openhands-agent-server 1.28.1__tar.gz → 1.29.2__tar.gz

{openhands_agent_server-1.28.1 → openhands_agent_server-1.29.2}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: openhands-agent-server
-Version: 1.28.1
+Version: 1.29.2
 Summary: OpenHands Agent Server - REST/WebSocket interface for OpenHands AI Agent
 Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/OpenHands/software-agent-sdk
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/OpenHands/software-agent-sdk

openhands_agent_server-1.29.2/openhands/agent_server/agent_profiles_router.py

@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+"""HTTP endpoints for managing named ``AgentProfile`` launch specs.
+
+Mirrors ``profiles_router.py`` (the LLM ``/api/profiles`` router) but serves the
+reference-bearing :class:`~openhands.sdk.profiles.AgentProfile` union and keeps a
+*separate* active pointer (``active_agent_profile_id``). Activation here is
+pointer-only — unlike the LLM ``/activate`` it must **not** write
+``agent_settings`` (the creation-time-only contract).
+
+``POST /{name}/materialize`` performs a dry-run resolve of a profile's LLM and
+MCP references and returns :class:`~openhands.sdk.profiles.AgentProfileDiagnostics`
+(never raises on dangling refs — those appear in the body).
+"""
+
+import copy
+import shlex
+from collections.abc import Iterator
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from typing import Annotated, Any
+from uuid import UUID, uuid4
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Path, Request, status
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, ValidationError
+
+from openhands.agent_server._secrets_exposure import (
+    build_expose_context,
+    get_cipher,
+    get_config,
+    parse_expose_secrets_header,
+    translate_missing_cipher,
+)
+from openhands.agent_server.persistence import (
+    PersistedSettings,
+    get_agent_profile_store,
+    get_llm_profile_store,
+    get_settings_store,
+)
+from openhands.sdk.logger import get_logger
+from openhands.sdk.profiles import (
+    ACPAgentProfile,
+    AgentProfileDiagnostics,
+    AgentProfileStore,
+    OpenHandsAgentProfile,
+    ProfileLimitExceeded,
+    ProfileVerificationSettings,
+    resolve_agent_profile_dry_run,
+    validate_agent_profile,
+)
+from openhands.sdk.profiles.agent_profile_store import PROFILE_NAME_PATTERN
+from openhands.sdk.settings import AgentSettingsConfig
+from openhands.sdk.settings.model import VerificationSettings
+from openhands.sdk.utils.cipher import Cipher
+from openhands.sdk.utils.pydantic_secrets import decrypt_str_with_cipher_or_keep
+
+
+logger = get_logger(__name__)
+
+agent_profiles_router = APIRouter(prefix="/agent-profiles", tags=["Agent Profiles"])
+
+MAX_AGENT_PROFILES = 50
+
+# Name the lazily-seeded migration profile (and its LLM ref fallback).
+SEED_PROFILE_NAME = "default"
+
+ProfileName = Annotated[
+    str,
+    Path(min_length=1, max_length=64, pattern=PROFILE_NAME_PATTERN),
+]
+ProfileId = Annotated[str, Path(min_length=1, max_length=128)]
+
+
+class AgentProfileInfo(BaseModel):
+    """Summary projection of a stored profile (no secret instantiation)."""
+
+    id: str | None = None
+    name: str
+    agent_kind: str = "openhands"
+    revision: int | None = None
+    llm_profile_ref: str | None = None
+    mcp_server_refs: list[str] | None = None
+
+
+class AgentProfileListResponse(BaseModel):
+    profiles: list[AgentProfileInfo]
+    active_agent_profile_id: str | None = None
+
+
+class AgentProfileDetailResponse(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    profile: dict[str, Any]
+
+
+class AgentProfileMutationResponse(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    message: str
+
+
+class ActivateAgentProfileResponse(BaseModel):
+    id: str
+    message: str
+    # Always False: activation is pointer-only by contract. The field documents
+    # that agent_settings was untouched; materialize (#3717) is the path that
+    # resolves a profile into settings.
+    agent_settings_applied: bool = False
+
+
+class RenameAgentProfileRequest(BaseModel):
+    new_name: str = Field(
+        ...,
+        min_length=1,
+        max_length=64,
+        pattern=PROFILE_NAME_PATTERN,
+    )
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def _store_errors() -> Iterator[None]:
+    """Map ``AgentProfileStore`` errors to HTTP responses.
+
+    Mirrors ``profiles_router._store_errors``: ``TimeoutError`` and
+    ``ValueError`` only. ``FileNotFoundError`` / ``FileExistsError`` are handled
+    inline per-endpoint so each gets a clean, resource-specific message.
+    """
+    try:
+        yield
+    except TimeoutError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+            detail="Agent profile store is busy. Please retry.",
+        )
+    except ValueError as e:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail=str(e))
+
+
+def _decrypt_mcp_tools(tools: dict[str, Any], cipher: Cipher) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return a copy of an ``mcp_tools`` dict with env/headers Fernet tokens
+    decrypted. Non-Fernet (plaintext) values pass through unchanged."""
+    servers = tools.get("mcpServers")
+    if not isinstance(servers, dict):
+        return tools
+    out = copy.deepcopy(tools)
+    for server in out["mcpServers"].values():
+        if not isinstance(server, dict):
+            continue
+        for key in ("env", "headers"):
+            mapping = server.get(key)
+            if isinstance(mapping, dict):
+                server[key] = {
+                    k: decrypt_str_with_cipher_or_keep(
+                        cipher, v, description="MCP env/headers"
+                    )
+                    for k, v in mapping.items()
+                }
+    return out
+
+
+def _decrypt_profile_mcp_tools(
+    profile: OpenHandsAgentProfile | ACPAgentProfile, cipher: Cipher | None
+) -> OpenHandsAgentProfile | ACPAgentProfile:
+    """Decrypt Fernet ``skills[].mcp_tools`` env/headers (no-op without a cipher).
+
+    The store masks/encrypts these on save but has no symmetric load-time
+    validator, so values arrive as ciphertext on both GET (at-rest) and save
+    (client round-trip). Decrypting here lets GET re-mask from plaintext and
+    stops save from double-encrypting an already-encrypted value.
+    """
+    if cipher is None:
+        return profile
+    skills = getattr(profile, "skills", None)
+    if not skills:
+        return profile
+    new_skills = [
+        skill.model_copy(
+            update={"mcp_tools": _decrypt_mcp_tools(skill.mcp_tools, cipher)}
+        )
+        if skill.mcp_tools
+        else skill
+        for skill in skills
+    ]
+    return profile.model_copy(update={"skills": new_skills})
+
+
+def _profile_verification(v: VerificationSettings) -> ProfileVerificationSettings:
+    """Project the secret-free subset of ``VerificationSettings``.
+
+    Drops ``critic_api_key`` — the profile is secret-free; the critic reuses
+    the resolved LLM profile's key.
+    """
+    return ProfileVerificationSettings(
+        critic_enabled=v.critic_enabled,
+        critic_mode=v.critic_mode,
+        enable_iterative_refinement=v.enable_iterative_refinement,
+        critic_threshold=v.critic_threshold,
+        max_refinement_iterations=v.max_refinement_iterations,
+        critic_server_url=v.critic_server_url,
+        critic_model_name=v.critic_model_name,
+    )
+
+
+def _build_seed_profile(
+    agent_settings: AgentSettingsConfig, active_llm_profile: str | None
+) -> OpenHandsAgentProfile | ACPAgentProfile:
+    """Build one ``AgentProfile`` faithfully from the current ``agent_settings``.
+
+    Carries every cleanly-overlapping launch field so the migrated profile is a
+    stable representation of the user's current configuration (the active
+    pointer is otherwise just a lightweight id). ``mcp_server_refs=None`` exposes
+    all of the user's MCP servers. An OpenHands profile references the active LLM
+    profile (falling back to ``"default"`` when none is set — a soft ref the
+    resolver checks at materialize time).
+    """
+    if agent_settings.agent_kind == "acp":
+        return ACPAgentProfile(
+            name=SEED_PROFILE_NAME,
+            acp_server=agent_settings.acp_server,
+            acp_model=agent_settings.acp_model,
+            acp_session_mode=agent_settings.acp_session_mode,
+            acp_prompt_timeout=agent_settings.acp_prompt_timeout,
+            # settings store the command as a token list; the profile holds a
+            # single (re-parseable) string. Empty list => use the server default.
+            acp_command=(
+                shlex.join(agent_settings.acp_command)
+                if agent_settings.acp_command
+                else None
+            ),
+            acp_args=list(agent_settings.acp_args) or None,
+            mcp_server_refs=None,
+        )
+    context = agent_settings.agent_context
+    return OpenHandsAgentProfile(
+        name=SEED_PROFILE_NAME,
+        llm_profile_ref=active_llm_profile or SEED_PROFILE_NAME,
+        agent=agent_settings.agent,
+        skills=list(context.skills),
+        system_message_suffix=context.system_message_suffix,
+        condenser=agent_settings.condenser,
+        verification=_profile_verification(agent_settings.verification),
+        enable_sub_agents=agent_settings.enable_sub_agents,
+        tool_concurrency_limit=agent_settings.tool_concurrency_limit,
+        mcp_server_refs=None,
+    )
+
+
+def _seed_default_profile(
+    store: AgentProfileStore,
+    request: Request,
+    settings: PersistedSettings,
+    cipher: Cipher | None,
+) -> None:
+    """Persist one default profile and point ``active_agent_profile_id`` at it.
+
+    The lock spans empty-check + save + pointer write so concurrent first
+    requests seed exactly once and the pointer matches the persisted id.
+    """
+    with _store_errors(), store._acquire_lock():
+        # Double-checked under the lock: a concurrent first request may have
+        # already seeded (the outer emptiness check in the list endpoint is
+        # unlocked).
+        if store.list():
+            return
+        profile = _build_seed_profile(settings.agent_settings, settings.active_profile)
+        # Settings persist skills[].mcp_tools encrypted (and never decrypt on
+        # load), so decrypt before re-encrypting at save to avoid double-encrypt.
+        profile = _decrypt_profile_mcp_tools(profile, cipher)
+        store.save(profile, cipher=cipher, max_profiles=MAX_AGENT_PROFILES)
+
+        profile_id = str(profile.id)
+        settings_store = get_settings_store(get_config(request))
+
+        def set_pointer(s: PersistedSettings) -> PersistedSettings:
+            s.active_agent_profile_id = profile_id
+            return s
+
+        settings_store.update(set_pointer)
+        logger.info(f"Seeded default agent profile '{profile.name}' (id={profile_id})")
+
+
+def _summary_id_for_name(store: AgentProfileStore, name: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return the stable id of the profile stored under ``name``, if present."""
+    with _store_errors():
+        for summary in store.list_summaries():
+            if summary.get("name") == name:
+                sid = summary.get("id")
+                return str(sid) if sid is not None else None
+    return None
+
+
+def _existing_identity(
+    store: AgentProfileStore, name: str
+) -> tuple[UUID | None, int | None]:
+    """Return the stable ``(id, revision)`` of the profile under ``name``.
+
+    Used to keep ``id`` stable across an overwrite — the active pointer is keyed
+    on it — and to bump ``revision`` monotonically. Ignores a malformed stored
+    id (treated as no prior identity).
+    """
+    with _store_errors():
+        for summary in store.list_summaries():
+            if summary.get("name") != name:
+                continue
+            sid = summary.get("id")
+            rev = summary.get("revision")
+            try:
+                parsed = UUID(str(sid)) if sid is not None else None
+            except (ValueError, TypeError):
+                parsed = None
+            return parsed, rev if isinstance(rev, int) else None
+    return None, None
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.get("", response_model=AgentProfileListResponse)
+async def list_agent_profiles(request: Request) -> AgentProfileListResponse:
+    """List all stored agent profiles and the active pointer.
+
+    On the first call against an empty store with no active pointer, lazily
+    seeds one default profile from the current ``agent_settings`` and activates
+    it (the one-time migration that replaces a dedicated seed step).
+    """
+    config = get_config(request)
+    settings_store = get_settings_store(config)
+    settings = settings_store.load() or PersistedSettings()
+
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    with _store_errors():
+        existing = store.list()
+
+    if not existing and settings.active_agent_profile_id is None:
+        _seed_default_profile(store, request, settings, get_cipher(request))
+        settings = settings_store.load() or settings
+
+    with _store_errors():
+        summaries = store.list_summaries()
+
+    return AgentProfileListResponse(
+        profiles=[AgentProfileInfo(**s) for s in summaries],
+        active_agent_profile_id=settings.active_agent_profile_id,
+    )
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.get("/{name}", response_model=AgentProfileDetailResponse)
+async def get_agent_profile(
+    request: Request, name: ProfileName
+) -> AgentProfileDetailResponse:
+    """Get a stored profile.
+
+    Use the ``X-Expose-Secrets`` header to control ``skills[].mcp_tools`` secret
+    exposure (``encrypted`` / ``plaintext``); absent, those values are masked.
+    """
+    expose_mode = parse_expose_secrets_header(request)
+    cipher = get_cipher(request)
+
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    try:
+        with _store_errors():
+            profile = store.load(name, cipher=cipher)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=f"Agent profile '{name}' not found",
+        )
+
+    # The store leaves skills[].mcp_tools encrypted on load; decrypt to plaintext
+    # so the expose serializer can correctly redact / re-encrypt / reveal them.
+    profile = _decrypt_profile_mcp_tools(profile, cipher)
+
+    context = build_expose_context(expose_mode, cipher)
+    with translate_missing_cipher():
+        payload = profile.model_dump(mode="json", context=context)
+
+    return AgentProfileDetailResponse(name=name, profile=payload)
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.post(
+    "/{name}",
+    response_model=AgentProfileMutationResponse,
+    status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED,
+)
+async def save_agent_profile(
+    request: Request, name: ProfileName, body: dict[str, Any]
+) -> AgentProfileMutationResponse:
+    """Save an ``AgentProfile`` under ``name`` (overwriting a namesake).
+
+    The path ``name`` is authoritative — it overrides any ``name`` in the body.
+    With ``OH_SECRET_KEY`` configured, ``skills[].mcp_tools`` secrets are
+    encrypted at rest; otherwise they are redacted. Returns 409 if creating a
+    new profile would exceed ``MAX_AGENT_PROFILES``.
+    """
+    cipher = get_cipher(request)
+    try:
+        profile = validate_agent_profile({**body, "name": name})
+    except ValidationError as e:
+        # Match FastAPI's request-validation shape (``detail`` is a list of error
+        # objects), but surface only ``loc``/``type`` — a nested mcp_tools
+        # MCPConfig error embeds the input (which may carry secrets) in ``msg``.
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+            detail=[{"loc": err["loc"], "type": err["type"]} for err in e.errors()],
+        )
+    except Exception:
+        # Any other validation failure (e.g. SkillValidationError from a
+        # malformed mcp_tools, or a schema/migration error) is a client error,
+        # never a 500. Stay generic — these messages can embed the input.
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+            detail="Invalid agent profile",
+        )
+
+    # A client editing a profile fetched with X-Expose-Secrets: encrypted posts
+    # back Fernet tokens; decrypt them so the save re-encrypts the original
+    # secret once rather than double-encrypting the token.
+    profile = _decrypt_profile_mcp_tools(profile, cipher)
+
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    # The id is server-managed (the active pointer is keyed on it): overwrite
+    # keeps the namesake's id and bumps revision; create mints a fresh id,
+    # ignoring any client-supplied one. The lock spans read + mint + save so two
+    # concurrent creates of the same new name can't both mint an id and clobber
+    # each other (the seed path guards the same window).
+    try:
+        with _store_errors(), store._acquire_lock():
+            existing_id, existing_rev = _existing_identity(store, name)
+            if existing_id is not None:
+                profile = profile.model_copy(
+                    update={"id": existing_id, "revision": (existing_rev or 0) + 1}
+                )
+            else:
+                profile = profile.model_copy(update={"id": uuid4()})
+            store.save(profile, cipher=cipher, max_profiles=MAX_AGENT_PROFILES)
+    except ProfileLimitExceeded:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+            detail=(
+                f"Agent profile limit reached ({MAX_AGENT_PROFILES}). "
+                "Delete a profile before saving a new one."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    logger.info(f"Saved agent profile '{name}'")
+    return AgentProfileMutationResponse(
+        name=name, message=f"Agent profile '{name}' saved"
+    )
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.delete("/{name}", response_model=AgentProfileMutationResponse)
+async def delete_agent_profile(
+    request: Request, name: ProfileName
+) -> AgentProfileMutationResponse:
+    """Delete a stored profile (idempotent).
+
+    If the deleted profile was the active one, ``active_agent_profile_id`` is
+    cleared.
+    """
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    deleted_id = _summary_id_for_name(store, name)
+
+    with _store_errors():
+        store.delete(name)
+
+    if deleted_id is not None:
+        config = get_config(request)
+        settings_store = get_settings_store(config)
+        settings = settings_store.load() or PersistedSettings()
+        if settings.active_agent_profile_id == deleted_id:
+
+            def clear_pointer(s: PersistedSettings) -> PersistedSettings:
+                s.active_agent_profile_id = None
+                return s
+
+            settings_store.update(clear_pointer)
+            logger.info(f"Cleared active pointer for deleted profile '{name}'")
+
+    logger.info(f"Deleted agent profile '{name}'")
+    return AgentProfileMutationResponse(
+        name=name, message=f"Agent profile '{name}' deleted"
+    )
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.post(
+    "/{name}/rename", response_model=AgentProfileMutationResponse
+)
+async def rename_agent_profile(
+    name: ProfileName, body: RenameAgentProfileRequest
+) -> AgentProfileMutationResponse:
+    """Rename a stored profile atomically.
+
+    The stable ``id`` is preserved, so an active pointer (keyed on ``id``)
+    survives the rename untouched. Returns 404 if the source is missing, 409 if
+    ``new_name`` is taken.
+    """
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    try:
+        with _store_errors():
+            store.rename(name, body.new_name)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=f"Agent profile '{name}' not found",
+        )
+    except FileExistsError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
+            detail=f"Agent profile '{body.new_name}' already exists",
+        )
+
+    if name == body.new_name:
+        message = f"Agent profile '{name}' unchanged (same name)"
+    else:
+        message = f"Agent profile '{name}' renamed to '{body.new_name}'"
+    logger.info(message)
+    return AgentProfileMutationResponse(name=body.new_name, message=message)
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.post(
+    "/{profile_id}/activate", response_model=ActivateAgentProfileResponse
+)
+async def activate_agent_profile(
+    request: Request, profile_id: ProfileId
+) -> ActivateAgentProfileResponse:
+    """Activate a profile by its stable ``id`` — pointer only.
+
+    Sets ``active_agent_profile_id`` and nothing else: unlike the LLM
+    ``/activate``, this does **not** write ``agent_settings`` (the
+    creation-time-only contract). Returns 404 if no stored profile has that id.
+    """
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    with _store_errors():
+        known_ids = {
+            str(s["id"]) for s in store.list_summaries() if s.get("id") is not None
+        }
+    if profile_id not in known_ids:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=f"Agent profile with id '{profile_id}' not found",
+        )
+
+    config = get_config(request)
+    settings_store = get_settings_store(config)
+
+    def set_pointer(settings: PersistedSettings) -> PersistedSettings:
+        settings.active_agent_profile_id = profile_id
+        return settings
+
+    try:
+        settings_store.update(set_pointer)
+    except (OSError, PermissionError):
+        logger.error("Failed to activate agent profile - file I/O error")
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to activate agent profile")
+    except RuntimeError as e:
+        # A corrupted / mis-keyed settings file is a server-side integrity
+        # failure, not a client conflict.
+        logger.error(f"Failed to activate agent profile: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            detail="Failed to activate agent profile",
+        )
+
+    logger.info(f"Activated agent profile id '{profile_id}'")
+    return ActivateAgentProfileResponse(
+        id=profile_id,
+        message=f"Agent profile '{profile_id}' activated",
+    )
+
+
+@agent_profiles_router.post(
+    "/{name}/materialize",
+    response_model=AgentProfileDiagnostics,
+)
+async def materialize_agent_profile(
+    request: Request, name: ProfileName
+) -> AgentProfileDiagnostics:
+    """Dry-run resolve a profile's LLM/MCP references; return a diagnostics report.
+
+    Dangling LLM/MCP references are reported in the body (valid=False) rather
+    than raising — the only error status is 404 (unknown profile name).
+    resolved_settings is redacted (api_key_set booleans; no raw secrets).
+    """
+    cipher = get_cipher(request)
+
+    store = get_agent_profile_store()
+    try:
+        with _store_errors():
+            profile = store.load(name, cipher=cipher)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=f"Agent profile '{name}' not found",
+        )
+
+    # The store leaves skills[].mcp_tools encrypted on load; decrypt so the
+    # resolver builds settings from plaintext (not ciphertext) values.
+    profile = _decrypt_profile_mcp_tools(profile, cipher)
+
+    config = get_config(request)
+    settings = get_settings_store(config).load() or PersistedSettings()
+    mcp_config = settings.agent_settings.mcp_config
+
+    llm_store = get_llm_profile_store()
+    return resolve_agent_profile_dry_run(
+        profile,
+        llm_store=llm_store,
+        mcp_config=mcp_config,
+        cipher=cipher,
+    )