ms-tau-sdk 2.0.7.dev41__tar.gz → 2.0.8.dev43__tar.gz

{ms_tau_sdk-2.0.7.dev41 → ms_tau_sdk-2.0.8.dev43}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Changelog
 
-## Unreleased
+## 2.0.7 — 2026-10-08
 
 - **Breaking: one delegation envelope on every call made for the work
   ([#78](https://github.com/mainsequence-sdk/ms-tau-sdk/issues/78), ADR 0021 amendment).** This
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
   - The SDK no longer hides the withdrawn private Secret entry operations, and the local health
     field `mcp_session_proof_limited_tool_count` is removed.
 
+- A new packaged skill, `tau_security_and_access`, teaches building project tools that act for the
+  person a turn serves: which delegation each tool should use, a worked example of tools that use
+  a person's own Secret without exposing it to the model, and how sharing decides what a delegated
+  call can reach. `ms-tau skills sync` now installs five skills.
+
 - Documentation now distinguishes requester-bound reads and supported writes from workload grants,
   states the write risk and platform rollout requirements, and includes conversation/Task
   permissions and denial recovery. The Security and access guide keeps its `security-model.md`

{ms_tau_sdk-2.0.7.dev41 → ms_tau_sdk-2.0.8.dev43}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.5
 Name: ms-tau-sdk
-Version: 2.0.7.dev41
+Version: 2.0.8.dev43
 Summary: Workspace-bound Tau application primitives for Main Sequence projects
 Project-URL: Changelog, https://github.com/mainsequence-sdk/ms-tau-sdk/blob/development/CHANGELOG.md
 Project-URL: Documentation, https://github.com/mainsequence-sdk/ms-tau-sdk/tree/development/docs

{ms_tau_sdk-2.0.7.dev41 → ms_tau_sdk-2.0.8.dev43}/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "hatchling.build"
 
 [project]
 name = "ms-tau-sdk"
-version = "2.0.7.dev41"
+version = "2.0.8.dev43"
 description = "Workspace-bound Tau application primitives for Main Sequence projects"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.13"

{ms_tau_sdk-2.0.7.dev41 → ms_tau_sdk-2.0.8.dev43}/src/ms_tau_sdk/agent_skills/tau_project_customization/SKILL.md

@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ separate authority. Prompt injection can cause unintended changes, sharing, or d
 person's permissions, and completed writes can outlast the delegation. Only Organization admins
 enable this authority.
 
+For a complete example, a tool that uses a person's Secret without exposing it, and how sharing
+decides what a delegated call can reach, use `tau_security_and_access`.
+
 ## Validation
 
 Verify each project-owned capability through its observable interface and focused tests. Check

ms_tau_sdk-2.0.8.dev43/src/ms_tau_sdk/agent_skills/tau_security_and_access/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+---
+name: tau-security-and-access
+description: Build and review project tools that call the platform or other applications for the person a turn serves, including tools that use a person's Secret without exposing it, and explain how delegation and sharing decide what those tools can reach.
+---
+
+# TAU Security and Access
+
+Use this skill when a project tool under `.tau/extensions/` calls the platform or another
+platform application, uses a Secret, or must answer each person with their own data. Extension
+mechanics are in `tau_project_customization`. The full model, with the administrator setup, is in
+the SDK's Security and access guide (`docs/reference/security-model.md`). Sharing itself is in
+`.agents/skills/mainsequence/platform_operations/access_control_and_sharing/SKILL.md`.
+
+## Who a call acts as
+
+Every call a tool makes through `platform_client()` follows one rule:
+
+| The call carries | Permissions used |
+| --- | --- |
+| No delegation | The caller's own: the Agent's workload grants, or in local mode your own login. |
+| A valid delegation | The person the turn serves, with their ordinary permissions, including administrative ones. |
+| A delegation that ended or is invalid | None. The call is refused with a `PermissionError` and is never retried as the Agent. |
+
+- The platform names the person when the turn starts, and `current_requester()` returns them. It
+  returns `None` when the Agent is not enabled to act for people (only an Organization admin can
+  enable it, with `acts_for_requester`), for work no person asked for, in local mode and outside a
+  turn.
+- The operation or application that receives the call decides what it may do. No list says which
+  operations accept a delegation. Read access never implies edit, run, share or delete.
+- The call stays the Agent's call, made for the person. It is not impersonation: the platform
+  checks it on every call, only while the turn or Task serving the person runs, for at most 24
+  hours after their request, and only in the Agent's Environment.
+
+## Choose the delegation for each tool
+
+| The tool | `delegation` |
+| --- | --- |
+| Answers each person with their own data, or uses their credentials | `"required"` |
+| Works for anyone, for the person when the turn serves one | `"auto"` (the default) |
+| Uses only the Agent's own resources, the same for everyone | `"none"` |
+
+With `"required"`, a turn that serves nobody raises a `PermissionError` before anything is sent.
+With `"auto"`, the same tool reaches different things for different people, and the Agent's own
+grants when nobody is served: make sure both are what you intend. Local turns serve nobody, so a
+`"required"` tool refuses in local mode; test it with fakes (see [Testing](#testing)).
+
+## Example: a tool that uses a person's own Secret
+
+A person stores an API key for an outside data provider, and the Agent uses it for them without
+ever seeing it:
+
+1. The person creates the Secret themselves. The Agent never asks for the value or accepts it.
+2. The tool that calls the provider reads the Secret as the person, inside that same call.
+3. The tool uses the value and returns only the result.
+
+```python
+"""Quotes from an outside provider, with each person's own API key."""
+
+import json
+
+import httpx
+from tau_agent.messages import TextContent
+from tau_agent.tools import AgentTool, AgentToolResult
+
+from ms_tau_sdk import current_requester, platform_client
+
+PROVIDER_URL = "https://quotes.example.test/v1/latest"
+
+
+def _text(message):
+    return AgentToolResult(content=[TextContent(text=message)])
+
+
+def _secret_name():
+    # The name comes from the person the platform named, never from the model.
+    person = current_requester()
+    return None if person is None else f"QUOTES_API_KEY__{person.uid}"
+
+
+async def _secret_uid(client, name):
+    # Listing returns names and UIDs, never values. Names are unique in the Agent's Environment.
+    answer = await client.request("GET", "/api/v1/secrets/", params={"name": name})
+    if answer.status_code != 200:
+        return None
+    found = answer.json()["results"]
+    return found[0]["uid"] if found else None
+
+
+async def connect_quotes(tool_call_id, arguments, signal=None, on_update=None):
+    name = _secret_name()
+    if name is None:
+        return _text("I can set up your key only while answering your own request.")
+    try:
+        uid = await _secret_uid(platform_client(delegation="required"), name)
+    except PermissionError:
+        return _text("Your access for this request ended. Please ask again.")
+    if uid is not None:
+        return _text(f"Your key is stored as the Secret {name}.")
+    return _text(
+        f"Create a Secret named {name} with your API key, in the Environment this Agent runs in: "
+        f"on the Secrets page in Command Center, or with `mainsequence secrets create {name}`, "
+        "which asks for the value without showing it. Never paste the key into this chat."
+    )
+
+
+async def latest_quote(tool_call_id, arguments, signal=None, on_update=None):
+    name = _secret_name()
+    if name is None:
+        return _text("I can use your key only while answering your own request.")
+    client = platform_client(delegation="required")
+    try:
+        uid = await _secret_uid(client, name)
+        if uid is None:
+            return _text(f"First create the Secret {name}. Ask me how.")
+        secret = await client.request("GET", f"/api/v1/secrets/{uid}/")
+    except PermissionError:
+        return _text("Your access for this request ended. Please ask again.")
+    if secret.status_code != 200:
+        return _text("I could not read your key.")
+    try:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as http:
+            quote = await http.get(
+                PROVIDER_URL,
+                params={"symbol": arguments["symbol"]},
+                headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {secret.json()['value']}"},
+            )
+    except httpx.HTTPError:
+        # The error can carry the request with its headers: never show it.
+        return _text("The quotes provider did not answer.")
+    if quote.status_code != 200:
+        return _text(f"The quotes provider answered {quote.status_code}.")
+    data = quote.json()
+    return _text(json.dumps({"symbol": data["symbol"], "price": data["price"]}))
+
+
+def setup(tau):
+    tau.register_tool(
+        AgentTool(
+            name="connect_quotes",
+            label="Connect Quotes",
+            description="Check or explain how to store your quotes API key as your own Secret.",
+            parameters={"type": "object", "properties": {}, "additionalProperties": False},
+            execute_fn=connect_quotes,
+        )
+    )
+    tau.register_tool(
+        AgentTool(
+            name="latest_quote",
+            label="Latest Quote",
+            description="Get the latest quote for a symbol with your own quotes API key.",
+            parameters={
+                "type": "object",
+                "properties": {"symbol": {"type": "string"}},
+                "required": ["symbol"],
+                "additionalProperties": False,
+            },
+            execute_fn=latest_quote,
+        )
+    )
+```
+
+What makes it safe:
+
+- No tool takes a Secret value or a Secret name from the model. The name is built from
+  `current_requester().uid`, so prompt injection cannot point the tool at another Secret.
+- `delegation="required"` reads the Secret as the person. The platform returns it only if the
+  person can view it; the name is a lookup key, not the protection.
+- The value exists only inside one call. It never goes into the result, `details`, a log, an
+  exception message, a file or a cache for the next turn. It travels in a header, never in a URL,
+  because URLs reach logs. Errors from the outside call are caught, and the provider's raw body is
+  never returned.
+- There is no tool that returns a Secret value, and no tool that calls any platform path the model
+  chooses. With the delegation, such a tool would let the model read every Secret the person can.
+- The Agent's own workload holds no grant on these Secrets, so a call without the person reaches
+  none of them.
+
+## Sharing decides what a delegated call can reach
+
+A delegated read returns anything the person can view in the Agent's Environment: what they
+created and what others shared with them, directly or through a team. This holds for Secrets and
+every other object. The platform enforces sharing; which of those objects a tool uses is part of
+the tool's design. For Secrets, the naming convention states that design:
+
+- **A personal credential:** a name tied to the person, such as `QUOTES_API_KEY__<person uid>`.
+  The person decides whether to share it.
+- **A team credential:** a name the team agrees on, shared with the team for view. The tool reads
+  it for any member.
+- **Someone else's Secret shared with the person:** valid whenever the tool is meant to use it.
+
+Whoever can edit a Secret decides its value, so the tool uses whatever value they set. Granting or
+accepting edit on a Secret means trusting that person with what the tool does with it. That is a
+decision people make through sharing, not one the platform makes for them.
+
+How sharing works:
+
+- The creator of a Secret can always view and edit it, and cannot be removed from it. People who
+  can edit a Secret can share it, for view or for edit, with people and teams.
+- Most people can share only within the teams they belong to; Organization admins can share
+  across their Organization.
+- `GET /api/v1/secrets/<uid>/can-view/` and `can-edit/` list the people and teams with access. A
+  tool can use them when its design needs to, for example to refuse a team key where it expects a
+  personal one. That is a choice of the tool, not a platform rule.
+
+## What never reaches the model
+
+Tool results, their `details`, and errors can reach the model provider and the session history.
+Never return a Secret value, a token, a proof, an assertion, a response object, its headers or a
+raw error body. Return business results: rows, numbers, names, and plain messages. The SDK already
+keeps its own credentials out of that path and never lets a tool set `Authorization` or an
+`X-MainSequence-*` header.
+
+## Limits
+
+- This works in the Agent's own project tools. An application that receives a delegated call
+  learns the person with `User.get_requester()`, but it cannot call the platform as that person.
+- The delegation ends with the turn. A task the tool leaves running acts as the Agent afterwards,
+  and nothing read for one person may be kept for another turn or another person.
+- When the person's access ends (the turn is over, the access was removed, 24 hours passed, or
+  the Agent is not enabled), calls raise a `PermissionError` whose `code` is
+  `requester_binding_invalid` or starts with `runtime_lease_`. Say in plain words that the request
+  cannot be served, and never retry it as the Agent.
+- Every other answer, such as `403` or `404` for an object the person cannot see, is returned as
+  it is: check the status before using the body.
+
+## Testing
+
+Patch the extension module's `current_requester` and `platform_client` with fakes, and test:
+
+- with a person and the Secret: the result holds only business fields, and the value appears in no
+  result text, `details`, log record or exception;
+- with a person and no Secret: the tool explains how to create it and sends no provider call;
+- with nobody: the tool refuses and sends nothing;
+- a `PermissionError` from the client: a plain message, and no second call;
+- a failing or erroring provider: a plain message without the provider's body or the request.
+
+## Review checklist
+
+- Each tool has a deliberate `delegation`: `"required"` for a person's own data or credentials.
+- No person's UID, Secret name or Secret value comes from tool arguments, the prompt or history.
+- No tool returns a credential or calls a platform path the model chooses.
+- Secret values stay inside one call, in headers, never in results, logs, errors, URLs or caches.
+- The naming convention says whose Secrets the tool uses, and the people sharing them know it.
+- A refused delegated call is reported, never retried as the Agent.
+- The Agent's workload holds no grants it does not need, and none on people's Secrets.