open-action-record 0.1.1__tar.gz

open_action_record-0.1.1/LICENSE

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+Apache License
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+Version 2.0, January 2004
+
+http://www.apache.org/licenses/ 
+
+TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
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open_action_record-0.1.1/PKG-INFO

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+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: open-action-record
+Version: 0.1.1
+Summary: Verify Open Action Records: signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it.
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar
+Project-URL: Specification, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar/blob/main/SPEC.md
+Keywords: ai-agents,audit,receipts,verification,provenance,open-action-record,oar
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Requires-Dist: asn1crypto>=1.5
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4
+Provides-Extra: test
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == "test"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# open-action-record (Python)
+
+Verify [Open Action Records](https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar): signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it.
+
+```bash
+pip install open-action-record
+oar-verify evidence.json
+```
+
+```python
+import json
+from open_action_record import verify_bundle, outcomes
+
+bundle = json.load(open("evidence.json"))
+report = verify_bundle(bundle)          # pass keys=... to check against keys you trust
+print(report.result, report.level)      # "pass", "sealed"
+print(outcomes(bundle))                 # ["confirmed", "denied", "not_confirmed"]
+```
+
+It checks every record's issuer signature, the separate sealing service's seal, each agent's hash chain, checkpoint coverage, outside RFC 3161 timestamps (against the bundled DigiCert roots) and any disclosed values. It reaches the same result as the TypeScript and browser verifiers on every shared test vector.
+
+Writing records from Python is planned; today, write them with [`@openactionrecord/core`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openactionrecord/core).
+
+Apache-2.0.

open_action_record-0.1.1/README.md

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+# open-action-record (Python)
+
+Verify [Open Action Records](https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar): signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it.
+
+```bash
+pip install open-action-record
+oar-verify evidence.json
+```
+
+```python
+import json
+from open_action_record import verify_bundle, outcomes
+
+bundle = json.load(open("evidence.json"))
+report = verify_bundle(bundle)          # pass keys=... to check against keys you trust
+print(report.result, report.level)      # "pass", "sealed"
+print(outcomes(bundle))                 # ["confirmed", "denied", "not_confirmed"]
+```
+
+It checks every record's issuer signature, the separate sealing service's seal, each agent's hash chain, checkpoint coverage, outside RFC 3161 timestamps (against the bundled DigiCert roots) and any disclosed values. It reaches the same result as the TypeScript and browser verifiers on every shared test vector.
+
+Writing records from Python is planned; today, write them with [`@openactionrecord/core`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openactionrecord/core).
+
+Apache-2.0.

open_action_record-0.1.1/pyproject.toml

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+[build-system]
+requires = ["setuptools>=69"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "open-action-record"
+version = "0.1.1"
+description = "Verify Open Action Records: signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it."
+readme = "README.md"
+license = "Apache-2.0"
+requires-python = ">=3.10"
+dependencies = ["cryptography>=42", "asn1crypto>=1.5", "rfc8785>=0.1.4"]
+keywords = ["ai-agents", "audit", "receipts", "verification", "provenance", "open-action-record", "oar"]
+classifiers = [
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
+  "Operating System :: OS Independent",
+  "Topic :: Security :: Cryptography",
+]
+
+[project.urls]
+Homepage = "https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar"
+Source = "https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar"
+Specification = "https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar/blob/main/SPEC.md"
+
+[project.scripts]
+oar-verify = "open_action_record.cli:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+where = ["src"]
+
+[tool.setuptools.package-data]
+open_action_record = ["tsa_roots.json", "py.typed"]
+
+[project.optional-dependencies]
+test = ["pytest>=8"]

open_action_record-0.1.1/setup.cfg

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+[egg_info]
+tag_build = 
+tag_date = 0
+

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/__init__.py

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+"""Verify Open Action Records (OAR): signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it."""
+
+from .verify import BundleError, RecordReport, Report, outcomes, parse_bundle, verify_bundle
+
+__all__ = ["BundleError", "RecordReport", "Report", "outcomes", "parse_bundle", "verify_bundle"]
+__version__ = "0.1.1"

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/canonical.py

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+"""RFC 8785 canonical JSON, SHA-256 digests and Ed25519 keys, as used by Open Action Records."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+from typing import Any
+
+import rfc8785
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PublicKey
+
+
+def canonical_bytes(value: Any) -> bytes:
+    return rfc8785.dumps(value)
+
+
+def digest(value: Any) -> str:
+    """"sha256:<hex>" of the canonical form of `value`."""
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(value)).hexdigest()
+
+
+def find_public_key(jwks: dict | None, kid: str) -> Ed25519PublicKey | None:
+    for k in (jwks or {}).get("keys", []):
+        if k.get("kid") == kid and k.get("kty") == "OKP" and k.get("crv") == "Ed25519":
+            try:
+                raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(k["x"] + "=" * (-len(k["x"]) % 4))
+                return Ed25519PublicKey.from_public_bytes(raw) if len(raw) == 32 else None
+            except (ValueError, KeyError):
+                return None
+    return None
+
+
+def signature_ok(jwks: dict | None, kid: str, value: Any, signature_hex: str) -> bool:
+    key = find_public_key(jwks, kid)
+    if key is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        key.verify(bytes.fromhex(signature_hex), canonical_bytes(value))
+        return True
+    except (InvalidSignature, ValueError, TypeError):
+        return False

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/cli.py

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+"""oar-verify: verify an Open Action Record bundle from the command line."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+from dataclasses import asdict
+
+from . import __version__
+from .verify import BundleError, outcomes, verify_bundle
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog="oar-verify", description="Verify an Open Action Record bundle.")
+    parser.add_argument("bundle", help="path to the bundle (.json)")
+    parser.add_argument("--keys", help='keys you trust: { "issuer": JWKS, "sealer": JWKS }')
+    parser.add_argument("--tsa-roots", help="timestamp-authority roots to accept instead of the bundled DigiCert roots")
+    parser.add_argument("--require-seal", action="store_true", help="fail records not countersigned by a separate sealing service")
+    parser.add_argument("--json", action="store_true", help="print the report as JSON")
+    parser.add_argument("--version", action="version", version=__version__)
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    try:
+        with open(args.bundle, encoding="utf-8") as f:
+            bundle = json.load(f)
+        keys = json.load(open(args.keys, encoding="utf-8")) if args.keys else None
+        roots = json.load(open(args.tsa_roots, encoding="utf-8")) if args.tsa_roots else None
+        report = verify_bundle(bundle, keys=keys, tsa_roots=roots, require_seal=args.require_seal)
+    except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, BundleError) as e:
+        print(str(e), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+
+    if args.json:
+        print(json.dumps({"report": asdict(report), "outcomes": outcomes(bundle)}, indent=2))
+    else:
+        mark = "✔" if report.result == "pass" else "✘"
+        print(f"{mark} {report.messages[0]}")
+        for m in report.messages[1:]:
+            print(f"  {m}")
+        for r in report.records:
+            if r.result == "fail":
+                failed = ", ".join(k for k, v in r.checks.items() if v == "fail")
+                print(f"  ✘ {r.receipt_id[9:17]} {r.phase} {r.outcome}: {failed} failed")
+        print("  Outcomes: " + ", ".join(outcomes(bundle)))
+    return 0 if report.result == "pass" else 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/timestamp.py

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+"""Checks an RFC 3161 timestamp token over a checkpoint, the same way the TypeScript verifiers do.
+
+The token must timestamp the SHA-256 of the signed checkpoint, its signature must verify, and the signing
+certificate must be a timestamping certificate that was valid at the time and chains to an accepted root.
+Certificate revocation is not checked.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import json
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from importlib import resources
+from typing import Any
+
+from asn1crypto import cms, tsp
+from cryptography import x509
+from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, padding, rsa
+from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtendedKeyUsageOID
+
+from .canonical import canonical_bytes
+
+_HASHES = {"sha256": hashes.SHA256, "sha384": hashes.SHA384, "sha512": hashes.SHA512}
+
+
+def bundled_roots() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    """The DigiCert roots accepted by default (the same list as the TypeScript verifiers)."""
+    return json.loads(resources.files(__package__).joinpath("tsa_roots.json").read_text())
+
+
+def anchor_digest(cp: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    """SHA-256 (hex) of the signed checkpoint: the value the authority timestamps."""
+    body = {k: cp[k] for k in ("count", "head_digest", "at", "sealer_kid", "sig")}
+    return hashlib.sha256(canonical_bytes(body)).hexdigest()
+
+
+@dataclass
+class TimestampResult:
+    ok: bool
+    reason: str = ""
+    gen_time: str = ""
+    tsa: str = ""
+
+
+class _TokenError(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+def verify_timestamp_token(token: str, imprint_hex: str, roots: list[dict[str, str]] | None = None) -> TimestampResult:
+    try:
+        return _check(token, imprint_hex, roots if roots is not None else bundled_roots())
+    except _TokenError as e:
+        return TimestampResult(False, str(e))
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - any parsing failure means the token cannot be read
+        return TimestampResult(False, "The timestamp token could not be read.")
+
+
+def _tlv(buf: bytes, pos: int) -> tuple[int, bytes, int]:
+    """One DER/BER element at `pos`: (tag, content, next position). Definite lengths only."""
+    tag = buf[pos]
+    length = buf[pos + 1]
+    p = pos + 2
+    if length & 0x80:
+        n = length & 0x7F
+        if not 1 <= n <= 4:
+            raise _TokenError("The timestamp token is not valid DER.")
+        length = int.from_bytes(buf[p : p + n], "big")
+        p += n
+    if p + length > len(buf):
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp token is not valid DER.")
+    return tag, buf[p : p + length], p + length
+
+
+def _octets(tag: int, content: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """An OCTET STRING's bytes; a constructed (chunked) one, as some encoders write, is joined."""
+    if tag == 0x04:
+        return content
+    if tag == 0x24:
+        out, p = b"", 0
+        while p < len(content):
+            t, c, p = _tlv(content, p)
+            out += _octets(t, c)
+        return out
+    raise _TokenError("The timestamp token has an unexpected structure.")
+
+
+def _econtent(encap_contents: bytes) -> bytes:
+    """The TSTInfo bytes inside EncapsulatedContentInfo: SEQUENCE { OID, [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING }."""
+    _t, _oid, p = _tlv(encap_contents, 0)
+    tag, explicit, _ = _tlv(encap_contents, p)
+    if tag != 0xA0:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp token has no content.")
+    inner_tag, inner, _ = _tlv(explicit, 0)
+    return _octets(inner_tag, inner)
+
+
+def _common_name(cert: x509.Certificate) -> str:
+    names = cert.subject.get_attributes_for_oid(x509.oid.NameOID.COMMON_NAME)
+    return str(names[0].value) if names else cert.subject.rfc4514_string()
+
+
+def _valid_at(cert: x509.Certificate, when) -> bool:
+    return cert.not_valid_before_utc <= when <= cert.not_valid_after_utc
+
+
+def _signed_by(cert: x509.Certificate, hash_name: str, signature: bytes, data: bytes) -> bool:
+    key = cert.public_key()
+    algorithm = _HASHES[hash_name]()
+    try:
+        if isinstance(key, rsa.RSAPublicKey):
+            key.verify(signature, data, padding.PKCS1v15(), algorithm)
+        elif isinstance(key, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKey):
+            key.verify(signature, data, ec.ECDSA(algorithm))
+        else:
+            return False
+        return True
+    except InvalidSignature:
+        return False
+
+
+def _check(token: str, imprint_hex: str, roots: list[dict[str, str]]) -> TimestampResult:
+    info = cms.ContentInfo.load(base64.b64decode(token))
+    if info["content_type"].dotted != "1.2.840.113549.1.7.2":
+        raise _TokenError("This is not a timestamp token.")
+    signed = info["content"]
+    encap = signed["encap_content_info"]
+    if encap["content_type"].dotted != "1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.4":
+        raise _TokenError("This is not a timestamp token.")
+    tst_der = _econtent(encap.contents)
+    tst = tsp.TSTInfo.load(tst_der)
+    imprint = tst["message_imprint"]
+    if imprint["hash_algorithm"]["algorithm"].dotted != "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1":
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp does not use SHA-256.")
+    if imprint["hashed_message"].native.hex() != imprint_hex:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp is for a different checkpoint.")
+    gen_time = tst["gen_time"].native
+
+    certs = [x509.load_der_x509_certificate(c.chosen.dump()) for c in (signed["certificates"] or [])]
+    signer_info = signed["signer_infos"][0]
+    hash_name = signer_info["digest_algorithm"]["algorithm"].native
+    if hash_name not in _HASHES:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp uses an unsupported hash algorithm.")
+    attrs = signer_info["signed_attrs"]
+    if not attrs:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp has no signed attributes.")
+    sig_alg = signer_info["signature_algorithm"]["algorithm"].dotted
+    if not (sig_alg.startswith("1.2.840.113549.1.1.") or sig_alg.startswith("1.2.840.10045.")) or sig_alg == "1.2.840.113549.1.1.10":
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp uses an unsupported signature algorithm.")
+
+    digest = next((a["values"][0].native for a in attrs if a["type"].dotted == "1.2.840.113549.1.9.4"), None)
+    if digest is None:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp has no message digest.")
+    h = hashlib.new(hash_name)
+    h.update(tst_der)
+    if digest != h.digest():
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp token was changed after signing.")
+
+    sid = signer_info["sid"]
+    if sid.name == "issuer_and_serial_number":
+        serial = sid.chosen["serial_number"].native
+        candidates = [c for c in certs if c.serial_number == serial]
+    else:
+        candidates = certs
+    if not candidates:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp token does not include the authority's certificate.")
+
+    attrs_der = attrs.dump()
+    to_verify = b"\x31" + attrs_der[1:]
+    signature = signer_info["signature"].native
+    signer = next((c for c in candidates if _signed_by(c, hash_name, signature, to_verify)), None)
+    if signer is None:
+        raise _TokenError("The timestamp signature does not verify.")
+
+    try:
+        eku = signer.extensions.get_extension_for_class(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage).value
+    except x509.ExtensionNotFound:
+        eku = []
+    if ExtendedKeyUsageOID.TIME_STAMPING not in eku:
+        raise _TokenError("The signing certificate is not a timestamping certificate.")
+    if not _valid_at(signer, gen_time):
+        raise _TokenError("The authority's certificate was not valid at the time of the timestamp.")
+
+    _chain_to_root(signer, certs, roots, gen_time)
+    return TimestampResult(True, gen_time=gen_time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.") + f"{gen_time.microsecond // 1000:03d}Z", tsa=_common_name(signer))
+
+
+def _issued_by(cert: x509.Certificate, issuer: x509.Certificate) -> bool:
+    try:
+        cert.verify_directly_issued_by(issuer)
+        return True
+    except (ValueError, TypeError, InvalidSignature):
+        return False
+
+
+def _chain_to_root(signer: x509.Certificate, certs: list[x509.Certificate], roots: list[dict[str, str]], when) -> None:
+    trusted = [(r, x509.load_der_x509_certificate(base64.b64decode(r["der"]))) for r in roots]
+    current = signer
+    for _ in range(6):
+        fingerprint = current.fingerprint(hashes.SHA256()).hex()
+        if any(r["sha256"] == fingerprint for r, _c in trusted):
+            return
+        anchor = next((c for _r, c in trusted if _issued_by(current, c)), None)
+        if anchor is not None:
+            if not _valid_at(anchor, when):
+                raise _TokenError("The root certificate was not valid at the time of the timestamp.")
+            return
+        issuer = next((c for c in certs if c is not current and _issued_by(current, c)), None)
+        if issuer is None:
+            raise _TokenError("The authority's certificate does not chain to a recognised root.")
+        if not _valid_at(issuer, when):
+            raise _TokenError("A certificate in the chain was not valid at the time of the timestamp.")
+        current = issuer
+    raise _TokenError("The certificate chain is too long.")

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/tsa_roots.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+[
+  {
+    "name": "DigiCert Trusted Root G4",
+    "sha256": "552f7bdcf1a7af9e6ce672017f4f12abf77240c78e761ac203d1d9d20ac89988",
+    "der": "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"
+  },
+  {
+    "name": "DigiCert Assured ID Root CA",
+    "sha256": "3e9099b5015e8f486c00bcea9d111ee721faba355a89bcf1df69561e3dc6325c",
+    "der": "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"
+  },
+  {
+    "name": "DigiCert Assured ID Root G2",
+    "sha256": "7d05ebb682339f8c9451ee094eebfefa7953a114edb2f44949452fab7d2fc185",
+    "der": "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"
+  }
+]

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record/verify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
+"""Verifies an Open Action Record bundle: issuer signatures, seals, chains, checkpoint coverage, outside
+timestamps and disclosures. Mirrors the TypeScript reference verifier and reaches the same result on the
+shared test vectors (vectors/ in the repository)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import math
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any
+
+from .canonical import digest, signature_ok
+from .timestamp import TimestampResult, anchor_digest, verify_timestamp_token
+
+CHECKS = ("issuer_signature", "seal", "chain", "checkpoint", "disclosures", "timestamp")
+LABELS = {
+    "issuer_signature": "Issuer signature",
+    "seal": "Seal",
+    "chain": "Chain",
+    "checkpoint": "Checkpoint coverage",
+    "disclosures": "Disclosures",
+    "timestamp": "Outside timestamp",
+}
+LEVELS = ("issuer-signed", "sealed", "timestamped")
+LEVEL_LABELS = {
+    "issuer-signed": "Issuer-signed",
+    "sealed": "Sealed by a separate service",
+    "timestamped": "Sealed and timestamped by an outside authority",
+}
+FIELDS = {
+    "instance": "instance_commitment",
+    "consumption": "consumption_commitment",
+    "target_ref": "target_ref_commitment",
+    "state_before": "state_before_commitment",
+    "state_after": "state_after_commitment",
+}
+FORMATS = ("oar-bundle/0.1", "aar-evidence/0.1")
+
+
+class BundleError(ValueError):
+    """The input is not a bundle this verifier can read."""
+
+
+@dataclass
+class RecordReport:
+    receipt_id: str
+    agent_id: str
+    phase: str
+    outcome: str
+    checks: dict[str, str]
+    result: str = "pass"
+    level: str = "issuer-signed"
+    messages: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Report:
+    result: str
+    level: str
+    records: list[RecordReport]
+    failed_checks: list[str]
+    messages: list[str]
+    checkpoint: dict | None = None
+    timestamp: dict | None = None
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _Entry:
+    record: dict
+    report: RecordReport
+    seal_valid: bool
+
+
+def parse_bundle(bundle: Any) -> dict:
+    if not isinstance(bundle, dict):
+        raise BundleError("Not a bundle: expected a JSON object.")
+    problems = []
+    if bundle.get("format") not in FORMATS:
+        problems.append(f'format: expected "oar-bundle/0.1", got {bundle.get("format")!r}')
+    records = bundle.get("records", bundle.get("receipts"))
+    if not isinstance(records, list) or not all(isinstance(r, dict) and "payload" in r and "issuer_sig" in r for r in records):
+        problems.append("records: expected an array of { payload, issuer_sig, seal? }")
+    keys = bundle.get("keys") or {}
+    if not isinstance(keys.get("issuer"), dict) or not isinstance(keys["issuer"].get("keys"), list):
+        problems.append('keys.issuer: expected a JWK set ({ "keys": [...] })')
+    if problems:
+        raise BundleError("Not a valid bundle:\n- " + "\n- ".join(problems))
+    return {
+        **bundle,
+        "records": records,
+        "disclosures": bundle.get("disclosures") or [],
+        "checkpoints": bundle.get("checkpoints") or [],
+        "scope": bundle.get("scope") or {"complete": False},
+    }
+
+
+def verify_bundle(bundle: Any, *, keys: dict | None = None, tsa_roots: list[dict] | None = None, require_seal: bool = False) -> Report:
+    """Verifies a bundle. Pass `keys` you obtained independently to rule out a substituted bundle."""
+    b = parse_bundle(bundle)
+    use_keys = keys or b["keys"]
+    issuer_keys = use_keys.get("issuer")
+    sealer_keys = use_keys.get("sealer") or {"keys": []}
+    partial = not bool(b["scope"].get("complete"))
+    messages: list[str] = []
+
+    entries: list[_Entry] = []
+    for record in b["records"]:
+        p = record.get("payload") or {}
+        report = RecordReport(
+            receipt_id=str(p.get("receipt_id", "unknown")),
+            agent_id=str(p.get("agent_id", "unknown")),
+            phase=str(p.get("phase", "")),
+            outcome=str(p.get("result", "")),
+            checks={"issuer_signature": "fail", "seal": "fail", "chain": "not_checked", "checkpoint": "not_checked", "disclosures": "not_checked", "timestamp": "not_checked"},
+        )
+        sig = record.get("issuer_sig") or {}
+        if sig.get("alg") == "EdDSA" and signature_ok(issuer_keys, sig.get("kid", ""), p, sig.get("sig", "")):
+            report.checks["issuer_signature"] = "pass"
+        else:
+            report.messages.append("The issuer signature does not match this record. It was changed after signing or signed with an unknown key.")
+
+        seal = record.get("seal")
+        seal_valid = False
+        if seal:
+            seal_valid = signature_ok(sealer_keys, seal.get("sealer_kid", ""), {"digest": digest(p), "seq": seal.get("seq"), "sealed_at": seal.get("sealed_at")}, seal.get("sig", ""))
+            if seal_valid:
+                report.checks["seal"] = "pass"
+            else:
+                report.messages.append("The seal does not match this record. It was changed after sealing or sealed with an unknown key.")
+        elif require_seal:
+            report.messages.append("This record has not been sealed.")
+        else:
+            report.checks["seal"] = "not_checked"
+            report.messages.append("Issuer-signed only: not countersigned by a separate sealing service.")
+        entries.append(_Entry(record, report, seal_valid))
+
+    _check_chains(entries, partial)
+    cov_failed, cov_messages, checkpoint = _check_checkpoints(entries, b["checkpoints"], sealer_keys, partial)
+    messages += cov_messages
+    ts_failed, ts_messages, stamp = _check_timestamps(entries, b["checkpoints"], sealer_keys, partial, tsa_roots)
+    messages += ts_messages
+    messages += _check_disclosures(entries, b["disclosures"])
+
+    failed_checks: list[str] = []
+    lowest = 2
+    for e in entries:
+        for name in CHECKS:
+            if e.report.checks[name] == "fail" and name not in failed_checks:
+                failed_checks.append(name)
+        e.report.result = "fail" if "fail" in e.report.checks.values() else "pass"
+        e.report.level = "timestamped" if e.report.checks["timestamp"] == "pass" else "sealed" if e.report.checks["seal"] == "pass" else "issuer-signed"
+        lowest = min(lowest, LEVELS.index(e.report.level))
+    if cov_failed and "checkpoint" not in failed_checks:
+        failed_checks.append("checkpoint")
+    if ts_failed and "timestamp" not in failed_checks:
+        failed_checks.append("timestamp")
+    level = LEVELS[lowest] if entries else "issuer-signed"
+    failed = cov_failed or ts_failed or any(e.report.result == "fail" for e in entries)
+    messages.insert(
+        0,
+        f"Verification failed: {', '.join(LABELS[c] for c in failed_checks)} check failed."
+        if failed
+        else f"All {len(entries)} records passed verification. Evidence level: {LEVEL_LABELS[level]}.",
+    )
+    return Report("fail" if failed else "pass", level, [e.report for e in entries], failed_checks, messages, checkpoint, stamp)
+
+
+def _seq(e: _Entry) -> float:
+    seal = e.record.get("seal")
+    return seal["seq"] if seal and isinstance(seal.get("seq"), int) else math.inf
+
+
+def _check_chains(entries: list[_Entry], partial: bool) -> None:
+    by_agent: dict[str, list[_Entry]] = {}
+    for e in entries:
+        by_agent.setdefault(e.report.agent_id, []).append(e)
+    for items in by_agent.values():
+        ordered = sorted(items, key=lambda e: (_seq(e), str(e.record["payload"].get("issued_at"))))
+        for i, e in enumerate(ordered):
+            prev = e.record["payload"].get("prev_receipt_hash")
+            if i == 0:
+                if prev is None:
+                    e.report.checks["chain"] = "pass"
+                elif partial:
+                    e.report.messages.append("The earlier record in the chain is not included, so this link was not checked.")
+                else:
+                    e.report.checks["chain"] = "fail"
+                    e.report.messages.append("The record before this one in the agent's chain is missing.")
+            elif prev is not None and prev == digest(ordered[i - 1].record):
+                e.report.checks["chain"] = "pass"
+            elif partial and prev is not None:
+                e.report.messages.append("The earlier record in the chain is not included, so this link was not checked.")
+            else:
+                e.report.checks["chain"] = "fail"
+                e.report.messages.append("This record does not link to the previous record in the agent's chain. A record was changed, removed or inserted.")
+
+
+def _checkpoint_ok(cp: dict, sealer_keys: dict) -> bool:
+    return signature_ok(sealer_keys, cp.get("sealer_kid", ""), {"count": cp.get("count"), "head_digest": cp.get("head_digest"), "at": cp.get("at")}, cp.get("sig", ""))
+
+
+def _next_head(prev: str | None, seq: int, payload_digest: str, sealed_at: str) -> str:
+    return digest({"prev": prev, "digest": payload_digest, "seq": seq, "sealed_at": sealed_at})
+
+
+def _check_checkpoints(entries, checkpoints, sealer_keys, partial):
+    messages: list[str] = []
+    failed = False
+    valid = [cp for cp in checkpoints if _checkpoint_ok(cp, sealer_keys)]
+    if len(valid) < len(checkpoints):
+        failed = True
+        messages.append(f"{len(checkpoints) - len(valid)} checkpoint(s) have an invalid sealer signature.")
+    if not valid:
+        for e in entries:
+            if e.record.get("seal"):
+                e.report.messages.append("No checkpoint is available yet, so coverage was not checked.")
+        return failed, messages, None
+    latest = max(valid, key=lambda cp: cp["count"])
+    summary = {"count": latest["count"], "at": latest["at"]}
+    covered = [e for e in entries if e.record.get("seal") and _seq(e) <= latest["count"]]
+
+    if partial:
+        for e in covered:
+            e.report.checks["checkpoint"] = "pass" if e.seal_valid else "fail"
+        return failed, messages, summary
+
+    by_seq: dict[int, _Entry] = {}
+    duplicates = set()
+    for e in covered:
+        s = int(_seq(e))
+        if s in by_seq:
+            duplicates.add(s)
+        by_seq[s] = e
+    missing = [s for s in range(1, latest["count"] + 1) if s not in by_seq]
+    ok = False
+    if not missing and not duplicates:
+        head = None
+        for s in range(1, latest["count"] + 1):
+            rec = by_seq[s].record
+            head = _next_head(head, s, digest(rec["payload"]), rec["seal"]["sealed_at"])
+        ok = head == latest["head_digest"]
+    if not ok:
+        failed = True
+        if missing:
+            messages.append(f"{len(missing)} record(s) covered by the latest checkpoint are missing.")
+        elif duplicates:
+            messages.append("More than one record uses the same seal number.")
+        else:
+            messages.append("The records do not match the sealer's latest checkpoint.")
+    culprits = [e for e in covered if not e.seal_valid] if (not ok and not missing and not duplicates) else []
+    for e in covered:
+        if ok or (culprits and e.seal_valid):
+            e.report.checks["checkpoint"] = "pass"
+        else:
+            e.report.checks["checkpoint"] = "fail"
+    return failed, messages, summary
+
+
+def _check_timestamps(entries, checkpoints, sealer_keys, partial, tsa_roots):
+    messages: list[str] = []
+    anchored = sorted((cp for cp in checkpoints if cp.get("anchors") and _checkpoint_ok(cp, sealer_keys)), key=lambda cp: cp["count"])
+    heads: dict[int, str] = {}
+    if not partial:
+        by_seq = {int(_seq(e)): e for e in entries if e.record.get("seal")}
+        head = None
+        s = 1
+        while s in by_seq:
+            rec = by_seq[s].record
+            head = _next_head(head, s, digest(rec["payload"]), rec["seal"]["sealed_at"])
+            heads[s] = head
+            s += 1
+    results: list[tuple[dict, TimestampResult]] = []
+    for cp in anchored:
+        anchor = next((a for a in cp["anchors"] if a.get("type") == "rfc3161"), None)
+        res = verify_timestamp_token(anchor["token"], anchor_digest(cp), tsa_roots) if anchor else TimestampResult(False, "The timestamp is of an unsupported type.")
+        if res.ok and cp["count"] in heads and heads[cp["count"]] != cp["head_digest"]:
+            res = TimestampResult(False, "The records do not match the timestamped checkpoint.")
+        results.append((cp, res))
+        if not res.ok:
+            messages.append(f"The outside timestamp on checkpoint {cp['count']} does not verify: {res.reason}")
+
+    pending = 0
+    for e in entries:
+        if not e.record.get("seal") or not e.seal_valid:
+            continue
+        hit = next(((cp, r) for cp, r in results if cp["count"] >= _seq(e)), None)
+        if hit is None:
+            pending += 1
+            e.report.messages.append("Sealed; outside timestamp pending.")
+            continue
+        e.report.checks["timestamp"] = "pass" if hit[1].ok else "fail"
+        if not hit[1].ok:
+            e.report.messages.append(f"The outside timestamp covering this record does not verify: {hit[1].reason}")
+    good = [(cp, r) for cp, r in results if r.ok]
+    stamp = None
+    if good:
+        cp, r = good[-1]
+        stamp = {"tsa": r.tsa, "at": r.gen_time, "count": cp["count"]}
+        messages.append(f"Timestamped by {r.tsa} at {r.gen_time}: the records up to seal {cp['count']} existed then and have not changed since.")
+    if pending:
+        messages.append(f"{pending} record(s) not yet covered by an outside timestamp." if stamp else "No outside timestamp covers these records yet.")
+    return any(not r.ok for _cp, r in results), messages, stamp
+
+
+def _check_disclosures(entries, disclosures) -> list[str]:
+    messages: list[str] = []
+    by_id = {e.report.receipt_id: e for e in entries}
+    for d in disclosures:
+        e = by_id.get(d.get("receiptId"))
+        if e is None:
+            messages.append(f"A disclosure refers to a record that is not included ({d.get('receiptId')}).")
+            continue
+        commitment = e.record["payload"].get(FIELDS.get(d.get("field"), ""), None)
+        salt = d.get("salt", "")
+        ok = (
+            isinstance(commitment, str)
+            and isinstance(salt, str)
+            and len(salt) == 64
+            and all(c in "0123456789abcdef" for c in salt)
+            and commitment == digest({"salt": salt, "value": d.get("value")})
+        )
+        if ok:
+            if e.report.checks["disclosures"] != "fail":
+                e.report.checks["disclosures"] = "pass"
+        else:
+            e.report.checks["disclosures"] = "fail"
+            e.report.messages.append(f"The disclosed {str(d.get('field', '')).replace('_', ' ')} details do not match the record.")
+    return messages
+
+
+def outcomes(bundle: Any) -> list[str]:
+    """The outcome of each action in the bundle, in order: "confirmed", "not_confirmed", "denied", ..."""
+    b = parse_bundle(bundle)
+    by_id = {r["payload"].get("receipt_id"): r["payload"] for r in b["records"]}
+
+    def action_key(p: dict) -> str:
+        # Follow decision_ref back to the action's first record (instance commitments may be re-salted per record).
+        current = p
+        for _ in range(16):
+            parent = by_id.get(current.get("decision_ref"))
+            if parent is None:
+                break
+            current = parent
+        return current.get("decision_ref") or current.get("receipt_id")
+
+    groups: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+    for r in b["records"]:
+        groups.setdefault(action_key(r["payload"]), []).append(r["payload"])
+    result = []
+    for items in groups.values():
+        def last(pred):
+            return next((p for p in reversed(items) if pred(p)), None)
+
+        dec = last(lambda p: p["phase"] == "decision" and p["result"] in ("allowed", "held", "denied"))
+        appr = last(lambda p: p["phase"] == "decision" and p["result"] in ("approved", "rejected", "expired"))
+        exe = last(lambda p: p["phase"] == "execution")
+        conf = last(lambda p: p["phase"] == "confirmation")
+        if conf:
+            result.append("confirmed" if conf["result"] == "confirmed" else "not_confirmed")
+        elif exe:
+            result.append("executed_unconfirmed" if exe["result"] == "executed" else "failed")
+        elif appr:
+            result.append({"rejected": "rejected", "expired": "expired"}.get(appr["result"], "allowed_not_executed"))
+        elif dec and dec["result"] == "denied":
+            result.append("denied")
+        elif dec and dec["result"] == "held":
+            result.append("awaiting_approval")
+        else:
+            result.append("allowed_not_executed")
+    return result

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/PKG-INFO

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+Metadata-Version: 2.4
+Name: open-action-record
+Version: 0.1.1
+Summary: Verify Open Action Records: signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it.
+License-Expression: Apache-2.0
+Project-URL: Homepage, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar
+Project-URL: Source, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar
+Project-URL: Specification, https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar/blob/main/SPEC.md
+Keywords: ai-agents,audit,receipts,verification,provenance,open-action-record,oar
+Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
+Classifier: Operating System :: OS Independent
+Classifier: Topic :: Security :: Cryptography
+Requires-Python: >=3.10
+Description-Content-Type: text/markdown
+License-File: LICENSE
+Requires-Dist: cryptography>=42
+Requires-Dist: asn1crypto>=1.5
+Requires-Dist: rfc8785>=0.1.4
+Provides-Extra: test
+Requires-Dist: pytest>=8; extra == "test"
+Dynamic: license-file
+
+# open-action-record (Python)
+
+Verify [Open Action Records](https://github.com/openactionrecord/oar): signed proof of what an AI agent's action actually changed, and who approved it.
+
+```bash
+pip install open-action-record
+oar-verify evidence.json
+```
+
+```python
+import json
+from open_action_record import verify_bundle, outcomes
+
+bundle = json.load(open("evidence.json"))
+report = verify_bundle(bundle)          # pass keys=... to check against keys you trust
+print(report.result, report.level)      # "pass", "sealed"
+print(outcomes(bundle))                 # ["confirmed", "denied", "not_confirmed"]
+```
+
+It checks every record's issuer signature, the separate sealing service's seal, each agent's hash chain, checkpoint coverage, outside RFC 3161 timestamps (against the bundled DigiCert roots) and any disclosed values. It reaches the same result as the TypeScript and browser verifiers on every shared test vector.
+
+Writing records from Python is planned; today, write them with [`@openactionrecord/core`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openactionrecord/core).
+
+Apache-2.0.

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/SOURCES.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+LICENSE
+README.md
+pyproject.toml
+src/open_action_record/__init__.py
+src/open_action_record/canonical.py
+src/open_action_record/cli.py
+src/open_action_record/py.typed
+src/open_action_record/timestamp.py
+src/open_action_record/tsa_roots.json
+src/open_action_record/verify.py
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/PKG-INFO
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/entry_points.txt
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/requires.txt
+src/open_action_record.egg-info/top_level.txt
+tests/test_vectors.py

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/dependency_links.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/entry_points.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+[console_scripts]
+oar-verify = open_action_record.cli:main

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/requires.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+cryptography>=42
+asn1crypto>=1.5
+rfc8785>=0.1.4
+
+[test]
+pytest>=8

open_action_record-0.1.1/src/open_action_record.egg-info/top_level.txt

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+open_action_record

open_action_record-0.1.1/tests/test_vectors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+"""The Python verifier must reach the expected result on every shared test vector."""
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from open_action_record import outcomes, verify_bundle
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "vectors"
+CASES = []
+for folder in (ROOT, ROOT / "compat"):
+    manifest = json.loads((folder / "manifest.json").read_text())
+    roots = json.loads((folder / manifest["tsa_roots_file"]).read_text())
+    for case in manifest["cases"]:
+        CASES.append(pytest.param(folder, roots, case, id=f"{folder.name}/{case['file']}{'+require_seal' if case['options'].get('require_seal') else ''}"))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("folder,roots,case", CASES)
+def test_vector(folder, roots, case):
+    bundle = json.loads((folder / case["file"]).read_text())
+    report = verify_bundle(
+        bundle,
+        tsa_roots=roots if case["options"].get("tsa_roots") == "test" else None,
+        require_seal=bool(case["options"].get("require_seal")),
+    )
+    expect = case["expect"]
+    assert report.result == expect["result"], report.messages
+    if "level" in expect:
+        assert report.level == expect["level"]
+    if "failedChecks" in expect:
+        assert sorted(report.failed_checks) == sorted(expect["failedChecks"])
+    if "outcomes" in expect:
+        assert outcomes(bundle) == expect["outcomes"]
+
+
+def test_untrusted_timestamp_root_fails():
+    bundle = json.loads((ROOT / "refund-lifecycle.json").read_text())
+    report = verify_bundle(bundle)  # bundled DigiCert roots: the test authority is not trusted
+    assert report.result == "fail"
+    assert "timestamp" in report.failed_checks
+
+
+def test_substituted_keys_fail():
+    bundle = json.loads((ROOT / "issuer-signed.json").read_text())
+    other = {"issuer": {"keys": [{**bundle["keys"]["issuer"]["keys"][0], "x": "A" * 43}]}}
+    assert verify_bundle(bundle, keys=other).result == "fail"