proofctl 0.3.1__tar.gz → 0.4.0__tar.gz

proofctl-0.4.0/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: proofctl
+Version: 0.4.0
+Summary: Zero-dependency linter for Python, Terraform, Dockerfiles, Kubernetes, and GitHub Actions — catches AI slop and security misconfigurations pre-commit
+Author-email: Kolawolu Odunola <kolawolu.o@gmail.com>
+License: MIT
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl
+Project-URL: Bug Tracker, https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl/issues
+Keywords: linter,security,terraform,kubernetes,ai,static-analysis,pre-commit
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: Environment :: Console
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Quality Assurance
+Classifier: Topic :: Security
+Requires-Python: >=3.11
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: typer[all]>=0.12
+Requires-Dist: rich>=13
+Requires-Dist: pyyaml>=6
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: pytest-mock>=3; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# proofctl
+
+A linter built for the DevOps stack — Python, Terraform, Kubernetes, Helm, Dockerfiles, GitHub Actions, Shell — that catches the specific kinds of mistakes AI coding tools introduce. **264 rules**, zero dependencies, runs in under a second.
+
+```
+proofctl check .
+```
+
+```
+PROOFCTL-S-001     module/auth.py:42                 SQL injection via string format in .execute()           ERROR
+PROOFCTL-Q-001     module/models.py:17               Mutable default argument — list assigned at def time    ERROR
+PROOFCTL-S-AI-006  module/loaders.py:88              Empty `except Exception:` swallows all errors silently  WARNING
+PROOFCTL-TF-A024   infra/sg.tf:14                    SG rule 0.0.0.0/0 ingress on port 22                    ERROR
+PROOFCTL-YAML-022  k8s/deployment.yaml:8             Workload uses default namespace                         WARNING
+PROOFCTL-YAML-007  .github/workflows/release.yml:23  Action not pinned to SHA                                ERROR
+PROOFCTL-SECRET-001 infra/lambda.tf:8                AWS access key (AKIA...)                                ERROR
+──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+7 findings (4 ERROR, 3 WARNING) — exit 2
+```
+
+---
+
+## Why proofctl
+
+LLM coding assistants ship code that compiles and looks correct but fails in predictable ways:
+
+- **Insecure** — SQL/command injection, hardcoded credentials, weak crypto, JWT signature bypass, public S3 buckets, K8s default namespaces.
+- **Broken** — hallucinated imports, phantom methods, type-hint vs implementation mismatch, `pass`-bodied functions shipped as real implementations.
+- **Fragile** — broad `except Exception:`, no timeouts, mutable defaults, defensive guards for impossible states, unused configuration kwargs.
+- **Wasteful** — single-method classes that should be functions, near-duplicate files, sprawling kwargs surface.
+
+proofctl runs as a pre-commit linter and catches these patterns before they merge. The rule set is **measured**, not just intuited — see [proofctl-eval/BENCHMARK.md](https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl-eval/blob/main/BENCHMARK.md) for per-rule signal-lift numbers across:
+
+- 17 paired AI-vs-human prompts (Layer D)
+- 788 real AI-attributed commits across 107 individual hobbyist Python repos + 153 individual infrastructure repos (Layer E)
+- 42 hand-labeled slop scenarios (Layer F)
+
+The top-firing rules on real AI-authored production code are **Q-002 broad except**, **Q-005 complexity**, **Q-006 long functions**, **YAML-007/GHA-006 GitHub Actions hygiene**, and **YAML-GHA-003 missing permissions** — confirmed across both synth and real-world corpora.
+
+---
+
+## What proofctl scans
+
+| Language | What it catches |
+|---|---|
+| Python | Security (SQLi, injection, eval, JWT bypass, weak crypto), quality (mutable defaults, broad except, complexity, long functions), AI-slop patterns (echo docstrings, single-method classes, stale kwargs), import hallucinations |
+| Terraform / HCL | AWS / GCP / Azure resource hardening (200+ rules across IAM, encryption, public exposure, audit logs), AI-slop patterns (deprecated resources, AWS region in GCP, placeholder values), required_version, sensitive outputs |
+| Kubernetes YAML | Pod Security Standards (runAsNonRoot, allowPrivilegeEscalation, readOnlyRootFilesystem, drop ALL caps, seccomp), data-exfiltration vectors (default namespace, hostPath, low UID, RBAC wildcards, automountServiceAccountToken), image hygiene (latest tag, digest pinning) |
+| Helm / Mustache | Same K8s checks via Helm-templated YAML |
+| Dockerfile | USER, base image pinning, secret leakage, root-running, OCI labels, HEALTHCHECK, AI-generated antipatterns |
+| GitHub Actions | SHA-pinning, expression injection, missing permissions, missing timeouts, secret env-var leakage |
+| Shell | Common mistake detection (set -euo, dangerous globbing) |
+| Secrets (any text file) | AWS / GCP / GitHub / Slack / Stripe / private keys / JWTs / hardcoded passwords / K8s Secret YAML / HCL heredocs |
+
+---
+
+## Installation
+
+```bash
+pip install proofctl
+```
+
+**Requires:** Python 3.11+
+
+No project dependencies are added — proofctl only scans, never imports your code.
+
+---
+
+## Quick start
+
+```bash
+proofctl check .                          # scan current directory
+proofctl check src/api/auth.py            # scan a single file
+proofctl check . --min-severity ERROR     # only show ERROR
+proofctl check . --fail-on ERROR          # CI gate: exit non-zero only on ERROR
+proofctl check . --changed-only           # only files changed in this branch
+proofctl check . --families S,Q,SECRET    # restrict rule families
+proofctl check . --format html --output report.html
+proofctl rules                            # list all rules
+```
+
+---
+
+## Pre-commit integration
+
+```yaml
+# .pre-commit-config.yaml
+repos:
+  - repo: https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl
+    rev: v0.3.1
+    hooks:
+      - id: proofctl
+```
+
+Or local:
+
+```yaml
+repos:
+  - repo: local
+    hooks:
+      - id: proofctl
+        name: proofctl
+        language: system
+        entry: proofctl check
+        args: [--no-pypi, --fail-on, ERROR]
+        pass_filenames: false
+```
+
+---
+
+## CI integration (GitHub Actions)
+
+```yaml
+name: proofctl
+on: [push, pull_request]
+
+jobs:
+  proofctl:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - run: pip install proofctl
+
+      # --new-only compares against the committed baseline snapshot —
+      # CI fails only on regressions introduced in this PR.
+      - run: proofctl check . --no-pypi --fail-on ERROR --new-only
+
+      - name: Generate HTML report
+        if: failure()
+        run: proofctl check . --no-pypi --format html --output proofctl-report.html || true
+
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        if: failure()
+        with:
+          name: proofctl-report
+          path: proofctl-report.html
+          retention-days: 14
+```
+
+Create a baseline snapshot for an existing project so CI only flags regressions:
+
+```bash
+proofctl baseline .
+git add .proofctl-baseline.json
+git commit -m "chore: add proofctl baseline"
+```
+
+---
+
+## Rules — 255 total across 14 families
+
+### Python — Quality (17 rules)
+
+| Rule | Severity | Catches |
+|------|----------|---------|
+| Q-001 | ERROR | Mutable default argument |
+| Q-002 | ERROR/WARNING | Bare or broad `except` with no re-raise (top AI-slop wedge — measured) |
+| Q-003 | WARNING | Excessive `Any` or unexplained `# type: ignore` |
+| Q-004 | INFO | Single-implementation abstraction |
+| Q-005 | WARNING/ERROR | Cyclomatic complexity (>10 / >20) |
+| Q-006 | WARNING/ERROR | Function body too long (>50 / >100 lines) |
+| Q-007 | WARNING/ERROR | Too many parameters (>5 / >7) |
+| Q-008 | WARNING | Boolean literal as positional argument |
+| Q-009 | INFO | `print()` in non-test code |
+| Q-AI-001 | WARNING | Confabulated enum error message ("must be one of [a,b,c]" without membership check) |
+| Q-AI-002 | ERROR | Return-type annotation contradicts return value (`-> int: return f"x: {x}"`) |
+| Q-AI-003 | WARNING | Stale parameter not forwarded to inner call |
+| Q-AI-004 | INFO | Single-method class (over-engineered abstraction) |
+| Q-AI-005 | WARNING | Defensive guard for impossible state |
+| Q-AI-006 | WARNING/ERROR | `except Exception: pass` — generic exception swallow |
+| Q-AI-007 | INFO | Sprawling unused kwargs (4+ defaulted, ≥2 unreferenced) |
+| Q-AI-008 | INFO | Verbose echo docstring on trivial accessor |
+
+### Python — Security (24 rules)
+
+| Rule | Severity | Catches | Authority |
+|------|----------|---------|-----------|
+| S-001 | ERROR | SQL injection via string formatting | OWASP A03, CWE-89 |
+| S-002 | ERROR | Command injection (`shell=True`) | OWASP A03, CWE-78 |
+| S-003 | ERROR | Unsafe deserialization | OWASP A08, CWE-502 |
+| S-004 | ERROR | Weak crypto (md5/sha1 — `hashlib.md5`, `from hashlib import md5`, `Crypto.Hash.MD5.new()`) | OWASP A02, CWE-327 |
+| S-005 | ERROR | `eval()`/`exec()` on non-literal input | CWE-95 |
+| S-006 | WARNING | Missing `timeout=` on HTTP calls | CWE-400 |
+| S-007 | ERROR | JWT signature bypass | OWASP A07 |
+| S-008 | ERROR | Path traversal — extends to `os.remove`, `shutil.*`, `tarfile`, `zipfile`, archive `extractall` | CWE-22 |
+| S-009 | ERROR | Insecure UUID for security tokens | CWE-338 |
+| S-010 | WARNING | Info exposure — `traceback.format_exc()` / `str(e)` in responses + secrets in logs | OWASP A09, CWE-200 |
+| S-011 | ERROR/WARNING | Insecure cipher mode (ECB, ARC4, TripleDES) + RSA/DSA keysize <2048 + static IV | OWASP A02 |
+| S-012 | WARNING | Regex injection / ReDoS | CWE-625 |
+| S-013 | WARNING | Open redirect — Flask/Django/FastAPI `redirect()` + `Location` header from user input | CWE-601 |
+| S-014 | ERROR | TLS verification disabled (`verify=False`) | OWASP A02, CWE-295 |
+| S-015 | WARNING | `random.*` used for security-sensitive value | CWE-338 |
+| S-016 | WARNING/INFO | Subprocess with partial executable path | CWE-426 |
+| **S-017** | ERROR | **XSS** — request taint into HTML sinks (Flask f-string return, HTMLResponse, `mark_safe`/`Markup`) | OWASP A03, CWE-79 |
+| **S-018** | ERROR | **SSRF** — request taint into HTTP-client URLs (requests/httpx/urllib) | OWASP A10, CWE-918 |
+| **S-019** | WARNING | **Unrestricted file upload** — Flask `request.files.save()` without `secure_filename` + extension allowlist | OWASP A04, CWE-434 |
+| **S-020** | ERROR | **Insufficiently protected creds** — password in URL / HTTP basic auth / plaintext into DB | OWASP A02, CWE-522 |
+| **S-021** | WARNING | **Incorrect file permissions** — `chmod(0o777|0o666)`, `umask(0)` | CWE-732 |
+| **S-022** | ERROR | **XPath injection** — f-string / `%` / `+` into `xpath()` / `lxml.etree.XPath` | OWASP A03, CWE-643 |
+| **S-023** | WARNING | **CSRF** — `@csrf_exempt` on POST handler | OWASP A01, CWE-352 |
+| **S-024** | WARNING | **Missing authorization** — admin/internal/delete paths without auth decorator | OWASP A01, CWE-862 |
+
+### Secrets (13 rules) — scans every text file
+
+| Rule | Severity | Catches |
+|------|----------|---------|
+| SECRET-001 | ERROR | AWS access key (`AKIA...`) |
+| SECRET-002 | ERROR | AWS secret key |
+| SECRET-003 | ERROR | GitHub token (`ghp_*`, `gho_*`, `ghs_*`) |
+| SECRET-004 | ERROR | Slack token (`xoxb/p/o/a-...`) |
+| SECRET-005 | ERROR | Private key marker (`-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----`) |
+| SECRET-006 | WARNING | JWT token |
+| SECRET-007 | ERROR | Generic high-entropy `password=`/`secret=`/`api_key=` assignment — Python AST visitor catches kwargs in calls, module-level `*_PASSWORD = "..."`, tuple-auth `auth=("u", "p")` |
+| SECRET-008 | ERROR | Google API key (`AIza...`) |
+| SECRET-009 | ERROR | Stripe key (`sk_live_*`, `pk_live_*`) |
+| SECRET-010 | ERROR | Hashicorp Terraform admin password (`administrator_login_password`) |
+| SECRET-011 | ERROR | `kind: Secret` YAML with non-empty `data:` / `stringData:` |
+| SECRET-012 | ERROR | Secret patterns inside HCL heredocs (`user_data = <<EOF`) |
+| **SECRET-013** | ERROR | **Connection string with embedded credentials** (`postgres://user:pass@host`, mysql, redis, mongodb, amqp, sqlserver) |
+
+### Python — Other (12 rules)
+
+| Family | Rules | What it covers |
+|---|---|---|
+| Placeholder (P) | P-001..003 | Unimplemented functions, TODOs, commented-out code |
+| Leakage (L) | L-001..003 | JS-in-Python idioms, PII patterns, cross-language slop |
+| Imports (I) | I-001, I-002 | Hallucinated imports, high-risk packages |
+| Methods (M) | M-001 | Method too complex |
+| Variants (V) | V-001, V-002 | Near-duplicate functions / files |
+| LLM Guardrails (LLM) | LLM-001..005 | OWASP LLM Top-10 (prompt injection, max_tokens, agent loops) |
+
+### Terraform — General + AI-slop (15 + 11 rules)
+
+`TF-T001..T015`: required_version constraints, sensitive outputs, hardcoded secrets, wildcard IAM, mutable git refs, etc.
+
+`TF-AI-001..011`: placeholder values, AWS region in GCP, deprecated resource types (`aws_alb` → `aws_lb`), inline lifecycle blocks removed in provider v4, etc. (AI-specific patterns no other linter looks for)
+
+### Terraform — AWS (40 rules)
+
+`TF-A001..A040`. Highlights:
+
+- **A001** EC2 IMDSv2 not enforced
+- **A002** S3 missing public-access-block
+- **A007** EBS not encrypted
+- **A012** VPC missing flow logs
+- **A015** KMS rotation not enabled
+- **A016** IAM policy with wildcard Resource/Action
+- **A017–A023** RDS hardening (encryption, IAM auth, deletion protection, audit logs)
+- **A024** SG rule with `0.0.0.0/0` ingress on sensitive ports
+- **A025** EKS public endpoint without CIDR restriction
+- **A027** Neptune cluster unencrypted
+- **A029** DynamoDB without `server_side_encryption`
+- **A030** ElastiCache transit/at-rest encryption disabled
+- **A034** IAM policy attached directly to user
+- **A035** IAM role with wildcard Principal
+- **A036/A037** CloudTrail validation / multi-region
+- **A038** Default SG with non-empty rules
+- **A039** Subnet auto-assigns public IP
+- **A040** Neptune cluster without CMK
+
+### Terraform — GCP (50+ rules)
+
+`TF-G001..G046`. Highlights:
+
+- **G001..G016** GKE hardening (auto-repair, node pool config, network policy, master auth networks, binary auth)
+- **G017–G019** GCS public access prevention, uniform access, versioning
+- **G020** `google_service_account_key` (key in TF state)
+- **G021/G026** Broad IAM roles / `allUsers` IAM bindings
+- **G023..G025** KMS rotation, prevent_destroy, destroy window
+- **G027/G028** Cloud Function / Cloud Run with public access
+- **G029** Subnet missing VPC Flow Logs
+- **G030** BigQuery dataset with public access
+- **G031** Pub/Sub without CMEK
+- **G032/G033** GCS access logging, private_ip_google_access
+- **G034..G041** GKE deep (legacy ABAC, private nodes, metadata server, secure boot, default SA)
+- **G042..G046** Compute firewall public ingress, Cloud SQL SSL, public IPs, IP forwarding
+
+### Terraform — Azure (14 rules)
+
+`TF-AZ001..AZ014`. Storage public blob, SQL public network, SSL enforcement, AKS IP/RBAC, Key Vault purge protection, role wildcards, App Service HTTPS, VM encryption-at-host, NSG SSH/RDP from internet, managed disk CMK.
+
+### Terraform — Mechanics + Lifecycle (12 rules)
+
+`TF-M001..M007`: SG inline-vs-rule mixing, `force_destroy`, `prevent_destroy`, mutable module refs, etc.
+`TF-V001..V005`: lifecycle antipatterns.
+
+### Terragrunt (6 rules)
+
+`TG-001..TG-006`: `var.*` in HCL inputs, missing `mock_outputs`, invalid `if_exists`, unencrypted remote state.
+
+### Dockerfile (15 rules)
+
+`DF-001..DF-010` plus AI-specific `DF-AI-002..005`. Covers latest tags, root user, secret leakage, `--no-install-recommends`, OCI labels, `HEALTHCHECK`, legacy `ENV KEY VALUE` form.
+
+### Kubernetes YAML (26 rules)
+
+`YAML-001..018, 022..026`. Pod Security Standards, hostPath, default namespace, image digest pinning, runAsUser, RBAC wildcards, NET_RAW. `YAML-AI-001..006` covers removed K8s API versions and deprecated annotations.
+
+### GitHub Actions (`YAML-GHA-*`)
+
+SHA pinning, expression injection, missing permissions, secret env-var leakage, missing timeouts. **Top wedge family on infrastructure repos** per BENCHMARK.md — AI tools writing CI workflows consistently miss these.
+
+### Shell (8 rules)
+
+`SH-001..008`. Dangerous globbing, missing `set -euo pipefail`, etc.
+
+For a complete machine-readable list:
+
+```bash
+proofctl rules
+proofctl rules --family TF
+proofctl rules --severity ERROR
+```
+
+---
+
+## Suppressing findings
+
+Inline (single line):
+
+```python
+result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)  # proofctl: ignore[PROOFCTL-S-002]
+```
+
+```hcl
+resource "aws_s3_bucket" "logs" {
+  acl = "public-read"  # proofctl: ignore[PROOFCTL-TF-AI-003]  // or # comment style
+}
+```
+
+Project-wide in `.proofctl.yaml`:
+
+```yaml
+disable:
+  - PROOFCTL-Q-004
+```
+
+---
+
+## Configuration
+
+Place `.proofctl.yaml` in the project root:
+
+```yaml
+exclude_paths:
+  - "**/.venv/**"
+  - "**/migrations/**"
+  - "**/.terraform/**"
+
+disable:
+  - PROOFCTL-Q-004
+  - PROOFCTL-DF-AI-002
+
+severity_overrides:
+  PROOFCTL-P-002: ERROR   # promote TODOs to ERROR
+
+rules:
+  PROOFCTL-P-002:
+    allowed_formats:
+      - 'TODO\(#\d+\)'    # allow TODO(#123) format
+    exclude_paths:
+      - tests/
+
+  PROOFCTL-Q-003:
+    any_threshold: 5
+
+  PROOFCTL-V-002:
+    similarity_threshold: 0.85
+    min_file_lines: 30
+
+  PROOFCTL-I-001:
+    local_namespaces:
+      - mycompany_
+      - internal_
+
+  PROOFCTL-TF-T013:
+    required_labels:
+      - environment
+      - team
+      - cost_center
+```
+
+---
+
+## Commands
+
+### `proofctl check`
+
+```
+proofctl check [PATH] [OPTIONS]
+
+Options:
+  --format / -f        terminal | json | html           (default: terminal)
+  --output / -o        Write report to file
+  --changed-only       Only scan git-changed files
+  --families           P,Q,S,L,I,M,V,LLM,TF,TG,DF,YAML,SH,SECRET
+  --min-severity       INFO | WARNING | ERROR
+  --fail-on            Exit non-zero at this severity (default: WARNING)
+  --no-pypi            Skip PyPI lookups (faster, works offline)
+  --new-only           Suppress findings present in .proofctl-baseline.json
+  --fix                Auto-fix fixable findings (Q-001 mutable defaults)
+```
+
+### `proofctl baseline`
+
+Snapshot the current findings so future `--new-only` runs only surface regressions.
+
+```bash
+proofctl baseline .
+git add .proofctl-baseline.json && git commit -m "chore: proofctl baseline"
+```
+
+### `proofctl rules`
+
+```bash
+proofctl rules                 # list all
+proofctl rules --family S      # filter by family
+proofctl rules --severity ERROR
+```
+
+---
+
+## Exit codes
+
+| Code | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| `0` | No findings |
+| `1` | Findings present, none at or above `--fail-on` threshold |
+| `2` | One or more findings at or above `--fail-on` threshold |
+
+---
+
+## Output formats
+
+**Terminal** (default) — rich-coloured table with file:line, rule, severity, hint.
+
+**JSON** — machine-readable for CI:
+
+```json
+{
+  "schema_version": 1,
+  "summary": { "total": 4, "ERROR": 3, "WARNING": 1 },
+  "findings": [
+    {
+      "file": "module/auth.py",
+      "line": 42,
+      "col": 8,
+      "rule_id": "PROOFCTL-S-001",
+      "rule_name": "SQL injection",
+      "severity": "ERROR",
+      "message": "SQL injection via string format in .execute()",
+      "hint": "Use parameterised queries: cursor.execute(sql, params)",
+      "authority": "OWASP A03:2021, CWE-89"
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+**HTML** — self-contained single-file dashboard with severity summary cards and a filterable table.
+
+---
+
+## How proofctl rules earn their place
+
+Rules in proofctl don't ship on intuition. The companion repo [proofctl-eval](https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl-eval) measures every rule's per-rule **signal lift** — fire rate on AI-generated code divided by fire rate on human-written reference code — across three corpora:
+
+- **Layer D** Synthesised: 17 paired prompts × Claude Sonnet 4.5 vs hand-written reference. Cheap to refresh (~$0.10), useful for catching anti-signal patterns.
+- **Layer E** Real: 788 real AI-attributed commits across 107 individual hobby Python repos + 153 individual infrastructure repos. Diff-against-parent gives clean attribution of what AI introduced. The gold-standard corpus.
+- **Layer F** Goats: 42 hand-labeled scenarios where we know which rules *should* fire. Recall test bed.
+
+A rule with **lift ≥ 5×** is an AI-slop wedge — it fires disproportionately on AI output. A rule with lift `< 1×` fires more on humans (anti-signal — usually indicates a bug). The benchmark is rerun on every release; rules with collapsed lift get demoted, anti-signal rules get debugged.
+
+Top measured wedges on real production AI commits (Layer E, May 2026):
+
+| Rule | What it catches | Real-world fires |
+|---|---|---|
+| Q-002 | Broad except handler | +7 / 200 commits |
+| Q-005 | Cyclomatic complexity | +6 |
+| Q-006 | Function too long | +5 |
+| Q-007 | Too many parameters | +4 |
+| YAML-007 | GHA action not SHA-pinned | +7 |
+| YAML-GHA-006 | GHA missing timeout-minutes | +7 |
+| YAML-GHA-003 | GHA missing/permissive permissions | +6 |
+| Q-AI-006 | Generic exception swallow | +3 |
+| Q-AI-004 | Single-method class | +1 |
+
+See [BENCHMARK.md](https://github.com/kolawoluu/proofctl-eval/blob/main/BENCHMARK.md) for full numbers and methodology.
+
+---
+
+## License
+
+MIT