pentr-verify 0.1.0__tar.gz

pentr_verify-0.1.0/.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+name: Release
+
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [published]
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
+      - name: Check the tag matches the package version
+        run: |
+          version=$(uv version --short)
+          test "${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" = "v${version}" || {
+            echo "release tag ${GITHUB_REF_NAME} does not match pyproject version ${version}"; exit 1; }
+      - run: uv run ruff check .
+      - run: uv run pytest -q
+      - run: uv build
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+
+  publish:
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    environment:
+      name: pypi
+      url: https://pypi.org/p/pentr-verify
+    permissions:
+      id-token: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: dist
+          path: dist/
+      - uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@release/v1

pentr_verify-0.1.0/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+.venv/
+build/
+dist/
+*.egg-info/
+.pytest_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.coverage

pentr_verify-0.1.0/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 PentrAI
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

pentr_verify-0.1.0/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.5
+Name: pentr-verify
+Version: 0.1.0
+Summary: Offline verifier for Pentr evidence lockers
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/PentrAI/pentr-verify
+Author: PentrAI
+License-Expression: MIT
+License-File: LICENSE
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.12
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+
+# pentr-verify
+
+Offline verifier for [Pentr](https://github.com/PentrAI) evidence lockers.
+
+When Pentr finishes a penetration test, it seals all the evidence it captured
+(command logs, HTTP requests and responses, screenshots) into a hash chain and
+signs the result with the organization's Ed25519 key. The exported locker is a
+directory or `.zip` that anyone can check with this tool. You don't need
+network access, a database or a Pentr account.
+
+The platform seals lockers with this same code, so a PASS here uses exactly the
+checks the platform's own seal is built on.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pipx install git+https://github.com/PentrAI/pentr-verify
+# or
+uv tool install git+https://github.com/PentrAI/pentr-verify
+```
+
+The only runtime dependency is `cryptography`. Python 3.12 or newer is required.
+
+## Usage
+
+```bash
+pentr-verify locker.zip                     # verify against the key inside the locker
+pentr-verify locker.zip --key org-key.pem   # pin the signer's public key
+pentr-verify locker/ --json                 # machine-readable report
+pentr-verify locker.zip --quiet             # skip the per-artifact listing
+```
+
+`--key` accepts a PEM public key, 64 hex characters, or 32 raw bytes.
+
+| Exit code | Meaning |
+|-----------|---------|
+| `0` | PASS: the locker verified |
+| `1` | FAIL: the locker did not verify (tampered, incomplete, or signed by a different key) |
+| `2` | Usage error: the input is not a readable locker, or `--key` is unreadable |
+
+### Pinned and unpinned verification
+
+Without `--key`, the locker is checked against the public key it carries. That
+proves the locker is internally consistent and has not been modified since it
+was signed. It does **not** prove who signed it. To prove provenance, get the
+organization's public key through a channel you trust and pass it with `--key`.
+
+## Locker layout
+
+```
+manifest.json          # canonical run manifest: every entry, its hash and chain hash
+signature_block.json   # the signed bytes: chain head, manifest hash, key id, signed_at
+signature.bin          # detached Ed25519 signature over signature_block.json
+public_key.pem         # the signer's public key
+seal.json              # run id, counts and claims, cross-checked against the above
+README.txt             # human instructions
+artifacts/<sha256>     # one file per manifest entry, named by its SHA-256
+```
+
+## What is checked
+
+1. `seal.json` names a known locker format and algorithms.
+2. The signature block binds the exact bytes of `manifest.json`.
+3. The key id is the SHA-256 of the public key, and matches the pinned key when `--key` is given.
+4. The Ed25519 signature over the signature block verifies.
+5. The chain's genesis matches the run id.
+6. Every entry hash and the chain head recompute from the entry metadata.
+7. Every artifact exists, has the listed size, and hashes to its name.
+8. No artifact is present that the manifest does not list.
+9. Every claim in `seal.json` matches the signed manifest.
+
+Every failure is reported with a stable code (`signature_invalid`,
+`chain_head_mismatch`, `blob_hash_mismatch`, `unlisted_blob`, ...). The full set
+is `FAILURE_CODES` in `pentr_verify/locker.py`.
+
+## Limits
+
+- **Key custody.** The Pentr platform holds each organization's private key,
+  encrypted at rest.
+- **Timestamp.** `signed_at` is recorded by the platform's own clock.
+- **Revocation check.** A locker signed with a key that was later retired
+  still verifies.
+
+## Releasing
+
+Publishing a GitHub release builds the package, runs the tests and uploads it
+to PyPI (`.github/workflows/release.yml`, PyPI trusted publishing). The release
+tag must match the version in `pyproject.toml`, e.g. `v0.1.0`.
+
+## Development
+
+```bash
+uv run pytest
+uv run ruff check .
+```
+
+## License
+
+MIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).

pentr_verify-0.1.0/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# pentr-verify
+
+Offline verifier for [Pentr](https://github.com/PentrAI) evidence lockers.
+
+When Pentr finishes a penetration test, it seals all the evidence it captured
+(command logs, HTTP requests and responses, screenshots) into a hash chain and
+signs the result with the organization's Ed25519 key. The exported locker is a
+directory or `.zip` that anyone can check with this tool. You don't need
+network access, a database or a Pentr account.
+
+The platform seals lockers with this same code, so a PASS here uses exactly the
+checks the platform's own seal is built on.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pipx install git+https://github.com/PentrAI/pentr-verify
+# or
+uv tool install git+https://github.com/PentrAI/pentr-verify
+```
+
+The only runtime dependency is `cryptography`. Python 3.12 or newer is required.
+
+## Usage
+
+```bash
+pentr-verify locker.zip                     # verify against the key inside the locker
+pentr-verify locker.zip --key org-key.pem   # pin the signer's public key
+pentr-verify locker/ --json                 # machine-readable report
+pentr-verify locker.zip --quiet             # skip the per-artifact listing
+```
+
+`--key` accepts a PEM public key, 64 hex characters, or 32 raw bytes.
+
+| Exit code | Meaning |
+|-----------|---------|
+| `0` | PASS: the locker verified |
+| `1` | FAIL: the locker did not verify (tampered, incomplete, or signed by a different key) |
+| `2` | Usage error: the input is not a readable locker, or `--key` is unreadable |
+
+### Pinned and unpinned verification
+
+Without `--key`, the locker is checked against the public key it carries. That
+proves the locker is internally consistent and has not been modified since it
+was signed. It does **not** prove who signed it. To prove provenance, get the
+organization's public key through a channel you trust and pass it with `--key`.
+
+## Locker layout
+
+```
+manifest.json          # canonical run manifest: every entry, its hash and chain hash
+signature_block.json   # the signed bytes: chain head, manifest hash, key id, signed_at
+signature.bin          # detached Ed25519 signature over signature_block.json
+public_key.pem         # the signer's public key
+seal.json              # run id, counts and claims, cross-checked against the above
+README.txt             # human instructions
+artifacts/<sha256>     # one file per manifest entry, named by its SHA-256
+```
+
+## What is checked
+
+1. `seal.json` names a known locker format and algorithms.
+2. The signature block binds the exact bytes of `manifest.json`.
+3. The key id is the SHA-256 of the public key, and matches the pinned key when `--key` is given.
+4. The Ed25519 signature over the signature block verifies.
+5. The chain's genesis matches the run id.
+6. Every entry hash and the chain head recompute from the entry metadata.
+7. Every artifact exists, has the listed size, and hashes to its name.
+8. No artifact is present that the manifest does not list.
+9. Every claim in `seal.json` matches the signed manifest.
+
+Every failure is reported with a stable code (`signature_invalid`,
+`chain_head_mismatch`, `blob_hash_mismatch`, `unlisted_blob`, ...). The full set
+is `FAILURE_CODES` in `pentr_verify/locker.py`.
+
+## Limits
+
+- **Key custody.** The Pentr platform holds each organization's private key,
+  encrypted at rest.
+- **Timestamp.** `signed_at` is recorded by the platform's own clock.
+- **Revocation check.** A locker signed with a key that was later retired
+  still verifies.
+
+## Releasing
+
+Publishing a GitHub release builds the package, runs the tests and uploads it
+to PyPI (`.github/workflows/release.yml`, PyPI trusted publishing). The release
+tag must match the version in `pyproject.toml`, e.g. `v0.1.0`.
+
+## Development
+
+```bash
+uv run pytest
+uv run ruff check .
+```
+
+## License
+
+MIT. See [LICENSE](LICENSE).

pentr_verify-0.1.0/pentr_verify/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+__version__ = "0.1.0"

pentr_verify-0.1.0/pentr_verify/cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+"""`pentr-verify` — verify an exported Pentr evidence locker, offline.
+
+This command needs no network, no database, and no Pentr credentials. It is the
+whole point of the evidence locker: an auditor who has never heard of us can
+check the evidence with the same code that sealed it.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from pentr_verify.locker import LockerFormatError, VerifyReport, open_locker, verify_locker
+
+EXIT_PASS = 0
+EXIT_FAIL = 1
+EXIT_USAGE = 2
+
+_UNPINNED_WARNING = """
+UNPINNED: this locker was verified against the public key inside it. That proves
+the locker is internally consistent and unmodified since it was signed — it does
+NOT prove who signed it. To prove provenance, obtain the organization's public
+key through a channel you trust and re-run with --key <file>.
+""".strip()
+
+
+def load_public_key_file(path: str) -> bytes:
+    """Read a public key as PEM, 64 hex chars, or 32 raw bytes -> raw 32 bytes."""
+    raw = Path(path).read_bytes()
+    text = raw.strip()
+    if text.startswith(b"-----BEGIN"):
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+
+        key = serialization.load_pem_public_key(text)
+        if not isinstance(key, Ed25519PublicKey):
+            raise ValueError("only Ed25519 public keys are supported")
+        return key.public_bytes(
+            encoding=serialization.Encoding.Raw,
+            format=serialization.PublicFormat.Raw,
+        )
+    if len(text) == 64:
+        try:
+            return bytes.fromhex(text.decode("ascii"))
+        except (ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
+            pass
+    if len(raw) == 32:
+        return raw
+    raise ValueError(f"{path} is not an Ed25519 public key (PEM, 64 hex, or 32 bytes)")
+
+
+def render_text(report: VerifyReport, quiet: bool = False) -> str:
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    if not quiet:
+        for e in report.entries:
+            status = "OK  " if e.ok else "BAD "
+            name = e.filename or "-"
+            lines.append(f"{status} {e.seq:>4}  {e.kind:<16} {e.sha256[:12]}  {name}")
+        if report.entries:
+            lines.append("")
+
+    if report.ok:
+        lines.append("PASS — evidence locker verified")
+    else:
+        lines.append("FAIL — evidence locker did NOT verify")
+        for f in report.failures:
+            subject = f" [{f.subject}]" if f.subject else ""
+            lines.append(f"  FAIL {f.code}{subject}: {f.message}")
+
+    lines.append("")
+    lines.append(
+        f"  run          {report.run_id}\n"
+        f"  artifacts    {report.entry_count}\n"
+        f"  chain head   {report.chain_head}\n"
+        f"  signed by    {report.key_id}\n"
+        f"  signed at    {report.signed_at}"
+    )
+    if report.ok and not report.pinned:
+        lines.append("")
+        lines.append(_UNPINNED_WARNING)
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def run(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog="pentr-verify",
+        description="Verify an exported Pentr evidence locker offline.",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("locker", help="Path to a locker directory or .zip")
+    parser.add_argument("--key", default=None,
+                        help="Public key to pin (PEM, hex, or raw). Without it, "
+                             "verification proves consistency but not provenance.")
+    parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", dest="as_json",
+                        help="Emit the verification report as JSON")
+    parser.add_argument("--quiet", action="store_true",
+                        help="Suppress the per-artifact listing")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    pinned: bytes | None = None
+    if args.key is not None:
+        try:
+            pinned = load_public_key_file(args.key)
+        except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
+            print(f"pentr-verify: cannot read --key: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+            return EXIT_USAGE
+
+    try:
+        locker = open_locker(args.locker)
+        report = verify_locker(locker, pinned_public_key=pinned)
+    except LockerFormatError as exc:
+        # Not a verification failure: the input is not a locker at all. Reporting
+        # this as exit 1 would tell an auditor their evidence was tampered with
+        # when they actually just mistyped a path.
+        print(f"pentr-verify: {exc}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return EXIT_USAGE
+
+    if args.as_json:
+        print(json.dumps(report.to_dict(), indent=2))
+    else:
+        print(render_text(report, quiet=args.quiet))
+    return EXIT_PASS if report.ok else EXIT_FAIL
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    sys.exit(run())
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

pentr_verify-0.1.0/pentr_verify/hash_chain.py

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import json
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+GENESIS_PREFIX = "pentr-evidence-locker-v1|"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class EntryInput:
+    seq: int
+    kind: str
+    phase: str
+    size: int
+    sha256: str
+    control_ids: list[str]
+    finding_ids: list[str]
+    filename: str | None
+    created_at: str
+
+
+def _canon(obj) -> str:
+    return json.dumps(obj, sort_keys=True, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+
+def genesis(run_id: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256((GENESIS_PREFIX + run_id).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def entry_metadata(entry: EntryInput) -> str:
+    return _canon({
+        "seq": entry.seq,
+        "kind": entry.kind,
+        "phase": entry.phase,
+        "size": entry.size,
+        "control_ids": sorted(entry.control_ids),
+        "finding_ids": sorted(entry.finding_ids),
+        "filename": entry.filename,
+        "created_at": entry.created_at,
+    })
+
+
+def entry_hash(prev_hex: str, artifact_sha256: str, metadata_json: str) -> str:
+    payload = prev_hex + artifact_sha256 + metadata_json
+    return hashlib.sha256(payload.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def compute_chain(run_id: str, entries: list[EntryInput]) -> tuple[list[str], str]:
+    prev = genesis(run_id)
+    hashes: list[str] = []
+    for entry in entries:
+        prev = entry_hash(prev, entry.sha256, entry_metadata(entry))
+        hashes.append(prev)
+    head = hashes[-1] if hashes else genesis(run_id)
+    return hashes, head