pmcp 2.7.0__tar.gz → 2.7.2__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (306) hide show
  1. pmcp-2.7.2/.consiliency/plans/detailed-limit-bound-20260829-1500.md +178 -0
  2. pmcp-2.7.2/.consiliency/plans/detailed-public-host-check-20260830-1200.md +248 -0
  3. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/CHANGELOG.md +56 -0
  4. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/PKG-INFO +14 -8
  5. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/README.md +13 -7
  6. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/SECURITY.md +11 -1
  7. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  8. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/__init__.py +1 -1
  9. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/auth.py +132 -10
  10. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/client/manager.py +14 -8
  11. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/types.py +18 -12
  12. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_auth.py +176 -0
  13. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_client_manager.py +29 -17
  14. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_policy_fail_open.py +65 -0
  15. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/uv.lock +1 -1
  16. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.claude/docs-catalog.json +0 -0
  17. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.claude/plans/ticklish-inventing-stearns.md +0 -0
  18. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/evidence/bypass-proofs-187.md +0 -0
  19. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/evidence/mutation-175.md +0 -0
  20. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/evidence/mutation-180.md +0 -0
  21. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/evidence/mutation-183.md +0 -0
  22. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/evidence/mutation-189.md +0 -0
  23. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/notes/derive_npm_flags.py +0 -0
  24. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/notes/differential_npm_corpus.py +0 -0
  25. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/notes/mutate.py +0 -0
  26. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/notes/sse-stream-ended-investigation-20260812.md +0 -0
  27. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/notes/verify_tables.py +0 -0
  28. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-anyio-transport-task-ownership-20260811-0204.md +0 -0
  29. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-catalog-indexing-hardening-20260827-1745.md +0 -0
  30. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-ci-job-timeouts-20260826-0400.md +0 -0
  31. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-ci-workflow-guards-20260826-2205.md +0 -0
  32. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-installed-version-from-runner-cache-20260817-1600.md +0 -0
  33. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-installed-version-from-serverinfo-20260817-0400.md +0 -0
  34. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-nopt-backed-npm-identity-20260826-2150.md +0 -0
  35. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-npm-flag-classification-20260826-1130.md +0 -0
  36. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-package-identity-parsing-20260825-0900.md +0 -0
  37. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-policy-fail-open-20260829-1200.md +0 -0
  38. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-remove-automatic-update-notices-20260819-0100.md +0 -0
  39. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-spawn-time-version-provenance-20260817-1800.md +0 -0
  40. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-stale-notice-package-identity-20260817-0300.md +0 -0
  41. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-update-server-resolution-residuals-20260816-1824.md +0 -0
  42. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-update-server-toctou-20260820-1300.md +0 -0
  43. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-value-flag-collisions-20260826-0500.md +0 -0
  44. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-verify-host-enumerated-types-20260827-1730.md +0 -0
  45. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.consiliency/plans/detailed-version-probe-ask-the-server-20260817-2000.md +0 -0
  46. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.dockerignore +0 -0
  47. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.env.example +0 -0
  48. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/CODEOWNERS +0 -0
  49. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/actions/pipeline-bootstrap-setup/action.yml +0 -0
  50. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/dependabot.yml +0 -0
  51. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/probe/p1_probe_client.py +0 -0
  52. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/probe/p1_probe_server.py +0 -0
  53. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/workflows/docker.yml +0 -0
  54. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/workflows/maintenance.yml +0 -0
  55. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/workflows/pipeline-bootstrap.yml +0 -0
  56. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/workflows/release.yml +0 -0
  57. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.github/workflows/test.yml +0 -0
  58. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.gitignore +0 -0
  59. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.mcp-gateway/descriptions.yaml +0 -0
  60. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.mcp.json.example +0 -0
  61. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.opencode/agent/fast-build-spark.md +0 -0
  62. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.opencode/agent/impl-codex53.md +0 -0
  63. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.opencode/agent/planner-gemini.md +0 -0
  64. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.opencode/agent/qa-debug.md +0 -0
  65. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.opencode/agent/research-spark.md +0 -0
  66. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/.pr_details.md +0 -0
  67. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/CONTRIBUTING.md +0 -0
  68. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/Dockerfile +0 -0
  69. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/LICENSE +0 -0
  70. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/SPEC_COMPLIANCE.md +0 -0
  71. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/agent-manifest.yaml +0 -0
  72. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/catalog-info.yaml +0 -0
  73. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/config/.mcp.json.example +0 -0
  74. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/.gitignore +0 -0
  75. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/RUNBOOK.md +0 -0
  76. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/repro_client.py +0 -0
  77. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/run.sh +0 -0
  78. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/slow_server.py +0 -0
  79. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/diagnostics/issue-79-1b/synthetic.mcp.json +0 -0
  80. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/docker-compose.yml +0 -0
  81. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/examples/gateway-only.mcp.json +0 -0
  82. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/examples/gateway-policy.yaml +0 -0
  83. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/examples/sample-backends.mcp.json +0 -0
  84. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/examples/scoped-advisor-policy.yaml +0 -0
  85. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/generated/.gitkeep +0 -0
  86. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/HANDOFF-agent-board-mcp-registration.md +0 -0
  87. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/ROADMAP-pmcp-agent-board-mcp.md +0 -0
  88. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/agent-board-overlay.template.jsonc +0 -0
  89. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/codebase-review-2026-06-15.md +0 -0
  90. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-103-scoped-advisor-audit-20260726.md +0 -0
  91. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-describe-nested-schema-and-indexit-stdio-20260706-0920.md +0 -0
  92. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-idle-timeout-downstream-calls-20260628-0646.md +0 -0
  93. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-mcp-2x-spec-2026-07-28-stage1-20260805-1740.md +0 -0
  94. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-overlay-server-env-patch-20260801-1530.md +0 -0
  95. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/detailed-private-manifest-overlay-20260629-0841.md +0 -0
  96. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/manifest.json +0 -0
  97. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v1-config.md +0 -0
  98. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v1-observe.md +0 -0
  99. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v1-resolver.md +0 -0
  100. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v1-runtime.md +0 -0
  101. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-P1.md +0 -0
  102. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-P2.md +0 -0
  103. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-P3B.md +0 -0
  104. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-P5.md +0 -0
  105. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-P6CLEAN.md +0 -0
  106. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v11-PG.md +0 -0
  107. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v12-FANOUT.md +0 -0
  108. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v12-TRISTATE.md +0 -0
  109. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v12-UPDPATH.md +0 -0
  110. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v2-lifecycle.md +0 -0
  111. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v2-ops.md +0 -0
  112. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v2-refresh.md +0 -0
  113. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v2-serialize.md +0 -0
  114. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v2-soak.md +0 -0
  115. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-auth.md +0 -0
  116. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-config.md +0 -0
  117. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-conform.md +0 -0
  118. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-observe.md +0 -0
  119. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-proto.md +0 -0
  120. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v3-tasks.md +0 -0
  121. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-authobs.md +0 -0
  122. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-authsoak.md +0 -0
  123. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-elicit.md +0 -0
  124. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-remote.md +0 -0
  125. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-safeurl.md +0 -0
  126. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v4-store.md +0 -0
  127. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v5-catalogcli.md +0 -0
  128. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v5-clihint.md +0 -0
  129. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v5-climatch.md +0 -0
  130. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v5-clisoak.md +0 -0
  131. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v5-reqcli.md +0 -0
  132. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v6-hostcontract.md +0 -0
  133. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v6-hostmeta.md +0 -0
  134. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v6-hostpolicy.md +0 -0
  135. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v6-hostreg.md +0 -0
  136. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v6-hostsoak.md +0 -0
  137. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-AUTHRS.md +0 -0
  138. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-CONCURR.md +0 -0
  139. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-ENVFIX.md +0 -0
  140. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-MANIFEST.md +0 -0
  141. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-REDACT.md +0 -0
  142. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v7-REGISTRY.md +0 -0
  143. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v8-AUTHFIX.md +0 -0
  144. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v8-COMPLETE.md +0 -0
  145. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v8-MATCHFIX.md +0 -0
  146. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v8-REGFIX.md +0 -0
  147. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v8-RELEASE.md +0 -0
  148. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/phase-plan-v9-SPECCURRENCY.md +0 -0
  149. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/v7-code-review-findings.md +0 -0
  150. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/plans/v7-issue-tracker.md +0 -0
  151. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/_mutate_workflow.sh +0 -0
  152. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/check_workflows.py +0 -0
  153. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/emit-event.mjs +0 -0
  154. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/package-lock.json +0 -0
  155. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/package.json +0 -0
  156. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/run.mjs +0 -0
  157. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/shims/README.md +0 -0
  158. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/shims/claude +0 -0
  159. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/shims/codex +0 -0
  160. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/pipeline-bootstrap/shims/gemini +0 -0
  161. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/_serverkill_runner.py +0 -0
  162. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/run_sse_flake_probe.py +0 -0
  163. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/run_sse_flake_probe_interrupt.py +0 -0
  164. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/sse_flake_probe.py +0 -0
  165. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/sse_flake_probe_interrupt.py +0 -0
  166. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/sse_flake_probe_serverkill.py +0 -0
  167. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/sse_flake_probe_sigkill.py +0 -0
  168. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/scripts/probes/sse_flake_probe_sigkill_connect.py +0 -0
  169. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/server.json +0 -0
  170. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/README.md +0 -0
  171. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/active/pmcp-gateway-orchestration-plan.md +0 -0
  172. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v1.md +0 -0
  173. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v10.md +0 -0
  174. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v11.md +0 -0
  175. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v12.md +0 -0
  176. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v2.md +0 -0
  177. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v3.md +0 -0
  178. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v4.md +0 -0
  179. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v5.md +0 -0
  180. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v6.md +0 -0
  181. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v7.md +0 -0
  182. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v8.md +0 -0
  183. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/phase-plans-v9.md +0 -0
  184. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/specs/tenant-code-mode-host-contract.md +0 -0
  185. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/__main__.py +0 -0
  186. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/cli.py +0 -0
  187. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/cli_commands/__init__.py +0 -0
  188. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/cli_commands/doctor.py +0 -0
  189. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/cli_commands/install.py +0 -0
  190. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/cli_commands/secrets.py +0 -0
  191. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/client/__init__.py +0 -0
  192. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/config/__init__.py +0 -0
  193. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/config/guidance.py +0 -0
  194. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/config/loader.py +0 -0
  195. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/env_store.py +0 -0
  196. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/errors.py +0 -0
  197. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/identity.py +0 -0
  198. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/__init__.py +0 -0
  199. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/_npm_resolve.js +0 -0
  200. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/code_patterns.yaml +0 -0
  201. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/code_patterns_loader.py +0 -0
  202. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/environment.py +0 -0
  203. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/installer.py +0 -0
  204. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/loader.py +0 -0
  205. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/manifest.yaml +0 -0
  206. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/matcher.py +0 -0
  207. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/npm_resolver.py +0 -0
  208. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/refresher.py +0 -0
  209. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/registry.py +0 -0
  210. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/sync.py +0 -0
  211. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/manifest/version_checker.py +0 -0
  212. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/policy/__init__.py +0 -0
  213. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/policy/policy.py +0 -0
  214. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/py.typed +0 -0
  215. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/remote_auth.py +0 -0
  216. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/resources/code_execution_guide.md +0 -0
  217. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/scoped_advisor_audit.py +0 -0
  218. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/server.py +0 -0
  219. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/subscriptions.py +0 -0
  220. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/summary/__init__.py +0 -0
  221. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/summary/generator.py +0 -0
  222. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/summary/template_fallback.py +0 -0
  223. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/templates/code_examples.yaml +0 -0
  224. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/templates/code_snippets_loader.py +0 -0
  225. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/tools/__init__.py +0 -0
  226. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/tools/handlers.py +0 -0
  227. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/transport/__init__.py +0 -0
  228. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/transport/http.py +0 -0
  229. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/src/pmcp/validation.py +0 -0
  230. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/team_announcement.md +0 -0
  231. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
  232. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/conftest.py +0 -0
  233. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/fixtures/npm/schema.json +0 -0
  234. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/fixtures/registry/v0_servers_page1.json +0 -0
  235. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/fixtures/registry/v0_servers_page2.json +0 -0
  236. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_catalog_publishers.py +0 -0
  237. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_client_transport.py +0 -0
  238. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_dependency_bounds.py +0 -0
  239. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_get_retirement.py +0 -0
  240. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_listen_over_http.py +0 -0
  241. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_listen_registration.py +0 -0
  242. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_server_handlers.py +0 -0
  243. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/mcp2x/test_subscription_contract.py +0 -0
  244. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/__init__.py +0 -0
  245. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/conftest.py +0 -0
  246. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/fake_remote.py +0 -0
  247. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/fake_stdio_server.py +0 -0
  248. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/harness.py +0 -0
  249. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_downstream_handshake_era.py +0 -0
  250. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_downstream_remote.py +0 -0
  251. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_downstream_stdio.py +0 -0
  252. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_emitter_harness.py +0 -0
  253. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_get_retired.py +0 -0
  254. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_harness.py +0 -0
  255. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_publisher_coverage.py +0 -0
  256. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_subscriptions_e2e.py +0 -0
  257. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_wire_handshake_era.py +0 -0
  258. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/runtime/test_wire_modern_era.py +0 -0
  259. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_auth_origin_wiring.py +0 -0
  260. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_baseline_constraints.py +0 -0
  261. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_cli.py +0 -0
  262. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_cli_p4.py +0 -0
  263. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_client_manager_reconnect.py +0 -0
  264. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_config_loader.py +0 -0
  265. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_boot.py +0 -0
  266. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_child_env.py +0 -0
  267. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_gates_handlers.py +0 -0
  268. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_gates_startup.py +0 -0
  269. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_optionality_e2e.py +0 -0
  270. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_predicate_guard.py +0 -0
  271. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_credential_requirement.py +0 -0
  272. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_env_store.py +0 -0
  273. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_errors.py +0 -0
  274. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_guidance_config.py +0 -0
  275. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_http_dos.py +0 -0
  276. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_http_transport.py +0 -0
  277. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_identity.py +0 -0
  278. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_install_command.py +0 -0
  279. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_integration.py +0 -0
  280. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_lazy_start.py +0 -0
  281. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_manifest.py +0 -0
  282. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_manifest_overlay.py +0 -0
  283. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_manifest_provision.py +0 -0
  284. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_npm_resolver.py +0 -0
  285. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_offline_discovery.py +0 -0
  286. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_package_metadata.py +0 -0
  287. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_phase4_e2e.py +0 -0
  288. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_phase6_tenant_code_mode.py +0 -0
  289. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_policy.py +0 -0
  290. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_progressive_disclosure.py +0 -0
  291. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_provision_validation.py +0 -0
  292. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_refresher.py +0 -0
  293. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_registry.py +0 -0
  294. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_scoped_advisor_audit.py +0 -0
  295. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_secrets_command.py +0 -0
  296. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_server.py +0 -0
  297. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_server_lifecycle.py +0 -0
  298. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_setup_command.py +0 -0
  299. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_singleton_lock_scope.py +0 -0
  300. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_ssrf_registry.py +0 -0
  301. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_startup_resolver.py +0 -0
  302. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_summary.py +0 -0
  303. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_tools.py +0 -0
  304. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_transport_http.py +0 -0
  305. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_version_checker.py +0 -0
  306. {pmcp-2.7.0 → pmcp-2.7.2}/tests/test_workflow_guards.py +0 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
1
+ # Detailed plan: bound `max_tools_per_server`, and stop the code arguing against it
2
+
3
+ > **Revision 2 (2026-08-29).** Boarded 3 AGREE, no blocking defects. Three
4
+ > corrections applied, one of them a **misattributed citation of mine** that
5
+ > argued the opposite of what the source says.
6
+
7
+ ## Task
8
+
9
+ Close Consiliency/pmcp#207. Add `Field(ge=1)` to
10
+ `LimitsPolicy.max_tools_per_server`, and correct three comments that state the
11
+ reason it was omitted — a reason #202 removed.
12
+
13
+ ## Research summary
14
+
15
+ Verified in this worktree.
16
+
17
+ **Why the bound was blocked, and why it no longer is.** #175 proposed it, then
18
+ dropped it: `PolicyManager._load_policy(..., fatal=False)` swallowed validation
19
+ errors and fell back to an **allow-all** default, so making `0` schema-invalid
20
+ would have silently discarded an operator's whole policy file. #202 made a
21
+ discovered policy that *parses but fails validation* terminate startup, so a
22
+ schema bound can no longer silently unrestrict anything.
23
+
24
+ **`0` is not a meaningful setting.** At `0`, `_parse_tool_entries` empties its
25
+ result before examining a single entry, and no documented semantic assigns `0` a
26
+ "disable tool indexing" meaning.
27
+
28
+ **WAS WRONG (rev 1):** it supported this by citing `manager.py:107` — "the cap is
29
+ a runaway guard, not a catalog-size limit". That sentence is about
30
+ `_MAX_LISTING_PAGES = 500`, **not** `max_tools_per_server`, and the same passage
31
+ describes `max_tools_per_server`'s default of 100 as a *legitimate catalog size*
32
+ — the opposite of the point it was quoted for. The conclusion survives on
33
+ `_parse_tool_entries`; the citation does not, and is removed rather than
34
+ reworded.
35
+
36
+ **Two independent axes.** `LimitsPolicy.max_tools_per_server` (`types.py:973`) is
37
+ the policy/schema surface. `ClientManager.__init__`'s `max_tools_per_server: int = 100`
38
+ (`manager.py:936`) is a separate constructor parameter, and
39
+ `manager.py:2169` guards `< 1` — so it already handles zero *and negatives*
40
+ defensively. #207 is about the schema axis; the constructor axis is deliberately
41
+ left alone (see Non-goals).
42
+
43
+ **What currently pins `0` as valid.** `tests/test_client_manager.py:6110`
44
+ asserts `LimitsPolicy(max_tools_per_server=0).max_tools_per_server == 0`, and
45
+ `:6116` constructs `ClientManager(max_tools_per_server=0)`. The first must
46
+ invert; the second must **stay**, because it exercises the constructor axis and
47
+ the log behaviour, both of which survive this change.
48
+
49
+ ## The migration consequence, stated plainly
50
+
51
+ **This change plus #202 converts a working configuration into a hard boot
52
+ failure.** An operator whose discovered policy contains `max_tools_per_server: 0`
53
+ starts fine today (with a now-accurate log saying nothing was indexed); after
54
+ this, that file fails validation and #202 terminates startup.
55
+
56
+ That is the intended direction — a nonsensical value should be rejected loudly
57
+ rather than silently indexing nothing — but it is a real behaviour change for
58
+ anyone holding that value, and it must be in the CHANGELOG under `### Changed`,
59
+ not buried as a fix. The affected population is plausibly zero, since `0` yields
60
+ a gateway that indexes no tools at all, but "plausibly zero" is not "none".
61
+
62
+ ## Changes
63
+
64
+ ### `src/pmcp/types.py` (modify)
65
+
66
+ - `LimitsPolicy.max_tools_per_server` (`:973` — rev 1 said `:960`, which is the
67
+ docstring) — modify — `Field(default=100, ge=1)`.
68
+ - `LimitsPolicy` docstring (`:957-970`) — modify — it currently says the field
69
+ **deliberately carries no `Field(ge=1)`** and explains why, citing the
70
+ swallow-and-fall-back-to-allow-all behaviour. That reason is now false. Replace
71
+ it with a short record that the bound was blocked until #202 made discovered
72
+ policy validation fatal. Keeping the history matters: without it, the next
73
+ person to consider a schema bound has no way to know the hazard existed or that
74
+ it was removed.
75
+
76
+ ### `src/pmcp/client/manager.py` (modify)
77
+
78
+ - The comment at `:2174-2177` — modify — same correction. It currently justifies
79
+ the missing bound by the fail-open.
80
+ - The comment at `:683-687` — modify — it tells the operator to "fix their policy
81
+ file", which after the bound is unreachable via a policy file; that path is
82
+ constructor-only.
83
+ - `:2169`'s `< 1` guard and the "so none were indexed" log at `:690` —
84
+ **unchanged**. They remain reachable through the constructor axis, and the log
85
+ fix from #175 is correct independently of whether the schema accepts `0`.
86
+
87
+ ### `tests/test_client_manager.py` (modify)
88
+
89
+ - `:6110` — modify — invert: `LimitsPolicy(max_tools_per_server=0)` must now
90
+ raise `ValidationError`. Also assert `-1` raises, since `ge=1` covers it and
91
+ the old bound covered neither.
92
+ - `:6116` and the rest of `TestZeroLimitLogsAccurately` — **keep**. They drive
93
+ `ClientManager(max_tools_per_server=0)` directly, which is still legal, and
94
+ they pin the accurate-log behaviour. Deleting them because "0 is now invalid"
95
+ would remove coverage of a path that still exists.
96
+ - The class docstring at `:6066-6075` — modify — it explains the log fix by
97
+ reference to a policy file setting `0`, which is no longer possible. Reframe to
98
+ the constructor axis so the test's stated reason matches its actual mechanism.
99
+
100
+ ### `tests/test_policy_fail_open.py` or a sibling (modify/create)
101
+
102
+ - Add the end-to-end consequence: a **discovered policy file** containing
103
+ `max_tools_per_server: 0` now makes `PolicyManager()` raise **`ValueError`** —
104
+ `PolicyManager` wraps pydantic errors, so this test must follow
105
+ `test_policy_fail_open.py`'s existing `ValueError` / `Invalid policy file`
106
+ pattern and its `_discovery_paths` helper. Only the schema-level test in
107
+ `test_client_manager.py` sees a raw `ValidationError`, and it needs the pydantic
108
+ import. This is the
109
+ interaction between #207 and #202, and neither issue's tests cover it alone —
110
+ #207's tests are schema-level and #202's use a different invalid key.
111
+
112
+ ## Documentation impact
113
+
114
+ - `CHANGELOG.md` — add — in a **fresh `[Unreleased]`** section. **2.7.0 is now
115
+ cut**, so #175's and #202's entries — including the sentence saying
116
+ `LimitsPolicy` still accepts `0` and that the bound is left to a follow-up —
117
+ sit under `## [2.7.0]` as shipped history. Leave them; they were true of that
118
+ release. Under `### Changed`, not `### Fixed`: a policy file with
119
+ `max_tools_per_server: 0` is now rejected, and via #202 that terminates
120
+ startup. Name the value explicitly so an affected operator can search for it.
121
+ - `README.md` — modify **only if** it documents `max_tools_per_server` or shows a
122
+ policy example carrying it; check both before editing.
123
+
124
+ ## Dependencies & order
125
+
126
+ 1. The `ge=1` bound and the inverted schema test.
127
+ 2. The four comment corrections — `types.py` docstring, `manager.py:2174-2177`,
128
+ `manager.py:683-687`, and the `TestZeroLimitLogsAccurately` docstring.
129
+ 3. The end-to-end discovered-policy test.
130
+ 4. CHANGELOG.
131
+
132
+ ## Verification
133
+
134
+ ```bash
135
+ uv run pytest -q tests/test_client_manager.py -k "ZeroLimit or Limits"
136
+ uv run pytest -q tests/test_policy_fail_open.py
137
+ uv run pytest -q
138
+ uv run ruff check src/ tests/ && uv run ruff format --check src/ tests/ && uv run mypy src/
139
+
140
+ # The zero-limit log path must still be reachable and still accurate:
141
+ # construct ClientManager(max_tools_per_server=0) directly and assert the
142
+ # message names the limit and does not say "unparseable".
143
+ ```
144
+
145
+ Edge cases: `max_tools_per_server: -1` in a policy file; the value absent
146
+ (default 100 still applies); an explicit `--policy` carrying `0` (already fatal
147
+ via `fatal=True`, but assert it, since that path's message differs); a policy
148
+ with `limits: {}`.
149
+
150
+ ## Acceptance criteria
151
+
152
+ - [ ] `LimitsPolicy(max_tools_per_server=0)` and `(-1)` both raise
153
+ `ValidationError`; the default of 100 still applies when the field is absent.
154
+ - [ ] A **discovered policy file** containing `max_tools_per_server: 0` makes
155
+ `PolicyManager()` raise — the #207 × #202 interaction, proven end-to-end
156
+ rather than inferred from the schema test.
157
+ - [ ] `ClientManager(max_tools_per_server=0)` **still works** and still logs the
158
+ accurate zero-limit message. A change that removes this path because the
159
+ schema now rejects `0` must not pass — the constructor axis is untouched by
160
+ this issue.
161
+ - [ ] None of the three corrected comments still asserts that auto-discovery
162
+ swallows validation errors — grep for `swallow` and `fatal=False` across
163
+ `src/` and `tests/` returns nothing describing current behaviour.
164
+ - [ ] Full suite green.
165
+
166
+ ## Non-goals
167
+
168
+ - **Bounding `ClientManager.__init__`'s parameter.** It is a programmatic API, its
169
+ `< 1` guard already handles the value defensively, and #175's own review noted
170
+ it is not required to close the finding. Mirroring `ge=1` there is defensible
171
+ but is a separate decision about how strict a Python constructor should be.
172
+ - Any further policy-schema tightening. This is the first bound added after #202
173
+ removed the hazard; adding one at a time keeps the blast radius legible.
174
+
175
+ ## Execution Policy
176
+
177
+ - execute: effort=low, reason=a one-field schema bound plus comment corrections;
178
+ the only subtlety is which existing tests invert and which must survive
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
1
+ # Detailed plan: fix the IP-literal classification, and stop the docs overclaiming
2
+
3
+ > **Revision 6 (2026-08-30).** The rev-4 board found a defect of a **different
4
+ > class** than the five rounds before it: legacy numeric IPv4 forms
5
+ > (`2852039166`, `0xA9FEA9FE`, `0177.0.0.1`) fail `ip_address()`, fall into the
6
+ > "it's a DNS name" branch, and are **accepted** — while the resolver interprets
7
+ > them directly as `169.254.169.254` and `127.0.0.1`. No DNS lookup is involved.
8
+ > This is the most serious finding in the issue and it is **not** the deferred
9
+ > #211 question.
10
+ >
11
+ > **Revision 5 (2026-08-30).** Rev 4's rule was still incomplete: I found two
12
+ > more accepted bypasses by probing it — `::10.0.0.5` / `::127.0.0.1`
13
+ > (IPv4-compatible IPv6) and `::0:5efe:a00:5` (ISATAP). **This is the fifth round
14
+ > of "find another spelling", and that pattern is itself the finding** — see
15
+ > "Why this keeps happening". Rev 5's rule is verified against 26 literals,
16
+ > 0 mismatches.
17
+ >
18
+ > **Revision 4 (2026-08-30).** Rev 3 boarded 2 DISAGREE. Its prescribed recipe —
19
+ > "prefer `is_global`" — **would have left `fec0::1` broken and regressed the
20
+ > existing multicast test**. A rule I then drafted myself was wrong in both
21
+ > directions too. Rev 4 carries a rule verified against 19 literals, 0
22
+ > mismatches.
23
+ >
24
+ > **Revision 3 (2026-08-30).** Two board rounds. Rev 1 claimed no
25
+ > attacker-influenced path reached a fetch or relay — disproved. Rev 2 proposed a
26
+ > trust split — the board showed it would kill the elicitation feature and that
27
+ > its own acceptance criterion would **freeze two live classification bugs**.
28
+ > Scope narrowed on the operator's instruction: land the self-contained
29
+ > IP-literal fix here; the trust split moves to **#211** with the evidence.
30
+
31
+ ## Task
32
+
33
+ Close Consiliency/pmcp#210's verifiable half. `_is_public_auth_host` classifies
34
+ two non-public address ranges as public, and three user-facing sentences promise
35
+ more than the code checks.
36
+
37
+ ## What is actually broken — measured
38
+
39
+ ```
40
+ 100.64.0.1 CGNAT / RFC 6598 shared public=True <-- wrong
41
+ fec0::1 IPv6 site-local (RFC 3879) public=True <-- wrong
42
+ 169.254.169.254 link-local IMDS public=False correct
43
+ ::ffff:10.0.0.5 IPv4-mapped RFC1918 public=False correct
44
+ 8.8.8.8 genuinely public public=True correct
45
+ ```
46
+
47
+ `_is_public_auth_host` tests `is_private or is_loopback or is_link_local or
48
+ is_multicast or is_unspecified`. That misses **RFC 6598 shared address space**
49
+ (`100.64.0.0/10`, used by carrier-grade NAT and by some cloud metadata paths) and
50
+ **deprecated IPv6 site-local** (`fec0::/10`). Both are non-public and both pass.
51
+
52
+ **A seat also claimed `::ffff:169.254.169.254` passes. It does not** — verified
53
+ above; Python's `is_private` handles the IPv4-mapped form. Recorded so the next
54
+ reader does not re-derive it.
55
+
56
+ **WAS WRONG (rev 2):** its acceptance criterion said "IP literals still behave as
57
+ today", which would have **pinned both bugs as intended behaviour**. That is the
58
+ same entrenching error the board caught in rev 1's criterion, in the criterion
59
+ written to replace it.
60
+
61
+ ## Changes
62
+
63
+ ### `src/pmcp/auth.py` (modify)
64
+
65
+ - `_is_public_auth_host` (`:127`) — modify — **unwrap, then classify positively.**
66
+ The verified rule, 19 literals, 0 mismatches on Python 3.10:
67
+
68
+ ```python
69
+ # Every IPv6 form that carries an IPv4 address in its low 32 bits.
70
+ _V4_EMBEDDING = [
71
+ ip_network("::ffff:0:0/96"), # RFC 4291 IPv4-mapped
72
+ ip_network("::/96"), # RFC 4291 IPv4-compatible (deprecated)
73
+ ip_network("64:ff9b::/96"), # RFC 6052 NAT64 well-known prefix
74
+ ]
75
+
76
+ def _unwrap(a):
77
+ if isinstance(a, IPv6Address):
78
+ for net in _V4_EMBEDDING:
79
+ if a in net:
80
+ return IPv4Address(int(a) & 0xFFFFFFFF)
81
+ if (int(a) >> 32) & 0xFFFF == 0x5EFE: # RFC 5214 ISATAP
82
+ return IPv4Address(int(a) & 0xFFFFFFFF)
83
+ return a
84
+
85
+ addr = _unwrap(ip_address(hostname))
86
+ return (addr.is_global
87
+ and not getattr(addr, "is_site_local", False)
88
+ and not addr.is_multicast)
89
+ ```
90
+
91
+ **WAS WRONG (rev 4):** it unwrapped only `ipv4_mapped` and NAT64. Probing it
92
+ found `::10.0.0.5` and `::127.0.0.1` (IPv4-compatible) and `::0:5efe:a00:5`
93
+ (ISATAP) still **accepted**. 6to4 (`2002::/16`) and Teredo (`2001::/32`) happen
94
+ to be safe because both are already non-global — luck, not design, and worth a
95
+ test so it stays true.
96
+
97
+ ### The numeric-form bypass — a second, distinct defect
98
+
99
+ `_is_public_auth_host` treats *"`ip_address()` raised"* as *"this is a hostname,
100
+ accept it"*. That conflates two very different things: a name whose target is
101
+ unknowable without resolving (the #211 question), and **an IP address written in
102
+ a form this code cannot parse**. Verified:
103
+
104
+ ```
105
+ 2852039166 ip_address() fails -> accepted resolver -> 169.254.169.254
106
+ 0xA9FEA9FE ip_address() fails -> accepted resolver -> 169.254.169.254
107
+ 0177.0.0.1 ip_address() fails -> accepted resolver -> 127.0.0.1
108
+ 167772161 ip_address() fails -> accepted resolver -> 10.0.0.1
109
+ 10.0.0.1 ip_address() parses -> rejected
110
+ ```
111
+
112
+ **Fix:** before deciding a host is a name, try to canonicalise it as a numeric
113
+ address — decimal, hex, octal, and dotted variants — and if it resolves to one,
114
+ classify it as a literal. A host that is *not* a name must not be granted a
115
+ name's benefit of the doubt.
116
+
117
+ **Do not fix this by resolving.** The correct rule is: if it can be read as a
118
+ number, it is a literal, and literals go through the classifier. Only genuinely
119
+ non-numeric hosts reach the accepted-unresolved path that #211 covers.
120
+
121
+ ## Why this keeps happening
122
+
123
+ Five rounds have each found another spelling of the same idea: *an IPv6 literal
124
+ that carries an IPv4 address*. That is the identical failure mode as this repo's
125
+ npm parser, which took five production fixes for the same reason — enumerating
126
+ forms of a thing instead of modelling it.
127
+
128
+ The difference, and the reason enumeration is defensible **here**: the set of
129
+ IPv4-embedding IPv6 formats is closed and specified by RFCs (4291 mapped and
130
+ compatible, 6052 NAT64, 3056 6to4, 4380 Teredo, 5214 ISATAP). It is a finite list
131
+ with citations, not an open-ended vocabulary. The rule above covers all six —
132
+ three by unwrapping, two because they are already non-global, one by pattern.
133
+
134
+ What makes that safe to rely on is the **test**, not the code: the matrix must
135
+ name every format and its RFC, so a seventh format added to the standards is a
136
+ visible gap rather than a silent one. Do not let the list live only in the
137
+ implementation.
138
+
139
+ **WAS WRONG (rev 3):** "prefer `is_global`, falling back to an explicit check".
140
+ `is_global` exists on every supported Python, so the fallback never runs — and
141
+ `is_global` is **`True` for `fec0::1`**, leaving one of the two named defects in
142
+ place. Two seats caught it.
143
+
144
+ **Also wrong — a rule I drafted after rev 3**, recorded because it is the
145
+ instructive failure: `is_global and not is_site_local and not is_reserved`
146
+ **rejects `::ffff:8.8.8.8`** (every IPv4-mapped address is `is_reserved`) and
147
+ **accepts `224.0.0.1` and `ff02::1`** (multicast is `is_global` on 3.10),
148
+ which would have regressed the existing multicast test at
149
+ `tests/test_auth.py:751`. Getting it wrong in both directions is why the rule
150
+ above is stated as verified output rather than reasoning.
151
+
152
+ Three mapped/embedded forms drove the design, none of which the issue named:
153
+ `::ffff:100.64.0.1` (mapped CGNAT — `is_private` unwraps but CGNAT is not
154
+ IPv4-private, so it stayed public), and `64:ff9b::a00:5` / `64:ff9b::7f00:1`
155
+ (NAT64 embedding `10.0.0.5` and `127.0.0.1`). NAT64 wrapping a genuinely public
156
+ address — `64:ff9b::808:808` → `8.8.8.8` — must still be **accepted**, which is
157
+ what makes unwrapping the right move rather than rejecting the prefix wholesale.
158
+ - The docstring — modify — state plainly that **a DNS name is accepted without
159
+ resolution**. That limitation is real and stays; it is #211's subject, and it
160
+ must be visible here rather than implied.
161
+ - `sanitize_public_auth_url`'s error message (`:143`) — modify — stop claiming
162
+ the host "must be public". Say what was checked: a non-public **IP literal**
163
+ was rejected. Do not imply a name was verified.
164
+
165
+ ### `tests/test_auth.py` (modify)
166
+
167
+ - Extend the existing public-URL test with the two fixed ranges and the
168
+ already-correct ones, each named: `100.64.0.1` and `fec0::1` **rejected**;
169
+ `169.254.169.254`, `::ffff:10.0.0.5`, `10.0.0.5`, `127.0.0.1`, `localhost`
170
+ rejected; `8.8.8.8` and a public DNS name accepted.
171
+ - Add a test asserting the **name limitation** explicitly — that a DNS name is
172
+ accepted unresolved — with a comment pointing at #211. Pinning a limitation is
173
+ only right when it is *documented as a limitation*; rev 2's mistake was pinning
174
+ it as correctness.
175
+
176
+ ## Documentation impact
177
+
178
+ - `CHANGELOG.md` — add — `### Fixed`: two non-public IP ranges were accepted by
179
+ the auth-URL host check.
180
+ - `README.md:168`, `README.md:173`, `SECURITY.md:39` — modify — all three promise
181
+ a "public host" or claim private/link-local/loopback/multicast hosts are
182
+ rejected. True only for IP literals. Qualify each. **`README:173` was found by a
183
+ seat and is absent from rev 2's list**; `SECURITY.md` was absent from rev 1's.
184
+
185
+ ## Dependencies & order
186
+
187
+ 1. The classification fix and its unit tests.
188
+ 2. The message and docstring.
189
+ 3. The three documentation sentences.
190
+ 4. CHANGELOG.
191
+
192
+ ## Verification
193
+
194
+ ```bash
195
+ uv run pytest -q tests/test_auth.py -k public_auth_url
196
+ uv run pytest -q
197
+ uv run ruff check src/ tests/ && uv run ruff format --check src/ tests/ && uv run mypy src/
198
+ ```
199
+
200
+ This host's `/tmp/package.json` and `/tmp/node_modules` make the npm identity
201
+ tests fail locally in a way that reproduces on a clean `main` export
202
+ (`tests/conftest.py`). Verify against `main` before blaming this diff, and do not
203
+ claim a green local suite that was not green.
204
+
205
+ ## Acceptance criteria
206
+
207
+ - [ ] **All eight newly-rejected literals** fail against `main` and pass here:
208
+ `100.64.0.1`, `::ffff:100.64.0.1`, `fec0::1`, `64:ff9b::a00:5`,
209
+ `64:ff9b::7f00:1`, `::10.0.0.5`, `::127.0.0.1`, `::0:5efe:a00:5`.
210
+ RED-on-main required for each. Rev 3 named two of these and rev 4 named
211
+ five; a fix satisfying either could still admit the rest.
212
+ - [ ] **6to4 and Teredo are asserted rejected** (`2002:0a00:0005::1`,
213
+ `2001:0:0:0:0:0:0a00:0005`) even though they pass today by being
214
+ non-global — so the behaviour is pinned rather than incidental.
215
+ - [ ] **The test matrix names each embedding format with its RFC.** The list must
216
+ be readable as a specification, so a future format is a visible gap.
217
+ - [ ] **Legacy numeric forms are rejected**: `2852039166`, `0xA9FEA9FE`,
218
+ `0177.0.0.1`, `167772161`, and the dotted-hex/octal variants. Each must
219
+ fail against `main`, where all are currently accepted. Two of them resolve
220
+ to the cloud-metadata address.
221
+ - [ ] **A genuinely non-numeric host is still accepted** (`auth.example.com`), so
222
+ the canonicalisation does not swallow the DNS path that #211 covers.
223
+ - [ ] **All five must-accept literals** still pass: `8.8.8.8`, `93.184.216.34`,
224
+ `2001:4860:4860::8888`, `::ffff:8.8.8.8`, and `64:ff9b::808:808`. The last
225
+ two are the over-rejection traps — a rule using `is_reserved` fails both.
226
+ - [ ] **The existing multicast/link-local rejections still hold**: `224.0.0.1`,
227
+ `ff02::1`, `169.254.169.254`, `10.0.0.5`, `::ffff:10.0.0.5`, `127.0.0.1`,
228
+ `localhost`, `fc00::1`, `2001:db8::1`, `::`. A rule built on bare
229
+ `is_global` regresses the first two.
230
+ - [ ] A public DNS name is still accepted, and a test says **in its name** that
231
+ this is a known limitation tracked by #211 — not a correctness assertion.
232
+ - [ ] No error message claims a host "must be public" or was verified public.
233
+ Asserted on message text.
234
+ - [ ] `README.md:168`, `README.md:173` and `SECURITY.md:39` no longer promise
235
+ more than IP-literal filtering.
236
+ - [ ] Full suite green.
237
+
238
+ ## Non-goals
239
+
240
+ - **The trust split, the fetch primitive, and the relay path** — all moved to
241
+ **#211**, which carries the board's evidence and the open design questions.
242
+ - **DNS resolution**, and **suffix denylists**. Both rejected with reasons
243
+ recorded in #211.
244
+
245
+ ## Execution Policy
246
+
247
+ - execute: effort=low, reason=a classification predicate, its tests, and three
248
+ documentation sentences; the subtlety is in not pinning the bugs as behaviour
@@ -7,6 +7,62 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
7
7
 
8
8
  ## [Unreleased]
9
9
 
10
+ ## [2.7.2] - 2026-08-30
11
+
12
+ ### Fixed
13
+ - **The public auth-URL host check accepted several non-public hosts.** Two
14
+ distinct defects in `_is_public_auth_host`, both reachable through auth
15
+ metadata, elicitation, and `resource_server_jwks_url`:
16
+ - The classifier subtracted a list of bad properties (`is_private`,
17
+ `is_loopback`, `is_link_local`, `is_multicast`, `is_unspecified`), and that
18
+ list had holes. RFC 6598 CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`) and deprecated RFC 3879
19
+ IPv6 site-local (`fec0::/10`) were classified as public, as were IPv4
20
+ addresses embedded in IPv6 literals — `64:ff9b::7f00:1` (RFC 6052 NAT64
21
+ carrying `127.0.0.1`), `::10.0.0.5` (RFC 4291 IPv4-compatible) and
22
+ `::0:5efe:a00:5` (RFC 5214 ISATAP). The check now unwraps every
23
+ IPv4-embedding IPv6 format and then classifies positively.
24
+ - **Legacy numeric host forms bypassed the check entirely.** `ip_address()`
25
+ raises on them, and the code read "raised" as "this is a DNS name, accept
26
+ it" — while a stock resolver reads `2852039166` and `0xA9FEA9FE` as
27
+ `169.254.169.254` and `0177.0.0.1` as `127.0.0.1`, with no DNS lookup
28
+ involved. Such hosts are now canonicalised (not resolved) and classified as
29
+ the literals they are.
30
+
31
+ Genuinely public addresses are unaffected, including public addresses carried
32
+ inside an embedding format (`::ffff:8.8.8.8`, `64:ff9b::808:808`) and addresses
33
+ that merely resemble one: ISATAP is matched on its full RFC 5214 §6.1
34
+ interface identifier (`00-00-5E-FE`, or `02-00-5E-FE` with the u/g bit set),
35
+ not on the `5efe` hextet alone, so an ordinary global address such as
36
+ `2606:4700::1234:5efe:a00:5` is still accepted.
37
+
38
+ Two limitations remain, both name-shaped and both tracked in #211: a DNS name
39
+ is accepted **without being resolved**, and so is a trailing-dot IPv4 such as
40
+ `169.254.169.254.`, which POSIX `inet_aton` also rejects as an address. The
41
+ DNS-name limitation is now stated in the docstring, `README.md` and
42
+ `SECURITY.md` instead of being implied away. The error message no longer claims
43
+ the host "must be public", since only IP literals are ever checked. (#210)
44
+
45
+ ## [2.7.1] - 2026-08-30
46
+
47
+ ### Changed
48
+ - **A policy file setting `max_tools_per_server: 0` is now rejected, and via
49
+ #202 that terminates startup.** `LimitsPolicy.max_tools_per_server` is bounded
50
+ at `ge=1`; `0` — and any negative value — no longer validates. **This can stop
51
+ a gateway that starts today.** If your policy file (`.mcp-gateway-policy.yaml`
52
+ / `.json`, or `~/.claude/gateway-policy.yaml` / `.json`) contains the literal
53
+ line `max_tools_per_server: 0`, the gateway will refuse to start with
54
+ `Invalid policy file ...`; remove the line to take the default of `100`, or
55
+ set the number of tools you actually want indexed. Such a gateway indexed no
56
+ tools at all before, so the value is unlikely to be in deliberate use — but
57
+ the failure is a hard one and worth searching for. 2.7.0 shipped the log fix
58
+ for this value and deliberately left the bound out: at that time a discovered
59
+ policy that failed validation was discarded in favour of the allow-all
60
+ default, so rejecting one value would have silently discarded the operator's
61
+ entire policy file. #202, in the same release, made that case fatal, which is
62
+ what makes the bound safe to add. `ClientManager`'s `max_tools_per_server`
63
+ constructor parameter is a separate, programmatic axis and is unchanged — it
64
+ still accepts `0` and still logs that nothing was indexed. (#207)
65
+
10
66
  ## [2.7.0] - 2026-08-29
11
67
 
12
68
  ### Added
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.5
2
2
  Name: pmcp
3
- Version: 2.7.0
3
+ Version: 2.7.2
4
4
  Summary: PMCP - Progressive MCP: Minimal context bloat with on-demand tool discovery
5
5
  Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp
6
6
  Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp
@@ -229,15 +229,21 @@ audience is bound to the configured `resource_server_audience` (the server's
229
229
  canonical resource URI, per RFC 8707); it is never derived from the request
230
230
  Host header. `resource-server` mode fails closed at startup if the issuer,
231
231
  JWKS URL, or audience is missing, and `resource_server_jwks_url` must be an
232
- `https` URL on a public host. Token signatures are only accepted for the
233
- operator-configured `resource_server_allowed_algorithms` allowlist (default
234
- `RS256`/`ES256`); the token's own `alg` header is never trusted. JWKS is fetched
232
+ `https` URL and is rejected when its host is a non-public IP literal. Token
233
+ signatures are only accepted for the operator-configured
234
+ `resource_server_allowed_algorithms` allowlist (default `RS256`/`ES256`); the
235
+ token's own `alg` header is never trusted. JWKS is fetched
235
236
  asynchronously and cached, so validation never blocks the event loop; an
236
237
  unreachable JWKS endpoint returns `503` while an invalid token returns `401`.
237
- It rejects private, link-local, loopback, multicast, and unspecified hosts in
238
- public auth metadata URLs. PMCP is still not an Authorization Server and does
239
- not provide dynamic client registration, SSO, RBAC, billing, or a complete
240
- multi-tenant identity service.
238
+ In public auth metadata URLs it rejects hosts written as non-public **IP
239
+ literals** — private, CGNAT, link-local, loopback, multicast, site-local, and
240
+ unspecified — including IPv4 addresses embedded in IPv6 literals and legacy
241
+ numeric forms such as `2852039166`. This is a filter on literals only: a DNS
242
+ name is accepted **without being resolved**, so a name that points at an
243
+ internal address still passes
244
+ ([#211](https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp/issues/211)). PMCP is still not an
245
+ Authorization Server and does not provide dynamic client registration, SSO,
246
+ RBAC, billing, or a complete multi-tenant identity service.
241
247
 
242
248
  Auth mode and OAuth resource-server parameters are configurable from the CLI or
243
249
  environment (CLI flags take precedence; env values are read only when the flag
@@ -165,15 +165,21 @@ audience is bound to the configured `resource_server_audience` (the server's
165
165
  canonical resource URI, per RFC 8707); it is never derived from the request
166
166
  Host header. `resource-server` mode fails closed at startup if the issuer,
167
167
  JWKS URL, or audience is missing, and `resource_server_jwks_url` must be an
168
- `https` URL on a public host. Token signatures are only accepted for the
169
- operator-configured `resource_server_allowed_algorithms` allowlist (default
170
- `RS256`/`ES256`); the token's own `alg` header is never trusted. JWKS is fetched
168
+ `https` URL and is rejected when its host is a non-public IP literal. Token
169
+ signatures are only accepted for the operator-configured
170
+ `resource_server_allowed_algorithms` allowlist (default `RS256`/`ES256`); the
171
+ token's own `alg` header is never trusted. JWKS is fetched
171
172
  asynchronously and cached, so validation never blocks the event loop; an
172
173
  unreachable JWKS endpoint returns `503` while an invalid token returns `401`.
173
- It rejects private, link-local, loopback, multicast, and unspecified hosts in
174
- public auth metadata URLs. PMCP is still not an Authorization Server and does
175
- not provide dynamic client registration, SSO, RBAC, billing, or a complete
176
- multi-tenant identity service.
174
+ In public auth metadata URLs it rejects hosts written as non-public **IP
175
+ literals** — private, CGNAT, link-local, loopback, multicast, site-local, and
176
+ unspecified — including IPv4 addresses embedded in IPv6 literals and legacy
177
+ numeric forms such as `2852039166`. This is a filter on literals only: a DNS
178
+ name is accepted **without being resolved**, so a name that points at an
179
+ internal address still passes
180
+ ([#211](https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp/issues/211)). PMCP is still not an
181
+ Authorization Server and does not provide dynamic client registration, SSO,
182
+ RBAC, billing, or a complete multi-tenant identity service.
177
183
 
178
184
  Auth mode and OAuth resource-server parameters are configurable from the CLI or
179
185
  environment (CLI flags take precedence; env values are read only when the flag
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ PMCP is a local-first MCP gateway. Its default security posture assumes:
36
36
  are only accepted for the operator-configured algorithm allowlist (default
37
37
  `RS256`/`ES256`); the token's own `alg` header is never trusted. The mode
38
38
  fails closed at startup without an issuer, JWKS URL, and audience, and the
39
- JWKS URL must be `https` on a public host. JWKS is fetched asynchronously and
39
+ JWKS URL must be `https` and is rejected when its host is a non-public IP
40
+ literal (see the DNS-name limitation below). JWKS is fetched asynchronously and
40
41
  cached so validation never blocks the event loop; an unreachable JWKS endpoint
41
42
  returns `503` while an invalid or wrong-audience token returns `401`.
42
43
  - Timing oracle attacks on token comparison (`hmac.compare_digest`)
@@ -64,6 +65,15 @@ PMCP is a local-first MCP gateway. Its default security posture assumes:
64
65
 
65
66
  ### Known limitations
66
67
 
68
+ - **The auth-URL host check filters IP literals only**: a public auth metadata
69
+ or JWKS URL is rejected when its host is a non-public IP literal — private,
70
+ CGNAT, link-local, loopback, multicast, site-local or unspecified, including
71
+ IPv4 addresses embedded in IPv6 literals (RFC 4291 mapped and compatible,
72
+ RFC 6052 NAT64, RFC 3056 6to4, RFC 4380 Teredo, RFC 5214 ISATAP) and legacy
73
+ numeric forms such as `2852039166` or `0177.0.0.1`. **A DNS name is accepted
74
+ without being resolved**, so a name pointing at an internal address is not
75
+ caught. Tracked in
76
+ [#211](https://github.com/Consiliency/pmcp/issues/211).
67
77
  - **No mTLS**: clients are not authenticated by certificate; only Bearer token.
68
78
  - **No per-tool ACL on HTTP**: any valid token can invoke any tool. Tool-level policy is
69
79
  enforced at the MCP layer, not the HTTP layer.
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
4
4
 
5
5
  [project]
6
6
  name = "pmcp"
7
- version = "2.7.0"
7
+ version = "2.7.2"
8
8
  description = "PMCP - Progressive MCP: Minimal context bloat with on-demand tool discovery"
9
9
  readme = "README.md"
10
10
  license = "MIT"
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
1
1
  """PMCP - A meta-server for minimal Claude Code tool bloat."""
2
2
 
3
- __version__ = "2.7.0"
3
+ __version__ = "2.7.2"