mcpscan-cli 0.22.0__tar.gz → 0.23.0__tar.gz

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (66) hide show
  1. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/PKG-INFO +1 -1
  2. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/__init__.py +1 -1
  3. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/path_traversal.py +71 -19
  4. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan_cli.egg-info/PKG-INFO +1 -1
  5. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/pyproject.toml +1 -1
  6. mcpscan_cli-0.23.0/tests/test_rule_mcp007.py +194 -0
  7. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_scanner.py +1 -1
  8. mcpscan_cli-0.22.0/tests/test_rule_mcp007.py +0 -107
  9. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/LICENSE +0 -0
  10. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/README.md +0 -0
  11. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/__main__.py +0 -0
  12. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/cli.py +0 -0
  13. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/discover.py +0 -0
  14. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/drift.py +0 -0
  15. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/findings.py +0 -0
  16. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/fixer.py +0 -0
  17. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/loaders.py +0 -0
  18. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/mcp_server.py +0 -0
  19. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/owasp.py +0 -0
  20. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/report.py +0 -0
  21. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/__init__.py +0 -0
  22. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/auth_gaps.py +0 -0
  23. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/base.py +0 -0
  24. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/command_injection.py +0 -0
  25. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/debug_endpoint.py +0 -0
  26. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/dom_trust.py +0 -0
  27. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/hooks.py +0 -0
  28. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/insecure_deser.py +0 -0
  29. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/insecure_transport.py +0 -0
  30. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/origin_check.py +0 -0
  31. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/permissions.py +0 -0
  32. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/policy_override.py +0 -0
  33. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/sdk_versions.py +0 -0
  34. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/secrets.py +0 -0
  35. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/server_auth.py +0 -0
  36. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/ssrf.py +0 -0
  37. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/tool_annotations.py +0 -0
  38. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/tool_poisoning.py +0 -0
  39. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/webfetch_domain.py +0 -0
  40. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/rules/workflow_injection.py +0 -0
  41. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/runtime/__init__.py +0 -0
  42. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/runtime/guard.py +0 -0
  43. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/runtime/provenance.py +0 -0
  44. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/runtime/rugpull.py +0 -0
  45. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/runtime/sanitizer.py +0 -0
  46. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/scanner.py +0 -0
  47. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan/suppress.py +0 -0
  48. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan_cli.egg-info/SOURCES.txt +0 -0
  49. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan_cli.egg-info/dependency_links.txt +0 -0
  50. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan_cli.egg-info/entry_points.txt +0 -0
  51. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/mcpscan_cli.egg-info/top_level.txt +0 -0
  52. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/setup.cfg +0 -0
  53. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_debug_endpoint.py +0 -0
  54. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_discover.py +0 -0
  55. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_dom_trust.py +0 -0
  56. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_drift.py +0 -0
  57. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_mcp_server.py +0 -0
  58. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_origin_check.py +0 -0
  59. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_rule_mcp001.py +0 -0
  60. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_rule_mcp015.py +0 -0
  61. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_runtime_guard.py +0 -0
  62. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_runtime_provenance.py +0 -0
  63. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_runtime_rugpull.py +0 -0
  64. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_runtime_sanitizer.py +0 -0
  65. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_server_auth.py +0 -0
  66. {mcpscan_cli-0.22.0 → mcpscan_cli-0.23.0}/tests/test_workflow_injection.py +0 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: mcpscan-cli
3
- Version: 0.22.0
3
+ Version: 0.23.0
4
4
  Summary: Supply-chain security scanner for MCP servers and Claude Code projects — catch tool-poisoning, command injection and risky permissions before you install.
5
5
  Author: Kiell Tampubolon
6
6
  License: MIT
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
1
1
  """mcpscan — supply-chain security scanner for MCP servers and Claude Code projects."""
2
2
 
3
- __version__ = "0.22.0"
3
+ __version__ = "0.23.0"
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
9
9
 
10
10
  import ast
11
11
  import re
12
- from typing import List
12
+ from typing import List, Tuple
13
13
 
14
14
  from ..findings import Finding, Severity
15
15
  from ..loaders import FileInfo, by_kind
@@ -30,21 +30,39 @@ TRAVERSAL = re.compile(r"\.\./|\.\.\\")
30
30
  BOUNDARY_CALL = re.compile(r"\w*(?:safe_path|validate_path)\w*\s*\(")
31
31
  RESOLVE = re.compile(r"\b(?:realpath|resolve)\s*\(")
32
32
  PREFIX_CHECK = re.compile(r"\b(?:startswith|is_relative_to|commonpath)\s*\(")
33
+ # Parameters that never carry caller input (pytest fixtures included).
34
+ NOT_CALLER_INPUT = {"self", "cls", "tmp_path", "tmpdir"}
33
35
  TWO_PATH_SINKS = {("shutil", "copy"), ("shutil", "copy2"), ("shutil", "copyfile"),
34
36
  ("shutil", "move"), ("os", "rename"), ("os", "replace")}
35
37
 
36
38
 
37
39
  def _derived(value: ast.AST, tainted: set) -> bool:
38
- """`p`, `Path(p)` or `os.path.abspath(p)` where p is tainted."""
40
+ """`p`, `p[k]`, `p.get(k)`, `base / p`, or Path/abspath/str/os.path.join over p, where p is tainted."""
39
41
  if isinstance(value, ast.Name):
40
42
  return value.id in tainted
41
- if isinstance(value, ast.Call) and len(value.args) == 1:
43
+ if isinstance(value, ast.Subscript):
44
+ return _derived(value.value, tainted)
45
+ if isinstance(value, ast.BinOp) and isinstance(value.op, ast.Div):
46
+ return _derived(value.left, tainted) or _derived(value.right, tainted)
47
+ if isinstance(value, ast.Call):
42
48
  fn = value.func
49
+ if isinstance(fn, ast.Attribute) and fn.attr == "get":
50
+ return _derived(fn.value, tainted)
43
51
  name = fn.id if isinstance(fn, ast.Name) else fn.attr if isinstance(fn, ast.Attribute) else ""
44
- return name in ("Path", "abspath") and _derived(value.args[0], tainted)
52
+ return name in ("Path", "abspath", "str", "join") \
53
+ and any(_derived(a, tainted) for a in value.args)
45
54
  return False
46
55
 
47
56
 
57
+ def _is_join(value: ast.AST) -> bool:
58
+ """`os.path.join(...)` or `base / name`: a path built onto a base directory."""
59
+ if isinstance(value, ast.BinOp):
60
+ return isinstance(value.op, ast.Div)
61
+ return isinstance(value, ast.Call) and isinstance(value.func, ast.Attribute) \
62
+ and value.func.attr == "join" and isinstance(value.func.value, ast.Attribute) \
63
+ and value.func.value.attr == "path"
64
+
65
+
48
66
  def _write_targets(call: ast.Call) -> List[ast.AST]:
49
67
  """Path arguments of a filesystem write sink, or [] if `call` is not one."""
50
68
  fn = call.func
@@ -64,13 +82,24 @@ def _write_targets(call: ast.Call) -> List[ast.AST]:
64
82
  return []
65
83
 
66
84
 
67
- def _param_write_lines(text: str) -> List[int]:
68
- """Lines where a function writes to one of its own parameters with no base-dir check."""
85
+ def _save_targets(call: ast.Call) -> List[ast.AST]:
86
+ """openpyxl/PIL-style `wb.save(path)`. One positional arg skips torch/np.save(obj, path).
87
+ Only a path joined in the same function counts: a helper handed a finished path
88
+ (`wb.save(filepath)`) is checked where that path is built."""
89
+ fn = call.func
90
+ if isinstance(fn, ast.Attribute) and fn.attr == "save" and len(call.args) == 1:
91
+ return [call.args[0]]
92
+ return []
93
+
94
+
95
+ def _param_write_lines(text: str) -> List[Tuple[int, bool]]:
96
+ """(line, is_builder) where a function writes to, or returns a path joined from, one of its
97
+ own parameters (or `arguments.get(...)`/`arguments[...]` of one) with no base-dir check."""
69
98
  try:
70
99
  tree = ast.parse(text)
71
100
  except (SyntaxError, ValueError):
72
101
  return []
73
- hits = set()
102
+ hits = {}
74
103
  for fn in ast.walk(tree):
75
104
  if not isinstance(fn, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)):
76
105
  continue
@@ -78,18 +107,29 @@ def _param_write_lines(text: str) -> List[int]:
78
107
  if BOUNDARY_CALL.search(src) or (RESOLVE.search(src) and PREFIX_CHECK.search(src)):
79
108
  continue
80
109
  a = fn.args
81
- tainted = {p.arg for p in a.posonlyargs + a.args + a.kwonlyargs} - {"self", "cls"}
82
- assigns = sorted((n for n in ast.walk(fn) if isinstance(n, ast.Assign)),
83
- key=lambda n: n.lineno)
84
- for n in assigns:
85
- if len(n.targets) == 1 and isinstance(n.targets[0], ast.Name) \
86
- and _derived(n.value, tainted):
87
- tainted.add(n.targets[0].id)
110
+ tainted = {p.arg for p in a.posonlyargs + a.args + a.kwonlyargs} - NOT_CALLER_INPUT
111
+ joined = set() # tainted names built with os.path.join or `/`
112
+ steps = sorted((n for n in ast.walk(fn) if isinstance(n, (ast.Assign, ast.For))),
113
+ key=lambda n: n.lineno)
114
+ for n in steps:
115
+ if isinstance(n, ast.For): # `for item in tainted_list` taints item
116
+ target, value = n.target, n.iter
117
+ else:
118
+ target, value = (n.targets[0] if len(n.targets) == 1 else None), n.value
119
+ if isinstance(target, ast.Name) and _derived(value, tainted):
120
+ tainted.add(target.id)
121
+ if _is_join(value) or _derived(value, joined):
122
+ joined.add(target.id)
88
123
  for n in ast.walk(fn):
89
- if isinstance(n, ast.Call) and any(
90
- isinstance(t, ast.Name) and t.id in tainted for t in _write_targets(n)):
91
- hits.add(n.lineno)
92
- return sorted(hits)
124
+ if isinstance(n, ast.Call) and (
125
+ any(_derived(t, tainted) for t in _write_targets(n))
126
+ or any(_derived(t, joined) or (_is_join(t) and _derived(t, tainted))
127
+ for t in _save_targets(n))):
128
+ hits[n.lineno] = False
129
+ elif isinstance(n, ast.Return) and n.value is not None and _is_join(n.value) \
130
+ and _derived(n.value, tainted):
131
+ hits.setdefault(n.lineno, True)
132
+ return sorted(hits.items())
93
133
 
94
134
 
95
135
  @register
@@ -121,9 +161,21 @@ class PathTraversal(Rule):
121
161
  ))
122
162
  if is_py:
123
163
  seen = {x.line for x in out if x.path == f.relpath}
124
- for i in _param_write_lines(f.text):
164
+ for i, builder in _param_write_lines(f.text):
125
165
  if i in seen:
126
166
  continue
167
+ if builder:
168
+ out.append(self.finding(
169
+ f, i, f.lines[i - 1],
170
+ title="Path helper joins a caller-controlled name onto a base "
171
+ "directory with no containment check",
172
+ detail="os.path.join/`/` keep an absolute name and `../` walks out of "
173
+ "the base. Resolve the result and confirm it stays inside the "
174
+ "base (realpath + commonpath, or resolve() + is_relative_to) "
175
+ "before returning it (CVE-2026-40576 shape).",
176
+ severity=Severity.MEDIUM,
177
+ ))
178
+ continue
127
179
  out.append(self.finding(
128
180
  f, i, f.lines[i - 1],
129
181
  title="Write to a caller-controlled path with no base-directory check",
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  Metadata-Version: 2.4
2
2
  Name: mcpscan-cli
3
- Version: 0.22.0
3
+ Version: 0.23.0
4
4
  Summary: Supply-chain security scanner for MCP servers and Claude Code projects — catch tool-poisoning, command injection and risky permissions before you install.
5
5
  Author: Kiell Tampubolon
6
6
  License: MIT
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
4
4
 
5
5
  [project]
6
6
  name = "mcpscan-cli"
7
- version = "0.22.0"
7
+ version = "0.23.0"
8
8
  description = "Supply-chain security scanner for MCP servers and Claude Code projects — catch tool-poisoning, command injection and risky permissions before you install."
9
9
  readme = "README.md"
10
10
  requires-python = ">=3.9"
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
1
+ """Tests for MCP007 (path traversal), mcpscan/rules/path_traversal.py.
2
+
3
+ Regression coverage for CVE-2026-27825 (sooperset/mcp-atlassian <= 0.16.0):
4
+ download_attachment(url, target_path) wrote to `target_path`, a bare tool
5
+ parameter, with no base-directory check. The line-based check missed it because
6
+ nothing on the `open(...)` line was interpolated. v0.17.0 fixed it with
7
+ validate_safe_path(). Also covers a false positive from the same repo: browser
8
+ `window.open(` inside a Python HTML string.
9
+ """
10
+
11
+ import unittest
12
+
13
+ from mcpscan.findings import Severity
14
+ from mcpscan.loaders import FileInfo
15
+ from mcpscan.rules.path_traversal import PathTraversal
16
+
17
+ VULNERABLE = '''
18
+ import os
19
+
20
+ def download_attachment(self, url, target_path):
21
+ if not os.path.isabs(target_path):
22
+ target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)
23
+ with open(target_path, "wb") as f:
24
+ f.write(b"x")
25
+ '''
26
+
27
+ FIXED = '''
28
+ import os
29
+ from .io import validate_safe_path
30
+
31
+ def download_attachment(self, url, target_path):
32
+ if not os.path.isabs(target_path):
33
+ target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)
34
+ validate_safe_path(target_path)
35
+ with open(target_path, "wb") as f:
36
+ f.write(b"x")
37
+ '''
38
+
39
+
40
+ def _file(text, relpath="server.py"):
41
+ return FileInfo(
42
+ relpath=relpath, abspath=relpath, text=text, kind="source", in_dot_claude=False
43
+ )
44
+
45
+
46
+ def _check(text):
47
+ return PathTraversal().check([_file(text)])
48
+
49
+
50
+ class TestParamWriteSink(unittest.TestCase):
51
+ def test_cve_2026_27825_shape_is_flagged(self):
52
+ findings = _check(VULNERABLE)
53
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [7])
54
+ self.assertEqual(findings[0].severity, Severity.HIGH)
55
+
56
+ def test_validate_safe_path_fix_is_clean(self):
57
+ self.assertEqual(_check(FIXED), [])
58
+
59
+ def test_resolve_plus_prefix_check_is_clean(self):
60
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
61
+ "from pathlib import Path\n"
62
+ "def save(p, data):\n"
63
+ " q = Path(p).resolve()\n"
64
+ " if not q.is_relative_to(BASE):\n"
65
+ " raise ValueError(p)\n"
66
+ " q.write_bytes(data)\n"
67
+ ), [])
68
+
69
+ def test_path_derived_write_text_and_shutil_are_flagged(self):
70
+ findings = _check(
71
+ "import shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n"
72
+ "def save(dest, src):\n"
73
+ " out = Path(dest)\n"
74
+ " out.write_text('x')\n"
75
+ " shutil.copy(src, dest)\n"
76
+ )
77
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [5, 6])
78
+
79
+ def test_read_mode_and_mkdir_are_not_write_sinks(self):
80
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
81
+ "from pathlib import Path\n"
82
+ "def load(p):\n"
83
+ " Path(p).mkdir(parents=True)\n"
84
+ " return open(p, 'rb').read()\n"
85
+ ), [])
86
+
87
+ def test_non_parameter_path_is_not_flagged(self):
88
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
89
+ "def save(data):\n"
90
+ " with open('out.json', 'w') as f:\n"
91
+ " f.write(data)\n"
92
+ ), [])
93
+
94
+
95
+ class TestJoinedAndArgumentPaths(unittest.TestCase):
96
+ """CVE-2026-44336 (PraisonAI rules_create), CVE-2026-84201 (appium-mcp-server write_file /
97
+ write_files_batch), CVE-2026-40576 (excel-mcp-server get_excel_path)."""
98
+
99
+ def test_join_then_open_write_is_flagged(self):
100
+ findings = _check(
101
+ "import os\n"
102
+ "def rules_create(rule_name, content):\n"
103
+ " rule_path = os.path.join(RULES_DIR, rule_name)\n"
104
+ " with open(rule_path, 'w') as f:\n"
105
+ " f.write(content)\n"
106
+ )
107
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [4])
108
+ self.assertEqual(findings[0].severity, Severity.HIGH)
109
+
110
+ def test_join_with_commonpath_check_is_clean(self):
111
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
112
+ "import os\n"
113
+ "def rules_create(rule_name, content):\n"
114
+ " rule_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(RULES_DIR, rule_name))\n"
115
+ " if os.path.commonpath([RULES_DIR, rule_path]) != RULES_DIR:\n"
116
+ " raise ValueError(rule_name)\n"
117
+ " with open(rule_path, 'w') as f:\n"
118
+ " f.write(content)\n"
119
+ ), [])
120
+
121
+ def test_arguments_get_and_batch_loop_are_flagged(self):
122
+ findings = _check(
123
+ "async def handle_call_tool(name, arguments):\n"
124
+ " path = arguments.get('path')\n"
125
+ " target = PROJECT_ROOT / path\n"
126
+ " with open(target, 'w') as f:\n"
127
+ " f.write(arguments['content'])\n"
128
+ "async def write_batch(arguments):\n"
129
+ " for file in arguments.get('files', []):\n"
130
+ " (PROJECT_ROOT / file['path']).write_text(file['content'])\n"
131
+ )
132
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [4, 8])
133
+
134
+ def test_arguments_get_with_resolve_check_is_clean(self):
135
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
136
+ "async def handle_call_tool(name, arguments):\n"
137
+ " target = (PROJECT_ROOT / arguments['path']).resolve()\n"
138
+ " if not target.is_relative_to(PROJECT_ROOT):\n"
139
+ " raise ValueError('outside project')\n"
140
+ " target.write_text(arguments['content'])\n"
141
+ ), [])
142
+
143
+ def test_path_builder_helper_is_flagged(self):
144
+ findings = _check(
145
+ "import os\n"
146
+ "def get_excel_path(filename):\n"
147
+ " if os.path.isabs(filename):\n"
148
+ " return filename\n"
149
+ " return os.path.join(EXCEL_FILES_PATH, filename)\n"
150
+ )
151
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [5])
152
+ self.assertEqual(findings[0].severity, Severity.MEDIUM)
153
+
154
+ def test_path_builder_with_containment_check_is_clean(self):
155
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
156
+ "import os\n"
157
+ "def get_excel_path(filename):\n"
158
+ " base = os.path.realpath(EXCEL_FILES_PATH)\n"
159
+ " p = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base, filename))\n"
160
+ " if os.path.commonpath([base, p]) != base:\n"
161
+ " raise ValueError(filename)\n"
162
+ " return p\n"
163
+ ), [])
164
+
165
+ def test_save_of_joined_path_is_flagged_but_not_a_handed_in_path(self):
166
+ findings = _check(
167
+ "import os\n"
168
+ "def export(wb, name):\n"
169
+ " wb.save(os.path.join(OUT_DIR, name))\n"
170
+ "def write_data(filepath, wb):\n"
171
+ " wb.save(filepath)\n"
172
+ )
173
+ self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [3])
174
+
175
+ def test_pytest_tmp_path_is_not_caller_input(self):
176
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
177
+ "def test_upload(tmp_path):\n"
178
+ " (tmp_path / 'a.txt').write_text('x')\n"
179
+ ), [])
180
+
181
+
182
+ class TestWindowOpenFalsePositive(unittest.TestCase):
183
+ def test_js_window_open_in_python_string_is_not_flagged(self):
184
+ self.assertEqual(_check(
185
+ 'html = f"""<script>window.open(\'\', \'_self\').close(); {status}</script>"""\n'
186
+ ), [])
187
+
188
+ def test_interpolated_open_is_still_flagged(self):
189
+ findings = _check('open("data/" + name).read()\n') # mcpscan: ignore[MCP007]
190
+ self.assertEqual(len(findings), 1)
191
+
192
+
193
+ if __name__ == "__main__":
194
+ unittest.main()
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ class TestFixer(unittest.TestCase):
392
392
  # readable/writable after this helper returns (see apply_fixes tests).
393
393
  tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
394
394
  abspath = os.path.join(tmp, relpath)
395
- with open(abspath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
395
+ with open(abspath, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh: # mcpscan: ignore[MCP007]
396
396
  fh.write(text)
397
397
  f = FileInfo(relpath=relpath, abspath=abspath, text=text,
398
398
  kind="source", in_dot_claude=False)
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
1
- """Tests for MCP007 (path traversal), mcpscan/rules/path_traversal.py.
2
-
3
- Regression coverage for CVE-2026-27825 (sooperset/mcp-atlassian <= 0.16.0):
4
- download_attachment(url, target_path) wrote to `target_path`, a bare tool
5
- parameter, with no base-directory check. The line-based check missed it because
6
- nothing on the `open(...)` line was interpolated. v0.17.0 fixed it with
7
- validate_safe_path(). Also covers a false positive from the same repo: browser
8
- `window.open(` inside a Python HTML string.
9
- """
10
-
11
- import unittest
12
-
13
- from mcpscan.findings import Severity
14
- from mcpscan.loaders import FileInfo
15
- from mcpscan.rules.path_traversal import PathTraversal
16
-
17
- VULNERABLE = '''
18
- import os
19
-
20
- def download_attachment(self, url, target_path):
21
- if not os.path.isabs(target_path):
22
- target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)
23
- with open(target_path, "wb") as f:
24
- f.write(b"x")
25
- '''
26
-
27
- FIXED = '''
28
- import os
29
- from .io import validate_safe_path
30
-
31
- def download_attachment(self, url, target_path):
32
- if not os.path.isabs(target_path):
33
- target_path = os.path.abspath(target_path)
34
- validate_safe_path(target_path)
35
- with open(target_path, "wb") as f:
36
- f.write(b"x")
37
- '''
38
-
39
-
40
- def _file(text, relpath="server.py"):
41
- return FileInfo(
42
- relpath=relpath, abspath=relpath, text=text, kind="source", in_dot_claude=False
43
- )
44
-
45
-
46
- def _check(text):
47
- return PathTraversal().check([_file(text)])
48
-
49
-
50
- class TestParamWriteSink(unittest.TestCase):
51
- def test_cve_2026_27825_shape_is_flagged(self):
52
- findings = _check(VULNERABLE)
53
- self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [7])
54
- self.assertEqual(findings[0].severity, Severity.HIGH)
55
-
56
- def test_validate_safe_path_fix_is_clean(self):
57
- self.assertEqual(_check(FIXED), [])
58
-
59
- def test_resolve_plus_prefix_check_is_clean(self):
60
- self.assertEqual(_check(
61
- "from pathlib import Path\n"
62
- "def save(p, data):\n"
63
- " q = Path(p).resolve()\n"
64
- " if not q.is_relative_to(BASE):\n"
65
- " raise ValueError(p)\n"
66
- " q.write_bytes(data)\n"
67
- ), [])
68
-
69
- def test_path_derived_write_text_and_shutil_are_flagged(self):
70
- findings = _check(
71
- "import shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n"
72
- "def save(dest, src):\n"
73
- " out = Path(dest)\n"
74
- " out.write_text('x')\n"
75
- " shutil.copy(src, dest)\n"
76
- )
77
- self.assertEqual([f.line for f in findings], [5, 6])
78
-
79
- def test_read_mode_and_mkdir_are_not_write_sinks(self):
80
- self.assertEqual(_check(
81
- "from pathlib import Path\n"
82
- "def load(p):\n"
83
- " Path(p).mkdir(parents=True)\n"
84
- " return open(p, 'rb').read()\n"
85
- ), [])
86
-
87
- def test_non_parameter_path_is_not_flagged(self):
88
- self.assertEqual(_check(
89
- "def save(data):\n"
90
- " with open('out.json', 'w') as f:\n"
91
- " f.write(data)\n"
92
- ), [])
93
-
94
-
95
- class TestWindowOpenFalsePositive(unittest.TestCase):
96
- def test_js_window_open_in_python_string_is_not_flagged(self):
97
- self.assertEqual(_check(
98
- 'html = f"""<script>window.open(\'\', \'_self\').close(); {status}</script>"""\n'
99
- ), [])
100
-
101
- def test_interpolated_open_is_still_flagged(self):
102
- findings = _check('open("data/" + name).read()\n') # mcpscan: ignore[MCP007]
103
- self.assertEqual(len(findings), 1)
104
-
105
-
106
- if __name__ == "__main__":
107
- unittest.main()
File without changes
File without changes
File without changes