pacioli-guard 0.6.2__tar.gz
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/LICENSE +202 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/MANIFEST.in +9 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/PKG-INFO +398 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/README.md +379 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/license.txt +201 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/__init__.py +1 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/enforce.py +360 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/hooks.py +12 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/modules.txt +1 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/patches/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/patches/v0_6_0/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/patches/v0_6_0/warn_unresolved_method_grants.py +122 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/patches.txt +2 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scope.py +908 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope/api_key_scope.json +132 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope/api_key_scope.py +9 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_doctype/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_doctype/api_key_scope_doctype.json +31 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_doctype/api_key_scope_doctype.py +9 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_method/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_method/api_key_scope_method.json +30 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/scoping/doctype/api_key_scope_method/api_key_scope_method.py +9 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/tests/__init__.py +0 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/tests/test_enforce.py +999 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/tests/test_patches.py +91 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard/tests/test_scope.py +1660 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard.egg-info/PKG-INFO +398 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +33 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +1 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pacioli_guard.egg-info/top_level.txt +1 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/pyproject.toml +35 -0
- pacioli_guard-0.6.2/setup.cfg +4 -0
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# Frappe apps are normally installed via `bench get-app <git-url>` (a raw clone), but if this is
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# ever built into an sdist/wheel the DocType schema, module list, and patches MUST travel with it —
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# otherwise the auth_hook fires against a DocType that was never migrated. Ship the data model.
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recursive-include pacioli_guard *.json
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include pacioli_guard/modules.txt
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include pacioli_guard/patches.txt
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include pacioli_guard/hooks.py
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include README.md
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Metadata-Version: 2.4
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Name: pacioli-guard
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Version: 0.6.2
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Summary: Deny-by-default credential governance for Frappe/ERPNext — the counting-house door (credential-layer, no core fork)
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Author: John Broadway
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License: Apache-2.0
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Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli
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Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/john-broadway/pacioli
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Keywords: frappe,erpnext,api-security,least-privilege,credential-scoping
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Classifier: Development Status :: 3 - Alpha
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Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
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Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: Apache Software License
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Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
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Classifier: Topic :: Security
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Requires-Python: >=3.10
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Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
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License-File: LICENSE
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Dynamic: license-file
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<img src="../assets/marks/device.svg" width="72" align="right" alt="The printer's device"/>
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*Tractatus de Instrumentis — the guard.* ❧ *Nulla in libro sine contraria — no debit without a credit.*
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# Pacioli Guard
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**Least-privilege API governance for ERPNext. Agents included.**
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Frappe/ERPNext has no native way to scope an API credential. An API key authenticates *as a user*
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and inherits that user's full role permissions across **every** REST endpoint — so a token you
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minted so an integration (or an AI agent) could call one governed `/api/method/…` can equally
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`POST /api/resource/<DocType>` directly, walking around whatever that method wrapped. OAuth2 scopes
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don't close it either (they're consent claims, confirmed by Frappe's own OAuth author).
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**Pacioli Guard binds a credential to an allowlist** — the methods (and, if you grant it, the
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DocTypes) it may touch — and enforces it **at the credential layer**, deny-by-default. A leaked or
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over-shared key becomes a blast-radius of *what you allowed*, not your whole ERP.
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It governs **every** API credential on the site — an integration, a Zapier/n8n flow, a script, a
|
|
39
|
+
vendor token, a cron job, an MCP/A2A agent. You don't need to run AI to need this.
|
|
40
|
+
|
|
41
|
+
This is the counting-house door, in Luca Pacioli's terms: **no one writes in the books but the
|
|
42
|
+
appointed hand — and only in the books appointed to them.**
|
|
43
|
+
|
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44
|
+
## How it works — no core fork
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
Enforced through Frappe's public `auth_hooks` extension point, which runs **after** the api-key
|
|
47
|
+
authenticates and **before** the request dispatches. A scoped credential that steps outside its
|
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48
|
+
allowlist gets a `403 PermissionError`; unscoped credentials (browser sessions, normal keys) are
|
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49
|
+
completely untouched. Nothing in Frappe core is modified — this is a plain `bench install-app`.
|
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50
|
+
|
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51
|
+
```
|
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52
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+
POST /api/resource/SI/<name>?run_method=submit → 200 (granted "Sales Invoice.submit" — resolved)
|
|
53
|
+
POST /api/resource/JE/<name>?run_method=submit → 403 (doctype not granted)
|
|
54
|
+
GET /api/method/<any-bare-rpc> → 403 (deny-unknown: bare names denied unless
|
|
55
|
+
granted AND on the 3-entry SAFE_METHODS)
|
|
56
|
+
POST /api/resource/<DocType> → 403 (raw-CRUD bypass closed, unless allow_resource)
|
|
57
|
+
# unscoped credential → unchanged behaviour
|
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58
|
+
```
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
## Install
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
```bash
|
|
63
|
+
# from your bench directory: wheel into the bench env, then install the app
|
|
64
|
+
env/bin/pip install pacioli-guard
|
|
65
|
+
bench --site <your-site> install-app pacioli_guard
|
|
66
|
+
```
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
## Scope a credential
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
Create an **API Key Scope** record (a first-class DocType, with child-table allowlists) for the
|
|
71
|
+
user whose API key you're scoping:
|
|
72
|
+
|
|
73
|
+
- `methods` — exact dotted names or `fnmatch` globs. A document method (item-URL `?run_method=submit`)
|
|
74
|
+
matches as `"<DocType>.submit"`. **As of 0.6.0 (deny-unknown), grant per-doctype
|
|
75
|
+
`"<DocType>.<method>"` patterns** — a bare RPC name only ever fires if it is one of the three
|
|
76
|
+
curated `SAFE_METHODS` (see "Deny-unknown" below); any other bare/unresolved method is denied
|
|
77
|
+
even if a pattern here matches it.
|
|
78
|
+
- `allow_resource` — defaults **false** (method-only; denies raw `/api/resource` CRUD).
|
|
79
|
+
- `resource_doctypes` — when `allow_resource` is true, an optional DocType allowlist (empty = all,
|
|
80
|
+
still bounded by the user's own roles).
|
|
81
|
+
- `Allow Read` / `Allow Create` / `Allow Write` / `Allow Delete` — the **per-credential resource
|
|
82
|
+
verbs** (all default on). A DocType allowlist alone admits *every* verb, so a credential meant to
|
|
83
|
+
*read* invoices also POSTs/PUTs/DELETEs them. Untick the verbs you don't want and the same
|
|
84
|
+
credential is genuinely read-only (or read+create, etc.) across its granted DocTypes. Leaving all
|
|
85
|
+
four ticked is the pre-narrowing behavior (full CRUD); to deny resource access entirely, untick
|
|
86
|
+
`allow_resource`. *Narrowing is per-credential in this version — per-DocType verb granularity is
|
|
87
|
+
a future increment.*
|
|
88
|
+
- `enabled` — the **kill switch** (defaults on). See CONTAIN below.
|
|
89
|
+
- `rate_limit_per_minute` — the **speed limit** (defaults 0 = none). See CONTAIN below.
|
|
90
|
+
- `enforce_workflow` — the **Workflow-bypass gate** (defaults **off**, opt-in per credential). See
|
|
91
|
+
"Workflow enforcement" below.
|
|
92
|
+
|
|
93
|
+
A deprecated one-version fallback still reads a JSON grant from a `api_scope` Long Text field on
|
|
94
|
+
**User** (`{ "methods": [...], "allow_resource": false }`) so pre-DocType setups keep enforcing
|
|
95
|
+
while they migrate. The enforcement seam (`pacioli_guard/scope.py`) is identical either way.
|
|
96
|
+
|
|
97
|
+
### Body-doctype scoping (submit/cancel) — the generic-RPC residual, closed for every submit/cancel RPC
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
A `methods` entry ordinarily matches by NAME only — it does not by itself constrain the doctype a
|
|
100
|
+
generic RPC touches, since `frappe.client.*`/`run_doc_method` take their real target from the
|
|
101
|
+
request BODY, not the URL. **As of 0.5.0 (extended in 0.5.1)** the guard reads the doctype out of the
|
|
102
|
+
body and enforces the SAME `"<DocType>.submit"`/`"<DocType>.cancel"` pattern the item-URL
|
|
103
|
+
`?run_method=submit` vector already required, for **every frappe RPC that calls `doc.submit()`/
|
|
104
|
+
`doc.cancel()` directly** (the shape that bypasses frappe's own `is_whitelisted` on an override-doctype
|
|
105
|
+
like Journal Entry):
|
|
106
|
+
`frappe.client.submit`, `frappe.client.cancel`, **`frappe.desk.form.save.cancel`** (the Desk UI's own
|
|
107
|
+
cancel endpoint), **`frappe.desk.doctype.bulk_update.bulk_update.submit_cancel_or_update_docs`** (bulk
|
|
108
|
+
submit/cancel of up to 500 docs), `run_doc_method` (v1 `dt`/`dn`/`docs` and v2 `document`/`method`), and
|
|
109
|
+
`frappe.desk.form.save.savedocs` with a Submit/Update/Cancel `action`. So granting a credential
|
|
110
|
+
`"Sales Invoice.submit"` lets it submit a Sales Invoice through *any* of these transports, but **not** a
|
|
111
|
+
Journal Entry or any other doctype through them, even though the credential never named the generic RPC.
|
|
112
|
+
A malformed/missing doctype — or the bulk RPC's non-submit/cancel `action="update"` — fails **closed**
|
|
113
|
+
(denied), never falls back to doctype-blind. The two Desk/bulk names and the fail-closed on bulk-update
|
|
114
|
+
were added in **0.5.1** after a guard-bypass redteam found them missing from 0.5.0 (a CRITICAL bulk
|
|
115
|
+
bypass + the Desk cancel), and the Desk Submit alias (`frappe.desk.form.save.submit`) plus the
|
|
116
|
+
**docstatus-by-body class** were added by a completeness audit against frappe 17 source: because
|
|
117
|
+
`frappe.client.save`/`.insert`/`.insert_many`/`.bulk_update` submit or cancel a doc whenever its
|
|
118
|
+
body carries `docstatus` 1/2 (via `Document.save()`'s transition detection), those are recognised
|
|
119
|
+
too — a docstatus-1/2 body rewrites to `"<DocType>.submit"`/`".cancel"`, a mixed-doctype batch or
|
|
120
|
+
`cancel_all_linked_docs` **deny-closes**, all before 0.5.0 ever left internal.
|
|
121
|
+
As of **0.6.0** nothing "stays doctype-blind — grant with care" anymore: the shapes that used to
|
|
122
|
+
(the draft-create path of `save`/`insert`, `set_value`, `bulk_delete`, bare read/query RPCs) are
|
|
123
|
+
**denied as bare grants** under deny-unknown below — a scoped credential creates drafts via
|
|
124
|
+
`POST /api/resource/<DocType>` (`allow_resource` + `Allow Create`), and `run_doc_method` now
|
|
125
|
+
resolves EVERY inner method (not just submit/cancel/discard) to `"<DocType>.<method>"`.
|
|
126
|
+
**Live-proven on the real Frappe v16 bench** at the Gate 10 close-out (2026-07-07): Journal Entry
|
|
127
|
+
submit/cancel drove through this body-doctype rewrite (`frappe.client.submit`/`.cancel` verbatim in
|
|
128
|
+
the bench request log, 0→1→2), SI/PI/PE stayed clean on the URL-path shape, and the per-doctype
|
|
129
|
+
`apply_workflow` re-grant proved positive — `../SCOPED-TOKEN-PROOF.md` **PHASE M** (PHASE L is the
|
|
130
|
+
pre-fix historical record). See CHANGELOG 0.5.0–0.6.0.
|
|
131
|
+
|
|
132
|
+
### Deny-unknown (0.6.0) — the posture flip, SHIPPED
|
|
133
|
+
|
|
134
|
+
Three adversarial passes against frappe 17 source drove the body-doctype coverage above — and the
|
|
135
|
+
third proved the honest boundary: a pure, I/O-free request classifier **cannot** be provably
|
|
136
|
+
complete (a *2-hop laundering* vector carries the target doctype **nowhere in the request** — see
|
|
137
|
+
the `Bulk Update` hard-deny below). Whack-a-mole on method names does not converge, so **0.6.0
|
|
138
|
+
inverts the posture**: a `methods` grant on a method call is honored ONLY when the call is
|
|
139
|
+
**doctype-RESOLVED** — the route itself carried the doctype (item-URL `?run_method`, v2
|
|
140
|
+
path-carried doc-method, v2 two-segment controller method, or a body-doctype rewrite above) — OR
|
|
141
|
+
the bare name is one of exactly **three curated `SAFE_METHODS`** (exact names, no globs, each
|
|
142
|
+
read-only with no docstatus/data mutation):
|
|
143
|
+
|
|
144
|
+
- `frappe.auth.get_logged_user` — identity probe (`pacioli doctor`)
|
|
145
|
+
- `frappe.desk.form.linked_with.get_submitted_linked_docs` — linked-doc lookup (the UNDO graph)
|
|
146
|
+
- `erpnext.controllers.stock_controller.show_accounting_ledger_preview` — PLAN preview
|
|
147
|
+
|
|
148
|
+
**Anything else is denied even if a grant pattern fnmatches it** — a new frappe RPC is denied until
|
|
149
|
+
reviewed, instead of open until enumerated. SAFE_METHODS membership is necessary-not-sufficient
|
|
150
|
+
(the grant must still name it), and the **admission criterion** is strict: read-only, no
|
|
151
|
+
docstatus/data mutation, reviewed on entry. **There is NO escape hatch** — no site config, no
|
|
152
|
+
per-credential flag — because an escape hatch is exactly the open-until-enumerated posture this
|
|
153
|
+
flip removes; a new safe method is a reviewed, changelogged, version-bumped act.
|
|
154
|
+
|
|
155
|
+
Consequences worth knowing before you upgrade (full list: CHANGELOG 0.6.0):
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
- `frappe.model.workflow.apply_workflow` is deliberately **not** safe-listed (it submits/cancels
|
|
158
|
+
internally); it resolves per-doctype from its `doc` body param — re-grant it as
|
|
159
|
+
`"<DocType>.apply_workflow"`.
|
|
160
|
+
- `run_doc_method` resolves **every** inner method to `"<DocType>.<method>"` (a missing/non-string
|
|
161
|
+
method deny-closes) — bare it never fires.
|
|
162
|
+
- **`Bulk Update` is hard-denied, ungrantable**: its whitelisted instance method reads the victim
|
|
163
|
+
doctype from the SAVED RECORD (`document_type` + `field=docstatus` on a `Bulk Update` row), so no
|
|
164
|
+
request classifier can resolve it and no grant can express it. Denied before the grant check.
|
|
165
|
+
- The `bench migrate` for 0.6.0 runs a **log-only audit** of existing grants and WARNs per pattern
|
|
166
|
+
the new posture treats differently (best-effort static heuristic; it cannot break the migrate).
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
**Named residuals — the honest boundary of 0.6.0** (stated, not silently claimed closed):
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
- **R3 — safe-listed reads bypass `resource_doctypes`.** The two safe-listed *read* methods carry a
|
|
171
|
+
doctype in their body that is **not** checked against `resource_doctypes` — a disclosure-only
|
|
172
|
+
bypass of the read-narrowing axis (no mutation), pre-existing.
|
|
173
|
+
- **v2 two-segment `/method/<dt>/<method>` grants the whole controller module.** It counts as
|
|
174
|
+
doctype-resolved (the doctype IS in the URL path, so it can't be spoofed), but frappe runs it as a
|
|
175
|
+
**module-level** whitelisted function in that doctype's controller — so a broad `<DocType>.*` grant
|
|
176
|
+
regains *every* whitelisted function in that module, not just document methods. Bounded
|
|
177
|
+
(`load_doctype_module` raises on a non-doctype, so `frappe.client.*` can't be laundered this way;
|
|
178
|
+
most ERPNext controller functions are unsaved mappers) but real: **grant explicit
|
|
179
|
+
`<DocType>.<method>` patterns, not `<DocType>.*`,** for a credential that shouldn't reach a
|
|
180
|
+
controller's whole surface.
|
|
181
|
+
- **v2 collection-mutation routes classify as `create` (NEW — found by the 0.6.0 redteam, staged for
|
|
182
|
+
Gate 10, NOT yet closed).** `POST /api/v2/document/<DocType>/bulk_update` and `…/bulk_delete` are
|
|
183
|
+
classified as a `resource` **create**, but frappe writes/submits (docstatus carried per-item in the
|
|
184
|
+
`docs` list) and *deletes* through them — so a credential narrowed to the `create` verb can write/
|
|
185
|
+
submit/delete existing docs of a granted doctype, and the `enforce_workflow` gate (which reads only
|
|
186
|
+
a top-level `docstatus`) misses the per-item one. Same doctype (not a cross-doctype spoof) and it
|
|
187
|
+
requires `allow_resource`. **Live-checked on the v16 bench (2026-07-06, Gate 10): this route does
|
|
188
|
+
NOT exist on Frappe v16** — `/api/v2/document/<Dt>/bulk_update` resolves to a document-name lookup
|
|
189
|
+
(same `DoesNotExistError` as any garbage trailing segment), so there is no mutating handler behind
|
|
190
|
+
it. The residual reappears only against v17-dev source, so it stays documented (not closed) for
|
|
191
|
+
forward-compat, but it is not a live hole on v16.
|
|
192
|
+
- **Container/tool-DocType 2-hop vectors — four now HARD-DENIED, reconcile a disclosed residual
|
|
193
|
+
(readiness audit + hardening, 2026-07-10).** The same 2-hop shape as `Bulk Update` — a whitelisted
|
|
194
|
+
method on a "container" doctype that reads its *victim* doctype from a **saved record** or a
|
|
195
|
+
**nested child-table row**, not from the request the classifier sees — recurs across ERPNext's
|
|
196
|
+
accounting module. The broker governs a small fixed set of doctypes; every tool-DocType of this
|
|
197
|
+
shape it does **not** use is now added to the same ungrantable hard-deny set (deny-more-only,
|
|
198
|
+
zero-regression):
|
|
199
|
+
- **`Data Import` / `Bank Statement Import` `form_start_import`** (v2 `/method/<DocType>/…`, resolves
|
|
200
|
+
to `("method", "Data Import.form_start_import")`) — a granted import-controller method would drive
|
|
201
|
+
insert+submit of whatever `reference_doctype` the target record names. **HARD-DENIED (ungrantable).**
|
|
202
|
+
- **`Unreconcile Payment` / `Repost Accounting Ledger`** — same child-table-of-references shape
|
|
203
|
+
(plausible, not traced to full depth; a hard-deny is safe regardless since the broker never uses
|
|
204
|
+
them). **HARD-DENIED (ungrantable).**
|
|
205
|
+
- **`Payment Reconciliation.reconcile`** (`run_doc_method`; `document.allocation[*].reference_*`) —
|
|
206
|
+
the allocation child rows name arbitrary Payment Entry / Sales Invoice / Journal Entry docs, and
|
|
207
|
+
ERPNext relinks them with `ignore_permissions=True`, reaching those doctypes with their **own role
|
|
208
|
+
permissions bypassed**. This one **cannot** be classifier-closed: the broker's own F-R2 write
|
|
209
|
+
*needs* `reconcile`, and a malicious call is byte-identical to the legitimate one (same
|
|
210
|
+
`run_doc_method`, same `Payment Reconciliation` doc, same nested refs), so a hard-deny would break
|
|
211
|
+
the broker and any per-credential carve-out is inherited by a stolen broker credential — the exact
|
|
212
|
+
threat. It stays a **disclosed residual**, closed by posture. **Operator rule:** grant
|
|
213
|
+
`Payment Reconciliation.reconcile` ONLY to the broker's own credential (which owns and constructs
|
|
214
|
+
the payload from a pinned plan — an agent cannot inject an allocation list); never to a general
|
|
215
|
+
agent credential, and never grant `<DocType>.*` on a container/tool doctype. Design + the rejected
|
|
216
|
+
shape-deny candidate: `../docs/plans/2026-07-10-container-doctype-2hop-hardening.md`.
|
|
217
|
+
|
|
218
|
+
The deny-unknown enforcement above is **live-proven on a real Frappe v16 bench** (2026-07-06, Gate 10
|
|
219
|
+
— bare-deny, the v2 dt-decoy spoof denied, SAFE_METHODS fire, apply_workflow per-doctype re-grant,
|
|
220
|
+
Bulk Update ungrantable, granted-resolved not over-blocked, migrate audit runs without breaking
|
|
221
|
+
migrate). Document-submit end-to-end (JE/SI/PI/PE) closed 2026-07-07: JE submit/cancel live through
|
|
222
|
+
the body-doctype rewrite (`frappe.client.submit` verbatim in the bench request log, 0→1→2), SI/PI/PE
|
|
223
|
+
regression clean on the URL-path shape, and the per-doctype `apply_workflow` re-grant proven positive
|
|
224
|
+
(a real Draft → Pending Approval transition) — broker-side record `SCOPED-TOKEN-PROOF.md` PHASE M.
|
|
225
|
+
|
|
226
|
+
## CONTAIN — the kill switch and the speed limit
|
|
227
|
+
|
|
228
|
+
The danger of an agent credential isn't just *what* it can call — it's **velocity under hijack**: a
|
|
229
|
+
compromised or misbehaving agent does allowed things, fast, until someone notices. Guard already
|
|
230
|
+
sits on every request the credential makes, so containment lives here too. Two fields on the same
|
|
231
|
+
**API Key Scope** record:
|
|
232
|
+
|
|
233
|
+
- **`enabled` (kill switch).** Untick it and **every** request from that credential is denied at
|
|
234
|
+
the chokepoint — effective on the *next request*, no restart, no cache to wait out (the grant is
|
|
235
|
+
read per request). It dominates the allowlists: a killed credential can't call anything, not even
|
|
236
|
+
what it was granted. A grant created before this field existed reads as enabled — the field's
|
|
237
|
+
absence is not a kill.
|
|
238
|
+
- **`rate_limit_per_minute` (speed limit).** `0` (default) = no limit. When set, requests are
|
|
239
|
+
counted per fixed one-minute window and the request over the limit gets a `403` naming the limit.
|
|
240
|
+
**Every** request the credential makes burns budget — permitted or denied — because what's being
|
|
241
|
+
contained is the credential's total velocity, not its success rate.
|
|
242
|
+
|
|
243
|
+
What CONTAIN stops: runaway velocity (a hijacked or looping agent gets damped to N calls/minute)
|
|
244
|
+
and gives you an instant, no-deploy revoke (untick one box).
|
|
245
|
+
|
|
246
|
+
What it does **NOT** do — honestly:
|
|
247
|
+
|
|
248
|
+
- The rate counter lives in the site cache (`frappe.cache()`), so it is **best-effort velocity
|
|
249
|
+
damping, not tamper-evident accounting** — a cache flush (or Redis restart) resets the window.
|
|
250
|
+
It is a damper, not a ledger; don't cite its counts as an audit record.
|
|
251
|
+
- Fixed windows have the classic **boundary burst**: a credential can spend a full budget in the
|
|
252
|
+
last second of one window and another in the first second of the next — briefly ~2× the nominal
|
|
253
|
+
rate. Acceptable for damping; set the limit with that in mind.
|
|
254
|
+
- If the cache is unusable while a limit is set, that credential **fails closed** (denied) — whoever
|
|
255
|
+
set a limit opted into containment, and an uncountable window can't honestly be called under it.
|
|
256
|
+
Credentials with no limit never touch the counter.
|
|
257
|
+
- **To revoke, untick `enabled` — do not delete the scope doc.** The kill switch is the sanctioned
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revoke, and it always wins. Deleting the *API Key Scope* row is not the same thing: if a site
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still carries a legacy `User.api_scope` JSON grant from before the DocType existed (the deprecated
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one-version fallback), deleting the row makes the credential fall through to that older grant —
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which predates `enabled` and so reads as *enabled*. During a migration window, delete-to-revoke
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can silently reopen a credential; untick-to-revoke never can. (Once a site has fully migrated off
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the legacy field, this footgun is gone.)
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Every guard denial — out-of-scope, kill switch, or rate — also writes a row to Frappe's stock
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**Error Log** (`frappe.log_error`, title prefixed `Pacioli Guard denied a request`), so denials are
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visible in the desk without a new DocType. The log write is fail-open by design: a failure to log
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can never suppress the deny.
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## Workflow enforcement — the belt-and-suspenders gate
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Pacioli's **broker** (the MCP tool front door) already refuses to `submit` a workflow-governed
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document on the agent's own path — that's `pacioli/workflow.py`. But Frappe itself does **not**
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enforce Workflow on a direct `docstatus` change (`validate_workflow` only fires when the document's
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`workflow_state` field itself changes on save), so the SAME scoped credential that's denied by the
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broker can submit around a configured approval chain with a raw REST call that never touches the
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broker at all. `enforce_workflow` closes that at the **credential layer** — it turns "governs the
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agent's path" into "governs every api-key path through this credential."
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Turn it on per credential (**off by default** — like every CONTAIN field before it, a gate that can
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newly deny a previously-passing call must never flip on site-wide by surprise):
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```
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enforce_workflow = 1
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```
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With it on, `check_scope` refuses — AFTER the existing scope allowlist, on a call the credential
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would otherwise be permitted to make — any of:
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- A `submit`/`cancel` **method call** on a doctype with an active Workflow (covers the v1 item-URL
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`run_method`, the v2 path-carried doc-method, and the legacy `?cmd=` route alike — they all
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classify to the same shape).
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- A raw `PUT`/`PATCH` to `/api/resource/<DocType>/<name>` (v1) or `/api/v2/document/<DocType>/<name>`
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(v2) whose body carries a `docstatus` key at all, against a workflow-governed doctype — the sneaky
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raw-REST update path. The mere *presence* of the key is the signal; this does not read/compare the
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document's current `docstatus` (a fragile extra DB read).
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- A `POST` **create** carrying a *submitting* `docstatus` (1 or 2) — insert-as-submitted. Here
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presence alone is not the signal (a draft legitimately posts `docstatus: 0`); only a submitting
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value is.
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- The Desk UI's own **`frappe.desk.form.save.savedocs`** endpoint with an `action` other than a
|
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plain draft `"Save"` — its method name never ends in `submit`/`cancel`, so it is recognised
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specifically (the doctype is read from its `doc` body param); a missing/unknown action is treated
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as docstatus-moving (deny-biased).
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+
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...unless the call **is** `frappe.model.workflow.apply_workflow` — the sanctioned transition path,
|
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exempt from *this* gate (it still clears the kill switch, the rate limit, and the base scope
|
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allowlist like any other call; "exempt" means never treated as a workflow *bypass*, not "waved
|
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through the guard entirely").
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### What it does **NOT** do — honestly
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- **Body-doctype submit/cancel ARE covered here now (0.5.1).** This gate judges the SAME
|
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body-doctype-rewritten target the base scope gate resolves — `frappe.client.submit`/`.cancel`,
|
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the Desk cancel, bulk submit/cancel, `run_doc_method`(submit/cancel), and `savedocs`
|
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Submit/Update/Cancel all resolve to `"<DocType>.submit"`/`".cancel"`, so a workflow-governed
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+
submit/cancel on a doctype named only in the request body is caught, not just the URL-path
|
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+
`run_method` shape. This closed a real gap (0.5.0 ran on the un-rewritten target → a body-doctype
|
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|
+
submit yielded doctype `"frappe.client"` → no workflow found → silent no-op); it mattered most for
|
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|
+
**Journal Entry**, which submits/cancels EXCLUSIVELY via `frappe.client.submit`/`.cancel` (its
|
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|
+
overridden submit/cancel aren't whitelisted) and would otherwise have had zero workflow protection.
|
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+
Found by the same guard-bypass redteam, before 0.5.0 shipped. The remaining theoretical residual is
|
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|
+
narrow: a *non*-submit/cancel method that flips `docstatus` by raw field write (`frappe.client.set_value`
|
|
323
|
+
on the `docstatus` field) is not rewritten — mitigated because the base scope grants such blind
|
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|
+
methods only with care, and the raw-REST `PUT …?docstatus=` path is caught separately (below).
|
|
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|
+
- **Credential-layer boundary, same as every other gate in this hook.** Fires only for
|
|
326
|
+
api-key/`Basic` requests. NOT OAuth Bearer, desk/cookie sessions, background jobs, the bench
|
|
327
|
+
console, or script/report calls. This closes the gap for *other scoped api callers bypassing the
|
|
328
|
+
broker* — it is not an ERPNext-wide Workflow patch; only frappe core touching `validate_workflow`
|
|
329
|
+
itself could do that.
|
|
330
|
+
- **Ambiguous/malformed Workflow config is not detected the way the broker detects it.** The
|
|
331
|
+
broker's own pure core explicitly refuses when more than one active Workflow governs a doctype
|
|
332
|
+
(naming every one it found). This gate relies on frappe's internal `get_workflow_name`, which is
|
|
333
|
+
not known to expose that ambiguity at all — if a site somehow carries more than one active
|
|
334
|
+
Workflow for a doctype, this gate silently governs by whichever one frappe's own lookup picked. Do
|
|
335
|
+
not assume this mirrors the broker's ambiguity handling.
|
|
336
|
+
- **Deny-biased on lookup failure, not deny-biased on ambiguity it can't see.** If the internal
|
|
337
|
+
Workflow lookup itself raises for a call that already looks docstatus-changing, that is treated as
|
|
338
|
+
"assume governed" and refused — an unverifiable answer is never read as "no workflow."
|
|
339
|
+
- **Live-verified (Gate 7, 2026-07-03, real ERPNext v16 bench).** Both knowledge-pins held under
|
|
340
|
+
live falsification: `frappe.model.workflow.get_workflow_name` exists at the pinned import path and
|
|
341
|
+
returns the active workflow name (`'SI Approval (Gate5)'`) for a governed doctype and a falsy value
|
|
342
|
+
for an ungoverned one; and a raw JSON `PUT` `docstatus` body **does** surface through
|
|
343
|
+
`frappe.form_dict` (leg refused 403), as does the Desk `savedocs` `doc`/`action` (leg refused 403).
|
|
344
|
+
All four `is_docstatus_changing` detection branches were caught with `enforce_workflow=1` — item-URL
|
|
345
|
+
`run_method=submit` (the governed SI stayed docstatus 0), `savedocs` Submit, raw `PUT {docstatus:1}`,
|
|
346
|
+
and POST-create `docstatus:1` — while the sanctioned `apply_workflow` was not guard-blocked and an
|
|
347
|
+
ungoverned doctype was not over-blocked. Default-off was A/B-proven on the same vector
|
|
348
|
+
(`enforce_workflow=0` → 200, the SI submitted). The generic-RPC residual below was confirmed live as
|
|
349
|
+
documented (see the footgun note): `/api/method/run_doc_method` with the doctype in its body is not
|
|
350
|
+
classified as docstatus-changing, so a credential that is *also* granted that broad method can walk
|
|
351
|
+
around this gate — which is exactly why the default tight scope denies such methods outright.
|
|
352
|
+
|
|
353
|
+
## Honest scope
|
|
354
|
+
|
|
355
|
+
- Governs **programmatic** REST access (`/api/method` + `/api/resource` v1/v2, incl. item-URL
|
|
356
|
+
`run_method` doc-methods and the legacy `?cmd=` RPC). Frappe's own roles already govern
|
|
357
|
+
desk/browser users, correctly — this doesn't change their experience.
|
|
358
|
+
- **Credential schemes it scopes:** `token <key>:<secret>` and `Basic base64(key:secret)`
|
|
359
|
+
(`curl -u`). **OAuth2 `Bearer` tokens are NOT scoped** — they carry Frappe's own OAuth scopes and
|
|
360
|
+
authenticate as a real user, but this gate deliberately does not touch them (governing OAuth is a
|
|
361
|
+
separate layer, stated not silently skipped). If your agent authenticates via OAuth Bearer, this
|
|
362
|
+
credential floor does not yet constrain it.
|
|
363
|
+
- Internal `frappe.client` RPC and background jobs run in a non-credential context (no `Authorization`
|
|
364
|
+
header) and are not this hook's surface; tracking them is production hardening, tracked separately.
|
|
365
|
+
- A `methods` entry is enforced **deny-unknown as of 0.6.0**: it fires only on a doctype-RESOLVED
|
|
366
|
+
call (item-URL `run_method`, v2 path/two-segment doc-methods, or a body-doctype rewrite — the
|
|
367
|
+
submit/cancel/apply_workflow RPCs and every `run_doc_method` inner method resolve from the
|
|
368
|
+
request body per 0.5.0–0.6.0) or on an exact `SAFE_METHODS` name (three read-only utilities).
|
|
369
|
+
A bare/unresolved generic RPC — a draft `save`/`insert`, `set_value`, `bulk_delete`, any
|
|
370
|
+
unrecognised name — is **denied even if granted** (see "Deny-unknown" above; live-proven
|
|
371
|
+
2026-07-06: a *granted* bare `frappe.model.workflow.apply_workflow` and a *granted*
|
|
372
|
+
`Bulk Update.bulk_update` both 403'd on the real bench).
|
|
373
|
+
- Scope **narrows** a credential; it never widens one (a scoped user still can't exceed its roles).
|
|
374
|
+
One honest exception: a granted method that ERPNext itself runs with `ignore_permissions=True`
|
|
375
|
+
(notably `Payment Reconciliation.reconcile`) reaches its referenced docs with *their* roles
|
|
376
|
+
bypassed — see the container/tool-DocType 2-hop residual under "Named residuals" and grant such
|
|
377
|
+
methods only to the broker's own credential.
|
|
378
|
+
- Workflow-governed docstatus changes are a SEPARATE opt-in gate (`enforce_workflow`, off by
|
|
379
|
+
default) — see "Workflow enforcement" above for its own honest limits (generic-RPC footgun,
|
|
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|
+
credential-layer boundary, ambiguity handling, knowledge-pinned shapes).
|
|
381
|
+
|
|
382
|
+
## Design & proof
|
|
383
|
+
|
|
384
|
+
The security-critical decision logic (`pacioli_guard/scope.py`) is a **pure module** with no Frappe
|
|
385
|
+
import, unit-tested bench-free (`pacioli_guard/tests/test_scope.py`). The live end-to-end proof
|
|
386
|
+
(scoped credential denied on both `/api/method` and `/api/resource` against a real Frappe v16 bench,
|
|
387
|
+
frappe attributing the 403 to this app) is written up in `../SCOPED-TOKEN-PROOF.md`; the market/novelty
|
|
388
|
+
verdict is recorded in the workshop's internal research verdict (a 73-agent adversarial review; not shipped in this tree).
|
|
389
|
+
|
|
390
|
+
Part of **Pacioli** — least-privilege API governance for ERPNext. Pacioli Guard is the foundation;
|
|
391
|
+
the Pacioli MCP broker (planned/consented/proven/reversible tool calls) is the agent front door built on top.
|
|
392
|
+
|
|
393
|
+
License: Apache-2.0.
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|
+
|
|
395
|
+
|
|
396
|
+
---
|
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|
+
|
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398
|
+
<sub>VENETIIS MCDXCIV · IN THE WORKSHOP OF JOHN BROADWAY · MMXXVI</sub>
|