proofbundle 3.0.0__tar.gz → 3.0.1__tar.gz

{proofbundle-3.0.0/src/proofbundle.egg-info → proofbundle-3.0.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: proofbundle
-Version: 3.0.0
+Version: 3.0.1
 Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
 Author: Konrad Gruszka
 License: MIT
@@ -75,12 +75,28 @@ Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
 [![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
 [![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
 [![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
-<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+[![PyPI attestations](https://img.shields.io/badge/PyPI-PEP_740_attested-D6248A.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/#files)
+[![SLSA provenance](https://img.shields.io/badge/SLSA-build_provenance-D6248A.svg)](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance)
 
 **Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
 
 </div>
 
+## Contents
+
+- [60-second try](#60-second-try-offline)
+- [Inspect-native?](#inspect-native-metr-task-standard-uk-aisi-ecosystem)
+- [The problem](#the-problem)
+- [What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't](#what-a-receipt-proves-and-what-it-doesnt)
+- [How it fits together](#how-it-fits-together)
+- [Post-quantum posture](#post-quantum-posture-honest-two-layers)
+- [What's in the box](#whats-in-the-box)
+- [Docs](#docs)
+- [Install](#install)
+- [Status, scope and roadmap](#status-scope-and-roadmap)
+- [Contributing](#contributing)
+- [License](#license)
+
 ## 60-second try (offline)
 
 ```bash
@@ -91,21 +107,9 @@ git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
 pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
 ```
 
-## The problem
-
-Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
-**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
-was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
-
-proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
-depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
-receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
-
-## What the demo shows
-
-You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
-a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
-so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+The demo runs entirely in memory: an honest receipt verifies `=> OK`, six independent tampers each
+verify `FAILED`, and a swapped sample gets caught. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper
+slips through, so it doubles as a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
 
 ```bash
 # verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verifica
 proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
 ```
 
-## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard, UK-AISI ecosystem)
 
 The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
 reproducible offline in minutes:
@@ -135,7 +139,22 @@ In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthr
 **[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
 **[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
 
-## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+In plain language: a proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result. It shows
+who claimed the number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was
+good — the way a cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there
+is nothing to check at all.
+
+## What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't
 
 | ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
 |---|---|
@@ -149,6 +168,21 @@ This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributab
 and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
 **[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
 
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
 ## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
 
 proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
@@ -173,28 +207,6 @@ On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (
 (`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
 roadmap.
 
-## In plain language
-
-A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
-number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
-cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
-check at all.
-
-## How it fits together
-
-*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
-
-```mermaid
-flowchart LR
-    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
-    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
-    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
-    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
-    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
-    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-```
-
 ## What's in the box
 
 - **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
@@ -285,7 +297,7 @@ pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witnes
 Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
 `cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
 
-## Status & scope
+## Status, scope and roadmap
 
 Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
@@ -293,6 +305,13 @@ is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its ow
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
 [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
 
+**Roadmap (stated honestly, all forward-looking):**
+
+- A post-quantum *payload* signature (crypto-agility for the receipt itself) is on the roadmap; today the
+  post-quantum coverage is witness-side ML-DSA-44 cosignatures only.
+- A CLI flag to select the content-root algorithm is still deferred (`jcs-sha256-v1` is the signed default).
+- **Preview:** a TEE-attestation bridge — see [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md).
+
 ## Contributing
 
 See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/README.md

@@ -21,12 +21,28 @@ Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
 [![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
 [![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
 [![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
-<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+[![PyPI attestations](https://img.shields.io/badge/PyPI-PEP_740_attested-D6248A.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/#files)
+[![SLSA provenance](https://img.shields.io/badge/SLSA-build_provenance-D6248A.svg)](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance)
 
 **Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
 
 </div>
 
+## Contents
+
+- [60-second try](#60-second-try-offline)
+- [Inspect-native?](#inspect-native-metr-task-standard-uk-aisi-ecosystem)
+- [The problem](#the-problem)
+- [What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't](#what-a-receipt-proves-and-what-it-doesnt)
+- [How it fits together](#how-it-fits-together)
+- [Post-quantum posture](#post-quantum-posture-honest-two-layers)
+- [What's in the box](#whats-in-the-box)
+- [Docs](#docs)
+- [Install](#install)
+- [Status, scope and roadmap](#status-scope-and-roadmap)
+- [Contributing](#contributing)
+- [License](#license)
+
 ## 60-second try (offline)
 
 ```bash
@@ -37,21 +53,9 @@ git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
 pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
 ```
 
-## The problem
-
-Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
-**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
-was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
-
-proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
-depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
-receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
-
-## What the demo shows
-
-You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
-a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
-so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+The demo runs entirely in memory: an honest receipt verifies `=> OK`, six independent tampers each
+verify `FAILED`, and a swapped sample gets caught. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper
+slips through, so it doubles as a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
 
 ```bash
 # verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
@@ -66,7 +70,7 @@ proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verifica
 proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
 ```
 
-## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard, UK-AISI ecosystem)
 
 The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
 reproducible offline in minutes:
@@ -81,7 +85,22 @@ In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthr
 **[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
 **[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
 
-## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+In plain language: a proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result. It shows
+who claimed the number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was
+good — the way a cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there
+is nothing to check at all.
+
+## What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't
 
 | ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
 |---|---|
@@ -95,6 +114,21 @@ This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributab
 and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
 **[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
 
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
 ## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
 
 proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
@@ -119,28 +153,6 @@ On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (
 (`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
 roadmap.
 
-## In plain language
-
-A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
-number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
-cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
-check at all.
-
-## How it fits together
-
-*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
-
-```mermaid
-flowchart LR
-    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
-    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
-    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
-    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
-    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
-    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-```
-
 ## What's in the box
 
 - **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
@@ -231,7 +243,7 @@ pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witnes
 Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
 `cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
 
-## Status & scope
+## Status, scope and roadmap
 
 Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
@@ -239,6 +251,13 @@ is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its ow
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
 [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
 
+**Roadmap (stated honestly, all forward-looking):**
+
+- A post-quantum *payload* signature (crypto-agility for the receipt itself) is on the roadmap; today the
+  post-quantum coverage is witness-side ML-DSA-44 cosignatures only.
+- A CLI flag to select the content-root algorithm is still deferred (`jcs-sha256-v1` is the signed default).
+- **Preview:** a TEE-attestation bridge — see [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md).
+
 ## Contributing
 
 See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "proofbundle"
-version = "3.0.0"
+version = "3.0.1"
 description = "Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/src/proofbundle/__init__.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
-__version__ = "3.0.0"
+__version__ = "3.0.1"
 
 # The `proofbundle/v0.1` normative spec revision this build implements — kept in sync with the
 # `Revision:` line at the top of SPEC.md by tests/test_docs_truth.py (WP-B1, closes #28). Bump

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/src/proofbundle/adapters/eee.py

@@ -99,14 +99,27 @@ def _extract_score(score_details: dict, metric_config: dict) -> str:
 
 def _model_id_stripped(record: dict) -> dict:
     """A deep copy of the EEE record with the cleartext model identity removed (WP-I3 privacy fix).
-    Removes ``model_info.id`` and the top-level ``evaluation_id`` (which embeds the id) so a digest
-    over the result cannot be used as a model-id confirmation / enumeration oracle, while still
-    binding every score, timestamp, dataset and metric for tamper-evidence."""
+    Removes ``model_info.id`` and the id-bearing top-level fields (``evaluation_id`` which embeds the
+    id, and ``evaluation_result_id``) so a digest over the result cannot be used as a model-id
+    confirmation / enumeration oracle, while still binding every score, timestamp, dataset and metric
+    for tamper-evidence.
+
+    M2 (6-lens review 2026-07-11): ``evaluation_result_id`` was left IN the digest record while the
+    run_id provenance path already `_leaks_model_id`-guards it — an asymmetry that kept the digest a
+    model-id oracle (the id can correlate to / embed the model). It is a provenance identifier, not a
+    scored/content field, so stripping it from the DIGEST removes the oracle without weakening the
+    tamper-evidence over the actual result content (it stays available for run_id provenance, which
+    applies its own leak guard)."""
     import copy  # noqa: PLC0415
     r = copy.deepcopy(record)
     if isinstance(r.get("model_info"), dict):
         r["model_info"].pop("id", None)
-    r.pop("evaluation_id", None)   # format eval_name/model_id/timestamp — embeds the id
+    r.pop("evaluation_id", None)          # format eval_name/model_id/timestamp — embeds the id
+    # M2: strip the per-result ``evaluation_result_id`` (nested in each ``evaluation_results[*]``) —
+    # it is a provenance id that can embed/correlate the model id (a digest over it is an oracle).
+    for er in r.get("evaluation_results", []) or []:
+        if isinstance(er, dict):
+            er.pop("evaluation_result_id", None)
     return r
 
 

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1/src/proofbundle.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: proofbundle
-Version: 3.0.0
+Version: 3.0.1
 Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
 Author: Konrad Gruszka
 License: MIT
@@ -75,12 +75,28 @@ Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
 [![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
 [![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
 [![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
-<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+[![PyPI attestations](https://img.shields.io/badge/PyPI-PEP_740_attested-D6248A.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/#files)
+[![SLSA provenance](https://img.shields.io/badge/SLSA-build_provenance-D6248A.svg)](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/provenance)
 
 **Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
 
 </div>
 
+## Contents
+
+- [60-second try](#60-second-try-offline)
+- [Inspect-native?](#inspect-native-metr-task-standard-uk-aisi-ecosystem)
+- [The problem](#the-problem)
+- [What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't](#what-a-receipt-proves-and-what-it-doesnt)
+- [How it fits together](#how-it-fits-together)
+- [Post-quantum posture](#post-quantum-posture-honest-two-layers)
+- [What's in the box](#whats-in-the-box)
+- [Docs](#docs)
+- [Install](#install)
+- [Status, scope and roadmap](#status-scope-and-roadmap)
+- [Contributing](#contributing)
+- [License](#license)
+
 ## 60-second try (offline)
 
 ```bash
@@ -91,21 +107,9 @@ git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
 pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
 ```
 
-## The problem
-
-Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
-**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
-was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
-
-proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
-depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
-receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
-
-## What the demo shows
-
-You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
-a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
-so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+The demo runs entirely in memory: an honest receipt verifies `=> OK`, six independent tampers each
+verify `FAILED`, and a swapped sample gets caught. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper
+slips through, so it doubles as a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
 
 ```bash
 # verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verifica
 proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
 ```
 
-## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard, UK-AISI ecosystem)
 
 The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
 reproducible offline in minutes:
@@ -135,7 +139,22 @@ In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthr
 **[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
 **[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
 
-## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+In plain language: a proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result. It shows
+who claimed the number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was
+good — the way a cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there
+is nothing to check at all.
+
+## What a receipt proves, and what it doesn't
 
 | ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
 |---|---|
@@ -149,6 +168,21 @@ This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributab
 and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
 **[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
 
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
 ## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
 
 proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
@@ -173,28 +207,6 @@ On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (
 (`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
 roadmap.
 
-## In plain language
-
-A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
-number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
-cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
-check at all.
-
-## How it fits together
-
-*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
-
-```mermaid
-flowchart LR
-    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
-    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
-    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
-    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
-    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
-    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
-```
-
 ## What's in the box
 
 - **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
@@ -285,7 +297,7 @@ pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witnes
 Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
 `cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
 
-## Status & scope
+## Status, scope and roadmap
 
 Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
@@ -293,6 +305,13 @@ is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its ow
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
 [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
 
+**Roadmap (stated honestly, all forward-looking):**
+
+- A post-quantum *payload* signature (crypto-agility for the receipt itself) is on the roadmap; today the
+  post-quantum coverage is witness-side ML-DSA-44 cosignatures only.
+- A CLI flag to select the content-root algorithm is still deferred (`jcs-sha256-v1` is the signed default).
+- **Preview:** a TEE-attestation bridge — see [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md).
+
 ## Contributing
 
 See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/src/proofbundle.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ tests/test_promptfoo.py
 tests/test_provenance.py
 tests/test_pytest_plugin.py
 tests/test_rekor_interop.py
+tests/test_release_integrity_gate.py
 tests/test_rfc6962_external_vectors.py
 tests/test_schema.py
 tests/test_sdjwt_duplicate_cnf.py

{proofbundle-3.0.0 → proofbundle-3.0.1}/tests/test_hf_entry_verify_eee_digest.py

@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ class TestEeeRecordDigest(unittest.TestCase):
         rec2["model_info"]["id"] = "some-other-model"
         rec2["evaluation_id"] = "suite/some-other-model/2026"
         self.assertEqual(_record_digest(rec), _record_digest(rec2))
+        # M2 (6-lens review): the per-result evaluation_result_id (a provenance id that can embed the
+        # model id) must ALSO be stripped from the digest — else two records differing only in that id
+        # yield different digests = a model-id confirmation oracle.
+        self.assertNotIn("evaluation_result_id", stripped["evaluation_results"][0])
+        rec4 = self._record()
+        rec4["evaluation_results"][0]["evaluation_result_id"] = "suite/some-other-model/run-9"
+        self.assertEqual(_record_digest(rec), _record_digest(rec4),
+                         "evaluation_result_id must not change the digest (M2: no id oracle)")
         # but a tampered SCORE still changes the digest (tamper-evidence preserved)
         rec3 = self._record()
         rec3["evaluation_results"][0]["score_details"]["score"] = 0.91

proofbundle-3.0.1/tests/test_release_integrity_gate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"""Tests for scripts/check_version_and_changelog.py — the release-integrity gate.
+
+Bidirectional: a consistent release state passes; each drift class (version disagreement, missing
+changelog section, post-tag undelivered work) fails. The post-tag-drift case uses a real throwaway git
+repo so the M2-style "merged but never released" bug is caught by a durable test, not just live.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import importlib.util
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+_SPEC = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+    "chk", Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "scripts" / "check_version_and_changelog.py")
+chk = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_SPEC)
+_SPEC.loader.exec_module(chk)
+
+
+def _write_repo(t: Path, version: str, changelog_headings: list[str]) -> None:
+    (t / "src" / "proofbundle").mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    (t / "pyproject.toml").write_text(f'[project]\nname = "proofbundle"\nversion = "{version}"\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    (t / "src" / "proofbundle" / "__init__.py").write_text(f'__version__ = "{version}"\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    (t / "CITATION.cff").write_text(f"cff-version: 1.2.0\nversion: {version}\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    body = "# Changelog\n\n" + "".join(f"## [{h}] - 2026-07-12\n\n- something\n\n" for h in changelog_headings)
+    (t / "CHANGELOG.md").write_text(body, encoding="utf-8")
+
+
+def test_consistent_release_passes(tmp_path):
+    _write_repo(tmp_path, "3.0.1", ["3.0.1", "3.0.0"])
+    assert chk.check(tmp_path) == []   # no git → part 3 skipped, parts 1+2 clean
+
+
+def test_version_disagreement_fails(tmp_path):
+    _write_repo(tmp_path, "3.0.1", ["3.0.1"])
+    (tmp_path / "src" / "proofbundle" / "__init__.py").write_text('__version__ = "3.0.0"\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    probs = chk.check(tmp_path)
+    assert any("disagreement" in p for p in probs), probs
+
+
+def test_changelog_missing_current_version_fails(tmp_path):
+    _write_repo(tmp_path, "3.0.1", ["3.0.0"])   # bumped to 3.0.1 but no [3.0.1] section
+    probs = chk.check(tmp_path)
+    assert any("no `## [3.0.1]`" in p for p in probs), probs
+
+
+def test_post_tag_undelivered_drift_fails(tmp_path):
+    # The M2 catcher: tag v3.0.0, then a non-trivial commit, version NOT bumped, no [Unreleased] → FAIL.
+    t = tmp_path
+
+    def g(*a):
+        return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(t), *a], capture_output=True, text=True)
+
+    g("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+    g("config", "user.email", "t@t")
+    g("config", "user.name", "t")
+    _write_repo(t, "3.0.0", ["3.0.0"])
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "release: 3.0.0")
+    g("tag", "v3.0.0")
+    (t / "src" / "proofbundle" / "adapters.py").write_text("# security fix\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "security(M2): strip evaluation_result_id from the EEE digest")
+    probs = chk.check(t)
+    assert any("non-trivial" in p and "no `## [Unreleased]`" in p for p in probs), probs
+
+
+def test_post_tag_drift_ok_when_unreleased_present(tmp_path):
+    # Same as above but with an [Unreleased] section → the drift is documented → OK.
+    t = tmp_path
+
+    def g(*a):
+        return subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(t), *a], capture_output=True, text=True)
+
+    g("init", "-q", "-b", "main")
+    g("config", "user.email", "t@t")
+    g("config", "user.name", "t")
+    _write_repo(t, "3.0.0", ["Unreleased", "3.0.0"])
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "release: 3.0.0")
+    g("tag", "v3.0.0")
+    (t / "src" / "proofbundle" / "adapters.py").write_text("# security fix\n", encoding="utf-8")
+    g("add", "-A")
+    g("commit", "-qm", "security(M2): fix")
+    assert chk.check(t) == []
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(__import__("pytest").main([__file__, "-q"]))