcess(
+                args=["git"],
+                returncode=0,
+                stdout=f"{root}\n",
+                stderr="",
+            ),
+        ) as run:
+            resolved = _resolve_git_root(nested)
+
+        self.assertEqual(Path(root), resolved)
+        run.assert_called_once_with(
+            [
+                "git",
+                "-c",
+                f"safe.directory={nested}",
+                "-C",
+                str(nested),
+                "rev-parse",
+                "--show-toplevel",
+            ],
+            check=True,
+            text=True,
+            encoding="utf-8",
+            errors="replace",
+            stdout=-1,
+            stderr=-1,
+        )
+
+    def test_resolve_git_root_retries_dubious_ownership_root(self):
+        nested = Path("C:/Users/tanya/dragoneye")
+        root = Path("C:/Users/tanya")
+        dubious = CalledProcessError(
+            returncode=128,
+            cmd=["git"],
+            stderr=(
+                "fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at "
+                "'C:/Users/tanya'\n"
+            ),
+        )
+
+        with patch(
+            "push_guard.guard.subprocess.run",
+            side_effect=[
+                dubious,
+                CompletedProcess(
+                    args=["git"],
+                    returncode=0,
+                    stdout=f"{root}\n",
+                    stderr="",
+                ),
+            ],
+        ) as run:
+            resolved = _resolve_git_root(nested)
+
+        self.assertEqual(root, resolved)
+        self.assertEqual(2, run.call_count)
+        self.assertIn(f"safe.directory={root}", run.call_args_list[1].args[0])
+
+    def test_main_blocks_and_reports_redacted_findings(self):
+        secret = "ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJ"
+        finding_diff = "\n".join(
+            [
+                "diff --git a/config.py b/config.py",
+                "--- a/config.py",
+                "+++ b/config.py",
+                "@@ -1,0 +1,1 @@",
+                f"+token = '{secret}'",
+            ]
+        )
+
+        with (
+            patch("push_guard.guard._diffs_for_push_ref", return_value=[finding_diff]),
+            patch("sys.stdin", StringIO("refs/heads/main abc refs/heads/main def\n")),
+            patch("sys.stderr", new_callable=StringIO) as stderr,
+        ):
+            exit_code = main(["--repo", "."])
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, exit_code)
+        output = stderr.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("blocked this push", output)
+        self.assertIn("<redacted>", output)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, output)
+
+    def test_main_reports_clean_git_inspection_error_without_traceback(self):
+        with (
+            patch(
+                "push_guard.guard._diffs_for_push_ref",
+                side_effect=RuntimeError("git diff failed"),
+            ),
+            patch("sys.stdin", StringIO("refs/heads/main abc refs/heads/main def\n")),
+            patch("sys.stderr", new_callable=StringIO) as stderr,
+        ):
+            exit_code = main(["--repo", "."])
+
+        self.assertEqual(1, exit_code)
+        output = stderr.getvalue()
+        self.assertIn("could not inspect this push", output)
+        self.assertIn("Blocking push because inspection failed", output)
+        self.assertNotIn("Traceback", output)
+
+    def test_install_pre_push_hook_writes_local_hook(self):
+        with TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            repo = Path(tmpdir)
+            (repo / ".git" / "hooks").mkdir(parents=True)
+
+            with patch("push_guard.guard._resolve_git_root", return_value=repo):
+                hook = install_pre_push_hook(repo)
+
+            self.assertEqual(repo / ".git" / "hooks" / "pre-push", hook)
+            body = hook.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            self.assertIn("python -m push_guard", body)
+            self.assertIn("--repo", body)
+
+    def test_install_pre_push_hook_refuses_unmanaged_existing_hook(self):
+        with TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
+            repo = Path(tmpdir)
+            hook_dir = repo / ".git" / "hooks"
+            hook_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+            hook = hook_dir / "pre-push"
+            hook.write_text("#!/bin/sh\necho existing\n", encoding="utf-8")
+
+            with (
+                patch("push_guard.guard._resolve_git_root", return_value=repo),
+                self.assertRaises(RuntimeError),
+            ):
+                install_pre_push_hook(repo)
+
+            self.assertEqual("#!/bin/sh\necho existing\n", hook.read_text())