proofbundle 1.9.0__tar.gz → 1.9.1__tar.gz

{proofbundle-1.9.0/src/proofbundle.egg-info → proofbundle-1.9.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: proofbundle
-Version: 1.9.0
+Version: 1.9.1
 Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
 Author: Konrad Gruszka
 License: MIT
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ flowchart LR
 | For… | Read |
 |---|---|
 | Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
 | Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
 | Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
 | The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md) |
@@ -157,8 +158,7 @@ flowchart LR
 
 ```bash
 pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds rfc8785 JCS)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"         # emit eval receipts (adds an RFC 8785 canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
 pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
 pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
 ```
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 co
 
 ## Status & scope
 
-Beta, SemVer-committed, 299 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+Beta, SemVer-committed, 303 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
 **not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/README.md

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ flowchart LR
 | For… | Read |
 |---|---|
 | Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
 | Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
 | Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
 | The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md) |
@@ -109,8 +110,7 @@ flowchart LR
 
 ```bash
 pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds rfc8785 JCS)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"         # emit eval receipts (adds an RFC 8785 canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
 pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
 pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
 ```
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 co
 
 ## Status & scope
 
-Beta, SemVer-committed, 299 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+Beta, SemVer-committed, 303 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
 **not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "proofbundle"
-version = "1.9.0"
+version = "1.9.1"
 description = "Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT."
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.10"

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/src/proofbundle/__init__.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
-__version__ = "1.9.0"
+__version__ = "1.9.1"
 
 __all__ = [
     "__version__",

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/src/proofbundle/statuslist.py

@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ def _status_at(bit_array: bytes, bits: int, idx: int) -> int:
 
 
 def verify_status_snapshot(status_list_token: str, *, expected_uri: str, index: int,
-                           issuer_pubkey: bytes, now: Optional[int] = None) -> dict:
+                           issuer_pubkey: bytes, now: Optional[int] = None,
+                           receipt_issuer_pubkey: Optional[bytes] = None) -> dict:
     """Verify a Status List Token snapshot and read one token's status, fully offline.
 
     Checks, fail-closed: compact-JWS shape, `typ` == ``statuslist+jwt``, EdDSA signature under
@@ -78,11 +79,33 @@ def verify_status_snapshot(status_list_token: str, *, expected_uri: str, index:
     `bits` ∈ {1,2,4,8}, zlib decode, index in range. Freshness: `iat`/`exp`/`ttl` are returned;
     `fresh` is None unless ``now`` (POSIX seconds) is supplied, then it is
     ``iat <= now`` AND ``now < exp`` (if exp) AND ``now <= iat + ttl`` (if ttl).
-    Returns ``{ok, status, status_label, fresh, iat, exp, ttl, detail}`` — ``ok`` covers
-    signature + structure + lookup; combining ``ok`` with ``fresh`` is the caller's policy.
+
+    **Trust-anchor separation (v1.9.1, external review #8/#12):** a status list signed by the
+    SAME key that signed the receipt carries no *independent* revocation assurance — the issuer
+    simply attests its own "still valid" state, and can flip it at will. Pass
+    ``receipt_issuer_pubkey`` (the bundle's signing key) and the result reports
+    ``self_issued=True`` when the status issuer key equals it. This is REPORTED, not fatal — the
+    relying party decides whether self-issued revocation is acceptable for its threat model (it
+    often is not; a distinct, independently-operated status authority is the stronger anchor).
+
+    Returns ``{ok, status, status_label, fresh, self_issued, iat, exp, ttl, detail}`` — ``ok``
+    covers signature + structure + lookup; combining ``ok`` with ``fresh``/``self_issued`` is the
+    caller's policy.
     """
     result = {"ok": False, "status": None, "status_label": None, "fresh": None,
-              "iat": None, "exp": None, "ttl": None, "detail": ""}
+              "self_issued": None, "iat": None, "exp": None, "ttl": None, "detail": ""}
+    if receipt_issuer_pubkey is not None:
+        # hmac.compare_digest for a constant-time compare of the two public keys (defensive; the
+        # values are public, but consistent with the codebase's compare discipline).
+        import hmac as _hmac  # noqa: PLC0415
+        # SYMMETRISCHER Typ-Guard: beide MUESSEN bytes/bytearray sein, sonst crasht bytes(str) mit TypeError
+        # statt fail-closed (verify_status_snapshot deklariert 'never crashes'). Non-bytes receipt_issuer_pubkey
+        # (str/int/list) → self_issued bleibt False (kein Crash, kein Fake-True).
+        result["self_issued"] = (isinstance(issuer_pubkey, (bytes, bytearray))
+                                 and isinstance(receipt_issuer_pubkey, (bytes, bytearray))
+                                 and len(issuer_pubkey) == len(receipt_issuer_pubkey)
+                                 and _hmac.compare_digest(bytes(issuer_pubkey),
+                                                          bytes(receipt_issuer_pubkey)))
     if status_list_token.count(".") != 2:
         result["detail"] = "not a compact JWS"
         return result

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1/src/proofbundle.egg-info}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: proofbundle
-Version: 1.9.0
+Version: 1.9.1
 Summary: Emit and verify portable cryptographic evidence bundles, offline: Ed25519 + RFC 6962 Merkle + optional SD-JWT.
 Author: Konrad Gruszka
 License: MIT
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ flowchart LR
 | For… | Read |
 |---|---|
 | Skeptics (why not SHA-256 / Sigstore / trust the issuer) | [docs/FAQ.md](docs/FAQ.md) |
+| New to this? plain-terms glossary | [docs/GLOSSARY.md](docs/GLOSSARY.md) |
 | Reviewers (30-minute adversarial audit path) | [docs/REVIEWERS.md](docs/REVIEWERS.md) |
 | Where every trust anchor comes from | [docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md](docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md) |
 | The demos, tier by tier | [docs/DEMO.md](docs/DEMO.md) |
@@ -157,8 +158,7 @@ flowchart LR
 
 ```bash
 pip install proofbundle                 # core: offline verify + plain emit (dependency-free)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds rfc8785 JCS)
-pip install "proofbundle[eval]"         # emit eval receipts (adds an RFC 8785 canonicalizer)
+pip install "proofbundle[eval]"          # + eval receipts, prereg, and the demo (adds an RFC 8785 JCS canonicalizer)
 pip install "proofbundle[inspect]"      # inspect_ai adapter + hook
 pip install "proofbundle[pq]"           # verify ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum) witness cosignatures
 ```
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ Requires Python 3.10+. The verify path never rolls its own crypto — Ed25519 co
 
 ## Status & scope
 
-Beta, SemVer-committed, 299 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
+Beta, SemVer-committed, 303 tests + a CI mutation gate + property-based parser fuzzing. Correctness
 is anchored to external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Rekor proof, not just its own bundles. It is
 **not** a log service, a full in-toto client, a TEE, a consensus network, or a compliance product
 by itself — it is the small, offline, standards-native receipt layer between them. Security policy:

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/tests/test_fuzz_parsers.py

@@ -83,6 +83,15 @@ if given is not None:
             _must_not_crash(verify_status_snapshot, token, expected_uri="u", index=0,
                             issuer_pubkey=b"\x00" * 32)
 
+        @settings(max_examples=200, deadline=None)
+        @given(_texts, st.one_of(st.text(min_size=32, max_size=32), st.integers(),
+                                 st.lists(st.integers()), st.none(), st.binary(max_size=64)))
+        def test_verify_status_snapshot_never_crashes_on_malformed_receipt_key(self, token, rk):
+            # v1.9.1 self_issued: receipt_issuer_pubkey darf JEDEN Typ tragen ohne die 'never crashes'-Zusage
+            # zu brechen (der symmetrische Typ-Guard fängt non-bytes → self_issued=False statt TypeError).
+            _must_not_crash(verify_status_snapshot, token, expected_uri="u", index=0,
+                            issuer_pubkey=b"\x00" * 32, receipt_issuer_pubkey=rk)
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

{proofbundle-1.9.0 → proofbundle-1.9.1}/tests/test_statuslist.py

@@ -177,3 +177,35 @@ class TestFreshnessAndStrictTypes(unittest.TestCase):
         res = verify_status_snapshot(f"{h}.{p}.{sig}", expected_uri=URI, index=0, issuer_pubkey=self.pub)
         self.assertFalse(res["ok"])
         self.assertIn("exp", res["detail"])
+
+
+class TestSelfIssuedSeparation(unittest.TestCase):
+    """v1.9.1 (#8/#12): a status list signed by the receipt key has no independent revocation
+    assurance — verify_status_snapshot reports self_issued so the relying party can refuse it."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.status_signer = generate_signer()
+        self.status_pub = _raw(self.status_signer)
+        self.token = issue_status_list_token([0, 1], uri=URI, signer=self.status_signer, iat=IAT)
+
+    def test_self_issued_none_when_not_asked(self):
+        res = verify_status_snapshot(self.token, expected_uri=URI, index=0,
+                                     issuer_pubkey=self.status_pub)
+        self.assertTrue(res["ok"])
+        self.assertIsNone(res["self_issued"])          # not requested → not judged
+
+    def test_self_issued_true_when_same_key(self):
+        res = verify_status_snapshot(self.token, expected_uri=URI, index=0,
+                                     issuer_pubkey=self.status_pub,
+                                     receipt_issuer_pubkey=self.status_pub)
+        self.assertTrue(res["ok"])                      # still valid crypto
+        self.assertTrue(res["self_issued"])             # but flagged as self-issued
+
+    def test_self_issued_false_when_distinct_key(self):
+        receipt_pub = _raw(generate_signer())           # an independent receipt issuer
+        res = verify_status_snapshot(self.token, expected_uri=URI, index=1,
+                                     issuer_pubkey=self.status_pub,
+                                     receipt_issuer_pubkey=receipt_pub)
+        self.assertTrue(res["ok"])
+        self.assertFalse(res["self_issued"])            # distinct anchor → not self-issued
+        self.assertEqual(res["status_label"], "INVALID")