proofbundle 1.9.2__tar.gz → 2.0.0__tar.gz

{proofbundle-1.9.2/src/proofbundle.egg-info → proofbundle-2.0.0}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: proofbundle
-Version: 1.9.2
+Version: 2.0.0
 Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
 Author: Konrad Gruszka
 License: MIT
@@ -27,7 +27,13 @@ Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
 Provides-Extra: sdjwt
 Provides-Extra: eval
 Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4; extra == "eval"
+Provides-Extra: anchors
+Requires-Dist: rfc3161-client>=1.0.6; extra == "anchors"
+Requires-Dist: opentimestamps>=0.4.5; extra == "anchors"
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4; extra == "anchors"
 Provides-Extra: adapters
+Provides-Extra: chia
+Provides-Extra: experimental
 Provides-Extra: pq
 Requires-Dist: cryptography>=48; extra == "pq"
 Provides-Extra: pytest
@@ -49,8 +55,8 @@ Dynamic: license-file
 <div align="center">
 
 <picture>
-  <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="assets/b7n0de-logo-dark.svg">
-  <img alt="b7n0de, Verified AI Work" src="assets/b7n0de-logo.svg" height="60">
+  <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo-dark.svg">
+  <img alt="b7n0de, Verified AI Work" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo.svg" height="60">
 </picture>
 
 <h1>proofbundle</h1>
@@ -62,13 +68,29 @@ these exact bytes* and *that nothing changed since* — not that the number is t
 Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
 
 [![CI](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
-[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-D6248A.svg)](LICENSE)
+[![demo reproducible](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml)
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE)
+[![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
 [![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
-[![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](scripts/mutation_check.py)
-<!-- PyPI / Downloads / SLSA / PEP 740 badges are enabled on the first PyPI release — see RELEASE.md. -->
+[![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
+<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+
+**Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
 
 </div>
 
+## 60-second try (offline)
+
+```bash
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
+proofbundle demo   # honest receipt => OK, six tampers each => FAILED, sample swap caught
+# Inspect-native (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem, mockllm, no API key):
+git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
+pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
+```
+
 ## The problem
 
 Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
@@ -79,23 +101,40 @@ proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, aud
 depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
 receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
 
-## 60-second try (offline, no setup)
-
-```bash
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
-proofbundle demo
-```
+## What the demo shows
 
 You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
-a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. The command exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
-so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md)**.
+a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
+so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
 
 ```bash
+# verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/examples/example_bundle.json -o receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # CRYPTO: OK  (the verify itself runs fully offline)
+
 # your own receipt, from a signed payload:
 proofbundle emit --payload-file result.json --new-key signer.key --out receipt.json
-proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = OK, 1 = failed, 2 = malformed
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verification failure, 2 = malformed
+
+# apply YOUR trust decision — verify makes NO trust decision on its own:
+proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
 ```
 
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+
+The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
+reproducible offline in minutes:
+
+```bash
+# setup as in the 60-second try above (clone + pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]"), then:
+make full-demo   # a genuine inspect_ai eval log (mockllm: offline, no API key, no GPU)
+                 # -> signed receipt next to the log -> proofbundle verify => OK
+```
+
+In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthrough:
+**[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
+**[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
+
 ## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
 
 | ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
@@ -108,7 +147,31 @@ proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = OK, 1 = failed, 2 = malformed
 
 This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributable, tamper-evident,
 and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
-**[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
+**[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
+
+## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
+
+proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
+with very different quantum exposure, and it is honest about both:
+
+- **Quantum-robust (hash-based)** — SHA-256, RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, RFC 8785 canonicalization,
+  and, among the external time anchors, the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin hash-chain) and `chia-datalayer/v1`
+  (Merkle inclusion) types. Grover only halves the effective bit-strength (SHA-256 keeps a ~128-bit quantum
+  margin, which NIST currently treats as adequate), so these stay secure.
+- **Quantum-vulnerable (elliptic-curve / classical PKI, Shor)** — the Ed25519 receipt signature; for the
+  `chia-datalayer` anchor, Chia's BLS12-381 wallet layer; and, for the RFC 3161 anchor, the TSA's own
+  classical (RSA/ECDSA) certificate-chain signature. A large enough quantum computer could forge any of these.
+
+The attack that matters is not decryption but **back-dated forgery**: an attacker with a quantum computer
+could mint a fake signature on a tampered receipt. The defense — **when a receipt carries a hash-based time
+anchor** (optional, the `[anchors]` beta extra: OpenTimestamps or `chia-datalayer`) — is that the anchor
+proves the original receipt existed *before* that capability, so a forged receipt has no matching anchor.
+That protects the evidence long-term even if the signature layer later breaks. A plain receipt with no anchor
+does not carry this property.
+
+On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (FIPS 204) cosignatures
+(`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
+roadmap.
 
 ## In plain language
 
@@ -119,13 +182,15 @@ check at all.
 
 ## How it fits together
 
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
 ```mermaid
 flowchart LR
     H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
     A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
     R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
     V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
-    C --> OK(["=> OK / FAILED"])
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
     style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
     style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
 ```
@@ -135,7 +200,7 @@ flowchart LR
 - **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
   real [Sigstore Rekor](https://docs.sigstore.dev/) proof, so correctness isn't self-referential.
 - **Eval receipts** — a signed claim (`metric ⋈ threshold`, `n`, salted model/dataset commitments,
-  assurance level, provenance) from your run. See [EVAL_CLAIM.md](EVAL_CLAIM.md).
+  assurance level, provenance) from your run. See [EVAL_CLAIM.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/EVAL_CLAIM.md).
 - **Selective disclosure** — SD-JWT ([RFC 9901](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9901/)) with Key
   Binding: prove a threshold while withholding the exact score.
 - **Transparency-log interop** — C2SP `tlog-checkpoint` / cosignature / `.tlog-proof`, with
@@ -149,22 +214,32 @@ flowchart LR
   best-of-many publishing becomes visible.
 - **Integrations** — opt-in inspect_ai end-of-task hook and pytest plugin (emit only when
   `PROOFBUNDLE_EMIT=1` / `--proofbundle`), plus a Hugging Face Community Evals bridge. See
-  [INTEGRATIONS.md](INTEGRATIONS.md), or the end-to-end walkthrough
-  [docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md) — run an eval, get a receipt, verify it offline.
+  [INTEGRATIONS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEGRATIONS.md), or the end-to-end walkthrough
+  [docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md) — run an eval, get a receipt, verify it offline.
+- **External time anchors** *(v2.0 beta, the `[anchors]` extra)* — an optional `anchors[]` layer that
+  attaches external evidence of *when* a commitment or receipt existed, from a party the producer does not
+  control. Two built-in types verify offline: **RFC 3161** TSA tokens (against a frozen cert chain) and
+  **OpenTimestamps** Bitcoin proofs (honest pending → confirmed lifecycle). A `register_anchor_type`
+  extension interface lets a third party ship its own fail-closed type; two worked examples ship — a
+  first-party **`chia-datalayer/v1`** (offline Merkle inclusion of a canonical root under a published Chia
+  DataLayer root) and a third-party **`markovian-provenance/v1`** (a wallet-attributable, Bitcoin-anchored
+  stamp). See [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md).
 
 ## Docs
 
 | For… | Read |
 |---|---|
-| Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](docs/FAQ.md) |
-| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
-| Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
-| Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
-| The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md) |
-| The normative format + verification order | [SPEC.md](SPEC.md) |
-| Honest comparison to Rekor / in-toto / OMS / ValiChord | [INTEROP.md](INTEROP.md) |
-| Regulatory mapping (and what to never claim) | [COMPLIANCE.md](COMPLIANCE.md) |
-| Funders / role fit | [docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md](docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md) |
+| Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
+| Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
+| Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
+| The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md) |
+| The normative format + verification order | [SPEC.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SPEC.md) |
+| Honest comparison to Rekor / in-toto / OMS / ValiChord | [INTEROP.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEROP.md) |
+| Regulatory mapping (and what to never claim) | [COMPLIANCE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/COMPLIANCE.md) |
+| Funders / role fit | [docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md) |
+| External time anchors + the bring-your-own-type extension interface (v2.0 beta) | [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md) |
+| **Preview:** TEE-attestation bridge (v2.0 beta) | [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md) |
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -184,18 +259,18 @@ Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-b
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
 **not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
-[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+[SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
 
 ## Contributing
 
-See [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first
 issues are labeled [`good-first-issue`](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/labels/good-first-issue);
-security findings go through [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). The verifier core aims to stay small,
+security findings go through [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The verifier core aims to stay small,
 dependency-light, and correct.
 
 ## License
 
-MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
+MIT — see [LICENSE](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE).
 
 ---
 

proofbundle-2.0.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+<div align="center">
+
+<picture>
+  <source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo-dark.svg">
+  <img alt="b7n0de, Verified AI Work" src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/assets/b7n0de-logo.svg" height="60">
+</picture>
+
+<h1>proofbundle</h1>
+
+**AI eval results need receipts.**
+
+Turn an AI evaluation result into one portable, offline-verifiable receipt. It proves *who signed
+these exact bytes* and *that nothing changed since* — not that the number is true. Ed25519 + RFC 6962
+Merkle, one file, no server, no network.
+
+[![CI](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+[![demo reproducible](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/actions/workflows/demo-reproducible.yml)
+[![PyPI](https://img.shields.io/pypi/v/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![Python](https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/proofbundle.svg)](https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/)
+[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE)
+[![DOI](https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.21230467.svg)](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21230467)
+[![Ruff](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/astral-sh/ruff/main/assets/badge/v2.json)](https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff)
+[![Mutation tested](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-mutation_gated-D6248A.svg)](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/scripts/mutation_check.py)
+<!-- SLSA / PEP 740 attestation badges follow once the first attested release lands, see RELEASE.md. -->
+
+**Reviewing this for adoption?** Start with the 30-minute adversarial audit path: **[docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md)**.
+
+</div>
+
+## 60-second try (offline)
+
+```bash
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
+proofbundle demo   # honest receipt => OK, six tampers each => FAILED, sample swap caught
+# Inspect-native (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem, mockllm, no API key):
+git clone https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle && cd proofbundle
+pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]" && make demo   # or `make full-demo` for log -> receipt -> verify
+```
+
+## The problem
+
+Every AI eval number you read — a safety benchmark, a capability score, a leaderboard entry — is an
+**unverifiable claim**. You trust the lab. There's no portable way to check, offline, that a result
+was signed by a stated party, hasn't been altered, and covers the samples it claims.
+
+proofbundle is that check. It's a small MIT-licensed Python tool (a compact, auditable trusted core,
+depends only on [`cryptography`](https://cryptography.io)) that turns a result into a signed
+receipt anyone can verify from a single file — and it's honest about the line it does not cross.
+
+## What the demo shows
+
+You'll see an honest receipt verify `=> OK`, then six independent tampers each verify `FAILED`, then
+a swapped sample get caught — all in memory. `proofbundle demo` exits non-zero if any tamper slips through,
+so it's also a self-test. Full walkthrough: **[docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md)**.
+
+```bash
+# verify a real hosted receipt without writing any code:
+curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/examples/example_bundle.json -o receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # CRYPTO: OK  (the verify itself runs fully offline)
+
+# your own receipt, from a signed payload:
+proofbundle emit --payload-file result.json --new-key signer.key --out receipt.json
+proofbundle verify receipt.json        # exit 0 = crypto OK, 1 = crypto/verification failure, 2 = malformed
+
+# apply YOUR trust decision — verify makes NO trust decision on its own:
+proofbundle verify receipt.json --policy trust_policy.json   # POLICY: OK | FAIL (exit 3) | NOT_EVALUATED
+```
+
+## Inspect-native? (METR Task Standard / UK-AISI ecosystem)
+
+The receipt layer runs directly on [Inspect AI](https://inspect.aisi.org.uk/) — and the proof is
+reproducible offline in minutes:
+
+```bash
+# setup as in the 60-second try above (clone + pip install -e ".[eval,inspect]"), then:
+make full-demo   # a genuine inspect_ai eval log (mockllm: offline, no API key, no GPU)
+                 # -> signed receipt next to the log -> proofbundle verify => OK
+```
+
+In your own pipeline the end-of-task hook signs every run automatically. Walkthrough:
+**[docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md)** · worked example:
+**[examples/inspect_receipt.py](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/examples/inspect_receipt.py)**.
+
+## What a receipt proves — and what it doesn't
+
+| ✅ It proves | ❌ It does **not** prove |
+|---|---|
+| These exact bytes were signed by this key (**authorship**) | That the number is **true** |
+| Nothing changed since signing (**integrity**, Ed25519 + RFC 6962) | That the **issuer is honest** |
+| The result is attributable to a stated issuer | That the **eval was well-designed** |
+| A threshold was met while hiding the model/dataset (salted commitments) | That there was **no cherry-picking** — unless pre-registered |
+| Optionally: individual samples, offline-auditable (per-sample Merkle) | That the **computation was correct** — that needs a TEE or independent reproduction |
+
+This boundary is the point, not a weakness. A receipt makes a claim **attributable, tamper-evident,
+and — with pre-registration and per-sample auditing — bounded and spot-checkable**. Full detail:
+**[THREAT_MODEL.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/THREAT_MODEL.md)**.
+
+## Post-quantum posture (honest, two layers)
+
+proofbundle is **not** "quantum-proof" or "quantum-safe" as a whole. It combines two cryptographic layers
+with very different quantum exposure, and it is honest about both:
+
+- **Quantum-robust (hash-based)** — SHA-256, RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, RFC 8785 canonicalization,
+  and, among the external time anchors, the OpenTimestamps (Bitcoin hash-chain) and `chia-datalayer/v1`
+  (Merkle inclusion) types. Grover only halves the effective bit-strength (SHA-256 keeps a ~128-bit quantum
+  margin, which NIST currently treats as adequate), so these stay secure.
+- **Quantum-vulnerable (elliptic-curve / classical PKI, Shor)** — the Ed25519 receipt signature; for the
+  `chia-datalayer` anchor, Chia's BLS12-381 wallet layer; and, for the RFC 3161 anchor, the TSA's own
+  classical (RSA/ECDSA) certificate-chain signature. A large enough quantum computer could forge any of these.
+
+The attack that matters is not decryption but **back-dated forgery**: an attacker with a quantum computer
+could mint a fake signature on a tampered receipt. The defense — **when a receipt carries a hash-based time
+anchor** (optional, the `[anchors]` beta extra: OpenTimestamps or `chia-datalayer`) — is that the anchor
+proves the original receipt existed *before* that capability, so a forged receipt has no matching anchor.
+That protects the evidence long-term even if the signature layer later breaks. A plain receipt with no anchor
+does not carry this property.
+
+On the witness side, C2SP checkpoints already carry post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** (FIPS 204) cosignatures
+(`proofbundle[pq]`); a post-quantum *payload* signature — crypto-agility for the receipt itself — is on the
+roadmap.
+
+## In plain language
+
+A proofbundle receipt is the cash-register receipt of an AI test result: it shows who claimed the
+number and that nobody quietly changed it afterwards. It does not show the test was good — the way a
+cash-register receipt does not show the meal was good — but without a receipt there is nothing to
+check at all.
+
+## How it fits together
+
+*(diagram renders on GitHub — [view it there](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle#how-it-fits-together); PyPI shows the source)*
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    H["eval harness<br/>inspect_ai · lm-eval · promptfoo · pytest"] --> A["adapter → signed claim<br/>salted commitments · provenance · samples root"]
+    A --> R["receipt<br/>one portable file"]
+    R --> V{{"proofbundle verify — offline"}}
+    V --> C["signature · Merkle inclusion · SD-JWT/KB ·<br/>witness quorum · status list · sample openings"]
+    C --> OK(["CRYPTO: OK / FAILED"])
+    style V fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+    style OK fill:#D6248A,stroke:#D6248A,color:#fff
+```
+
+## What's in the box
+
+- **Core** — Ed25519 signature + RFC 6962 / 9162 Merkle inclusion, verified fully offline. Checks a
+  real [Sigstore Rekor](https://docs.sigstore.dev/) proof, so correctness isn't self-referential.
+- **Eval receipts** — a signed claim (`metric ⋈ threshold`, `n`, salted model/dataset commitments,
+  assurance level, provenance) from your run. See [EVAL_CLAIM.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/EVAL_CLAIM.md).
+- **Selective disclosure** — SD-JWT ([RFC 9901](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9901/)) with Key
+  Binding: prove a threshold while withholding the exact score.
+- **Transparency-log interop** — C2SP `tlog-checkpoint` / cosignature / `.tlog-proof`, with
+  post-quantum **ML-DSA-44** witness cosignatures. Optional Token-Status-List revocation snapshots.
+- **Per-sample audit** — commit to every sample; an auditor challenges random indices (with a fresh
+  nonce or a **public randomness beacon**, v1.9) and openings must bind to the signed root. With
+  such an auditor-supplied or beacon-bound challenge, 300 samples catch 1% sample-doctoring with 95%
+  confidence, regardless of run size — a challenge the issuer chose itself does not give this
+  guarantee.
+- **Pre-registration** — `proofbundle prereg <plan>` commits to the protocol before the run, so
+  best-of-many publishing becomes visible.
+- **Integrations** — opt-in inspect_ai end-of-task hook and pytest plugin (emit only when
+  `PROOFBUNDLE_EMIT=1` / `--proofbundle`), plus a Hugging Face Community Evals bridge. See
+  [INTEGRATIONS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEGRATIONS.md), or the end-to-end walkthrough
+  [docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md) — run an eval, get a receipt, verify it offline.
+- **External time anchors** *(v2.0 beta, the `[anchors]` extra)* — an optional `anchors[]` layer that
+  attaches external evidence of *when* a commitment or receipt existed, from a party the producer does not
+  control. Two built-in types verify offline: **RFC 3161** TSA tokens (against a frozen cert chain) and
+  **OpenTimestamps** Bitcoin proofs (honest pending → confirmed lifecycle). A `register_anchor_type`
+  extension interface lets a third party ship its own fail-closed type; two worked examples ship — a
+  first-party **`chia-datalayer/v1`** (offline Merkle inclusion of a canonical root under a published Chia
+  DataLayer root) and a third-party **`markovian-provenance/v1`** (a wallet-attributable, Bitcoin-anchored
+  stamp). See [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md).
+
+## Docs
+
+| For… | Read |
+|---|---|
+| Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
+| Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
+| Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
+| The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/DEMO.md) |
+| The normative format + verification order | [SPEC.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SPEC.md) |
+| Honest comparison to Rekor / in-toto / OMS / ValiChord | [INTEROP.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/INTEROP.md) |
+| Regulatory mapping (and what to never claim) | [COMPLIANCE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/COMPLIANCE.md) |
+| Funders / role fit | [docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/PROJECT_BRIEF.md) |
+| External time anchors + the bring-your-own-type extension interface (v2.0 beta) | [docs/ANCHORS.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/ANCHORS.md) |
+| **Preview:** TEE-attestation bridge (v2.0 beta) | [docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md) |
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
+pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
+```
+
+Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 comes from
+`cryptography`; Merkle hashing is RFC 6962.
+
+## Status & scope
+
+Beta, SemVer-committed, with a CI test suite behind a mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
+**not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
+by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:
+[SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) and the [Code of Conduct](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). Good first
+issues are labeled [`good-first-issue`](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/labels/good-first-issue);
+security findings go through [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/SECURITY.md). The verifier core aims to stay small,
+dependency-light, and correct.
+
+## License
+
+MIT — see [LICENSE](https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/main/LICENSE).
+
+---
+
+<p align="center"><sub>proofbundle is part of <b>b7n0de</b>, Verified AI Work · <a href="https://b7n0de.com">b7n0de.com</a></sub></p>

{proofbundle-1.9.2 → proofbundle-2.0.0}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "proofbundle"
-version = "1.9.2"
+version = "2.0.0"
 description = "Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"
@@ -44,8 +44,24 @@ sdjwt = []
 # path (verify_bundle / decode_eval_claim) never canonicalizes — it checks stored bytes — so the
 # verifier stays dependency-free. `pip install proofbundle[eval]` adds emit-side canonicalization.
 eval = ["rfc8785>=0.1.4"]
+# EXPERIMENTAL: external time anchors (proofbundle.anchors) — RFC 3161 TSA + OpenTimestamps. Opt-in and
+# clearly experimental (API/format may change). rfc3161-client (Trail of Bits) is deliberately offline —
+# it verifies an RFC 3161 token against bundled roots, no network in the verify path. opentimestamps is
+# the OTS proof library. rfc8785 gives the receipt its canonical (JCS) root. The base install stays
+# anchor-free (only cryptography); a receipt with no anchors verifies unchanged.
+anchors = ["rfc3161-client>=1.0.6", "opentimestamps>=0.4.5", "rfc8785>=0.1.4"]
 # The lm-eval adapter reads exported results.json (no import) → pure stdlib.
 adapters = []
+# chia-datalayer/v1 anchor WRITER (anchors_chia_add). Needs no extra Python package — it drives the
+# stable `chia rpc data_layer|full_node` CLI of a locally installed, cert-authed Chia node (the DataLayer
+# node is the real dependency, not a wheel). Declared so `pip install proofbundle[chia]` is a documented,
+# discoverable install target. VERIFYING an anchor offline (anchors_chia) needs neither this nor a node.
+chia = []
+# EXPERIMENTAL (v2.0 preview): the TEE-attestation bridge (proofbundle.experimental.enclave).
+# Opt-in and clearly unstable — API/wire-format may change or be removed without deprecation.
+# No new runtime dependency (pure stdlib + the core `cryptography`); the extra exists to signal
+# intent and gate the preview, mirroring the `sdjwt` extra. `pip install "proofbundle[experimental]"`.
+experimental = []
 # ML-DSA-44 (FIPS 204) cosignature verification (C2SP tlog-cosignature type 0x06). Needs a
 # cryptography build with OpenSSL 3.5+ (default PyPI wheels since 48.0.0). Verify-only by default;
 # the emit helper needs the same. Ed25519 paths never require this.

{proofbundle-1.9.2 → proofbundle-2.0.0}/src/proofbundle/__init__.py

@@ -13,10 +13,16 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
-__version__ = "1.9.2"
+__version__ = "2.0.0"
+
+# The `proofbundle/v0.1` normative spec revision this build implements — kept in sync with the
+# `Revision:` line at the top of SPEC.md by tests/test_docs_truth.py (WP-B1, closes #28). Bump
+# both together whenever SPEC.md's normative text changes (not on every package release).
+SPEC_REVISION = "2026-07-09"
 
 __all__ = [
     "__version__",
+    "SPEC_REVISION",
     "SCHEMA",
     "verify_bundle",
     "load_bundle",