phantomprobe 0.9.1__tar.gz → 0.9.3__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/CHANGELOG.md +203 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/PKG-INFO +36 -11
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/README.md +35 -10
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py +14 -1
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/active.py +191 -99
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/cli.py +34 -7
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/constants.py +1 -1
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/src/phantomprobe/cpe_tables.py +285 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/src/phantomprobe/cve.py +413 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/dashboard.py +13 -1
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/js.py +29 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/src/phantomprobe/nvd.py +256 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/src/phantomprobe/ports.py +171 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/tests/test_active.py +350 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_audit_script.py +26 -1
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_cli.py +61 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/tests/test_cve.py +1049 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.3/tests/test_ports.py +253 -0
- phantomprobe-0.9.1/CHANGELOG.md +0 -94
- phantomprobe-0.9.1/src/phantomprobe/cve.py +0 -622
- phantomprobe-0.9.1/tests/test_active.py +0 -107
- phantomprobe-0.9.1/tests/test_cve.py +0 -496
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/.gitignore +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/CONTRIBUTING.md +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/LICENSE +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/pyproject.toml +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/__init__.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/__main__.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/aggressive.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/asgi.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/burp.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/cookies.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/dns_security.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/doh.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/http_checks.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/http_client.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/models.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/passive.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/report.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/screenshot.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/takeover.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/src/phantomprobe/waf.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/conftest.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_aggressive.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_burp.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_cookies.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_dashboard.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_dns_security.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_http_checks.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_http_client.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_takeover.py +0 -0
- {phantomprobe-0.9.1 → phantomprobe-0.9.3}/tests/test_waf.py +0 -0
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# Changelog
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All notable changes to PhantomProbe are recorded here. The format follows
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[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and the project
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follows [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [0.9.3] - 2026-11-17
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Each entry below was found by checking the scanner against a known answer, and
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confirmed afterwards against live NVD, CISA KEV and real DNS.
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### Added
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- **Service banners in phase 2.** Where a service speaks first (FTP, SSH,
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SMTP, POP3, IMAP and the MySQL handshake), the port scan now records what it
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sends on connect, and `--cve` correlates the version in it. Nothing is sent
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to draw the banner out. The CPE table already listed OpenSSH, ProFTPD,
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vsftpd, Exim, MySQL and MariaDB, but a scan only recorded that their ports
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were open, so those entries could never match. A port number alone still
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names no product: "Port 3306/MySQL" without a banner is not looked up.
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- **A caution on distribution builds.** A distribution fixes a vulnerability
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in the release it ships and keeps the upstream version number, so a version
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match can be a patched system. When the banner a version was read from names
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a distribution, every CVE matched on it says so in the Markdown and JSON
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reports, the console summary and the dashboard, and the CVE section of the
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report opens by stating that a version match is a lead to confirm.
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### Fixed
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- **A lettered version lost its letter.** OpenSSL 1.1.1w and ProFTPD 1.3.5e
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were looked up as 1.1.1 and 1.3.5, the oldest release of each line. NVD
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compares the letter: it returned 63 CVEs for OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 33 for
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1.1.1w, so fixed vulnerabilities were reported as open. A single trailing
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letter is now kept; the `p1` of `OpenSSH_8.9p1` is still left out.
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- **Wildcard DNS filled the report with subdomains that do not exist.** Behind
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a wildcard every name resolves, so one real scan reported all 198 wordlist
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names, nine tenths of its findings, although phase 1 had flagged the
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wildcard. Enumeration now learns the wildcard's answer first and lists only
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names that answer differently, with one note accounting for the rest.
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- **CVE correlation missed most current nginx CVEs.** `f5:nginx` returns 41
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results and passed the audit, but NVD files the newer nginx CVEs under
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`f5:nginx_open_source`. For nginx 1.24.0 the scanner saw 2 CVEs of 17, and
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showed 1 of the 10 scored 7.0 or higher. A technology can now carry further
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identifiers (`CPE_SIBLINGS`), queried together and merged.
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- **The same gap affected 18 more products.** 42 candidate second identifiers
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were looked up in NVD and 36 exist. 32 of those were asked about a real
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version alongside the identifier in the table, and 25 returned CVEs the
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table's identifier did not; they are now queried too, across 19 products.
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For five products the table's identifier returned nothing at all, which
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looks exactly like a clean target: Joomla 3.9.0 (125 CVEs under
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`joomla:joomla\!`), Docker 20.10.5 (16), Confluence 7.13.0 (14), RabbitMQ
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3.8.9 (8) and IIS 7.5 (3). MySQL 8.0.30 had 147 CVEs under `oracle:mysql`
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and a further 155 under `oracle:mysql_server`, and Magento 2.4.3 had 8
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against 126 under `adobe:magento`. Each addition carries its measurement in
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`cpe_tables.py`, with the identifiers that were measured and left out listed
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beside them. The measurements themselves, with the scripts that produced
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them, are in `docs/research/nvd-identifier-audit-2026-11-16/`.
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- **An exploited CVE scoring under 7.0 was dropped before KEV was consulted.**
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The severity cut ran first, so the promise that an exploited CVE outranks a
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dormant one could not hold for CVE-2020-11023 (jQuery, scored 6.1 to 6.9, in
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KEV since 2025). Exploitation data is now fetched before the cut, and a CVE in
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KEV is kept at any score.
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- **NVD results were read as one short page.** The client took the first 20 and
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stopped, and NVD sorts oldest first: for `f5:nginx` that page ran from 2009
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to 2014. Pages are now followed to the end, and a cut at the cap is announced.
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- **Client-side library versions never reached CVE matching.** Script URLs were
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not recorded as findings, and JavaScript analysis ran after correlation.
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Versioned script assets are now reported and analysis runs first. A script URL
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is read for client-side libraries only, so `spring-1.2.0.js` is not taken for
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the Spring Framework.
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- **A busy NVD made a product look clean.** A 503, a 429 or a timeout returned
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nothing for that product. They are now retried, and a timeout while reading
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the response body no longer ends the scan.
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- **Technology fingerprinting reported words, not technologies.** Signatures
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were substrings searched across the headers and the page text together, so
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"java" matched any page containing "javascript", ".net" any link to a .net
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domain, and "passenger" a travel site. One real scan credited a WordPress
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site with Java and Node.js. Each signature now names the header, cookie or
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markup it may be found in and matches whole words, and each finding states
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the signal that identified it. Cookie values and request ids are kept out of
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the evidence.
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- **The full Docker image stopped building.** The `playwright` dependency has
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no upper bound and resolved to 1.65, whose bundled Node driver needs
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`libatomic`. The slim base image does not ship it, so `playwright install`
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could not start. The full image now installs `libatomic1`.
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- **CI could not run Python 3.8 or 3.9.** `ubuntu-latest` moved to Ubuntu
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26.04, which has no build of either version, so both jobs failed before any
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test ran. The test job is pinned to `ubuntu-24.04`.
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### Changed
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- The CPE audit checks sibling identifiers alongside their technology, and its
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documentation states what a passing count does and does not prove.
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- `cve.py` is split by responsibility into `cve.py` (correlation), `nvd.py`
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(the NVD client) and `cpe_tables.py` (the identifier tables), each under 500
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lines. `CVEMatcher` keeps its interface.
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- IIS is reported as `iis` rather than folded into `asp.net`, and a WordPress
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generator tag carries its version through to CVE correlation.
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## [0.9.2] - 2026-09-11
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### Fixed
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- **A skipped dashboard was silent.** On a plain `pip install phantomprobe`
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without the `[dashboard]` extra, `--dashboard` correctly skipped the web UI,
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but the only notice printed once at the start and scrolled away during the
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scan, so the run looked like it did nothing. The scan always wrote its reports
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to the current directory, where a user expecting a dashboard would not look.
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The end-of-run summary now always states where the reports were written, and
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says plainly when `--dashboard` was requested without its dependencies, with
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the one command that installs them.
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## [0.9.1] - 2026-09-04
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### Fixed
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- **The CI was red on every run since the 0.9.0 dashboard redesign.** The docker
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job's reachability check grepped the served page for a string the redesign
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removed; it now matches a stable section heading. Local pytest stayed green,
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which is why it went unnoticed.
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- **The release workflow could swallow itself**: PyPI publish ran first and was
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mandatory, so a missing token failed the whole run and no GitHub Release was
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created. The Release is now created first and always; the PyPI publish is last
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and runs only when a token is configured.
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### Changed
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- The README leads with `pip install phantomprobe` now that the package is on
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PyPI, and carries a PyPI version badge.
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## [0.9.0] - 2026-09-03
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The first packaged release. It consolidates the earlier single-file prototypes
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into a modular, passive-first scanner, so several entries below read as fixes
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against that prototype. Every data table and severity calibration was checked
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against its live source before shipping.
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### Added
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- **Subdomain takeover detection** (`--phase2`). A two-signal check: the CNAME
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must point at a known service *and* the service must report the resource
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unclaimed, using the can-i-take-over-xyz fingerprints. Resolves CNAMEs over
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DNS-over-HTTPS so the core stays dependency-free.
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- **Email security** over DoH: SPF, DMARC and DKIM, with `+all` treated as
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worse than a missing record, and DKIM reporting only the selectors it finds.
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- **CAA and DNSSEC** checks, reported as hardening.
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- **Cookie security** analysis (`Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite`), weighted by
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whether a cookie looks like a session or a tracker.
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- **WAF / CDN fingerprinting** of 35 WAFs from the wafw00f signature set.
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- **HSTS preload eligibility**, judged against hstspreload.org's current
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one-year `max-age` floor; **redirect-chain** analysis; and **security.txt**
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discovery.
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- **CVE exploitation intelligence**: every match is enriched with CISA KEV
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(exploited in the wild, with a ransomware marker) and EPSS (probability of
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exploitation), and an exploited CVE ranks above a higher-scored dormant one.
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- **Phase 3 active vulnerability probing** (`--aggressive`, opt-in): CORS, open
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redirect, HTTP parameter pollution and S3 bucket exposure. Non-destructive;
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request smuggling deliberately excluded.
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- **CPE audit script** (`scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py`) to re-check the CVE
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table against live NVD, and a **CI job** that builds and exercises every
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Docker stage.
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- **`requirements-dev.txt`** and a `--no-takeover` flag.
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### Changed
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- **Restructured** the 2270-line single scanner file into a proper
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`src/phantomprobe/` package of focused modules, each under 500 lines.
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- **Redesigned the dashboard**: a dense, calibrated dark theme that scores zero
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on the impeccable design detector, down from 41 anti-patterns.
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- **Expanded the CVE CPE table** from 21 to 74 products, each vendor/product
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pair verified against NVD before being added (nginx corrected to `f5`, express
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to `openjsf`).
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- **Version is single-sourced** from `constants.py` via hatchling, so
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distribution metadata cannot drift from the running code.
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- Trimmed the `burp` extra to `requests` alone, and rewrote the README.
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### Fixed
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- **Packaging and tests were broken**: the wheel shipped only a shim reaching
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the real code through a `sys.path` hack, and all five tests failed on imports.
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- **Docker**: the dashboard bound to loopback inside the container (unreachable
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via the published port), the `full` image could not take a screenshot
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(browsers installed as root), and several compose profiles were misconfigured.
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- **Console encoding** could abort a whole scan: an unencodable byte in output
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raised on a legacy code page, discarding every finding.
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- **Burp integration** was rewritten against the API Burp actually exposes; the
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old code sent the key as a header instead of a path prefix and read fields
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that do not exist.
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- **CVE correlation returned nothing**: a padded CPE matched zero results in
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NVD, two vendor mappings were wrong, and CVSS v4.0 scores were unread.
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### Security
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- Fixed **stored XSS** in the dashboard: target- and finding-derived fields are
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now HTML-escaped before rendering.
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- All outbound fetches go through a helper enforcing an **http/https scheme
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allowlist**, so a hostile page cannot point the scanner at `file://`.
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[0.9.3]: https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe/releases/tag/v0.9.3
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[0.9.2]: https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe/releases/tag/v0.9.2
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[0.9.1]: https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe/releases/tag/v0.9.1
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[0.9.0]: https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe/releases/tag/v0.9.0
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Metadata-Version: 2.5
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Name: phantomprobe
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Version: 0.9.
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Version: 0.9.3
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Summary: Passive-first reconnaissance scanner for penetration testers and bug bounty hunters
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe
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Project-URL: Repository, https://github.com/Ravel226/PhantomProbe
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[](https://pypi.org/project/phantomprobe/)
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[](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
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[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
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PhantomProbe maps a target's attack surface and reports what is actually wrong
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with it. The core runs on the Python standard library alone, so a default
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### Phase 2: active reconnaissance (`--phase2`)
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- **Port scan** - common service ports, concurrently
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- **Port scan** - common service ports, concurrently. Where a service speaks
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first (FTP, SSH, SMTP, POP3, IMAP and the MySQL handshake), the banner it
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sends on connect is recorded. Nothing is sent to draw it out
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- **Subdomain enumeration** - common-name discovery. Under wildcard DNS, where
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every name resolves, only names that answer differently from the wildcard are
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listed, and one note says how many were held back
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- **Technology fingerprinting** - server and framework detection from response
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headers, cookie names and CMS markup, each reported with the signal that
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identified it
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- **Subdomain takeover** - dangling-CNAME detection against a two-signal check
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(the CNAME must point at a known service *and* the service must report the
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resource unclaimed), using the [can-i-take-over-xyz](https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz)
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- **CISA KEV** - whether the CVE is exploited in the wild, with a ransomware marker
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- **EPSS** - the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
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An exploited CVE is ranked above a higher-scored dormant one.
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An exploited CVE is ranked above a higher-scored dormant one. The report keeps
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CVEs scored 7.0 or higher, plus any CVE in CISA KEV whatever its score. With
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`--js`, versions carried in script URLs (`jquery-3.6.0.min.js`) are correlated
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too, and with `--phase2` so are the versions in service banners
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(`SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.9p1`).
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A match is made on the version a service reports, which is a lead to confirm
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and not a finding. Distributions fix vulnerabilities without changing that
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version, so a match read from a banner that names one (Ubuntu, Debian, the Red
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Hat family and others) is reported with that caution attached.
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A pair that returns results can still be incomplete, because NVD files many
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products under more than one identifier. For 19 of the 74 products a second
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identifier returned CVEs the first did not: MySQL 8.0.30 has 147 under one and
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155 more under another, and Joomla 3.9.0 has none under one and 125 under the
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other. Every identifier a product has is queried and the results merged. Keep
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the CPE table honest as vendors change hands:
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```bash
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python scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py # re-check every mapping against NVD
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### Other features
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- **JavaScript analysis** (`--js`) - extracts API endpoints, exposed secrets
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(API keys, tokens, AWS keys) and hidden paths from linked scripts
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(API keys, tokens, AWS keys) and hidden paths from linked scripts, and lists
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versioned script assets for `--cve` to check
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- **Screenshot** (`--screenshot`) - a full-page capture via headless Chromium
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- **Burp Professional** (`--burp`) - runs a Burp scan and imports its issues; see below
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├── dns_security.py SPF, DMARC, DKIM, CAA, DNSSEC
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├── http_checks.py HSTS preload, redirect chain, security.txt
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│
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├── active.py Phase 2:
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├── active.py Phase 2: subdomains, fingerprinting, orchestration
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├── ports.py Port scan and service banners
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├── takeover.py Subdomain takeover (two-signal)
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├── waf.py WAF/CDN fingerprinting
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├── cve.py
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├── cve.py CVE correlation + KEV/EPSS enrichment
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├── nvd.py NVD API client: paging, retries, record parsing
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├── cpe_tables.py What NVD calls each technology (data only)
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├── js.py JavaScript endpoint/secret discovery
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├── screenshot.py Playwright capture (extra: screenshot)
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├── burp.py Burp REST integration (extra: burp)
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└── asgi.py Standalone ASGI entry point (extra: dashboard)
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scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py Re-check the CVE table against live NVD
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tests/
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tests/ 377 tests, network stubbed
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```
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## Development
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[](https://pypi.org/project/phantomprobe/)
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[](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
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[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
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[](tests/)
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PhantomProbe maps a target's attack surface and reports what is actually wrong
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with it. The core runs on the Python standard library alone, so a default
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### Phase 2: active reconnaissance (`--phase2`)
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- **Port scan** - common service ports, concurrently. Where a service speaks
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first (FTP, SSH, SMTP, POP3, IMAP and the MySQL handshake), the banner it
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sends on connect is recorded. Nothing is sent to draw it out
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- **Subdomain enumeration** - common-name discovery. Under wildcard DNS, where
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every name resolves, only names that answer differently from the wildcard are
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listed, and one note says how many were held back
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- **Technology fingerprinting** - server and framework detection from response
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headers, cookie names and CMS markup, each reported with the signal that
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identified it
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- **Subdomain takeover** - dangling-CNAME detection against a two-signal check
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(the CNAME must point at a known service *and* the service must report the
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resource unclaimed), using the [can-i-take-over-xyz](https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz)
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@@ -116,8 +122,23 @@ and enriches every match with:
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- **CISA KEV** - whether the CVE is exploited in the wild, with a ransomware marker
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- **EPSS** - the probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
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An exploited CVE is ranked above a higher-scored dormant one.
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An exploited CVE is ranked above a higher-scored dormant one. The report keeps
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CVEs scored 7.0 or higher, plus any CVE in CISA KEV whatever its score. With
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`--js`, versions carried in script URLs (`jquery-3.6.0.min.js`) are correlated
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too, and with `--phase2` so are the versions in service banners
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(`SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.9p1`).
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A match is made on the version a service reports, which is a lead to confirm
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and not a finding. Distributions fix vulnerabilities without changing that
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version, so a match read from a banner that names one (Ubuntu, Debian, the Red
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Hat family and others) is reported with that caution attached.
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A pair that returns results can still be incomplete, because NVD files many
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products under more than one identifier. For 19 of the 74 products a second
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identifier returned CVEs the first did not: MySQL 8.0.30 has 147 under one and
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155 more under another, and Joomla 3.9.0 has none under one and 125 under the
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other. Every identifier a product has is queried and the results merged. Keep
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the CPE table honest as vendors change hands:
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```bash
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python scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py # re-check every mapping against NVD
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@@ -143,7 +164,8 @@ dedicated tool under a scoped engagement.
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### Other features
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- **JavaScript analysis** (`--js`) - extracts API endpoints, exposed secrets
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(API keys, tokens, AWS keys) and hidden paths from linked scripts
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(API keys, tokens, AWS keys) and hidden paths from linked scripts, and lists
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versioned script assets for `--cve` to check
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- **Screenshot** (`--screenshot`) - a full-page capture via headless Chromium
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148
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- **Burp Professional** (`--burp`) - runs a Burp scan and imports its issues; see below
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@@ -253,13 +275,16 @@ src/phantomprobe/
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├── dns_security.py SPF, DMARC, DKIM, CAA, DNSSEC
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├── http_checks.py HSTS preload, redirect chain, security.txt
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│
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├── active.py Phase 2:
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├── active.py Phase 2: subdomains, fingerprinting, orchestration
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├── ports.py Port scan and service banners
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├── takeover.py Subdomain takeover (two-signal)
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├── waf.py WAF/CDN fingerprinting
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│
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├── aggressive.py Phase 3: CORS, open redirect, HPP, S3 (opt-in)
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│
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├── cve.py
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├── cve.py CVE correlation + KEV/EPSS enrichment
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├── nvd.py NVD API client: paging, retries, record parsing
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├── cpe_tables.py What NVD calls each technology (data only)
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├── js.py JavaScript endpoint/secret discovery
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├── screenshot.py Playwright capture (extra: screenshot)
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├── burp.py Burp REST integration (extra: burp)
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└── asgi.py Standalone ASGI entry point (extra: dashboard)
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scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py Re-check the CVE table against live NVD
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tests/
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```
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## Development
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that was right when written can quietly stop matching. Re-run this now and then,
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and after adding anything to CPE_MAPPING.
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A count above zero proves a pair exists, not that it is complete. f5:nginx
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returned 41 and passed here while NVD was filing the newer nginx CVEs under
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f5:nginx_open_source, so nginx 1.24.0 was shown 2 CVEs out of 17. Further
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identifiers for the same software go in CPE_SIBLINGS and are checked here with
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their technology. Finding them still takes a known answer: pick a version, look
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up a CVE its vendor says affects it, and confirm the scanner returns that CVE.
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python scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py # check the whole table
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python scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py --tech nginx php # check a few entries
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python scripts/audit_cpe_mapping.py --check f5:nginx # try a candidate pair
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unknown = [n for n in names if n not in mapping]
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if unknown:
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parser.error(f"not in CPE_MAPPING: {', '.join(unknown)}")
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pairs = [
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pairs = []
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for n in names:
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pairs.append((n, mapping[n]["vendor"], mapping[n]["product"]))
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# A sibling that stops existing fails as quietly as a primary does.
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for extra in CVEMatcher.CPE_SIBLINGS.get(n, []):
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pairs.append((f"{n}+{extra['product']}",
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extra["vendor"], extra["product"]))
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seconds = len(pairs) * interval
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eta = f"{seconds / 60:.0f} min" if seconds >= 90 else f"{seconds:.0f}s"
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