proofbundle 2.0.0b3__tar.gz → 3.0.0__tar.gz

proofbundle-3.0.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: proofbundle
+Version: 3.0.0
+Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
+Author: Konrad Gruszka
+License: MIT
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://b7n0de.com
+Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle
+Project-URL: Issues, https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/issues
+Project-URL: Changelog, https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md
+Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#readme
+Keywords: cryptography,merkle,transparency-log,ed25519,sd-jwt,verifiable-credentials,attestation,provenance,rfc6962
+Classifier: Development Status :: 4 - Beta
+Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
+Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.10
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.13
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.14
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Provides-Extra: sdjwt
+Provides-Extra: eval
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4; extra == "eval"
+Provides-Extra: anchors
+Requires-Dist: rfc3161-client>=1.0.6; extra == "anchors"
+Requires-Dist: opentimestamps>=0.4.5; extra == "anchors"
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4; extra == "anchors"
+Provides-Extra: adapters
+Provides-Extra: chia
+Provides-Extra: experimental
+Provides-Extra: pq
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=48; extra == "pq"
+Provides-Extra: pytest
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=7; extra == "pytest"
+Provides-Extra: inspect
+Requires-Dist: inspect_ai<0.4,>=0.3.112; extra == "inspect"
+Provides-Extra: dev
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=7; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.5; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: jsonschema>=4; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: mypy>=1.8; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: build>=1; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: hypothesis>=6; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: sd-jwt>=0.10; extra == "dev"
+Requires-Dist: inspect_ai<0.4,>=0.3.112; extra == "dev"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+<div align="center">
+
+<picture>
+  <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo-dark.svg">
+  <img alt="b7n0de, Verified AI Work" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo.svg" height="60">
+</picture>
+
+<h1>proofbundle</h1>
+
+**AI eval results need receipts.**
+
+Turn an AI evaluation result into one portable, offline-verifiable receipt. It proves *who signed
+these exact bytes* and *that nothing changed since* — not that the number is true. Ed25519 + RFC 6962
+Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![demo reproducible](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml)
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE)
+[![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
+[![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
+[![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
+<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+
+**Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
+
+</div>
+
+## 60-second try (offline)
+
+```bash
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
+proofbundle demo   # honest receipt => OK, six tampers each => FAILED, sample swap caught
+# Inspect-native (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem, mockllm, no API key):
+git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
+pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
+```
+
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+## What the demo shows
+
+You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
+a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
+so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+
+```bash
+# verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/examples/example_bundle.json -o receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # CRYPTO: OK  (the verify itself runs fully offline)
+
+# your own receipt, from a signed payload:
+proofbundle emit --payload-file result.json --new-key signer.key --out receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verification failure, 2 = malformed
+
+# apply YOUR trust decision — verify makes NO trust decision on its own:
+proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
+```
+
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+
+The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
+reproducible offline in minutes:
+
+```bash
+# setup as in the 60-second try above (clone + pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]"), then:
+make full-demo   # a genuine inspect_ai eval log (mockllm: offline, no API key, no GPU)
+                 # -> signed receipt next to the log -> proofbundle verify => OK
+```
+
+In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthrough:
+**[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
+**[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
+
+## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+
+| ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
+|---|---|
+| These exact bytes were signed by this key (**authorship**) | That the number is **true** |
+| Nothing changed since signing (**integrity**, Ed25519 + RFC 6962) | That the **issuer is honest** |
+| The result is attributable to a stated issuer | That the **eval was well-designed** |
+| A threshold was met while hiding the model/dataset (salted commitments) | That there was **no cherry-picking** — unless pre-registered |
+| Optionally: individual samples, offline-auditable (per-sample Merkle) | That the **computation was correct** — that needs a TEE or independent reproduction |
+
+This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributable, tamper-evident,
+and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
+**[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
+
+## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
+
+proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
+with very different quantum exposure, and it is honest about both:
+
+- **Quantum-robust (hash-based)** — SHA-256, RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, RFC 8785 canonicalization,
+  and, among the external time anchors, the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin hash-chain) and `chia-datalayer/v1`
+  (Merkle inclusion) types. Grover only halves the effective bit-strength (SHA-256 keeps a ~128-bit quantum
+  margin, which NIST currently treats as adequate), so these stay secure.
+- **Quantum-vulnerable (elliptic-curve / classical PKI, Shor)** — the Ed25519 receipt signature; for the
+  `chia-datalayer` anchor, Chia's BLS12-381 wallet layer; and, for the RFC 3161 anchor, the TSA's own
+  classical (RSA/ECDSA) certificate-chain signature. A large enough quantum computer could forge any of these.
+
+The attack that matters is not decryption but **back-dated forgery**: an attacker with a quantum computer
+could mint a fake signature on a tampered receipt. The defense — **when a receipt carries a hash-based time
+anchor** (optional, the `[anchors]` beta extra: OpenTimestamps or `chia-datalayer`) — is that the anchor
+proves the original receipt existed *before* that capability, so a forged receipt has no matching anchor.
+That protects the evidence long-term even if the signature layer later breaks. A plain receipt with no anchor
+does not carry this property.
+
+On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (FIPS 204) cosignatures
+(`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
+roadmap.
+
+## In plain language
+
+A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
+number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
+cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
+check at all.
+
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
+## What's in the box
+
+- **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
+  real [Sigstore Rekor](https://docs.sigstore.dev/) proof, so correctness isn't self-referential.
+- **Eval receipts** — a signed claim (`metric ⋈ threshold`, `n`, salted model/dataset commitments,
+  assurance level, provenance) from your run. See [EVAL_CLAIM.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/EVAL_CLAIM.md).
+- **Selective disclosure** — SD-JWT ([RFC 9901](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9901/)) with Key
+  Binding: prove a threshold while withholding the exact score. Secure-by-default in 3.0.0 (breaking): an
+  unsigned SD-JWT, or one whose disclosures do not bind this bundle, now fails verification (was warn-only).
+- **Transparency-log interop** — C2SP `tlog-checkpoint` / cosignature / `.tlog-proof`, with
+  post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** witness cosignatures. Optional Token-Status-List revocation snapshots.
+- **Per-sample audit** — commit to every sample; an auditor challenges random indices (with a fresh
+  nonce or a **public randomness beacon**, v1.9) and openings must bind to the signed root. With
+  such an auditor-supplied or beacon-bound challenge, 300 samples catch 1% sample-doctoring with 95%
+  confidence, regardless of run size — a challenge the issuer chose itself does not give this
+  guarantee.
+- **Pre-registration** — `proofbundle prereg <plan>` commits to the protocol before the run, so
+  best-of-many publishing becomes visible.
+- **Integrations** — opt-in inspect_ai end-of-task hook and pytest plugin (emit only when
+  `PROOFBUNDLE_EMIT=1` / `--proofbundle`), plus a Hugging Face Community Evals bridge. See
+  [INTEGRATIONS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEGRATIONS.md), or the end-to-end walkthrough
+  [docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md) — run an eval, get a receipt, verify it offline.
+- **External time anchors** *(v2.0 beta, the `[anchors]` extra)* — an optional `anchors[]` layer that
+  attaches external evidence of *when* a commitment or receipt existed, from a party the producer does not
+  control. Two built-in types verify offline: **RFC 3161** TSA tokens (against a relying-party-supplied TSA
+  root, see the 3.0.0 trust note below) and **OpenTimestamps** Bitcoin proofs (honest pending → confirmed lifecycle). A `register_anchor_type`
+  extension interface lets a third party ship its own fail-closed type; two worked examples ship — a
+  first-party **`chia-datalayer/v1`** (offline Merkle inclusion of a canonical root under a published Chia
+  DataLayer root) and a third-party **`markovian-provenance/v1`** (a wallet-attributable, Bitcoin-anchored
+  stamp). **Since 2.1:** a `verify --require-anchor` relying-party gate (optionally narrowed by
+  `--anchor-type`) turns "no verifying anchor of that type" into a failure layered over the crypto result
+  (exit 3, like `--policy`); a pending anchor does not satisfy it unless `--allow-pending`. Plus RFC 3161
+  hardening — the frozen cert chain is validated at the token's own `gen_time`, with optional `policyOid`
+  pinning. **Breaking in 3.0.0:** an anchor's TRUST now comes only from the relying party — supply a TSA
+  root (`--trusted-tsa-root`) or a Bitcoin block header (`--bitcoin-header`), or the equivalent `anchors`
+  policy keys; the bundle's producer-controlled `frozen` block is evidence, never a trust source, so
+  `--require-anchor` without relying-party trust material is unmet (exit 3). An anchor stays detached from
+  the content root, and the `statement` target is RESERVED for decision receipts.
+  See [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md).
+- **Universal content root** *(2.1, `jcs-sha256-v1`, [ADR 0002](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-universal-content-root.md))* — one shared primitive now underlies both the
+  decision-receipt path and the in-toto eval-result / test-result / SVR exports: SHA-256 over the RFC 8785
+  (JCS) canonical bytes of the full pre-signature Statement, so a content root survives counter-signing and
+  key rotation. The algorithm is a versioned id signed inside the payload (`contentRootAlg`, default
+  `jcs-sha256-v1`); a verifier re-serializes with exactly the declared algorithm, never falls back, and an
+  unknown algorithm fails closed. Migration is a compatible evolution, not a cutover: absent `contentRootAlg`
+  ⇒ the historic `legacy-sortkeys-json-v0` mode, so every already-signed 2.0.0 receipt keeps verifying
+  byte-for-byte. This is **not** a completed universal migration — a CLI flag to select the algorithm is still
+  deferred. Independent cross-implementation (MarkovianProtocol) interop is now proven for RFC 8785
+  canonicalization + content-root binding (see `conformance/decision/crossimpl/`); the same corpus additionally
+  verifies a confirmed Bitcoin anchor (block 957504) offline. The external fixture currently reports 12 findings
+  against the enforced `decision-receipt/v0.1` validator — recorded as an expected-fail, not hidden — so full
+  schema conformance awaits a further schema-conformant regeneration.
+- **Decision Receipts** *(2.1, vendored `decision-receipt/v0.1` predicate)* — a separate predicate for agent
+  *decisions* (not eval metrics): who decided, the proposed action, the policy boundary, digest-bound evidence,
+  the verdict (`ALLOW`/`DENY`/`REFUSE`/`ESCALATE`/`DEFER`/`OBSERVE`), and explicitly what was *not* checked.
+  `proofbundle decision emit|verify` with a v0.2 trust policy (`trusted_decision_makers`, `accepted_predicate_
+  types`). An eval receipt says *the number is authored and intact*; a Decision Receipt says *this decision was
+  made by this gate over this evidence* — never that the decision was correct. `actionOutcome=executed` without
+  a signed outcome is self-assertion. See
+  [docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md)
+  and [ADR 0001](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/adr/0001-decision-receipt-separate-predicate.md).
+
+## Docs
+
+| For… | Read |
+|---|---|
+| Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
+| Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
+| Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
+| The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md) |
+| The normative format + verification order | [SPEC.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SPEC.md) |
+| Honest comparison to Rekor / in-toto / OMS / ValiChord | [INTEROP.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEROP.md) |
+| Regulatory mapping (and what to never claim) | [COMPLIANCE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/COMPLIANCE.md) |
+| Funders / role fit | [docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md) |
+| External time anchors + the bring-your-own-type extension interface (v2.0 beta) | [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md) |
+| **Preview:** TEE-attestation bridge (v2.0 beta) | [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md) |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
+pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
+```
+
+Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
+`cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
+
+## Status & scope
+
+Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
+**not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
+by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
+[SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first
+issues are labeled [`good-first-issue`](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/labels/good-first-issue);
+security findings go through [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The verifier core aims to stay small,
+dependency-light, and correct.
+
+## License
+
+MIT — see [LICENSE](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+---
+
+<p align="center"><sub>proofbundle is part of <b>b7n0de</b>, Verified AI Work · <a href="https://b7n0de.com">b7n0de.com</a></sub></p>

proofbundle-3.0.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+<div align="center">
+
+<picture>
+  <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo-dark.svg">
+  <img alt="b7n0de, Verified AI Work" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo.svg" height="60">
+</picture>
+
+<h1>proofbundle</h1>
+
+**AI eval results need receipts.**
+
+Turn an AI evaluation result into one portable, offline-verifiable receipt. It proves *who signed
+these exact bytes* and *that nothing changed since* — not that the number is true. Ed25519 + RFC 6962
+Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![demo reproducible](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml)
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE)
+[![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
+[![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
+[![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
+<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+
+**Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
+
+</div>
+
+## 60-second try (offline)
+
+```bash
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
+proofbundle demo   # honest receipt => OK, six tampers each => FAILED, sample swap caught
+# Inspect-native (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem, mockllm, no API key):
+git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
+pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
+```
+
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+## What the demo shows
+
+You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
+a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
+so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+
+```bash
+# verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/examples/example_bundle.json -o receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # CRYPTO: OK  (the verify itself runs fully offline)
+
+# your own receipt, from a signed payload:
+proofbundle emit --payload-file result.json --new-key signer.key --out receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verification failure, 2 = malformed
+
+# apply YOUR trust decision — verify makes NO trust decision on its own:
+proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
+```
+
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+
+The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
+reproducible offline in minutes:
+
+```bash
+# setup as in the 60-second try above (clone + pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]"), then:
+make full-demo   # a genuine inspect_ai eval log (mockllm: offline, no API key, no GPU)
+                 # -> signed receipt next to the log -> proofbundle verify => OK
+```
+
+In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthrough:
+**[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
+**[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
+
+## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+
+| ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
+|---|---|
+| These exact bytes were signed by this key (**authorship**) | That the number is **true** |
+| Nothing changed since signing (**integrity**, Ed25519 + RFC 6962) | That the **issuer is honest** |
+| The result is attributable to a stated issuer | That the **eval was well-designed** |
+| A threshold was met while hiding the model/dataset (salted commitments) | That there was **no cherry-picking** — unless pre-registered |
+| Optionally: individual samples, offline-auditable (per-sample Merkle) | That the **computation was correct** — that needs a TEE or independent reproduction |
+
+This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributable, tamper-evident,
+and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
+**[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
+
+## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
+
+proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
+with very different quantum exposure, and it is honest about both:
+
+- **Quantum-robust (hash-based)** — SHA-256, RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, RFC 8785 canonicalization,
+  and, among the external time anchors, the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin hash-chain) and `chia-datalayer/v1`
+  (Merkle inclusion) types. Grover only halves the effective bit-strength (SHA-256 keeps a ~128-bit quantum
+  margin, which NIST currently treats as adequate), so these stay secure.
+- **Quantum-vulnerable (elliptic-curve / classical PKI, Shor)** — the Ed25519 receipt signature; for the
+  `chia-datalayer` anchor, Chia's BLS12-381 wallet layer; and, for the RFC 3161 anchor, the TSA's own
+  classical (RSA/ECDSA) certificate-chain signature. A large enough quantum computer could forge any of these.
+
+The attack that matters is not decryption but **back-dated forgery**: an attacker with a quantum computer
+could mint a fake signature on a tampered receipt. The defense — **when a receipt carries a hash-based time
+anchor** (optional, the `[anchors]` beta extra: OpenTimestamps or `chia-datalayer`) — is that the anchor
+proves the original receipt existed *before* that capability, so a forged receipt has no matching anchor.
+That protects the evidence long-term even if the signature layer later breaks. A plain receipt with no anchor
+does not carry this property.
+
+On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (FIPS 204) cosignatures
+(`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
+roadmap.
+
+## In plain language
+
+A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
+number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
+cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
+check at all.
+
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
+## What's in the box
+
+- **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
+  real [Sigstore Rekor](https://docs.sigstore.dev/) proof, so correctness isn't self-referential.
+- **Eval receipts** — a signed claim (`metric ⋈ threshold`, `n`, salted model/dataset commitments,
+  assurance level, provenance) from your run. See [EVAL_CLAIM.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/EVAL_CLAIM.md).
+- **Selective disclosure** — SD-JWT ([RFC 9901](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9901/)) with Key
+  Binding: prove a threshold while withholding the exact score. Secure-by-default in 3.0.0 (breaking): an
+  unsigned SD-JWT, or one whose disclosures do not bind this bundle, now fails verification (was warn-only).
+- **Transparency-log interop** — C2SP `tlog-checkpoint` / cosignature / `.tlog-proof`, with
+  post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** witness cosignatures. Optional Token-Status-List revocation snapshots.
+- **Per-sample audit** — commit to every sample; an auditor challenges random indices (with a fresh
+  nonce or a **public randomness beacon**, v1.9) and openings must bind to the signed root. With
+  such an auditor-supplied or beacon-bound challenge, 300 samples catch 1% sample-doctoring with 95%
+  confidence, regardless of run size — a challenge the issuer chose itself does not give this
+  guarantee.
+- **Pre-registration** — `proofbundle prereg <plan>` commits to the protocol before the run, so
+  best-of-many publishing becomes visible.
+- **Integrations** — opt-in inspect_ai end-of-task hook and pytest plugin (emit only when
+  `PROOFBUNDLE_EMIT=1` / `--proofbundle`), plus a Hugging Face Community Evals bridge. See
+  [INTEGRATIONS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEGRATIONS.md), or the end-to-end walkthrough
+  [docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md) — run an eval, get a receipt, verify it offline.
+- **External time anchors** *(v2.0 beta, the `[anchors]` extra)* — an optional `anchors[]` layer that
+  attaches external evidence of *when* a commitment or receipt existed, from a party the producer does not
+  control. Two built-in types verify offline: **RFC 3161** TSA tokens (against a relying-party-supplied TSA
+  root, see the 3.0.0 trust note below) and **OpenTimestamps** Bitcoin proofs (honest pending → confirmed lifecycle). A `register_anchor_type`
+  extension interface lets a third party ship its own fail-closed type; two worked examples ship — a
+  first-party **`chia-datalayer/v1`** (offline Merkle inclusion of a canonical root under a published Chia
+  DataLayer root) and a third-party **`markovian-provenance/v1`** (a wallet-attributable, Bitcoin-anchored
+  stamp). **Since 2.1:** a `verify --require-anchor` relying-party gate (optionally narrowed by
+  `--anchor-type`) turns "no verifying anchor of that type" into a failure layered over the crypto result
+  (exit 3, like `--policy`); a pending anchor does not satisfy it unless `--allow-pending`. Plus RFC 3161
+  hardening — the frozen cert chain is validated at the token's own `gen_time`, with optional `policyOid`
+  pinning. **Breaking in 3.0.0:** an anchor's TRUST now comes only from the relying party — supply a TSA
+  root (`--trusted-tsa-root`) or a Bitcoin block header (`--bitcoin-header`), or the equivalent `anchors`
+  policy keys; the bundle's producer-controlled `frozen` block is evidence, never a trust source, so
+  `--require-anchor` without relying-party trust material is unmet (exit 3). An anchor stays detached from
+  the content root, and the `statement` target is RESERVED for decision receipts.
+  See [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md).
+- **Universal content root** *(2.1, `jcs-sha256-v1`, [ADR 0002](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/adr/0002-universal-content-root.md))* — one shared primitive now underlies both the
+  decision-receipt path and the in-toto eval-result / test-result / SVR exports: SHA-256 over the RFC 8785
+  (JCS) canonical bytes of the full pre-signature Statement, so a content root survives counter-signing and
+  key rotation. The algorithm is a versioned id signed inside the payload (`contentRootAlg`, default
+  `jcs-sha256-v1`); a verifier re-serializes with exactly the declared algorithm, never falls back, and an
+  unknown algorithm fails closed. Migration is a compatible evolution, not a cutover: absent `contentRootAlg`
+  ⇒ the historic `legacy-sortkeys-json-v0` mode, so every already-signed 2.0.0 receipt keeps verifying
+  byte-for-byte. This is **not** a completed universal migration — a CLI flag to select the algorithm is still
+  deferred. Independent cross-implementation (MarkovianProtocol) interop is now proven for RFC 8785
+  canonicalization + content-root binding (see `conformance/decision/crossimpl/`); the same corpus additionally
+  verifies a confirmed Bitcoin anchor (block 957504) offline. The external fixture currently reports 12 findings
+  against the enforced `decision-receipt/v0.1` validator — recorded as an expected-fail, not hidden — so full
+  schema conformance awaits a further schema-conformant regeneration.
+- **Decision Receipts** *(2.1, vendored `decision-receipt/v0.1` predicate)* — a separate predicate for agent
+  *decisions* (not eval metrics): who decided, the proposed action, the policy boundary, digest-bound evidence,
+  the verdict (`ALLOW`/`DENY`/`REFUSE`/`ESCALATE`/`DEFER`/`OBSERVE`), and explicitly what was *not* checked.
+  `proofbundle decision emit|verify` with a v0.2 trust policy (`trusted_decision_makers`, `accepted_predicate_
+  types`). An eval receipt says *the number is authored and intact*; a Decision Receipt says *this decision was
+  made by this gate over this evidence* — never that the decision was correct. `actionOutcome=executed` without
+  a signed outcome is self-assertion. See
+  [docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md)
+  and [ADR 0001](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/adr/0001-decision-receipt-separate-predicate.md).
+
+## Docs
+
+| For… | Read |
+|---|---|
+| Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
+| Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
+| Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
+| The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md) |
+| The normative format + verification order | [SPEC.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SPEC.md) |
+| Honest comparison to Rekor / in-toto / OMS / ValiChord | [INTEROP.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEROP.md) |
+| Regulatory mapping (and what to never claim) | [COMPLIANCE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/COMPLIANCE.md) |
+| Funders / role fit | [docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md) |
+| External time anchors + the bring-your-own-type extension interface (v2.0 beta) | [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md) |
+| **Preview:** TEE-attestation bridge (v2.0 beta) | [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md) |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
+pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
+```
+
+Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
+`cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
+
+## Status & scope
+
+Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
+**not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
+by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
+[SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first
+issues are labeled [`good-first-issue`](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/labels/good-first-issue);
+security findings go through [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The verifier core aims to stay small,
+dependency-light, and correct.
+
+## License
+
+MIT — see [LICENSE](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+---
+
+<p align="center"><sub>proofbundle is part of <b>b7n0de</b>, Verified AI Work · <a href="https://b7n0de.com">b7n0de.com</a></sub></p>

{proofbundle-2.0.0b3 → proofbundle-3.0.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "proofbundle"
-version = "2.0.0b3"
+version = "3.0.0"
 description = "Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ keywords = [
     "rfc6962",
 ]
 classifiers = [
+    # Stays Beta until the funded external security review passes (Owner decision E1, 2026-07-12):
+    # "stable is evidenced, not asserted". The move to "5 - Production/Stable" is a separate,
+    # audit-gated milestone (see docs/GRANT_MILESTONES.md), never claimed pre-audit.
     "Development Status :: 4 - Beta",
     "Intended Audience :: Developers",
     "License :: OSI Approved :: MIT License",

{proofbundle-2.0.0b3 → proofbundle-3.0.0}/src/proofbundle/__init__.py

@@ -13,10 +13,16 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
-__version__ = "2.0.0b3"
+__version__ = "3.0.0"
+
+# The `proofbundle/v0.1` normative spec revision this build implements — kept in sync with the
+# `Revision:` line at the top of SPEC.md by tests/test_docs_truth.py (WP-B1, closes #28). Bump
+# both together whenever SPEC.md's normative text changes (not on every package release).
+SPEC_REVISION = "2026-07-11"
 
 __all__ = [
     "__version__",
+    "SPEC_REVISION",
     "SCHEMA",
     "verify_bundle",
     "load_bundle",
@@ -39,6 +45,8 @@ __all__ = [
     "prereg_hash",
     "verify_prereg",
     "beacon_audit_challenge",
+    "canonicalize_statement",
+    "statement_content_root",
     "VerificationResult",
     "Check",
     "ProofBundleError",
@@ -65,6 +73,8 @@ _LAZY = {
     "prereg_hash": ".prereg",
     "verify_prereg": ".prereg",
     "beacon_audit_challenge": ".beacon",
+    "canonicalize_statement": ".canonical",
+    "statement_content_root": ".canonical",
 }
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:  # static analysers + IDEs see the real names/types; runtime stays lazy
@@ -77,6 +87,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:  # static analysers + IDEs see the real names/types; runtime s
     from .persample import (audit_challenge, build_sample_tree, sample_opening,
                             verify_sample_opening)
     from .beacon import beacon_audit_challenge
+    from .canonical import canonicalize_statement, statement_content_root
     from .prereg import prereg_hash, verify_prereg
     from .statuslist import verify_status_snapshot
     from .tlogproof import verify_tlog_proof