messagefoundry 0.3.0__tar.gz → 0.3.1__tar.gz

messagefoundry-0.3.1/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+# Python
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+.venv/
+venv/
+*.egg-info/
+build/
+dist/
+
+# Engine runtime data (PHI may live here — never commit)
+*.db
+*.db-wal
+*.db-shm
+*.pid
+out/
+harness_io/
+*.log
+
+# One-time bootstrap admin credential written next to the store (consumed + deleted by the operator) — never commit
+bootstrap-admin.txt
+
+# Secrets / credentials — never commit (no such files exist today; these are foot-gun guards)
+.env
+.env.*
+*.key
+*.pem
+*.pfx
+secrets/
+
+# Container deployment secrets + TLS material — never commit (the *.example templates ARE tracked)
+/docker/secrets.env
+/docker/tls/
+
+# are never committed. Ignore every samples/ subdirectory by DEFAULT rather than naming the partner
+# here — fail-closed, so a new unlisted staging dir cannot reach a public repo just because nobody
+# remembered to add a rule. The shipped example dirs are re-included explicitly.
+/samples/*/
+!/samples/config/
+!/samples/consistency/
+!/samples/dicom/
+!/samples/ech-sidecar/
+!/samples/generators/
+!/samples/messages/
+!/samples/results_relay/
+# Generated, regenerable test corpus (build with: python -m messagefoundry.generators.adt). MUST come
+# after the un-ignores above, or the re-included parent would drag it back in.
+/samples/messages/adt/
+# Workflow agent self-verification temp dirs (an isolated copy of a ported migration module + codesets
+# + fixture for a check/dryrun). Customer-estate-derived — never commit. Delete after a porting batch.
+/_verify_*/
+# exports). Customer data — NEVER commit. `git archive` (the publish path) excludes it by
+# construction; this is the local-only working area.
+/migration-local/
+
+# Tooling
+.mypy_cache/
+.ruff_cache/
+.pytest_cache/
+.vscode/
+.idea/
+
+# Claude Code: settings.json is shared/tracked; settings.local.json is machine-local (never commit)
+.claude/settings.local.json
+
+# Local reference notes pointing at machine-specific Claude Code transcript paths — never commit
+TRANSCRIPTS.md
+
+# Local planning/marketing/security working docs — keep out of the repo
+# (docs/DUAL_LICENSING_PLAN.md is now a committed artifact — see ADR 0017 / #13 licensing)
+/docs/marketing/
+/docs/security/CISO-REVIEW.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-POSTURE-REVIEW.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-RESPONSE-PLAN.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-CUSTOMER-OFFERINGS.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-RESPONSE-HANDOFF.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-RESPONSE-A3-HANDOFF.md
+/docs/security/DEPENDENCY-RESPONSE-A4-HANDOFF.md
+# vuln_metrics.py local CSV output (the CI run uploads it as an artifact; not committed)
+/docs/security/metrics/
+
+# Operator-local load/throughput profiles — tuned to a specific deployment's volume; kept OUT of the
+# OSS repo + public mirror (the plan itself lives on the operator share, WIN2025-LOAD-THROUGHPUT-MATRIX.md).
+# Still usable by name (they sit in PROFILES_DIR) and copy-on to the test box.
+/harness/load/profiles/hospital-baseline.toml
+/harness/load/profiles/soak-12h.toml
+# Deep-research survey of alternative OSS DB backends for the shared-DB commit-wall — local working
+# note, not a committed artifact (the conclusion is carried in the throughput ADRs / AI memory).
+/docs/research/db-commit-wall-backend-survey.md
+
+# --- MessageFoundry ---
+.mefor/
+*.db*
+.DS_Store
+Thumbs.db
+
+# Agent/web-fetch debris dropped in the repo ROOT (e.g. blog.html, contest.txt, free.html) — never
+# commit. Anchored to root (leading /) so tracked *.html/*.txt UNDER subdirs (docs/, samples/,
+# scripts/, packaging/, messagefoundry/auth/data/…) are unaffected; no *.html/*.txt is legitimately
+# tracked at the repo root, so an anchored catch-all is safe. Force-add (git add -f) if one ever is.
+/*.html
+/*.txt
+/*.yml
+
+# The real customer/vendor token list consumed by scripts/security/scan_forbidden.py at
+# commit time. Only the SYNTHETIC scan-tokens.local.txt.example is ever committed.
+#
+# Deliberately unconditional, and listed ahead of the scanner it serves: an operator creates
+# this file before the tooling that references it exists, so ignoring the path up front
+# removes any window in which a real token list sits un-ignored in a working tree.
+scripts/security/scan-tokens.local.txt
+
+# --- Private-only paths (formerly enforced by scripts/publish/publish-denylist.txt) ---------------
+# The cutover RETIRES the publish deny-list. On the private repo these were TRACKED and stripped from
+# the mirror at publish time; with the deny-list gone and development happening directly on the public
+# repo, a gitignore rule is now the ONLY thing keeping them out of a commit -- and the cutover runbook
+# runs `git add -A`. Same failure shape as the leak-scanner token file, different files.
+#
+# DELIBERATELY NOT LISTED: tests/test_scan_forbidden.py, tests/test_anon_core.py and
+# .github/dependabot.yml. Those were deny-listed too, but this change set publishes synthetic/public
+# versions of them -- ignoring them here would silently drop content that is meant to ship.
+# PUBLISHED by this change (removed from the list above): CLAUDE.md, docs/BACKLOG.md and
+# docs/WORKTREES.md. All three were scanned and carry no customer/estate tokens (BACKLOG.md needed a
+# two-line redaction). CLAUDE.md in particular MUST be tracked: it is gitignored-by-default's worst
+# case here, because `git worktree add` cannot deliver an untracked file, so every worktree silently
+# came up with ZERO project conventions loaded.
+/.claude/
+/TRANSCRIPTS.md
+/docs/security/
+/docs/reviews/
+/docs/marketing/
+# Deliberately still private, each for a different reason:
+#   docs/security/      — 32 files of posture/risk-register detail; an attacker roadmap.
+#   docs/reviews/       — review findings, same reason.
+#   docs/CI-TOPOLOGY.md — STALE: it documents the retired private-repo/public-mirror split and
+#                         scripts/publish/, which the cutover deleted. Publishing it would actively
+#                         mislead. Rewrite for the post-cutover topology or delete it.
+#   docs/Secure_Development_Standards.md — scans clean, but it was deliberately pulled from the public
+#                         PyPI sdist (#1020); reversing that is an owner call, not a side effect.
+/docs/CI-TOPOLOGY.md
+/docs/Secure_Development_Standards.md

{messagefoundry-0.3.0 → messagefoundry-0.3.1}/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,90 @@ All notable changes to MessageFoundry are documented here. The format follows
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.3.1] — 2026-07-27 — Early Access
+
+### Security
+- **BREAKING — multi-factor authentication is now an ACCESS gate, not only a step-up gate**
+  (ASVS 6.3.3). An MFA-pending session is refused on **every** authorized route with `403` +
+  `X-MFA-Required: 1`; a browser session is confined to the new `/ui/mfa` page until it verifies.
+  Previously the second factor was demanded only at the step-up (sensitive-action) boundary, so a
+  password-only session could read the whole estate.
+  **`[security].require_mfa_scope`** (new, default **`every_local_account`**) widens who must enrol
+  from the Administrator role to every local account; set it to `administrators` to keep the previous
+  posture. It is reported as a loosening on `GET /security/posture` but never refuses to boot.
+  **Who is affected on upgrade:**
+  - **Existing sessions are unaffected until they expire** — they were minted MFA-satisfied and the
+    stamp is honoured. The change bites at the next sign-in.
+  - **Every un-enrolled local account must now enrol a factor before it can do anything else.** The
+    escape path is reachable from the pending session itself (`/me/reauth` → `/me/mfa/enroll` →
+    `/me/mfa/confirm`, or `/ui/account` in the browser), and confirming satisfies that same session.
+    Note the consequence: for an un-enrolled account, whoever holds the password can self-enrol the
+    second factor. The out-of-band `MFA_ENABLED` notification is the compensating control.
+  - **Non-interactive local service accounts using bearer tokens will start failing** with
+    `X-MFA-Required` and cannot enrol unattended. Move them to mTLS (`require_service_cert` is exempt
+    by design) or to AD, or set `require_mfa_scope = "administrators"`.
+  - **The PySide6 test harness** needs an enrolled account or `require_mfa_scope = "administrators"`:
+    its API client only retries an `X-MFA-Required` refusal when an MFA handler is registered, and
+    none is wired today.
+  - **Caveat on factor strength:** a WebAuthn passkey is asserted at `user_verification=preferred`,
+    so for a passkey-only account the second factor may be **device possession alone**. This is the
+    owner-signed L3 relaxation, recorded in `docs/SECURITY.md`, not an oversight.
+- **BREAKING (federated deployments only) — a directory session is no longer minted MFA-satisfied
+  unconditionally** (ASVS 6.3.4). `_complete_ad_login` now takes the grant per mechanism: AD
+  simple-bind and Kerberos still pass it under the owner-signed **delegated-directory-MFA
+  relaxation** (the engine learns nothing about directory-side strength from a bind or a ticket),
+  while the **federated (OIDC) leg passes `[auth].oidc_require_mfa_claim`** — the one directory
+  signal the engine actually verifies. With the claim gate on (the default) nothing changes: a token
+  carrying no configured `amr`/`acr` was already refused at claims validation. **With
+  `oidc_require_mfa_claim = false`, federated sessions are now minted un-verified and refused** —
+  turn the claim gate on, move those users to AD, or set `[security].require_mfa = false`, which
+  remains the global off-switch.
+  Also fail-closed: the directory exemption is now an **allow-list** (`provider == "ad"`) rather than
+  a denylist (`!= "local"`), so an unrecognized provider value requires a second factor instead of
+  silently skipping one.
+- **New `auth.mfa_denied` audit event.** The MFA gate sits above the permission loop, so
+  `auth.permission_denied` never fires for a pending session; without its own row a stolen
+  password-only token could enumerate the entire authenticated surface leaving no trace.
+- `ENGINE_UI_SEAM` 13 → 14 — `api.security.require()` gained an `mfa_gate` keyword, and the console
+  imports it directly. A console wheel older than this engine refuses to mount, as designed.
+- **In-use data protection for PHI is now declared and reported** ([ADR 0152](docs/adr/0152-in-use-data-protection-for-phi-platform-memory-encryption-attestation-asvs-11-7-1.md),
+  ASVS 11.7.1). An **exposed** PHI instance (a non-loopback bind **or** a declared
+  `[api].tls_terminated_upstream`, which includes the recommended loopback-behind-proxy topology) that has
+  not set **`[security].memory_encryption_operator_declared = true`** — the operator's declaration that the
+  host provides hardware memory encryption (AMD SEV-SNP / Intel TDX) — now **warns at every start**.
+  **Not a breaking change: nothing that boots today stops booting.** The refusal is opt-in via the new
+  `[security].require_memory_encryption_declaration` (default `false`), because this is a **host**
+  property that no operator can satisfy on Windows (where the platform read-out is always `null`) — the
+  same scoping rule as `[security].allowed_client_networks`' companion refusal (ADR 0151). Loopback and
+  synthetic instances are byte-identical. See
+  [OFF-LOOPBACK-DEPLOYMENT.md](docs/security/OFF-LOOPBACK-DEPLOYMENT.md) ladder row 12 and
+  [SYSTEM-REQUIREMENTS.md](docs/SYSTEM-REQUIREMENTS.md).
+- **Report-only platform memory-encryption read-out on `GET /security/posture`** (ADR 0152 rung 1;
+  `ENGINE_UI_SEAM` 12 → 13) — `memory_encryption_self_reported_capability` / `..._self_reported_active` /
+  `..._self_reported_mechanism` / `memory_encryption_readout_source`, plus
+  `memory_encryption_operator_declared`, the tri-state
+  `memory_encryption_readout_contradicts_declaration` (`null` = nothing was measured that could
+  contradict anything) and `memory_encryption_note`, the disclaimer carried **in the response body** so it
+  travels with any copy of the artifact. Linux reads `/proc/cpuinfo` flags (capability) and
+  `/dev/sev-guest` / `/dev/tdx_guest` **character devices** (activation) as **separate** facts; everywhere
+  else every field is `null`. **No value of any of these satisfies ASVS 11.7.1** — they are what the host
+  says about itself, and cryptographic attestation (rung 3) is **not built**. The read-out is never
+  accepted as a substitute for the declaration, in either direction.
+- **Windows crash dumps of the engine process are suppressed** — a WER dump is a full PHI disclosure
+  written to disk. `serve` applies the process-local half itself (`SetErrorMode` OR-ed into the inherited
+  mode, `WerSetFlags(NOHEAP | NO_UI | DISABLE_SNAPSHOT_*)`); the machine-policy half no process can reach
+  is opt-in via `install-service.ps1 -SuppressCrashDumps` (WER `ExcludedApplications`, registered for both
+  `messagefoundry.exe` and the venv `python.exe`, plus a **narrowing-only** `LocalDumps` override that is
+  written only where LocalDumps is already configured — creating that key would switch dump collection
+  ON). Residuals in [SERVICE.md](docs/SERVICE.md).
+
+### Fixed
+- **Two config blocks in the off-loopback runbook aborted at load** — `[diagnostics].audit_all_authz` and
+  `[ai].data_class` had been relocated by ADR 0118, so an operator copy-pasting either block got an
+  immediate start failure. Corrected to `[security].audit_all_authorization_decisions` and
+  `[security].handles_real_patient_data`, and every fenced `toml` block in that runbook is now pinned by a
+  test that loads it and fails on a silently-ignored key.
+
 ## [0.3.0] — 2026-07-13 — Early Access
 
 Highlights since 0.2.15 — streaming attachments end-to-end, a copy-on-Send message model, richer
@@ -872,16 +956,23 @@ tests, but the external code review + penetration test (the bar for a security-c
 - Releases are built, SBOM'd (CycloneDX), and signed with [Sigstore](https://www.sigstore.dev/) — see the
   `release` workflow.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.10...HEAD
-[0.2.10]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.9...v0.2.10
-[0.2.9]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.8...v0.2.9
-[0.2.8]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.7...v0.2.8
-[0.2.7]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.6...v0.2.7
-[0.2.6]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.5...v0.2.6
-[0.2.5]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.4...v0.2.5
-[0.2.4]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.3...v0.2.4
-[0.2.3]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.2...v0.2.3
-[0.2.2]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.1...v0.2.2
-[0.2.1]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.0...v0.2.1
-[0.2.0]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
-[0.1.0]: https://github.com/wshallwshall/MessageFoundry/releases/tag/v0.1.0
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.3.1...HEAD
+[0.3.1]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.3.0...v0.3.1
+[0.3.0]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.15...v0.3.0
+[0.2.15]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.14...v0.2.15
+[0.2.14]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.13...v0.2.14
+[0.2.13]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.12...v0.2.13
+[0.2.12]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.11...v0.2.12
+[0.2.11]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.10...v0.2.11
+[0.2.10]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.9...v0.2.10
+[0.2.9]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.8...v0.2.9
+[0.2.8]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.7...v0.2.8
+[0.2.7]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.6...v0.2.7
+[0.2.6]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.5...v0.2.6
+[0.2.5]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.4...v0.2.5
+[0.2.4]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.3...v0.2.4
+[0.2.3]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.2...v0.2.3
+[0.2.2]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.1...v0.2.2
+[0.2.1]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.2.0...v0.2.1
+[0.2.0]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/compare/v0.1.0...v0.2.0
+[0.1.0]: https://github.com/MEFORORG/MessageFoundry/releases/tag/v0.1.0

{messagefoundry-0.3.0 → messagefoundry-0.3.1}/PKG-INFO

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Metadata-Version: 2.4
 Name: messagefoundry
-Version: 0.3.0
+Version: 0.3.1
 Summary: Open-source healthcare integration engine — route, transform, and validate messages across many formats and connection types
 Project-URL: Homepage, https://messagefoundry.org/
 Project-URL: Documentation, https://messagefoundry.org/
@@ -24,12 +24,14 @@ Classifier: Topic :: System :: Networking
 Classifier: Typing :: Typed
 Requires-Python: >=3.14
 Requires-Dist: aiosqlite>=0.20
+Requires-Dist: annotated-types<0.8
 Requires-Dist: argon2-cffi>=23.1
 Requires-Dist: cryptography>=48.0.1
 Requires-Dist: defusedxml>=0.7.1
 Requires-Dist: fastapi>=0.137.1
 Requires-Dist: hl7>=0.4.5
 Requires-Dist: hl7apy>=1.3
+Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27
 Requires-Dist: ldap3>=2.9
 Requires-Dist: prometheus-client>=0.20
 Requires-Dist: psutil>=6.0
@@ -37,26 +39,25 @@ Requires-Dist: pydantic>=2.6
 Requires-Dist: pyspnego>=0.10
 Requires-Dist: starlette>=1.3.1
 Requires-Dist: tomlkit>=0.12
+Requires-Dist: truststore>=0.10
 Requires-Dist: tzdata>=2024.1
 Requires-Dist: uvicorn[standard]>=0.29
 Provides-Extra: dev
-Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27; extra == 'dev'
 Requires-Dist: mypy>=1.10; extra == 'dev'
 Requires-Dist: pytest-asyncio>=0.26; extra == 'dev'
 Requires-Dist: pytest-rerunfailures>=16.0; extra == 'dev'
 Requires-Dist: pytest-timeout>=2.3; extra == 'dev'
 Requires-Dist: pytest>=9.0.3; extra == 'dev'
-Requires-Dist: ruff>=0.4; extra == 'dev'
+Requires-Dist: ruff<0.16,>=0.4; extra == 'dev'
 Provides-Extra: dicom
 Requires-Dist: pydicom<4,>=3.0.2; extra == 'dicom'
 Requires-Dist: pynetdicom<4,>=3.0.4; extra == 'dicom'
 Provides-Extra: fhir
+Requires-Dist: annotated-types<0.8; extra == 'fhir'
 Requires-Dist: fhir-resources>=7.1.0; extra == 'fhir'
 Requires-Dist: fhirpathpy>=2.2.0; extra == 'fhir'
 Provides-Extra: harness
-Requires-Dist: httpx>=0.27; extra == 'harness'
 Requires-Dist: pyside6>=6.6; extra == 'harness'
-Requires-Dist: truststore>=0.10; extra == 'harness'
 Provides-Extra: otel
 Requires-Dist: opentelemetry-exporter-otlp>=1.20; extra == 'otel'
 Requires-Dist: opentelemetry-sdk>=1.20; extra == 'otel'

{messagefoundry-0.3.0 → messagefoundry-0.3.1}/messagefoundry/__init__.py

@@ -11,6 +11,27 @@ Config modules define the message graph against this surface::
     from messagefoundry import inbound, outbound, router, handler, Send, MLLP, File, Message
 """
 
+from messagefoundry.actions import (
+    append_to_field,
+    arith_field,
+    code_lookup,
+    convert_case,
+    copy_field,
+    copy_segment,
+    date_diff_field,
+    delete_segment,
+    format_date,
+    pad_field,
+    replace_literal,
+    set_field,
+    split_field,
+    substring_field,
+    trim_field,
+)
+from messagefoundry.config.active_environment import current_environment
+from messagefoundry.config.db_lookup import DbLookupError, db_lookup
+from messagefoundry.config.fhir_lookup import FhirLookupError, fhir_lookup
+from messagefoundry.config.ingest_time import current_ingest_time
 from messagefoundry.config.models import (
     AckMode,
     BatchConfig,
@@ -22,44 +43,40 @@ from messagefoundry.config.models import (
     SaturationThreshold,
     StallThreshold,
 )
-from messagefoundry.config.active_environment import current_environment
-from messagefoundry.config.db_lookup import DbLookupError, db_lookup
-from messagefoundry.config.fhir_lookup import FhirLookupError, fhir_lookup
-from messagefoundry.config.ingest_time import current_ingest_time
 from messagefoundry.config.reference import reference
 from messagefoundry.config.response import response_get
 from messagefoundry.config.state import state_get
 from messagefoundry.config.wiring import (
+    DICOM,
+    FHIR,
+    MLLP,
+    SMTP,
+    X12,
     CodeSet,
     Database,
     DatabaseLookup,
     DatabasePoll,
     DatabaseRef,
+    DICOMweb,
     Direct,
     Email,
     FhirLookup,
     File,
     FileRef,
     Ftp,
-    FHIR,
     Http,
-    DICOM,
-    DICOMweb,
     Loopback,
-    MLLP,
+    MessageTypeError,
     PassThrough,
     Reference,
     Rest,
-    SMTP,
+    Send,
+    SetMeta,
+    SetState,
     Sftp,
     Soap,
     Tcp,
     Timer,
-    X12,
-    Send,
-    SetMeta,
-    SetState,
-    MessageTypeError,
     code_set,
     env,
     handler,
@@ -68,24 +85,16 @@ from messagefoundry.config.wiring import (
     outbound,
     router,
 )
-from messagefoundry.actions import (
-    append_to_field,
-    arith_field,
-    code_lookup,
-    convert_case,
-    copy_field,
-    copy_segment,
-    date_diff_field,
-    delete_segment,
-    format_date,
-    pad_field,
-    replace_literal,
-    set_field,
-    split_field,
-    substring_field,
-    trim_field,
-)
 from messagefoundry.diagnostics import checkpoint, log_note
+from messagefoundry.parsing.compression import (
+    CompressionError,
+    deflate_compress,
+    deflate_decompress,
+    gzip_compress,
+    gzip_decompress,
+    zip_compress,
+    zip_decompress,
+)
 from messagefoundry.parsing.groups import SegmentGroup
 from messagefoundry.parsing.message import Message, RawMessage
 from messagefoundry.parsing.split import split_by_obr
@@ -98,7 +107,7 @@ from messagefoundry.timezone import (
     to_zone,
 )
 
-__version__ = "0.3.0"
+__version__ = "0.3.1"
 
 __all__ = [
     "Message",
@@ -183,5 +192,13 @@ __all__ = [
     "hl7_now",
     "age_from_dob",
     "length_of_stay",
+    # Compression codec (ADR 0123) — pure gzip/zlib-deflate/zip for on-demand Handler use.
+    "CompressionError",
+    "gzip_compress",
+    "gzip_decompress",
+    "deflate_compress",
+    "deflate_decompress",
+    "zip_compress",
+    "zip_decompress",
     "__version__",
 ]